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A HISTORY OF
RUSSIA

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AMASA STONE MATHER
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A HISTORY OF *Russia*

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
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THE
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THE present volume is the tenth work published by the Yale University Press on the Amasa Stone Mather Memorial Publication Fund. This Foundation was established August 25, 1922, by a gift to Yale University from Samuel Mather, Esq., of Cleveland, Ohio, in pursuance of a pledge made in June, 1922, on the fifteenth anniversary of the graduation of his son, Amasa Stone Mather, who was born in Cleveland on August 20, 1884, and was graduated from Yale College in the Class of 1907. Subsequently, after traveling abroad, he returned to Cleveland, where he soon won a recognized position in the business life of the city and where he actively interested himself also in the work of many organizations devoted to the betterment of the community and to the welfare of the nation. His death from pneumonia on February 9, 1920, was undoubtedly hastened by his characteristic unwillingness ever to spare himself, even when ill, in the discharge of his duties or in his efforts to protect and further the interests committed to his care by his associates.

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PREFACE

THERE is no lack of shorter or longer summaries of Russian history in English. Though not a specialist in the field, I have read some of them and have seen most of them. The best are translations from the Russian, partly of the best modern classical works on the subject; some of them are very useful for advanced students of Russian history. However, they are written for Russian students and Russian readers and therefore cannot fully satisfy the requirements of those Americans who are interested in Russia and her history. Besides, some of them—especially the most modern—are more or less veiled propaganda, mostly for justification of the Bolshevik experiment in Russia. Since interest in Russia and her history is slowly but steadily growing in America the need of a good, up-to-date, unbiased presentation of the evolution of Russia from the political, social, economic, religious, and cultural point of view, for an American reader and student, was and is bitterly felt.

I have read carefully the book of Professor G. Vernadsky and I must confess that in reading it I felt that to a large extent it will fill the gap of which I have spoken. Mr. Vernadsky is one of the best students of Russian history of the younger generation. He knows the sources and knows how to use them. He has read extensively and his bibliography at the end of the book is full and up to date. Being now associated with one of the leading American universities and having enjoyed the help of competent advisers, he has endeavored—and as far as I can see with full success—to answer all the questions in Russian history which have a special interest for the American reader.

His presentation is full of facts but not overburdened with them, not a mere repertory of them. He has carefully grouped and

coördinated the facts and has given to them an explanation which is often convincing and always stimulating. Moreover, for the first time he has tried to include the last eventful trials in the general evolution of the Russian people and to show the links which connect the Russian revolution with the past. And he has done it in an unbiased scientific spirit. In his presentation the activity of the Bolsheviks appears in a new light, as a link in the long chain of tribulations and sufferings of the Russian people.

The chief originality of the book consists, however, in a new and promising approach to the main problems of Russian history, which he shares with some other talented scholars of the younger generation. His point of view may be called shortly Eurasian, which does not imply, however, that politically he belongs to the creed known generally under the same name. As in other fields of historical research, a certain *Vulgata* has been gradually formed in the presentation of the facts regarding Russian history. The leading Russian historians have endeavored—and with fair success—to show that the evolution of Russia was, in the main, similar to that of the other European nations. The so-called “Europeanizing” of Russia was a natural process, similar to the gradual evolution of other European nations, but somewhat belated and made more complicated by the peculiarities of Russian experience.

True as it is, this point of view is apt to overemphasize the similarities and to underestimate the differences. Most of the prominent Russian scholars disregard an outstanding fact in Russian history; viz., that geographically and from the cultural point of view, Russia—closely connected as it is with Central Europe—is still more closely connected with a large portion of Asia and with its peculiar cultural development. We must not forget that for centuries of her early history Russia formed a constituent part of large and powerful Asiatic—Iranian and Mongolian—empires, that Russia emerged as one of the European states after a long and close cohabitation with Mongolian tribes and after a long and

difficult struggle against them, and that Russia still occupies territorially a large part of Asia. No doubt Russia has succeeded in partly absorbing, partly Europeanizing many Asiatic tribes. However, the question arises, how large was the contribution of these tribes to the peculiar development of Russia? It is a pity that we know so little of the historical development of the Central Asiatic peoples and that we still wait for a real investigation of Chinese history based on a critical study of all the material available. There is no reason, however, to discard and disregard the little that we know. I regard the endeavor of Mr. Vernadsky to take into account in writing the history of the Russian people their oriental affinities as a good and successful start on a path which might lead to more and important and lasting results.

M. I. ROSTOVITZEFF

New Haven, Connecticut.

February, 1929.

PREFACE

THE present volume is my first book addressed to American and English readers. It is a survey not only of political and military events in Russia throughout the centuries but also of the main currents in the development of Russian culture, both material and spiritual.

The book is not a translation of my Russian *Outline* published two years ago in Prague, but is written on entirely new lines with more attention to recent events. No new data available after January 1, 1929, could be taken into consideration in the preparation of this volume. I have tried to be completely impartial in my treatment of current political events as well as events of the more distant past.

I wrote the manuscript originally in Russian, except the last chapter which was written in English. My Russian manuscript was translated by George A. Nebolsine, M.A.

Messrs. Sterling H. Tracy, Michael M. Karpovich, and Malcolm W. Davis were kind enough to revise the English style of the whole book. I am further indebted to Mr. Karpovich for valuable advice regarding the contents.

Mr. Davis, both personally and in his capacity as editor of the Yale University Press, greatly helped me and encouraged me in my work.

To my wife I am indebted for the sections dealing with the history of Russian music.

G. V.

New Haven, Connecticut.

February, 1929.

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A HISTORY OF RUSSIA

INTRODUCTION

I.

THE vast number of the Russian people and the great area of the earth's surface which they occupy, have made Russia an important force in world history. The major part of the Russian race, which numbers about 125 million, inhabits the territories of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, comprising four-fifths of its total population, estimated on January 1, 1928, to be 149,900,000.

One thousand years ago the Russian people numbered but a few millions. The area they occupied was but a small part of the territories included in the Union, whose area is 8,187,253 square miles according to the most recent figures, or about two and two-thirds times the area of the United States.

The most striking fact in Russian history is the extraordinary growth of this people and their expansion over so enormous a territory.

2.

THE Russian people form a part of the Slavonic family which includes among others the Czechs, Poles, Serbs, and Bulgarians. The Slavonic family belongs to the Indo-German group of peoples. The Slavonic languages have features in common with Baltic (Lithuanian), German, Greek, Iranian, and other Aryan tongues.

The Slavonic family is divided into three parts: the western, comprising the Czechs and Poles; the southern, comprising the Balkan Slavs; and the eastern, comprising the Russian Slavs. There was a certain admixture of alien blood. In the ninth century A.D., the Normans descended from Scandinavia and seized control over the eastern Slavs. The Varangians, as the Norman invaders were known, were comparatively few in number, certainly not over 100,000, and were rapidly absorbed by the Slavs. Both before and after the ninth century the eastern Slavs mixed with peoples of the Ural-Altai family: Mongols, Turks, and Finns. The proportion of admixture of Ural-Altai blood in the eastern Slavs cannot be esti-

mated accurately. In any case, it was not sufficiently large to change completely the racial characteristics of the eastern Slavs. The Russian people, therefore, are basically a Slavonic race, divided at the present time into three branches: the Great Russians, comprising about 65 per cent; the Ukrainians or Little Russians, more than 25 per cent; and the White Russians, less than 10 per cent. This subdivision took place at an early time. Its beginning may be traced to the thirteenth century. An important reason for its persistence was that from the fourteenth to the eighteenth century the Russian people were torn politically into two parts: the eastern, or the Moscow Kingdom; and the western, under the domination of the Poles and the Lithuanians. The culture of the western part of Russia, Little and White Russia, owes much to Polish influence, which likewise affected the language. Parts of Little and White Russia were annexed to the Moscow Kingdom in the middle of the seventeenth century and parts only were added at the end of the eighteenth century, the time of the partition of Poland. Thus, not until the nineteenth century were all three branches of the Russian people united again in one state. In the twentieth century, at the time of the revolution, the question of their partition again arose.¹

3.

THE outward manifestation of the subdivision of the Russian people into three branches is the difference in language. A distinction must be made, however, between folk dialects and the literary languages. From the point of view of dialect there is no Great Russian language, since the tongue itself is broken up into several popular dialects. So, also, there is no Ukrainian language, as the dialects of different parts of the Ukraine differ considerably. Thus, from the point of view of popular dialects, it is possible to speak of the three groups of language only with reservations.

Before the middle of the nineteenth century there was only one written Russian language, which was formed on the bases of the old church Slavonic and the Moscow dialect of the Great Russian language. But this language included also elements of Ukrainian origin.² The Russian literary language cannot thus be called the

¹ Parts of the Ukrainians and White Russians are now annexed by Poland.

² The reason for this was that at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning

Great Russian language, but is to a considerable degree an all-Russian literary language.

Nevertheless, among Ukrainian intellectuals a movement developed in the nineteenth century to create a Ukrainian literary language differing from the Russian. This Ukrainian language assumed definite form at the end of the nineteenth century. At the same time a similar desire was expressed among White Russian intellectuals, but the White Russian literary language began to be shaped only at the time of the Russian revolution and cannot yet be regarded as having acquired a final character.

The dialects of the Great Russians, the Ukrainians, and the White Russians are not separated one from the other by impenetrable partitions, but tend to merge by gradual stages. However, the literary languages of Russia, the Ukraine, and White Russia vary from each other considerably. The differences are partly artificial, as seen in the creation of scientific terms and technical modes of expression in Ukrainian and White Russian. New terms were frequently invented or borrowed from foreign languages for the sole purpose of having them distinct from the Russian.

It is not yet clear whether the Ukrainian and White Russian peoples will use their languages as the sole vehicle for literary expression, or whether they will prefer in the future to use the Russian literary language as they have done in the past.³ The divergencies in language are not directly due to political differences, nor would political unification of the Russian people necessarily mean identity of language in all parts of Russia.

4.

In the beginning of the twentieth century the geographical distribution of the Russian people corresponded almost exactly with the boundaries of the Russian Empire. Only an insignificant part of the Russian people remained outside these boundaries, in Galicia and Bukovina, then included in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and now in Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. Following the downfall of the Russian Empire, the greater part of

of the eighteenth century, Ukrainians played an important part in the Russian Church and State. See Chap. V, Sec. 8.

³ The Ukrainian language is now officially adopted in the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, as is the White Russian language in the White Russian Socialist Soviet Republic, both these republics forming part of the Soviet Union.

the Russian people remained within the boundaries of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, but a considerable number were annexed after the war by Poland, Rumania, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland.


The geographical limits of the expansion of the Russian people are extremely wide. They exceed greatly what is known as "European Russia." This conception of European Russia is an artificial creation of German and Russian historical and geographical science of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. At no time in history did the conception of European Russia correspond to the actual distribution of the Russian people. "Russia," in the sense of the territories occupied by the Russian people, never coincided with the limits of "European Russia," which has no natural boundary in the east. The geographical character of "European" and "Asiatic" Russia is the same. On both sides of the Ural Range there are the same zones of tundra, forest, and steppe. The Ural Range, far from separating, brings together by its orographic and geological peculiarities, eastern and western Russia. There are no "natural boundaries" between "European" and "Asiatic" Russia. Therefore, Russia is not composed of two parts, European and Asiatic. There is only one Russia, "Eurasian" Russia, or Eurasia.⁴

All the vast stretches of Eurasia were occupied by the Russian people in the course of a long historical process. In the first centuries of its history, the seventh to the ninth century, A.D., the Russian people occupied only the extreme western corner of Eurasia and the Black Sea. From this corner of Eurasia the Russian people moved eastward against the sun. In the middle of the seventeenth century the flow of Russian colonization reached the Pacific Ocean, and in the middle of the nineteenth century reached Tien Shan in central Asia. In this movement the Russian people demonstrated extraordinary persistence and determination.⁵

The fundamental urge that directed the Russian people eastward lies deep in history. It was not "imperialism," nor was it the consequence of the petty political ambitions of Russian statesmen.

⁴ By Eurasia I do not mean a combination of Europe and Asia but the middle of the continent as a special geographic and historic area. This area must be distinguished both from Europe and from Asia.

⁵ No less remarkable is the persistence with which the Russian people from the tenth to the twentieth century held their western frontier, the Carpathian Mountains, against the ferocious attacks of their western neighbors.



THE NATURAL ZONES OF EURASIA

The distribution of the natural zones (vegetation and soil) is represented in the chart above according to conditions prevailing in the early period of Russian history. The principal towns and the network of the most important railroad system are traced in accordance with the present conditions.

It was the inevitable logic of geography which lies at the basis of history.

The history of the Russian people is the history of their gradual extension over Eurasia. The geographic area, Eurasia, may be characterized as a series of great plains, the White Sea-Caucasian, Western Siberian, and Turkestan. From a botanical standpoint the whole area of Eurasia may be divided into long latitudinal strips. The principal divisions are as follows: (a) the tundra of the north which stretches along the whole shore of the Arctic Ocean, an un-forested and untillable zone; (b) the forest zone, the southern boundary of which extends from the southern Carpathians approximately along the line of Kiev-Kazan-Tiumen, and from there to the Altai Mountains and along the northern boundary of the Mongolian steppes and deserts; (c) the steppe zone to the south of the forest zone, composed of the black earth and the chestnut soil belts; (d) the desert zone, Aral-Caspian and Mongolian. Like the northern belt of tundra, the desert zone is wider in the east, converging and disappearing in the west.

5.

THE geographical structure of Eurasia predetermined to a certain extent the historical development of the Russian people. Especially important was the contrast between the forest and steppe zones which was the geographic basis for two different forms of civilization. At the present time there is no sharply defined boundary between these two zones, particularly in "European" Russia. Agriculture is the chief industry in both. However, in earlier times the forest and steppe zones were sharply divided. The forest zone was the home of hunters and the steppe zone that of herdsmen. The forest zone presented greater possibilities for the formation of small states. The steppe zone, connected with the desert zone, was the home of huge states of nomadic culture.

The part played by nomads in history is often represented as purely negative, just as the cultural level of nomads is regarded as being invariably low. It is impossible to accept such a generalization. The cultural level of nomads is not absolute. It has changed with time and place; sometimes neighboring nomads were of different stages of culture. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the Mongolian tribes were at a lower level of political and

artistic development than in the thirteenth century. The rôle of nomadic peoples in the cultural history of Eurasia and of the ancient world was of great significance. The nomads were closely related to the settled population. The products of nomadic and settled people were complementary. The first group produced horses, cattle, hides, and wool; the second, grain and various products of home industry. The wealthy herdsmen and the leaders of the nomadic tribes were purchasers of artistic manufactures, precious cloths, gold and silver vessels, and the like. By trade and plunder they collected occasionally in their tents great riches. Frequently the nomadic chieftains engaged craftsmen to make utensils, weapons, and harness. At times, large workshops formed part of the tribal organization.

The empire of the nomads was in contact usually with more than one agricultural group, since the realm of the steppes frequently established connections between agricultural peoples great distances apart. In ancient times there were three regions of agricultural civilization: (a) in the southeast, in China; (b) in the south, in Khorezm; and (c) in the southwest, in the Mediterranean basin. These regions of agricultural civilization originally were connected one with the other, but the association was slight and each led a comparatively independent life.

Relations between these groups were established by the nomads who occupied the regions between China and Khorezm and the region between the Caspian and the Black Sea. The steppe in this respect may be compared with the sea. It exerted the same unifying influence on stable cultures of an agricultural character separated one from the other. In the steppe region, just as on the seas, arose great storms, periods of destructive raids, and the migration of nomadic tribes.

Before the beginning of our era, the unifying elements between the region of the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and Khorezm were the Scythians, while the same part was played between China and Khorezm by the Turks and Huns. In the fourth and fifth centuries the Huns under Attila attempted to become the intermediaries between the extreme west and east by displacing the Scythians. On an even more grandiose scale the same effort was repeated by the Mongols in the thirteenth century. The empire of Genghis Khan and his descendants stretched from the Pacific Ocean to the Adriatic Sea.

6.

THE Russian state absorbed the territories of Eurasia, as successor to the nomadic Turks and Mongols. From time immemorial the territory of Eurasia was the home of a single state, the center of which in early days was in the zone of the steppes. The rulers of the state were the Turko-Mongols, and the Russians were their subjects. Subsequently the Russians won dominance, the Turko-Mongols becoming their subjects; and the center of the state moved from the steppes to the forest zone.

The formation of a Russian state in Eurasia, based primarily on agricultural colonization, broke down the barrier which formerly separated the forest and steppe zones. The Russian people, prompted by economic necessity, greatly changed the natural character of primitive Eurasia. Agriculture penetrated into the forest regions and in the course of time cultivation spread over both steppe and forest lands, with the result that the north and the south of Russia became almost identical in appearance. Thus, identity was secured at the cost of destruction of much natural wealth—the cutting down of forests and the killing of fish and of fur-bearing animals. The Russian people united, however, not only in this destruction, but also in the later work of reconstruction. All over Eurasia there appeared new industries and trades; riches were drawn from under the earth; lines of communication were built. The Russian people succeeded in occupying and utilizing the territories of Eurasia because they had always held the intermediary position between the steppe and forest zones. The Russian people not only plowed, cut forests, and grazed cattle, but also carried on trade.

7.

FROM a geographical standpoint the Russian people were the successors of the Turko-Mongols. From the cultural standpoint they were the successors of Byzantium. The decisive event in the cultural development of Russia was the conversion of the people to Orthodox Christianity by Byzantium in the ninth and tenth centuries, at the very time when Byzantine culture reached its most brilliant expression.

Byzantium played the leading part then in the history of European culture. Consequently, in accepting the culture of Byzantium

Russia drew from the original source. Together with the church there penetrated into Russia all the principal elements of Byzantine civilization, literature, and art. The culture so transplanted was not accepted as a whole by the Russian people, but with many modifications. Acceptance of Greek Orthodoxy and culture, however, separated Russia from Europe culturally as a result of the succeeding breach between the Roman and Byzantine churches. This cultural separation of Russia from the west was also widened by the constant military pressure of western peoples—the Poles, the Germans, and the Swedes. It was only at the end of the seventeenth century that the necessity of acquiring western technical skill led to a cultural affinity between Russia and the west, which first took the character of plain imitation by order of the Government. The circumstances of the merging of Russia with the west created a dualism in the religious and national psychology of the people. This led to a long and difficult crisis in national psychology in the course of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries.

8.

THE origins of Russia's historic development, indicated above, explain the proposed division of Russian history into periods. Any such division of history must, of course, be merely schematic and arbitrary. It has value, however, if the basis of the division is not accidental but is founded upon significant events in the historic process. This treatment of Russian history has as its basis both material and spiritual events in the development of the Russian people.

At the basis of the division is the relation between the forest and the steppe zones. These terms are used not in a strict botanical sense but with reference to their sociological implications. On the eve of Russian history, prior to the tenth century, we observe efforts to unify the steppes and the forests in order that the regions might benefit by an exchange of natural wealth. These efforts, begun long before the appearance of the Russian people as an independent historical entity, were made both by the inhabitants of the forests and by the inhabitants of the steppes. They were continued after the emergence of the Russian people, first by the Khazars and later by the Varangian princes. The last great attempt to carry out this object was directed by Prince

Sviatoslav Igorevich, who tried to unite under his power the Dnieper, the lower Volga, and the lower Danube. The death of Sviatoslav (972) may be accepted as the end of the first period of Russian history. The end of this period was distinguished by the conversion of the Russians to Christianity.

From the end of the tenth century to the middle of the thirteenth century the relation between the forest and the steppe zones is broken. A bitter struggle between the Russian princes and the Cumans drove the Russian people to the forests and forced them to abandon the steppes to the invaders. This period may be characterized as that of the struggle between forest and steppe. In spite of the hardships of life during this period, the development of agriculture continued—retarded by the struggle but never quite stopped. The chronological limits of this period may be set as 972 and 1238, and it was marked by Russia's religious dependence upon Byzantium.

The Mongolian invasion put an end to the conflict between forest and steppe. It was in fact the victory of the steppe zone. The cessation of fighting led to the further growth of agriculture, now principally in the forest zone, and the subjection of Russia to the great Mongolian Khan and the "Golden Horde." This resulted in the formal unification of the Russian states. When the power of the Horde fell, Moscow was in a position to seize it. During this period western Russia, however, was separated from eastern Russia, and the west was annexed by Lithuania and Poland.

The chronological limits of the third period are from 1238 to 1452, the latter date marking the foundation of a vassal Tatar principedom in Kasimov, owing allegiance to Moscow; Moscow assumes the rôle of the government which succeeded the "Golden Horde." During this period the Russian church was freed from Byzantine dependence by the weakening of Byzantium and the strength of the Mongolian Khan, who gave his patronage to the Russian church. An important date for the Russian church was the Florentine union of 1439 when the official Byzantine church temporarily submitted to the Pope, while the Russian church remained independent. The fall of the Byzantine Empire and the capture of Constantinople in 1453 had the effect of making Russia appear in the eyes of the Russian people the leading Orthodox state in Christendom.

The fourth period, 1452 to 1696, was characterized by the Russian advance southeastward to the Turko-Mongol frontier and the victory of the forest zone over the steppes. The conquest of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Siberia was followed by the reoccupation, after many centuries, of the mouth of the Don. Azov was conquered in 1696 by Peter the Great. The chief events in the religious development of Russia were: the division of the Russian church into two metropolitan districts, Moscow and western Russia; the development of the patriarchate in the Moscow Kingdom; and the defense of Orthodoxy against Roman Catholic pressure from western Russia; and the schism of the "Old Ritualists" in Moscow.

The fifth period from 1696 to 1917 was one of expansion of the Russian state almost to the natural boundaries of Eurasia and unification of forest and steppe into one economic whole. Agriculture became dominant over the whole of Eurasia. The spiritual development of this period was marked by a crisis in the religious consciousness of the Russian people, when the church became the prisoner of the state.

The Revolution of 1917 began a new period in Russian history.

CHAPTER I.

THE ORIGINS OF THE RUSSIAN STATE

(to 972 A.D.)

I.

THE Russian state came into existence in the western corner of the area which we have termed Eurasia. From the sixth to the eighth century this western corner of Eurasia, encompassed by the Baltic, the river Dnieper, the Black Sea, and the lower Danube, was settled by an eastern branch of the Slavonic tribes. In the middle of the ninth century these tribes were united by Normans who penetrated to the mainland from the Baltic Sea. This event is recognized as the date of the foundation of the Russian state. In fact, however, political life in the territories occupied by the western Slavs originated much earlier. The forms of organization that came into existence in southern Russia centered around the trade between the wooded and pasture lands of western Eurasia, the Black Sea, and the East.

2.

THE first occupants of the southern Russian steppes of whom we have definite knowledge were the Scythians. This tribe belonged linguistically to the Aryan peoples, but in its mode of life was closely similar to that of the nomadic Turko-Mongols. The favorite occupation of the Scythians was war, and the horse their closest companion. It is quite probable that among the Scythians there were groups of Mongols.

The Scythians appeared in southern Russia in the seventh century B.C. After having occupied the Eurasian steppes, they found themselves neighbors to the Turks who inhabited Mongolia. Together these peoples maintained the connecting links between China and Greece.

The western shore of the Black Sea was occupied from the

seventh century B.C. by Greek colonies—Olbia, at the mouth of the Bug; Chersonesus, close to the present city of Sevastopol; Panticapaeum, on the site of the city of Kerch, and many others. These colonies conducted a lively trade with the Scythians, and Greek artists and craftsmen made the household articles of the wealthy Scythians and their kings.¹

Greek authors have left us interesting information concerning the life and customs of the Scythians. Thus, there has been preserved a description of Scythia, written by the famous Greek historian of the fifth century B.C., Herodotus. He tells us that Scythia extended from the mouth of the Ister (the Danube) up the rivers Borysthenes (the Dnieper) and Tanais (the Don) far to the north of the Black Sea. Considering all the data available on the Scythians and their trade with the Greeks to the south and the Mongols and Chinese to the east, it is possible to surmise that at times they succeeded in uniting under their power not only the steppes but also part of the wooded north. At all events, along the boundary of the forests and the steppes, trading settlements were founded, of which archaeological proof exists.

Beginning with the fourth century B.C., another Aryan people, the Sarmatians, began to press upon the Scythians, and in the end of the second century B.C. they occupied the shores of the Black Sea.

3.

THE Sarmatian domination over the southern Russian steppes was displaced in the second and third centuries A.D. by German tribes of Goths who descended from the north along the rivers Dniester, Bug, and Dnieper. Having conquered the western corner of the Eurasian steppes, the Goths soon acquired both the nomadic customs and the material culture of the peoples they displaced, and became themselves mounted warriors. In the middle of the fourth century a strong military power was organized under the leadership of Hermanaric.

A new invasion from the east at the end of the fourth century destroyed the power of the Goths. The invaders then were the

¹ Many examples of Greco-Scythian art have been found by excavators in southern Russia. A portion of these are preserved at the Hermitage Museum in Leningrad.

Huns, a Turko-Mongol tribe led by a militaristic Mongolian aristocracy, similar to the Mongol-Tartars who overran Russia in the thirteenth century. Their power increased until the middle of the fifth century, and under Attila they subjugated the greater part of Europe. The center of Attila's power in the last years of his life was in Pannonia. The steppes of Pannonia, now called Hungary, were the western outpost of the Eurasian steppes. The lords of Pannonia were strategically situated for marauding expeditions against the Mediterranean coast, Rome, and Byzantium. For this reason Pannonia was the favored goal of nomadic invasions, and was finally occupied by the Magyars at the end of the ninth century. The empire of Attila extended over an enormous area from east to west. It fell apart following his death, and made way for the formation of new political organizations.

4.

WHILE the nomadic Aryan and Mongolian tribes were displacing each other in the southern Russian steppes, the forests on both sides of the Ural Mountains were occupied by Finnish tribes. They were of the same racial stock as the Mongols and the Turks, and constituted the northern or Ural branch of the Ural-Altai peoples. To the same group belonged the Magyars, but in their customs they were more closely related to the Altai branch of the nomadic Mongols. The Finns were a hunting and fishing people. Fish was their chief food, and furs served them both as clothing and as the chief article of trade with their neighbors. The Finnish tribes inhabiting the north were submerged in forests. Having contact with each other only along the rivers, they could not form a strong military power; and so they were incapable of resisting the pressure of Slavonic colonization when it started northward. By gradual penetration, the Slavs settled in the regions occupied by the Finns, who either retreated or were absorbed by the ever increasing number of invaders.

5.

UNTIL the dismemberment of the Hunnish Empire, we have no definite knowledge of the Slavs. It is probable that the Slavonic tribes were comprised in the Hunnish Empire just as they were later in the empire of the Avars. In this case, the Slavs must have

constituted whole companies in the Hunnish army, as they did later in the army of the Avars, but they probably did not fight in separate units and for this reason were not noticed by the Romans or Byzantines.

The region between the Carpathian Mountains and the Dnieper may be regarded as the original home of the Slavs. It is impossible to be certain whether this was always their native land or whether they had moved there at some remote time of which we have no knowledge. The Slavs may have come from the east. In any event, their language was influenced by that of the Turko-Mongols.

The Slavs were also affected by the Germans and the Greeks as well as by the Mongols. The culture of the Slavs was of a relatively high order, even in the primitive period of their organization. The occupation of the Slavonic tribes was agriculture, and it is also probable that a part of the Slavs were herdsmen. They lived in large family groups, property rights being vested in the group and not in the individuals composing it. These families later united and formed tribes which, following the dismemberment of the Hunnish Empire, appear as independent political organisms. From the sixth century on, Byzantine historians make references to the Slavs who disturbed the peace of the Byzantine Empire in the north. It is impossible to tell whether the Slavs reached the Danube only in the sixth century, when they are first mentioned by Byzantine historians, or whether they were there earlier. According to the sixth century historian, Procopius of Caesarea, the Slavs occupied the regions beyond the Danube far into the north-east.

By a comparative study of historical and philological material, the conclusion may be reached that toward the sixth century A.D., the Slavonic peoples had nearly completed their separation into several groups: the western Slavs, including the Czechs and Poles; the southern Slavs, including the Serbs and Bulgarians; and the eastern Slavs, the Russians. The Byzantine historian Procopius speaks only of the southern and eastern Slavs. The southern group succeeded in the seventh and eighth centuries in occupying the whole Balkan Peninsula as far as the Adriatic Sea and the southernmost part of Greece. The eastern Slavs, whose habitation in the sixth century lay between the Carpathian Mountains, the lower Danube, the shore of the Black Sea, and the southern Bug River,

moved northward. They occupied the upper Bug and the upper Dnieper.² The eastern Slavonic peoples in the ninth century occupied the sources of the rivers Vistula, Dnieper, Oka, and western Dvina. Simultaneously with this movement northward, the Slavs spread over the coastal regions of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and reached the Don River. Arabian historians of the tenth century call the Don River the Slavonic River.

During the two and a half centuries from the end of the sixth to the beginning of the ninth, the eastern Slavs occupied the territories extending from the northwestern corner of the Black Sea to Lake Ladoga and along the coast of the Black Sea from the Danube to the Don. The Slavs, however, did not succeed during this time in organizing themselves politically. They became subjects of the states formed by the nomadic Turko-Mongol peoples, the Avars and Khazars, who dominated these territories. But if there was no political unity among the Slavs, they were conscious of racial unity. The eastern Slavs, though comprising a number of tribes, formed one people.³


6.

In the middle of the sixth century there appeared in the southern Russian steppes a Turkish tribe called the Avars, who had been driven out of the east by the movements of other Mongolian and Turkish peoples. The Avars moved westward very rapidly. In 562 they occupied Dobrudja and in 568 Pannonia. In making their conquests, however, the Avars did not displace the Slavonic population, but used the subjugated people in further campaigns. The custom of the Avars seems to have been to stay in their camps and to send the Slavs out to fight in open field. If the Slavs were defeated, they returned to the camp. If they were victorious, the Avars advanced to take the booty. In 626 the Slavs took part in a great expedition of the Avars against the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius, which failed only at the very gates of Constantinople.

The Avars held in subjection the majority of the Slavs. In the

² We know that the Slavs moved up the Dnieper by the name of the river Desna which is derived from the word "right." This river flows into the Dnieper from the east and therefore would be the "right" river to those moving upstream.

³ The division of the Russian people into three separate groups, Great Russians, Ukrainians, and White Russians, took place at a much later time.

seventh century their power extended from the Black Sea to the Adriatic and from the eastern boundary of the Franks to the Byzantine Empire; and it lasted until the beginning of the ninth century when it was crushed by the Frankish Emperor Charles the Great. The downfall of the Avar Khans or chieftains had a great effect upon their Slavonic subjects. The name Charles (Karl) came to have a meaning to the western and southern Slavs equivalent to King (Kral). The collapse of the Avar power also resulted in breaking the contact between the eastern, western, and southern Slavs. 

7.

A PART of the eastern Slavs fell under the domination of another Turkish tribe, the horde of the Khazars. The dividing line between the spheres of influence of the Avars and the Khazars was the Dnieper. The power of the Khazars arose about a century after that of the Avars, in the middle of the seventh century. The Khazars acted as intermediaries in the trade between central Asia and the northern shore of the Black Sea as well as between the Baltic and the Black Sea. The central base of the Khazars from the seventh to the ninth centuries was north of the Caspian Sea near the present sight of Astrakhan.

The Khazar power extended from the Caspian Sea and the lower Volga to the Dnieper and the Black Sea. At the head of the Khazars were two chieftains, the *Khagan*⁴ and the *beg*. The *Khagan* had formal authority in matters pertaining to the state and to religion. The *beg* exercised the real power, since he was the head of the army. The Khazars took a great interest in trade between the Far East and the Black Sea, as well as between the Arabian south and the Slavonic north. The great trade route of the north led along the upper reaches of the Volga through the home of the Bulgars to the Caspian Sea, and across the Caucasus into the Near East, which at the end of the seventh century was under Arab rule. Besides cattle-breeding, the Khazars also fished and cultivated the land.

As a result of their commerce with various peoples, the Khazars experienced widely varying cultural influences. The Arabs offered them Islam and the Greeks Christianity. The Khazar Khan did

⁴ I.e., Khan.

not accept either the one or the other, possibly for political reasons, fearing that a foreign faith would be followed by foreign domination. The Khazars chose a neutral faith, Judaism, which carried no political threat with it.

8.

IN the ninth century different states came into being on the rivers Dnieper and Volga, their centers being located where the northern forests met the southern steppes. The Varangian Russians centered about the junction of the Desna and the Dnieper, while the Bulgars centered about the junction of the Kama and the Volga. In the very beginning of the ninth century the Varangians came into contact with the Khazars and through them traded with the Arabs.⁵ A little later the Varangians opened a trade route to Byzantium. In 839 an embassy from the Greek Emperor Theophilus to the Frankish Emperor Louis the Pious included a number of Russians who had visited Theophilus on a mission and had been cut off from their home by piratical bands.

After 842 considerable numbers of Varangian Russians appeared on the Black Sea and shortly afterward, in June, 860, for the first time attacked Constantinople. The expedition, while not successful in defeating the Greeks, was followed by an advantageous treaty of peace.

The Bulgars were remnants of the Hunnish hordes. In the seventh century they divided, one part moving to the Danube where they founded the Bulgaro-Slavonic Kingdom, and another part occupying a position between the Varangians and the Khazars. The strengthening of the Bulgar Kingdom in the ninth century forced the Magyars away from the shores of the Kama River. Part of the Magyars moved to the Caucasus, while another part moved westward to the Danube where they founded the Hungarian Kingdom. The customs of the Bulgarians on the Volga were very similar to those of the Khazars. They traded, fished, and cultivated the land. In the summer they took to their horses and lived in the steppes; in the winter they lived in towns. Their trade contacts with the Arabs resulted in their conversion to Islam in 922, and Bulgaria on the Volga became a Moslem state.

⁵ The largest find of Arab coins made in any part of Europe or Asia was on the island of Gotland.

9.

FOLLOWING the organization of the Varangian state, the country around Kiev is called Russia by chroniclers. There is still a conflict among students of history over the origin of the name Russ. According to certain evidence, it came together with the Varangians. Russ might have been the name of a separate tribe of Varangians or of the whole armed company.⁶ In any case, the Varangian *druzhinas* or warrior bands of Kiev were long called Russ. The term appears also in the treaty of 911 between the Russians and the Greeks—"We of the Russian people: Karl, Inegeld, and Farlaf. . . ." and there follow other names of evident Scandinavian origin.

The Varangians were soon absorbed by the Slavs and only in the princely house was there any consciousness of relationship with the reigning families of Scandinavia. Whatever the origin of the name Russ may be, it became affixed in the ninth and tenth centuries to the principality of Kiev and subsequently to the whole eastern Slavonic nation.

The time of the final consolidation of the first Russian state was the reign of the Varangian Prince Oleg at the end of the ninth century. The state was of a military and trading character. Russia was the intermediary between the wooded north and the southern steppes and Byzantium. The Russians tried also to open a trade route to reach the Arabians. Twice in the course of the first half of the tenth century, military campaigns were undertaken in the Caucasus and on the southwestern shores of the Caspian Sea. These campaigns were accompanied by looting. The relations with Byzantium, on the other hand, were of a more organized character. Every spring long boats made from the trunks of trees were sent down the Dnieper from Kiev. These expeditions of Varangian and Slavonic traders carried fur, wax, honey, and slaves to Byzantium. In exchange for their goods the Russian traders in Constantinople received wine and rich fabrics. The prince with his *druzhina* gave military protection to the expedition, but the prince was also one of the largest shareholders in the undertaking.

Several times in the course of the first half of the tenth century

⁶ Other hypotheses concerning the origin of the name Russ are that it was given to the Kiev country before the coming of the Varangians or else was given to that country by the Greeks.

the Russians undertook military campaigns against the Byzantine Empire. Several of these campaigns had as their object mere plunder; others were intended to protect the rights of the Russian traders in Byzantium and to secure freedom of trade. In 911 and 944 treaties were made with the Greeks. Byzantium first attracted Russian warriors and traders by the brilliance of the Imperial Court and capital. But very soon the Russians were influenced also by the spiritual culture of Byzantium. In the first half of the tenth century a number of Russian warriors and traders were converted to Christianity. The treaty of 944 provided that part of the Russian traders were to perform their rites in the Christian manner and part in the heathen manner. In the middle of the tenth century the Princess Olga was converted and was received by the Byzantine Court in 957. In the "Ceremonial Book" of Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenetus, there is a rather detailed description of the reception of Olga in the great Byzantine palace in Constantinople. She was recognized as the head of the Russians, but following Byzantine etiquette was not accorded the highest honors.

10.

THE expansion of the first Russian state commenced with the reign of Olga's son, Sviatoslav. Sviatoslav was a man of great energy and resourcefulness, one of the most energetic characters in the whole of Russian history. He took over the reins of government during the lifetime of his mother but was not interested in the internal administration of the country, which he left to Olga. Sviatoslav spent little time in Kiev, preferring to campaign during his short reign of eight years, from 964 to 972, far away from the capital. Despite the desire of his mother, Sviatoslav refused to be baptized into Christianity. "How can I change my faith alone?" he asked. "The *druzhina* would laugh at me." He loved the hard life of campaigns. In the words of the chronicler, Sviatoslav was brave and quick as a panther. During his military campaigns he carried no trains of baggage. He ate no boiled meat, but cooked his horse-flesh or game on the live coals of a fire. He carried no tent and slept on a saddle-cloth with a saddle for a pillow. When he attacked an enemy, he did not use stealth but sent messengers declaring, "I come against you."

Sviatoslav began by attacking the Khazars. First he conquered

a Slavonic tribe on the river Oka, which was subject to the Khazars. Then he attacked their masters and about 965 completely despoiled the Khazar Empire. The chief towns of the Khazars, Sarkel on the Don and Itil on the Volga, were captured by the Russians. Sviatoslav's expedition had a different purpose from the marauding attacks of the first half of the tenth century, which were animated primarily by the desire for plunder. Sviatoslav had the intention of entrenching himself firmly on the lower Volga. Having overthrown the Khazar Empire, he planned to build up his power on the ruins. Had he remained on the Volga he would have become the natural successor to the Khazars, and the Russian princes after him might have taken the Judaic or Islamic faiths instead of Christianity.⁷

However, Sviatoslav left Itil when he was called by the Byzantine emperor to aid him against the Bulgars of the Danube. He may have left a force on the Volga. His campaign against the Bulgars in 967 was crowned with success. Sviatoslav occupied the town of Pereyaslavets on the Danube and entrenched himself there. "I desire to live in this place on the Danube," he said. "Here is the center of my lands. Here are to be had all good things: gold, cloths, wines, and fruits of the Greeks, silver and horses of the Czechs and Hungarians, and furs, wax, honey, and slaves from Russia."

With the conquest of the Bulgars, Sviatoslav carried into execution a political plan of great vision. He became the successor of the nomadic emperors, who occupied a strategic position. His empire at this time was of great extent, greater even than that of the Avars or the Khazars, for it controlled both the lower Danube and the lower Volga. The empire of Sviatoslav may be compared in size only to the Hunnish Empire of the fourth and fifth centuries, but to the expanses of the steppes which the Huns controlled he added the expanses of a forest state, Kiev and Novgorod.

It is probable that with the conquest of the Khazars, Sviatoslav acquired the title of Khan, their emperor. His successors bore this title and in the middle of the eleventh century the metropolitan bishop Hilarion ascribed this title to Vladimir the Saint and Yaroslav the Wise.

⁷ The chronicler of the time records later the efforts to convert the son of Sviatoslav, Vladimir, to Judaism or Islam.

The empire of Sviatoslav broke up in the east. Following the decline and later the almost complete destruction of the Khazar power, there appeared in the south of Russia, a new force also a Turkish tribe, the Pecheniogs. Taking advantage of the absence of Sviatoslav and the main Russian armies, they attacked and besieged Kiev in 968. Sviatoslav was forced to make a hasty return from the Danube to save his mother Olga and the citizens of Kiev. He succeeded in relieving the city and driving away the Pecheniogs, but did not stay long in the capital. After the death of Olga in 969, Sviatoslav set up his sons as rulers of the principal towns, while he himself returned to the Danube. But he could no longer control the eastern frontiers of his empire. The Greeks could not reconcile themselves to the fact that their enemy, the Bulgarians, had been replaced by another enemy, the Russians. Emperor John Tsimiskis, one of the most brilliant military leaders of Byzantium, personally opened a campaign against Sviatoslav, defeated him, and locked him up in a fortress. Sviatoslav was forced to conclude peace in 971 on the condition that he leave Bulgaria. Thus were his plans of conquest destroyed. On his return journey the Russian armies were surprised by the Pecheniogs in 972 and defeated. Sviatoslav was killed, and a Pechenieg prince made himself a drinking cup of his skull.

CHAPTER II.
THE STRUGGLE WITH THE STEPPE
(972-1238)

I.

AT the end of the tenth century the Russian people occupied almost the whole of the great area from the Finnish Gulf and Lake Ladoga in the north, to the lower Danube, the Black Sea, the Azov Sea, and the Caspian Sea in the south. From east to west the territory stretched from the Oka and the Don rivers to the Tisa and the Marosh rivers, within the boundaries of present-day Hungary. But from the end of the tenth to the middle of the thirteenth centuries the area occupied by the Russian people did not remain unaltered. The changes consisted principally in the gradual loss of the southern steppe zone and the loss of communication with the southern seas. The nomadic peoples of the steppes wedged themselves in between the southern seas and the territories occupied by the Russians. Bitter struggles characterized the whole period. The Russian princes at times attempted to fight against Turkish tribes with the help of Turkish allies. They were not always in agreement among themselves; and many of them, during such quarrels, hired Turkish mercenaries. The Russian princes attempted to fortify themselves against the steppe by the construction of trenches and forts.¹ But in spite of all their efforts the Russians were forced to retreat to the north.

In the middle of the thirteenth century the southern frontier of Russian people followed a line from Moldavia to the lower course of the Oka and northeast to Viatka. The losses of territory in the south may be illustrated by the example of the town Tmutorokan. In the eleventh century Tmutorokan, near the straits of Kerch, was a strong Russian center. In the chronicles of the twelfth cen-

¹ Predecessors of the later lines of defense against the steppe built by the tsars of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. The first prince to fortify himself against the invaders was Vladimir the Saint, in the tenth century.

tury it is no longer mentioned. The Russians, however, remained strongly entrenched in the southwestern corner of Eurasia, the Carpathian Mountains, and Moldavia, in spite of the ferocious attacks of the Magyars on one side and the Pecheniogs on the other. Russian settlements on the lower Danube as late as the twelfth century were included in the Byzantine Empire and later in the Bulgarian Kingdom.

North of the Carpathians the Russians were subjected to the pressure of the Hungarians and the Poles, but successfully resisted them and the boundary was moved westward. Farther to the north the Russian land, prior to the thirteenth century, was in a relatively peaceful state. The former line from the Nieman to the Lake Peipus and along the river Narov to the Gulf of Finland, was retained. In the eleventh century the town of Yuriev² was founded west of the Lake Peipus. In the north and northeast the Russians moved forward and occupied new territories. The White Sea, the Arctic Ocean, and the Ural Mountains were reached. Similarly Russian colonists in the east moved during the nineteenth century to the lower course of the Oka and the middle Volga.

2.

THE death of Sviatoslav was followed by the collapse of his ambitious plan of uniting the forests and the steppes and controlling the trade of both the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. The Russian princes were forced to concentrate almost all their attention upon the internal organization of their states and upon defense against the invaders of the steppes. The nomadic tribesmen who, like the Khazars, in earlier times had united the forests and the steppes under one rule, now became again a dangerous enemy. One wave succeeded the other; after the Pecheniogs there appeared the Cumans. For a long time neither the forest nor the steppe succeeded in completely crushing the other. The forces of the Kiev state and the nomadic tribes in the south of Russia were approximately equal, and their struggle was long and indecisive.

After the death of Sviatoslav his sons fell into dispute. Victory came to Vladimir in 980. The most important event during his reign was his conversion to Christianity and the institution of

² Present-day Tartu in Esthonia.

Christianity as the official religion not only of the princely house but of the whole Russian people.³

As we have seen above, part of the Russian people were converted to Christianity in the middle of the tenth century. The pagan religious ideology was broken down. There was a need for a new faith. The ancient Russian chronicles contained an account of Vladimir's christening after a long period of indecision. According to the chronicler, in 986 Vladimir was visited by religious missions of different faiths and churches. Mohammedans from the Bulgars of the Volga, Roman Catholics⁴ from Germany, Khazars professing Judaism, and a Greek philosopher of the Orthodox faith. The picture presented by the chronicler was not a mere rhetorical figure but an exact reflection of the facts. These different religions were professed partly by neighbors and partly even by inhabitants of the Kiev state.

The acceptance of one or another of these faiths must necessarily have determined the future cultural and political development of Russia. The acceptance of Islam would have drawn Russia into the circle of Arabian culture—that is, an Asiatic-Egyptian culture. The acceptance of Roman Christianity from the Germans would have made Russia a country of Latin or European culture. The acceptance of either Judaism or Orthodox Christianity insured to Russia cultural independence of both Europe and Asia.

Political arguments could be mustered equally in favor of Judaism and Orthodoxy. On the one hand, there were the same arguments that converted the Khan of the Khazars to Judaism, that is, the desire to secure political and religious independence from the strongest churches and states of the eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand, in favor of Orthodoxy, there were arguments of a different nature—the advantages of a cultural union with Byzantium, which already had close trade relations with Russia. Aside from political calculation the question of faith had also to be decided with regard to spiritual needs, for the question of a new faith had arisen in view of the inadequacy of the old Russian

³ The baptism of Olga in the middle of the tenth century (Chap. I, Sec. 9) was not followed by the conversion of the whole people.

⁴ The division of the Roman and Greek churches finally took place later in 1054, but there was a division in fact in 867.

paganism. According to the chronicler, Vladimir, after listening to the representatives of the various religious missions, seemed to be favorably impressed by the Greek philosopher. Before making a final decision, however, he dispatched his emissaries to the neighboring countries in order to observe "by whom and how God was worshipped." The accounts of his emissaries finally determined Vladimir to accept baptism into the Orthodox church. The Russian emissaries, in telling of how they attended a service in Saint Sophia in Constantinople, related that they did not know whether they were on earth or in heaven.

Prior to the official conversion of Russia to Christianity, there occurred political complications with Byzantium. Vladimir undertook a campaign against the Greek town Chersonesus. Following a prolonged siege the city surrendered to the Russian prince. The Byzantine emperor agreed to give Vladimir the Byzantine princess, Anne, in marriage. Upon his return from the Chersonesus campaign, Vladimir organized a general christening of his subjects.⁵ At the same time the people of Novgorod were likewise christened, but with them force had to be used, since their paganism was more strongly entrenched. The Christian churches were built upon the former places of pagan worship. A few years after the conversion of Vladimir, the legal position of the church was fixed by the order regarding a 10 per cent tax for the benefit of the church of the Our Lady in Kiev, about 996, and the statute regarding church courts in 1010.

3.

FOLLOWING the death of Vladimir the Saint, just as in the case of Sviatoslav, an internecine strife broke out among his sons. Victory lay at first with his eldest son Sviatopolk.⁶ To protect himself against his brothers Sviatopolk took recourse to murder. At his orders, Boris and Gleb, later venerated by the Russian church as saints, were put to death. But Sviatopolk did not succeed in getting rid of his most dangerous rival, likewise his brother, the prince of Novgorod, Yaroslav. Between Sviatopolk and Yaroslav

⁵ About 989 A.D.

⁶ Sviatopolk was born before Vladimir's conversion and might have been regarded as illegitimate.

there began a struggle. Yaroslav received support from his subjects and the Varangians, whose forces were augmented by mercenaries brought from across the sea. Sviatopolk concluded an alliance with his father-in-law, the Polish king, Boleslav the Brave. While Yaroslav remained true to Orthodoxy, Sviatopolk found support from western Roman Catholicism. The struggle between the brothers took on a far wider significance than a family disagreement. The victory of Sviatopolk would have subjected Russia to Polish and Catholic influence.

After a long period of indecisive struggle Yaroslav finally defeated his brother in 1019. Sviatopolk was killed during his retreat. Following this victory over his brother and the subjection of Kiev, Yaroslav entered into a conflict with his other brother, Mstislav. The latter was an interesting figure in the history of ancient Russia. He had attempted on a smaller scale to recreate the empire of his grandfather, Sviatoslav. In doing so he started not from the north but from the south. He ruled over the eastern corner of the Black Sea coast from the city of Tmutorokan and attempted to extend his power northward. In this respect his policy followed the tradition of the Khazar Khans of adding the forest regions of the Dnieper to their empire of the steppes. The two-year war between the brothers resulted in the victory of Mstislav. Yaroslav was forced to agree to a division of the Russian state along the line of the Dnieper. Several years later Mstislav died and in 1034 Yaroslav became head of both parts of the Russian lands. In the same year Yaroslav completely defeated the Pechenegs who had advanced again on Kiev. From this time on the Pechenegs never again attacked this town.

The internal policy of Yaroslav was of great significance. During his reign the first laws regulating procedure were drawn up. This collection of laws was known as the Russian Law. Yaroslav first granted the laws to his Novgorod subjects as a reward for their aid in his struggle against Sviatopolk. Later, the law was also promulgated in Kiev. The laws of Yaroslav attempted to limit the prevailing custom of blood vengeance for murder, by empowering only certain relatives to avenge a murder, in whose absence the murderer was fined by the treasury of the prince. The Russian Law was the product of a combination of Norman and Slavonic customs. A jurist having acquaintance with the Roman and By-

zantine law took part in its formulation. Yaroslav, furthermore, defined the powers of the church courts and the property rights of the church, thus adding to the ecclesiastical legislation of Vladimir.

Imitating the Byzantine emperors, Yaroslav wanted to make Kiev an imperial city similar to Constantinople. He embellished the city with beautiful buildings, some of which, like the church of St. Sophia, were constructed by Greek masters. In St. Sophia of Kiev Yaroslav brought together a collection of books. He also organized schools for the children of the *druzhina*. During his own life or that of his immediate successor, the World History of the Greek chronicler, George Hamartolos, and the collection of laws regulating ecclesiastical matters (*nomokanon*) were translated into Slavonic. In his reign there appeared a remarkable leader in the Russian church, Hilarion, the first Metropolitan of Russian origin (1051). He was fully educated in Greek ecclesiastical matters, and his profound wisdom and oratorical power are evidenced by one of his surviving addresses in which he spoke of the significance of Russian conversion to Christianity. Hilarion, even before he became Metropolitan, was known for his deeply religious life. In his earlier days he had dug for himself a cave in a hill near Kiev, for spiritual meditation. He may therefore be regarded as the founder of the Kiev Monastery of the Caves, which flourished under the sons of Yaroslav. Less than one hundred years following the conversion of Russia, the church could boast of such Christian leaders as Anthony and Theodosius of the Kiev monastery.

4.

AFTER the death of Yaroslav in 1054 Russia was divided into principalities ruled by his sons. As the royal house increased with each generation, these principalities were broken up into a greater number of parts. The subdivision of the Russian land under the descendants of Yaroslav, however, was not permanent. The princes frequently moved from one town to another. The eldest of the family always tried to occupy the throne of Kiev which was regarded as the highest. Following the death of each Kiev prince, a general movement of princes took place. The power was vested in the whole royal family and was constantly being reallocated be-

tween members of the family—a custom that corresponded to the universal principals of property ownership in ancient Russia.⁷

As might be expected, the distribution of power was frequently complicated by the personal ambitions of individual princes. Of considerable moment, likewise, were the desires of the population of the large towns. The popular council or *vieche* frequently refused to accept a new prince and called in another following its own wishes. However, in most cases the prince was selected from the dynasty of Yaroslav.

Principally in view of this custom, Russian history from the second half of the eleventh century to the first half of the thirteenth century is full of civil strife between princes. To strengthen their power, some of these princes frequently allied themselves with foreigners—Hungarians, Poles, or Cumans. At the end of the eleventh century and the beginning of the twelfth century, efforts were made to form an alliance among the princes. A family *seim* or council was called on several occasions. The idea of a general alliance of princes was supported by one of the best men of the time, a grandson of Yaroslav, Vladimir Monomakh, prince of Kiev. His death in 1125 brought to an end the efforts to form an alliance. Russia began to fall apart. In place of a single cultural and national center in Kiev, in the middle of the twelfth century a number of local centers came into existence: the Galician principality in the west; Novgorod in the north; the Vladimir-Suzdal principality in the northeast; and Kiev in the south. The importance of Kiev was shaken in 1169 when it was captured by the armies of Prince Andrei Bogolubsky from Vladimir. In the beginning of the thirteenth century Kiev suffered severely from the sacking of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204.⁸ Prior to this fatal year in Byzantine history⁹ the Greeks had played an important part in the political life of the Russians. Byzantium sent to Kiev Metropolitans who then headed the Russian church and constantly at-

⁷ There is much in common between this custom and the later customs of the peasant commune.

⁸ Kiev depended economically during this period upon trade with Byzantium.

⁹ The Greek Empire never quite recovered from the capture of Constantinople in 1204. A Latin empire was founded in Constantinople and lasted until 1261 when it was overthrown by the Greeks, but even following the recapture of the capital, the Greek Empire never regained its strength.

tempted to secure alliances with Russian princes by marriage with Byzantine princesses or aristocrats.¹⁰

Byzantium attempted to employ the Russian princes in its own politics. Thus, in the twelfth century, during a war with Hungary, Byzantium sought to form an alliance with the Galician princes for the purpose of attacking Hungary from the northeast. As the Galician princes were unfriendly with the Kiev princes, Byzantium attempted to raise the enemies of Kiev in Suzdal to counterbalance Kiev. On the other hand, in the second half of the twelfth century, when the Galician princes allied themselves with Hungary, Byzantium sought an alliance with the Kiev princes, setting them up against the Galician princes.

A constant struggle was waged by the Russian princes against the Cumans, nomadic tribesmen in the steppe zone who made frequent raids upon the Russian principalities, subjecting them to terrible destruction and enslaving the inhabitants. The Russian princes from time to time undertook campaigns against the Cumans; but although they occasionally defeated the mounted nomads, the Cumans invariably saved themselves by flight. The Russians could not completely subdue their nomadic enemy; and sometimes the Russian campaigns in the steppes were terminated by catastrophic defeat. The Cumans would trap the Russian armies and surround them on all sides. One of these unfortunate campaigns in 1185 is the subject of an old Russian epic poem "Tale of the Host of Igor."¹¹

In the thirteenth century the pressure of the Cumans was weakened and the alliances between separate Russian princes and Cuman Khans increased in frequency. At this time new enemies arose—in the northwest, the Germans, Swedes, and Lithuanians; and in the southeast, the Mongols.

The Germans appeared at the mouth of the Western Dvina in the middle of the twelfth century, their first contacts with the natives being peaceful. Most of them were traders and missionaries. In 1200 Bishop Albert founded the town of Riga at the mouth of the Dvina. The inhabitants of the region, Lithuanians and Letts, were converted to Christianity with difficulty. Then there came warriors

¹⁰ The mother of Vladimir Monomakh was a Greek princess, and the mother of Andrei Bogolubsky was also a Greek.

¹¹ See Sec. 6.

in support of the missionaries. An order of knights similar to those who fought against the Moslems in the Holy Land was organized. This order was known as the Sword-Bearers, their distinguishing mark being a cape with a red cross and a sword on the shoulder. The Sword-Bearers were subject to the orders of their master and were responsible to the Livonian bishop. They extended their power rapidly eastward from Riga in the direction of Pskov and Polotsk. The region southwest of the Livonian Order of Sword-Bearers, between the Nieman and the Vistula, was occupied by the Teutonic Order of Knights, wearing a black cape and white cross. The Teutonic Order first came into existence for the purpose of fighting the Moslems, but in view of the hopelessness of the struggle in the Holy Land the Order moved in 1230 to the Baltic Sea.¹²

Tribes of Letts and Lithuanians united to struggle against the German knights. For the most part they were unsuccessful, and the result was a movement of Letts and Lithuanians eastward into the Russian lands. Thus arose the threat of Lithuanian conquest in the northern principalities. Meanwhile the civil strife among the Russian princes continued. A leading part was played in the early thirteenth century by Prince Mstislav the Daring, a brilliant fighter, but unsuccessful in his policies. Mstislav took part in the wars between Smolensk and Kiev, Novgorod and Suzdal. He was allied with the Cumans and defended the Galician principality against the Hungarians, but nowhere did he achieve permanent political conquests. The glory of fighting was all he desired; everything else was unimportant. In character he resembled many of the western knights of his time, being perhaps most akin to Richard the Lionhearted.

While the Russian princes continued their endless feuds, a new danger appeared in the east. A wave of nomadic peoples with unprecedented force was advancing westward. This wave flooded the Russian land, submerging the princes and their quarrels.

In 1223 the Mongols or Tartars appeared in the southeast. Fleeing from the Mongolian advance, the Cumans sought the aid of

¹² The excuse was an invitation on the part of a Polish prince, Conrad of Mazowia, who asked the Order to occupy his lands and protect him against the attacks of a Lithuanian tribe of Prussians. The Knights conquered the Prussians and created a German state, later Prussia.

the Russian princes. Khan Kotian, father-in-law of Mstislav the Daring, said: "Today they have taken our land; tomorrow they will take yours." Mstislav undertook the organization of an alliance of Russian princes against the Tartars. It was decided at a conference called in Kiev not to await the enemy but to go out and meet him in the depth of the steppes.¹³ The meeting took place on the river Kalka near the Azov Sea. The Russian troops fought bravely but in their action there was no unity, nor was there any unity between the Russians and the Cumans. Meanwhile, the Mongolian armies were led by the extraordinary generals, Djebe and Subutai. The Mongolians first defeated the Cumans and part of the Russian troops before the Kiev warriors could take part in the struggle. The Kiev prince then shut himself up in an armed camp on the shore of the Kalka. For three days he resisted the enemy, but was forced to buy his freedom and retreat. But the Mongolians did not abide by the convention and killed all their enemies. The Prince of Kiev was crushed to death under planks.

Following their victory the Mongolians did not advance upon the Russian territory but turned back.¹⁴ During the following fifteen years Russia heard nothing of the Mongolians. The chronicler wrote of those "evil Tartars": "Only God knows whence they came and whither they went."

5.

THE political organization of the Russian principalities in the pre-Mongolian period was a combination of monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic government. The monarchical element was to be found in the person of the prince, who in ancient Russia was, however, not an autocratic ruler. His chief function was military. His duty was to defend the town from enemies outside. Another important function of the prince was judicial. He appointed special agents to render judgment in litigations among his subjects.

The aristocratic element was to be found in the prince's council. Every prince had a council composed of the higher officers of his *druzhina*. This council discussed the most important questions of government and generally took part in legislation.

¹³ The emissaries sent by the Mongols to the Russian princes were killed.

¹⁴ For reasons see Chap. III, Sec. 2.

The democratic element of government was to be found in the popular gathering known as the *vieche*. This was not a representative body, but consisted of all the adult males of the population of each town. Unanimity was necessary before the *vieche* could arrive at a decision. In practice this requirement frequently led to armed encounters between the opposing groups in the *vieche*, after which the defeated side would acquiesce in the decision of the victors. The *vieche* of the capital of the principality had authority over the smaller towns.

These three elements of power appeared in all Russian principalities of the Mongolian period, but the relative importance of each differed from place to place. The *vieche* was especially powerful in the large trading city of northern Russia—Novgorod.¹⁵ The peculiarities of the form of government in Novgorod became fixed only in the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth centuries. Their origin, however, went back to the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The prince was served by two elected aides—the *Posadnik* (mayor) and the *Tysiatsky* or Chief of the Thousand—the militia commander—without whom he could make no decision. A custom also developed gradually by which the prince in assuming power was required to kiss the cross of Novgorod as he took his oath. The Novgorod *vieche* had a permanent chancery—the *vieche* house. In practice the affairs of the city were managed by a council of merchants. Novgorod was divided into five sections. These sections were in turn divided into “hundreds” and the “hundreds” into streets. At the *vieche* the people were organized along these lines of division. When unanimity was not reached and the opposing sides fought, they usually met on the bridge over the Volkhov River.

The aristocratic element was particularly strong in southwestern Russia, in the principalities of Galicia and Volyn. The council of *boyars* dominated the political life of these principalities. It is possible that one of the causes of the aristocratic domination in western Russia was the influence of western feudalism coming through Poland and Hungary. The prince was forced to submit to the *boyars* or to fight them. One of the energetic princes of south-

¹⁵ Novgorod was the largest town of early Russia. During the Mongolian period the population of Novgorod grew very rapidly and was estimated at over two hundred thousand according to figures which are probably exaggerated.

western Russia said about the *boyars*—"without crushing the bees the honey cannot be eaten."¹⁶

The monarchical element was particularly developed in north-eastern Russia. The development of princely power was greatly aided by the dominating personality of Prince Andrei Bogolubsky, who was killed in 1175.

Notwithstanding all the difficulties in the political organization of separate principalities, the *vieche* and the council of *boyars* may be found in all of them. The only question was which of these elements was strongest.

The social stratification of the old Russian principalities was also almost identical. Ancient Russian society was divided into two basic groups, the freemen and the slaves. The chief reason for slavery was economic necessity. A man sold himself into slavery when he had no more means with which to subsist. Besides, almost all war prisoners were made slaves. Between the slaves and the freemen was an intermediary class of people, *zakupy*, half slaves and half free, who were forced to work in return for borrowed money.

Among the freemen there were no fixed classes and it was easy to pass from one group or occupation to another. It is therefore possible to speak only roughly of the groups into which free society was divided. They were four in number: the Church, including priests and monks; the *boyars*—the officers of the prince's army and the large landowners; the townsmen—traders and craftsmen; and finally, the peasants.

During the period between the tenth and the twelfth centuries the family system of old Russia broke down. Individuals took on a greater and greater significance. The chief elements of economic life were foreign trade and agriculture. The society of the time was organized on the basis of private property vested in the individual or in the family. The oldest land deed found, of the year 1147, shows freedom of purchase and sale of land. The contemporary law was greatly influenced by Byzantium. Byzantine law, which was in fact Roman law, penetrated to Russia through the church.

¹⁶ This refers to the old method of apiculture in hollow trunks of trees which necessitated killing the bees before the honey could be obtained.

THE spiritual culture of ancient Russia came, together with the church, from Byzantium—a culture principally religious. The church, therefore, was the chief cultural force of ancient Russia.

Following the conversion of the Russians under Vladimir, paganism was stamped out in the towns very quickly, but stubbornly maintained itself in the country districts. In the popular beliefs pagan influences remained for a very long time. Little is known of the organization of the Russian church in the first fifty years following the conversion.¹⁷ The metropolitan seat was not in Kiev but in Pereyaslavl. The Russian church took definite form only in 1037.¹⁸ The Russian church was a metropolitan district of the ecumenical patriarchate of Constantinople. The metropolitan was nominated by Constantinople and was usually a Greek. There were only two exceptions to this rule, in the cases of Metropolitan Hilarion in the eleventh century, and Metropolitan Clement in the twelfth century. The bishops were sometimes Greek, but for the most part Russian. In the time of Yaroslav there were ten bishops. Later the number increased. An important center of spiritual life in pre-Mongolian Russia was the Kiev Monastery of the Caves.

The first literary work in Russia was the edition of the books of church ritual and of church law translated from the Greek to serve the purposes of the Russian church. Some of these books were translated into Slavonic in Russia; others were brought from Bulgaria in Slavonic translation. The church Slavonic language of Bulgaria was the literary and church language of ancient Russia. At this time the difference between the Russian language and the south Slavonic language was much less than at present. The church Slavonic language in Russia was itself gradually changed by the infiltration of Russian. Religious literature rapidly came into existence: the sermons of the Russian bishops and the lives of the first Russian saints and monks. The church at this time was not a secluded organization, but stood at the head of national thought. It was within the monastery walls and the church circles

¹⁷ It is possible that the Russian church for a time depended not upon the patriarch of Constantinople but of Bulgaria.

¹⁸ At the same time the Bulgarian Archbishopric lost its power. Twenty years previously the Bulgarian Empire had fallen before the Byzantine emperor, Basil II, the Bulgar-Slayer.

that the first chronicles of contemporary events both of the church and lay world were compiled. At the end of the eleventh century one of the monks of the Kiev Monastery of the Caves wrote the first all-Russian chronicle on the basis of the records of Kiev and Novgorod. In the beginning of the twelfth century this chronicle was given literary form. Thus came into existence the first history of Russia.¹⁹ This history is filled with the idea of the cultural and racial unity of the Russians and of their relationship to the whole Orthodox Christian world. The Kiev history led to the development of similar writings in every principality. Every prince and bishop had a chronicler record events in his domain. These ancient Russian annals are saturated with religious thought and the causes of historic events are usually ascribed to the struggle between Christianity and the evil forces in the human soul. Together with the church literature there grew up also a lay literature. This type of writing originated in the society of the military aristocracy, the *druzhina*, and is characterized by its requirements and tastes. For the most part the lay literature is an epic description of military feats of various princes and warriors. The most famous is the "Tale of the Host of Igor," a song of the heroic though unsuccessful campaign against the Cumans by Prince Igor in 1185.

While the literature of ancient Russia developed rapidly and began to free itself practically from church influence, the art of ancient Russia remained completely dependent upon the church. The architecture, painting, and vocal music of the period were produced to satisfy the demands of the church. Instrumental music was not permitted in the services of the Orthodox church. Prior to the fifteenth century, singing in Russia was in unison. Only in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was harmony developed. Sculpture, which had found some place in the Greek church, was not used in the Russian church. In the eleventh century the principal towns of the time, Kiev, Novgorod, and Chernigov, built large stone churches. These were at first constructed by foreign masters from Byzantine Empire. In these churches the influence of the architecture of Constantinople and the Byzantine provinces in the Near East may be observed, but in some examples, as in the Church of St. Sophia in Novgorod, certain changes from Byzantine proto-

¹⁹ This history, known as the *Poviest vremennykh let* (Annals) has come to us only in manuscripts of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

types are to be noted, made apparently to satisfy the tastes of the Russians.

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries German masters appeared, but at the same time craftsmanship was developed among the Russians themselves. Of great artistic importance are the twelfth and thirteenth century churches of northeastern Russia. The architectural decoration of these churches shows the influence of the Orthodox East—Armenia and Georgia. They also have many features in common with the western Romanesque architecture.

Religious painting of ancient Russia was likewise influenced by Byzantium and the Near East. Contemporary painting took two forms, frescoes on the walls of churches and portable icons. Both these forms came from Byzantium and as in the case of architecture, were executed at first by Greek masters and only later by Russians.²⁰ Some icons were imported directly from Byzantium.

Icons were a characteristic expression of the customs of the Orthodox church. They represented Jesus Christ, Our Lady, the Saints, or scenes from their lives. The icon, however, is not a portrait but an object of worship. This use of the icon was recognized following the defeat of the iconoclastic party in Byzantium in the middle of the ninth century. The Orthodox believer places his icon in a prominent place in his home, in Russia usually in a corner. A wick is lighted before it and worship is performed facing the icon. It is in fact a symbol or a reminder of the spiritual world to the believer, and its purpose is to raise corresponding emotions in the soul. For this reason ancient Russian iconography had a much more powerful psychological influence than ordinary painting. The old icon-painters regarded their task with religious feeling and in this likewise differed from lay artists.

²⁰ Mosaics were less frequent in ancient Russia. The remains of some fine examples exist in St. Sophia in Kiev.

CHAPTER III.

RUSSIA UNDER THE SWAY OF THE STEPPE

(1238-1452)

I.

THE Mongolian period is of enormous significance in Russian history. The invasion began the separation of the eastern and western parts of the Russian people. Finding themselves divided politically between the Mongols and the Lithuanians, the Russians split into two sections culturally distinct. The territorial distribution of the Russians remained, however, practically the same as in the preceding period. In the thirteenth century, following the ruin caused by the first Mongolian invasion, a movement of population from the middle Dnieper region took place northeastward into the region of the upper Volga and Oka rivers; but the general retreat of the Russians from the southern steppes to the north practically ceased. The Russians settled where they were in the thirteenth century, on the border of the steppes, preparing to advance into them again.

Progress into the steppe regions was most rapid in the southwest, where in the second half of the fourteenth century the Russians in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania reached the Black Sea between the Dniester and southern Bug rivers. In the southeast other Russians from Moscow and Suzdal penetrated peacefully, moving far down the Volga and Don. A considerable number of Russians settled in Sarai, as is witnessed by the formation of an Orthodox bishopric there. Russian merchants in considerable numbers visited the northern Caucasus. Furthermore, Russian soldiers recruited by their Mongolian masters frequently took part in engagements in China. Simultaneously, the colonization of the north continued. Novgorod merchants pushed farther and farther into the northern forests.

At the end of the twelfth century, as on several earlier occasions, the Mongolian tribes of eastern Eurasia experienced a great intensification of national energy. Among their chieftains there appeared a man of unusual power of will and vision, Temuchin, the "barbaric genius." Born in 1155 of a noble family, he made himself leader of the Mongolian aristocrats, who desired to create a powerful state in the steppes. He was elected "Khan" of this group and named Genghis, Heavenly Emperor.¹ Upon his appointment as Khan, Genghis immediately set about organizing his forces. The fighters were divided into "tens," "hundreds," and "thousands." He carefully selected his assistants among men he knew well. Attention was paid to the supply of the army. The most important part of his army was the Guard, who served as the personal troops of the Khan and were the picked portion of the whole army. They were organized along strictly aristocratic lines, and a special "thousand" within the Guard was composed of "brave fighters." Over all his troops Genghis wielded an iron discipline.

When the organization of the Mongolian army was finished, the world expansion of the Mongols commenced. War was decided upon at the meeting of the elders (*Kurultai*) at the source of the river Orkhon in 1206. The *Kurultai* appointed Genghis Khan Master over the whole Mongolian people. He first led his forces eastward toward the kingdom of northern China. The long war which followed brought Genghis into touch with Chinese statesmen familiar with ancient administrative and governmental customs. Following the capture of Peking in 1215, Ye-liu Chu-tsai, one of the outstanding statesmen of the time, a poet and scholar, astronomer and astrologer, who possessed an extraordinary talent for organization, became a close associate of Genghis. While the military organization of the Mongolian Empire must be attributed to Genghis Khan, it owed its administrative mechanism to Ye-liu Chu-tsai.

Having achieved decisive success in the east, Genghis Khan turned to the west. At this time there existed under the name of Khorezm an enormous Moslem kingdom consisting of Turkestan,

¹ This name was probably derived from that of the deity worshiped by the Shamanist Mongols and indicates the complete autocracy of his power.

Afghanistan, and Persia. With this kingdom Genghis Khan desired rather permanent trade relations than war; but the Mongolian envoys and traders were killed in 1218 in Otrar, an important town of Khorezm. This made war inevitable. Before it began, in the spring of 1219, Genghis Khan called the *Kurultai* to discuss the details of the coming conflict and to give orders to all the chiefs. In the autumn of 1219 Genghis took Otrar and in the beginning of 1220, Bokhara. The shah of Khorezm fled to Mazenderan.

The force sent to capture the fleeing shah was ordered to reconnoiter the lands already marked for conquest. The Mongolians under Djebe and Subutai passed from northern Iran to Transcaucasia. The Georgians made an effort at resistance which resulted in the destruction of the Georgian knights in battle. The Mongolian force crossed the Caucasus and passed into the steppes of the Don and the land of the Cumans. The Russian princes came to the help of the Cumans and a battle took place on the river Kalka,² following which the Mongolians turned back. The expedition had accomplished its purposes; but, as has been said, the sudden appearance and disappearance of the Mongolians seemed to the Russians of the time quite inexplicable. It is doubtful that the question arose among the Russians of that day, whether the appearance of the Mongolians in 1223 was accidental, what forces had caused it, and whether it would be repeated. No information was available as to what transpired in the depths of Eurasia. No one took into consideration the calculations of the framers of Mongolian policy.

Genghis Khan died in 1227 in the midst of a successful campaign against a tribe of Tanguts, but his death did not mean the breakdown of the military organization of the Mongolians. His son Ugedey was appointed his successor. Ye-liu Chu-tsai now rose to a position of unparalleled importance.

The first stage of the Mongolian program of conquest was completed during the life of Genghis Khan in the twenties of the twelfth century. The preparation for the second stage began ten years later. When all the internal arrangements were completed a further advance was decided upon at the *Kurultai* which met at Karakorum in 1235 and determined that the Mongolian armies should move in three directions: China, Persia, and Russia. At the

² See above, Chap. II, Sec. 4.

head of the Russian expedition was placed Batu, grandson of Genghis, and nephew of Ugedey.³ Batu was accompanied by representatives of other descendants of Genghis Khan. Military control was in the hands of Subutai personally, one of the most talented of all the leaders of Genghis Khan. He had under him from 120,000 to 150,000 horsemen, and in 1236-37 he completed their concentration on the Volga.

Batu turned first of all against the Bulgarians of the Volga who refused to recognize the Mongolian power. Having vanquished them, he crossed the Volga in the end of 1237 and approached the boundaries of the principality of Riazan. He demanded submission and money tribute. Riazan refused and was conquered. Then, having subjugated the principality of Vladimir, the Tartars pursued its prince, George Vsevolodich, and crushed his army, George being killed in battle. The Tartars moved westward through Tver toward Novgorod. They came within sixty miles of the latter and then suddenly turned southward, fearing snows and floods.

After the north Russian expedition, Batu settled on the lower Don and Volga—that is, in the same place which several centuries earlier had been the center of the Khazar Empire. He then moved westward, and in 1240 the Mongolians conquered Kiev after a desperate defense by the Russians.

Following the occupation of Kiev the Mongolian armies divided into two. One army advanced against Poland, defeated the Poles as well as the Germans who had come to their aid, and then turned south and invaded Hungary. The other army, led by Batu and Subutai, attacked the Magyars of Hungary and completely defeated them. The Hungarian king fled to the Adriatic Sea and Subutai sent a small mounted band after him. Batu reached Vienna and was in Klosterneuburg near Vienna when he received news of the death of Khan Ugedey. This news stopped the advance of the Mongols. Batu gave the order of retreat. The question of appointing a new Khan required his presence in Mongolia. He returned to the Black Sea through Bulgaria, thus completing a circle.

The great campaign of Batu of 1237-41 ended with his return to the Volga steppes. It had resulted in the conquest by the Mongolians of an enormous territory. Batu had brought under his sway

³ Djuchi, father of Batu, was of doubtful origin. Genghis Khan did not regard him as his own son.

not only the southern Russian steppes and the northern Russian forests, but also the lower Danube. Hungary remained a Mongolian province only for one year, but Bulgaria and Moldavia became a part of the Mongolian Empire for a century.

At approximately the same time, the eastern armies of the Mongolians completed the conquest of northern China and the southern army conquered Transcaucasia. Their empire in the middle of the thirteenth century included a huge region from the Pacific Ocean to the Adriatic Sea.

3.

THE great Mongolian Empire rapidly began to fall apart into *ulus* or principalities of the descendants of the house of Genghis Khan. Nominally a certain unity of the empire continued up to the middle of the fourteenth century. The Mongolian emperor in China, Kubilai, who reigned from 1257 to 1298, and his descendants, were regarded as the leading rulers in the system of Mongolian kingdoms. However, this did not prevent animosity between individual Mongolian states. Russia became part of Djuchi's *ulus*⁴ or the "Golden Horde," whose center was the town of Sarai on the lower Volga. This city was situated at the junction of the steppe and the desert zones. The Don and the Volga, which come very near to each other at this point, formed an advantageous location with regard both to Russia and to the Black Sea.

The first century of the existence of the "Golden Horde," up to the middle of the fourteenth century, was the time of its highest development both in respect to international politics and to internal order.⁵ The "Golden Horde" maintained close diplomatic relations with Egypt and Byzantium, while the Genoese colonies in the Crimea were the intermediaries in a lively commerce with Europe. The towns of Solkhat in the Crimea and Sarai attracted the traders of many countries, including Russia. The internal policy of the Khans of the "Golden Horde" was chiefly concerned with the protection of trade routes and the creation of strict order in their domains for this purpose.

⁴ The kingdom of Batu was known as the Djuchi's *ulus* after his father, Djuchi.

⁵ Only at the very end of the thirteenth century did the "Golden Horde" experience a short period of internal strife when one of the generals of the Khan attempted to organize an independent state.

Of considerable importance in the policy of the Mongolian Khans was their attitude toward religion, in which they accorded complete toleration. They even acted as patrons of all religious organizations without preference. The first Mongolian Khans were Shamanists. The son of Batu who ruled the "Golden Horde" for a very short time was a Christian.⁶ The brother of Batu was a Moslem. The next Khan was again a Shamanist. Uzbek, who ruled from 1314 to 1341, was a Moslem, and only from this time on did Islam become the official religion of the Khans of the "Golden Horde." But even then the policy of toleration continued. The Russian church was not only free from oppression under the Mongolian rulers, but was especially patronized by the Mongolian Khans. In the capital city of Sarai a Russian bishopric was founded, and the bishop received freedom to preach and the right to proselytize his faith.

A different condition prevailed with respect to Russian governmental institutions. The princes were forced to recognize their complete submission to the Khan. They had to go to the Horde to receive permission to be crowned.⁷ But on these conditions they retained their power as agents of the Khan. When they fell into dispute among themselves as in the past, the deciding factor was the Khan. Frequently the quarreling princes would go to the Horde to be judged, each accusing the other of insubordination to the Khan, who judged the cases and punished offenders, at times by death.

Next to the Russian princes the Mongolians appointed their own agents in the principal Russian towns during the first years of their rule. These agents collected revenue and enlisted soldiers.⁸ At times the Horde appointed representatives with full powers on special missions to Russia, such as the punishment of a prince or a town for insubordination to the Horde. These representatives were accompanied at times by a military force.

Among the Russian princes there prevailed two general ideas

⁶ It is unknown to what communion he adhered.

⁷ At first they had to travel not only to Sarai, but also to the great Mongolian Khan in Karakorum in Mongolia.

⁸ During the thirteenth century soldiers were frequently recruited from the Russian lands. Part of the recruits entered the army of the "Golden Horde" and part were sent to the Great Khan in China. Russian soldiers took part in the conquest of southern China under Kubilai Khan.

as to how to regard the Mongolian power. Some princes espoused the policy of loyal submission to the Mongolian rule. This allowed them to defend the Russian lands from western attack and to strengthen their own authority. Examples of this policy were the princes of northwestern Russia and Moscow.⁹ An outstanding instance of a prince who followed this policy was Alexander Nevsky, who died in 1263 and was later canonized by the Russian church. He succeeded in stopping the advance of the Swedes, Germans, and Lithuanians upon the northwestern territories of Russia.

The policy of other Russian princes consisted in attempts to free themselves from the Mongolian yoke with the help of the west. This attitude was particularly characteristic of such western Russian princes as Daniel of Galicia. He expressed his readiness to recognize the authority of the Pope and in return received a crown in 1255. But a crown was not in itself sufficient, and military assistance did not arrive, so that Daniel was forced in the end to submit to the Tartars. The Mongolian power up to the fourteenth century thus encompassed both eastern and western Russia.

4.

In the middle of the fourteenth century the power of the Khans of the "Golden Horde" began to fail. Continuous internal strife agitated the center of authority. One pretender rose against another. The decline of the "Golden Horde" is explained partly by the indecision of the Khans in their cultural policy. The other Mongolian kingdoms which formed the Mongolian Empire gradually transformed themselves under the cultural influence of the locality they occupied. In China the Mongolian Khan became converted to Buddhism and the Chinese rapidly absorbed the Mongolian invaders. In Persia the Khan accepted Islam, and the Mongolian Kingdom was transformed into the Persian Empire. If the Mongolian Khans in Russia had become converted to Orthodoxy they would in all probability have converted their kingdom into a Mongolo-Russian state. This, however, did not take place. With all their patronage of the Orthodox church, the Khans of the "Golden Horde" eventually became converted not to Orthodoxy but to Islam. This circumstance prevented the foundation of a Russian

⁹ Moscow, which was first mentioned in the chronicles of the twelfth century, began to acquire great significance in the fourteenth century.

state with its center in Sarai, and led to the long historical process of development of the Russian state centering in Moscow, which was to include in its population a portion of Turko-Mongols.

Moscow rapidly gained strength under the power of the "Golden Horde" and in the end of the fourteenth century occupied the leading position among the eastern and northern Russian principalities. But, simultaneously with the creation of this internal Russian center at Moscow, an external center came into existence in the west in the form of the Lithuanian state. The Lithuanian tribes began to unite in the second half of the thirteenth century. The concentration of power in the person of the Grand Duke originated at the beginning of the fourteenth century. The Lithuanian princes, taking advantage of the waning power of the "Golden Horde," succeeded in the middle of the fourteenth century in occupying a considerable portion of western Russia. Russian princes and towns frequently submitted to the Lithuanians without resistance, in order to free themselves from the Tartar yoke. In the sixth decade of the thirteenth century, the Grand Duke of Lithuania, Olgerd, not only occupied all the Russian principalities west of the Dnieper, but extended his sway as far as the Black Sea.

Russian influence was very strong in the Lithuanian state. The Orthodox culture of the Russians was at a higher level of development than the pagan Lithuanian culture. Russians served in the army and in the palace of the Grand Duke of Lithuania. But the Lithuanian principality was not converted to Orthodoxy, due to the fact that at the end of the fourteenth century Lithuania fell under Polish influence when the Grand Duke Yagailo was offered the Polish throne. He accepted the offer and was converted in 1386 to Roman Catholicism. At first the union between Poland and Lithuania was only personal, each state living an independent political life. But the union had great political consequences. The pagan nobility of Lithuania was rapidly converted to Catholicism and took on Polish characteristics. A part of the Russian nobility in Lithuania followed the same course. An important consequence of this was that there were no religious and cultural ties between the Lithuanian nobility and the greater part of the population of the principality.

The unification of Poland and Lithuania had great importance

in the defense of both these states against the German Teutonic Knights. In 1410 the united Polish and Lithuanian-Russian forces defeated the German Knights in a decisive battle at Tannenberg, at the same spot where the Russian army of General Samsonov was crushed by the Germans in 1914.

5.

In the middle of the fourteenth century internal dissension began to disrupt the Horde. Several pretenders to the throne of the Khan appeared and finally one of the pretenders, Mamai, succeeded in seizing the supreme power. During the weakening of the Horde, Moscow grew in strength and finally revolted. In 1380 Dimitri, Grand Duke of Moscow, defeated Mamai in a bloody battle at Kulikov Meadow on the upper reaches of the river Don.¹⁰

The victory had immense psychological significance, but at the same time it was not decisive. The Russian losses in the battle were very large, as was the expense of the struggle. Meanwhile, there was the prospect of a long-drawn-out conflict with the Tartars.

Soon after the battle of Kulikov, a revolt occurred in the Horde and Mamai was overthrown by a new pretender, Tokhtamysh. The new Khan was a vassal of the Turko-Mongol conqueror, Timur, who like Genghis Khan was an outstanding general and military organizer. Tokhtamysh was greatly strengthened by the patronage of Timur, and soon after his triumph in the Horde undertook a campaign against Moscow. On this occasion Dimitri Donskoi did not venture to struggle with the Tartars but retreated from Moscow to the north of Russia. Moscow was taken by the Tartars and pillaged in 1382. Dimitri was forced to submit again to the Horde.

The authority of the Horde over Moscow continued from this time for some scores of years; but submission protected Moscow from Lithuanian conquest, for the Horde undertook the struggle against the Lithuanian-Russian army. A terrific defeat in 1399 on the river Vorskla brought an end to the Lithuanian invasion.¹¹

But the support of Timur did not long give strength to the "Golden Horde." He died in 1405 and soon after, in the early fifteenth century, the Horde was again torn by internal dissension. Several Tartar princes transferred their allegiance to Moscow and

¹⁰ Thereafter Dimitri was surnamed Donskoi (of the Don).

¹¹ The battle took place near the spot where in 1709 Peter defeated the Swedes.

Lithuania, bringing their armies with them; others pursued an indecisive policy between the Horde and Moscow, fighting sometimes against the Horde and sometimes against Moscow. In 1445 the Grand Duke Basil of Moscow was captured by Ulu-Makhmet, Khan of an independent Tartar group. This event was quite unexpected even to the Tartars themselves, and they apparently did not know what to do with Basil. Finally he was released from captivity on condition that he collect a large ransom. To collect the ransom Basil was accompanied to Russia by many Tartar princes with their supporters. It appears that some of them entered his service at that time. The Grand Duke Basil was accused in Moscow of bringing the Tartars to the Russian land, of giving them towns and counties for exploitation, of loving the Tartars, and of oppressing the Russians and taking gold and silver from them to give to the Tartars.

The Tartars who had originally come to Russia as agents of a distant power now appeared in the capacity of servants of the Russian government of the principality of Moscow. The Grand Duke Basil was to satisfy the Tartar princes with Russia towns and counties. In return they supported him. The more farsighted among Russian statesmen understood that this general admission of the Tartars to service in the government of Moscow signalized the end of the Horde. About the year 1452 Basil gave to one of his faithful Tartar aides, Kasim, the life tenancy of a town on the river Oka. The creation of a vassal Tartar state on the southeastern frontier of the Grand Duchy of Moscow was a threat to the newly created Tartar kingdom at Kazan. The ruler of Kazan, Makhmut, and Prince Kasim were brothers, but their close relationship seemed only to stimulate their enmity, Kasim being prompted by revenge for his murdered father. The kingdom of Kazan was thus weakened at the very outset of its existence. The Horde was crumbling. Besides Kazan, another new Tartar kingdom came into being in the Crimea. The "Golden Horde" continued to occupy Sarai for several decades, but was now very weak. The Grand Duke of Moscow, Basil, ceased to be its vassal.

6.

As we have seen, the Mongolian yoke bore for a longer time on the northeastern half of Russia than upon the southwestern half. For

this reason Mongolian influence exercised was stronger in Moscow than in Lithuania. It found expression in many aspects of the Russian governmental and social structure. The most substantial effect was felt in the political thought of the Russian people. The Mongolian state was built upon the principle of unquestioning submission of the individual to the group, first to the clan and through the clan to the whole state. This principle was in the course of time impressed thoroughly upon the Russian people. It led to the system of universal service to the state which all without differentiation were forced to give. Under the influence of Mongolian ideas, the Russian state developed on the basis of universal service. All classes of society were made a definite part of the state organization. Taken altogether, these ideas amount to a peculiar system of state socialism. The political theory developed into a finished plan later, in the Moscow Kingdom and the Russian Empire; but the basis of the idea of state service was laid down during the period of Tartar domination.

The Mongolians also introduced a new view regarding the power of the prince. The power of the Khan was one of merciless strength. It was autocratic; submission to it was unqualified. This view of the authority of the prince was transferred to the Grand Duke of Moscow when the rule of the Khans was weakened. When the last threads of Tartar control were broken by Moscow, the dukes of Moscow openly regarded themselves as absolute monarchs and considered their people completely subject to their will. All lands within the boundaries of his state were claimed by the duke to be devoted to the interests of the state. The current theory was that the prince was the sole owner of the land, and that all other persons merely had the tenure and use of it temporarily.

Besides the general influence upon the conceptions of sovereignty, the Mongolian domination brought with it a number of administrative changes. Under Mongolian influence a system of taxation was evolved in Moscow.¹² The Mongolian census of the population was the basis for the later census of the Moscow state. The Mongolians also introduced a postal system. Finally, Moscow borrowed its military organization from the Mongols. Cavalry was the basic military force. The division of the mounted army into five corps and the arms borne were all copied from the Tartars.

¹² Many Russian financial and administrative terms were borrowed from the Tartars.

7.

THE Mongolian influence, both psychological and administrative, was felt principally in Moscow. With the gradual expansion of the Moscow principality the Mongolian practices in political organization began to spread all over northeastern Russia. In Moscow itself the Mongolian ideas were only accepted after a struggle with the old Russian ideas. Thus, for example, the new theory of the state was in the course of development for two centuries following the first Mongolian invasion. During this time the authority of the Grand Duke of Moscow over the eastern territories of Russia grew. In the fourteenth and the first half of the fifteenth centuries, the Moscow Grand Duke was only one of the eastern Russian princes. His power, however, waxed greater with each decade. Political authority in the Russian lands was divided among a great number of princes, and in every principality the prince had direct authority only over part of its territories, the rest being controlled by nobles or monasteries. The nobles, or *boyars*, served the prince, but in turn were served by others. There resulted a complex system similar to the feudal organization of western Europe; but Moscow feudalism was accompanied by less division of power. The forces of union were stronger than the forces of division. With each decade the ascendancy of the Moscow prince increased, leading to the creation of the Moscow monarchy.

The slow assimilation of Mongolian ideas was particularly noticeable in the development of civil law. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, even in Moscow itself, the old principles of civil law were strong, and during this period the old ideas continued unmolested in northwestern Russia in the city states of Novgorod and Pskov.¹³ In northwestern Russia as late as the fifteenth century, private ownership of land was the dominant system.¹⁴ The ancient traditions of pre-Mongolian Russian law were retained in southwestern Russia. The old customs were supported by the influence of Roman and Byzantine law which penetrated into western Russia through Poland and Moldavia.

¹³ These ideas were clearly expressed in the *Court Laws* passed by the Pskov *Vieche* in 1467. This interesting monument of jurisprudence was a direct continuation of the ancient "Russian Law." See Chap. II, Secs. 3 and 5.

¹⁴ A number of ancient deeds of the fifteenth century are still extant.

8.

THE Mongolian period is of great importance in the history of the Russian church. As we have noted above, the Mongolian Khans acted as patrons of the Orthodox church. The Russian metropolitans received from the Khans their licenses (*yarlyki*), by which the rights of the church and the integrity of church property were guaranteed. The organization of the Russian church in the Mongolian period remained for the most part unchanged. It continued to form one metropolitan district, but the metropolitan shifted his residence from the southwest to the northeast. Cyril III, who died in 1280, lived during the greater part of his tenure of office in Vladimir. Metropolitan Maxim, who held the office from 1283 to 1305, moved the seat of the metropolitanate definitely from Kiev to northeastern Russia, and under Metropolitan Peter, Moscow became the permanent seat of the head of the church.¹⁵ But the Metropolitanate long continued to bear the name of "Kiev and All-Russia." Following the transfer of the metropolitan seat to Moscow and the formation of a separate political organism under the Grand Duke of Lithuania in southwestern Russia, efforts were made to organize a separate western Russian metropolitan district. At the same time the founding of a bishopric in Sarai, the capital of the "Golden Horde," was of great importance. The Bishop of Sarai played an important part in the Russian church, especially in the second half of the thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth century.

The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were characterized by the multiplication of monasteries in northeastern Russia. The severity of the Mongolian rule led to a widespread desire among many men to leave the world and devote themselves to a spiritual and ascetic life. The monk went into the forests, built a cell for himself; there he and sometimes two or three disciples would spend their time in religious exercises and prayer. If the monk were a man of high moral outlook and spiritual purity, capable of exercising an influence upon other people, the news of his exalted life spread to neighboring villages and other monks joined him to assist in his religious exercises. The monks were also followed by laymen in

¹⁵ The seat of the Metropolitan was officially fixed in Moscow under Metropolitan Alexis.

search of consolation and advice. This led to the creation of villages around the monasteries. Contributions of money and of land were made to the monasteries to induce the monks to pray for the souls of the contributors. The monasteries continued to grow and prosper even after the founders died. Stone churches and walls were built to protect the monks from robbers. Such was the usual development of many north Russian monasteries, the most important of which was St. Sergius Trinity Monastery forty miles from Moscow.

The monks were the pioneers of colonization in northeastern Russia and their influence was of great cultural importance. The old Russian monastery was also a wayside inn, a school, and a hospital. If the monastery was wealthy, it also became a bank. Monasteries had libraries and so were frequently centers of study to which the princes and statesmen turned for religious, historical, and legal information. The cultural rôle of the Russian monasteries continued through to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.¹⁶

To a greater degree than before the Mongolian invasion, the church and the monasteries directed the intellectual life of Russia, affecting literature and art. During the Mongolian period painting reached a high point of development—that is, religious icon-painting. Especially popular were the icons of Novgorod. The most famous of Russian icon-painters of the time, Andrew Rublev, who died about 1427, was a monk of the Trinity Monastery.¹⁷ Russian icon-painting of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries may be regarded as one of the highest artistic expressions of mankind.

¹⁶ In the eighteenth century the spiritual demands of the Russian people changed and the knowledge which the monasteries contained was less sought. For the same reason their importance decreased. In the middle of the eighteenth century a great number of monasteries were closed by the Imperial Government (see Chap. VIII, Sec. 1, and in the twentieth century the remaining monasteries were closed by the Soviet Government.

¹⁷ The art of Rublev has some features in common with that of the Italian Fra Angelico, a contemporary.

CHAPTER IV.

RUSSIA FROM THE MIDDLE OF THE FIFTEENTH TO THE END OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

(1452-1598)

I.

IN the middle of the sixteenth century the Russian people began an advance upon the south and east. This colonizing movement is connected with the expansion of the Polish, Lithuanian, and Moscow states, but also continued independently of these states. On the extreme southwestern frontier, the Russian people, as has been noted, reached the Black Sea at the end of the fourteenth century, but they were pushed back from it at the end of the fifteenth century by the Crimean Tartars. The Russians, however, retained a firm hold over the Dnieper River as far as the cataracts. Along the Don and Volga they advanced rapidly during the sixteenth century, and Russian armies conquered the middle and lower Volga.

A line of towns connected by fortified works supported the colonizing activity of the Moscow state. The expansion continued particularly in the region of the Ukraine following the absorption of Little Russia by the Moscow state in the seventeenth century. The Cossacks, meanwhile, advanced to the east of the Volga. The southeastern boundaries of Russia were populated both through the efforts of the state and the natural process of migration. People fled from state taxes and serfdom. In the second half of the seventeenth century migration was further increased by the persecution of religious dissenters.

On the northeastern front, in the course of less than a century, from the middle of the sixteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth century, Russian colonists occupied the enormous area of Siberia as far as Kamchatka.

2.

IN the second half of the fifteenth century the Grand Duke of Moscow, Ivan III, succeeded in annexing almost all the hitherto independent cities and principalities of northern Russia—Novgorod, Tver, and the small principalities on the upper Oka.¹ The Duchy of Moscow became a powerful military state and under the able direction of Ivan III extended its influence far into the Islamic world. Emissaries of Moscow penetrated as far as Herat.

In the fifteenth century, as we have seen, the Tartar kingdoms of Kazan and Crimea broke free from the "Golden Horde," while in Kasimov another Tartar kingdom was formed under the suzerainty of Moscow. Ivan III succeeded in stirring up enmity between the Tartar kingdoms, and profited by the struggle between Kasimov and Kazan, as well as by the struggle of Crimea against the "Golden Horde." In the year 1480 Ivan shook off the last vestiges of his own subjection to it.

In the sixteenth century the situation changed. Moscow failed to maintain its alliance with the Crimean Kingdom, and found itself confronted by an alliance between Kazan and the Crimea directed against the Duchy of Moscow. But the Kasimov Tartars remained faithful to Moscow and with their assistance Ivan the Terrible, grandson of Ivan III, annihilated the kingdom of Kazan and annexed the whole of Kazan to Moscow in 1552. Following this conquest, Astrakhan was subjugated in 1556. Siberia paid homage to Moscow in 1555. The real annexation of Siberia, however, took place later, following the expeditionary campaign of a Cossack force under the command of Yermak in 1584.

While expanding rapidly in the east, Moscow also fought bitterly for the restitution of Russian lands held under the dominion of Lithuania. The rulers of Moscow were descendants of Vladimir the Saint, and laid claim to the western lands which he had possessed, as their heritage. Moscow's struggle with Lithuania was long and stubborn. Years of peace were the occasion only for preparation of new wars. At first, success lay with Moscow, and in the beginning of the sixteenth century its army occupied Smolensk.

The danger of conquest by Moscow threw Lithuania into a closer

¹ Pskov and Riazan were annexed by Moscow at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

alliance with Poland. During the fifteenth century and the first half of the sixteenth century, Poland and Lithuania were united only by the bonds of a dynastic union in the person of a common king. Even this bond was temporarily broken when the unity of rulership was interrupted. The joint activities of Poland and Lithuania during this period was that of two allied countries rather than that of a single power. In the middle of the sixteenth century the situation changed. Poland, taking advantage of Lithuania's difficulties with Moscow, urged the complete unification of the two states. The union took place in 1569 on conditions disadvantageous to Lithuania. Prior to the final agreement of union, half the Lithuanian lands were ceded to Poland.² Under the treaty of union, Poland and Lithuania were to have a single king whom they were to elect jointly, a single Senate of landlords called the *Rada*, and a joint representative body called the *Seim*. Each retained its own army, taxes, and laws.

Following the union of Poland and Lithuania, the latter disappeared as an independent political force.³ The powerful new state, under the leadership of Poland, became Moscow's chief enemy in the west. Meanwhile Ivan the Terrible was engaged in war not only with Lithuania but also with the Baltic states which interfered in Russia's communications with Europe through the Baltic Sea. This drew Russia into war with Sweden. The situation became acute for Moscow, when Stephen Batory, one of the greatest military leaders of his time, occupied the Polish throne in 1576. For several years thereafter the Russians were defeated by the Poles and were forced to retreat. Moscow was saved only by the heroic defense of Pskov, which repelled the fierce attack of Batory. In 1583 Ivan the Terrible was forced to conclude a disadvantageous peace both with Poland and with Sweden. Moscow lost all the lands conquered from Lithuania with the exception of Smolensk, as well as the gains in the Baltic area. Sweden received in

² The best lands of Lithuania were included in this cession: The southern territories, including Kiev and comprising almost the whole of Ukraine. White Russia remained Lithuanian.

³ In 1791 the last vestiges of Lithuanian independence were destroyed by Poland. (See Chap. VI, Sec. 8.) Lithuania later was annexed by Russia in the third partition of Poland. In 1918 Lithuania regained her independence, but in 1920 Polish forces seized the city of Vilna and the territory around it, which the League of Nations later awarded to Poland.

addition a portion of the Baltic coast which had long belonged to Russia.⁴

3.

IN the pre-Mongolian period of Russian history, as we have seen, three principles underlay the organization of Russian political authority: the monarchical, the aristocratic, and the democratic. These three principles became identified with three regions in Russia. The monarchical principle triumphed in Moscow, the aristocratic principle in Lithuania, and the democratic principle in northwestern Russia—Novgorod and Pskov—from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries. But at the end of the fifteenth century Novgorod was annexed by Moscow and the power of the *vieche* was destroyed. In the sixteenth century the same fate was suffered by Pskov, and the last remnants of the independence of Novgorod were eradicated by Ivan the Terrible.

The democratic principle did not disappear, however, with the annexation by Moscow of the northern dominions. It reappeared in the south of Russia. The Cossack communes were governed on a democratic basis. They originated in the south of Russia in the middle of the fifteenth century. During the weakening of the Turko-Mongol state, the intervening region between the "Golden Horde" and Russia was occupied by Russians and Tartars who desired to break away from the restrictions imposed upon individuals by both states. These settlers not only occupied themselves with peaceful labors but were also obliged to be ready for armed defense of their homes. They further took advantage of their occupation of the frontier regions to rob the trade caravans which connected Russia with the "Golden Horde." The Tartars called these independent frontiersmen Cossacks. This name was also adopted by the Russian frontiersmen. The Cossacks gradually formed themselves into groups in order to increase their military force. In the middle of the sixteenth century two Cossack states came into existence, formed by the merger of separate groups and communes: the Host of the Don in southeastern Russia; and the Zaporog Host⁵ in southwestern Russia. These Cossack states were pure re-

⁴ This portion was returned to Moscow several years later but was lost again during the "Time of Trouble" (Chap. V, Sec. 5).

⁵ *Zaporog* means literally "beyond the cataracts," i.e., those of the Dnieper River.

publics. Authority was vested in the Ataman or Hetman,⁶ elected by the whole population. He possessed no independent power but was merely the executive of the Cossack popular council, called the Circle. Only during campaigns did the Ataman acquire dictatorial power over the whole Host; but with the termination of the campaign he had to give a full account of his administration to the Circle. The Circle chose, also, an assistant to the Ataman and the Chancellor of the Host. The Circle was the highest judicial authority and wielded unlimited power over the life and death of the whole population of the state. The usual punishment for serious offenses was death by drowning in a river. In the Cossack republics there were no class differences; all were regarded as equal. There was no private property in land; all the land belonged to the whole Host and individual Cossacks were given only the right of temporary use of the ground they occupied.

The absence of class differences attracted a constant stream of people of the lower classes of Poland and Russia to the Cossack lands. The number of settlers from Moscow increased especially during the second half of the sixteenth century when the institution of serfdom made its appearance.⁷ At first agriculture played only a small part in the life of the Cossacks. Their customary occupation in peace time was hunting and fishing. They bought grain from Moscow, and in later times received grain as a subsidy. In the seventeenth century classes began to form in the Cossack state. The old settlers on the Don, having permanent homes, came to be called "house-owning" Cossacks, while the newcomers who possessed no property were called *golytba* or shelterless (literally "naked"), and formed the unsettled element. The *golytba* often played an active part in the political difficulties of Moscow, as during the "Time of Trouble" from 1605 to 1613, and during the revolt of Stephen Razin in 1671. In the seventeenth century the Cossack state gradually lost its independence. The Host of the Don in 1614 became the vassal of Moscow; and in return the Moscow Government furnished the Cossacks with firearms and supplies for the struggle against the Turks. But during the whole of the seventeenth century the Host of the Don had complete control over its internal affairs.

⁶ This word is derived from the German "Hauptmann" which came to the Cossacks through Poland and Lithuania.

⁷ See below, Sec. 6.

4.

IN the Russian territories which became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the kingdom of Poland, there developed an aristocratic society. From the end of the fifteenth century the power of the Lithuanian Grand Duke was limited by an aristocratic council of *boyars* known as the *Rada*. The council comprised the nobles (*Pany*) who were the hereditary rulers of large feudal estates. The nobles retained all the important posts in the government: those of Hetman or commander of the troops; of chancellor or keeper of the royal seal; and of financial controller. Besides the *Rada* there was also an assembly known as the *Seim*, composed of all the landowners both large and small, as well as a small number of representatives from the towns. But actually the nobles had a preponderating influence in the *Seim*. Only the landowners and a part of the townsmen had political representation in Lithuania. The peasants were subject to limitations in their rights, which gradually restricted their freedom, particularly on privately owned estates. From the middle of the fifteenth century the peasants were forbidden to move from privately owned land to state lands. Their condition rapidly approached that of slaves.

The social structure of the Russo-Lithuanian state was defined in the code of laws known as the Lithuanian statutes. This was drawn up in the first half of the sixteenth century, but was twice revised. In 1588 the statutes were printed in Russian. They represent a fully developed, systematically written code, having great juridical significance. Concerning themselves largely with questions of civil rights and property interests, they indicate a high degree of juridical knowledge and a considerable development of the principles of civil rights in the Russo-Lithuanian state. But like the political structure itself, the legal principles were chiefly to the advantage of the upper class of landowners and townsmen.

5.

Moscow developed the third type of Russian political organization of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—the type destined to become the basis of Russian political evolution in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As we have seen, the concept of absolute power of the Moscow ruler was borrowed from the Mongols.

But besides this, the influence of Byzantine ideas was also observable—such as the sanctification of the state by the church, and close union between the church and the state. The coronation of Ivan IV in 1547 reflected these ideas. The promotion of the Moscow Metropolitan archbishop to the rank of a patriarch was the next step toward Byzantinization.⁸ The creation of this dualism of tsar and patriarch was a limitation upon the independence of the Moscow rulers, which led in the seventeenth century to a conflict between church and state.

In the sixteenth century the Moscow rulers engaged in a stubborn struggle with the upper class in Moscow society. The *boyars* of Moscow were composed of different groups. There were first the old *boyar* families—some closely related to the Moscow princes—which had been in Moscow before it became the center of the Russian lands. Second, there were the descendants of other Russian princes, but not of the Moscow dynasty. Finally, there were the *boyars* of the annexed principalities. The former independent princes, now brought to Moscow in the capacity of *boyars* of the Moscow tsar, could not reconcile themselves to the loss of their political power and were ready at all times to join in movements against him. Inasmuch as many of these princes and *boyars* were large landowners and controlled great numbers of armed supporters, their opposition could easily lead to armed conflict. However, Ivan took the offensive. He organized the *Oprichnina*, a band of faithful servants, and crushed the *boyars* and princes before they revolted against him. It was only following the defeat of the *boyars* that the Moscow tsar could consider himself an autocrat.

The autocracy of the Moscow tsars was of a peculiar character. The political structure of their kingdom was not identical either with that of Byzantium or with that form of absolutism which later developed in St. Petersburg, along western lines. The peculiarity of the Moscow Government consisted in the close contact between the rulers and the people. The state combined a strong central power with independence of the local *mir* or commune. This form of self-government was less a privilege of the inhabitants than their duty to the state—which explains the fact that the electors were responsible to the central government for those elected.

⁸ This actually took place at the end of the sixteenth century.

Local self-government in Moscow had two main functions—judicial and financial. In each department of the Moscow state there was an annual congress of all the representatives of the inhabitants. At these congresses a judicial commission was elected for one year to suppress crime. The chief of this commission was an elder chosen from among the landlords. There also operated in the sixteenth century a financial commission having powers over townsmen and peasants, but not over the landowning classes. Financial committees were elected locally, and the landowning classes over which they had no authority took no part in the elections. Thus self-government was more restricted in character in the financial than in the judicial sphere.

The principle of self-government was applied by the Moscow state, not only in respect to local affairs, but also to general concerns of the whole state. In the second half of the sixteenth century the tsar from time to time called in Moscow a popular congress or *Zemsky Sobor*. These congresses reached their fullest development, however, only in the seventeenth century.

6.

THE sixteenth century was a period of great social changes in the Moscow state. Three important tendencies in development must be noted: the decline of the former landed aristocracy or the *boyars*; the creation of a new order of landholders, or *pomiestchiks*; and the restriction of the freedom of the peasants to move from the land they occupied. These tendencies were closely related. The *Oprichnina*, organized by Ivan, was the connecting link of the whole system. Its formation was one of the most dramatic incidents of Ivan's struggle against the *boyars*.

In the end of 1564 Ivan unexpectedly and secretly left Moscow and moved to a village called Alexandrovskaja Sloboda near the Trinity Monastery, and from there dispatched word to Moscow that he had abandoned the tsardom because of the treachery of the *boyars*. In reply there came a delegation from the terrified citizens of Moscow with a request that he remain their tsar. Ivan agreed on condition that he be given absolute power and authority to pursue the "traitors." He demanded an extension of customary authority by the creation of a private household and a separate do-

mestic guard for himself.⁹ The new courtiers, known as the *oprichniks*, became the chief weapons of Ivan the Terrible in his struggle with the *boyars*. The significance of the *Oprichnina* was that it permitted Ivan to lead an entirely new sort of life. The "traitorous" *boyars* were not admitted to the new court. Ivan chose his courtiers from the younger generation, without regard to seniority or nobility. Having thus modified the character of the state, Ivan could freely deal with anyone whom he suspected of treachery, and particularly with the *boyars* and princelings. Wholesale executions took place. In 1570 the city of Novgorod was destroyed. While the executions disposed of individuals, Ivan's economic reforms ruined entire families of *boyars*. Gradually he appropriated all the towns and counties where the *boyars* and princes had ancestral estates. He deported the former owners to frontier zones where they were unknown. Their lands were distributed among the *oprichniks* of the tsar. Thus Ivan the Terrible destroyed the former social and governmental organization of Russia, the patrimonial *boyar* system, and created the new order of *dvorians* or courtiers. The new court was organized along the lines of a monastery, where humble prayer alternated with wild orgies, and where the *oprichniks* or court adherents were "brothers" and wore black garments.

The *oprichniks* ran riot for almost seven years, during which time they accomplished their purpose of weakening the aristocratic *boyars*. The further activity of the *Oprichnina* by this time threatened the Government itself. While able to suppress traitors, it was helpless against the foreign enemy, without the aid of the old landowning class or *zemschina*.¹⁰

The activity of the *Oprichnina* in the sixteenth century may be compared with that of the Communist party of the twentieth century. The difference is that the terror of the *Oprichnina* was di-

⁹ The word *Oprichnina* means exactly "separate" or "private" household or court.

¹⁰ In 1571 the Crimean Khan, Devlet Girei, managed to occupy Moscow and after plundering the town to burn it. When in 1572 Devlet Girei repeated the invasion, the forces of the whole Russian state were mustered and he was defeated. Following these events the *Oprichnina* declined. A reaction set in. The former landowners received back their lands, and the *oprichniks* received other lands instead.

rected against the higher *boyars*, while the communists attacked the whole *bourgeoisie*. The rule of the *Oprichnina* was accompanied, as has been pointed out, by the creation of a new landowning class, or *pomiestchiks*, the holding of land being made dependent upon service to the tsar.¹¹

As a result of this method of land distribution, Ivan the Terrible succeeded in creating a new ruling class, which remained the basic political force in the Russian state until the middle of the nineteenth century. The land given to the *pomiestchiks* was populated by peasants. In the middle of the sixteenth century these peasants were freemen—that is, they had the right to move from their land, following the autumn harvest, to lands belonging to other proprietors. This freedom of migration proved unprofitable to the *pomiestchiks* and the Government began to limit the peasants' right to move freely. During a period of economic hardship due to the Lithuanian war, the Government proclaimed certain years as "prohibited." The peasants were deprived of the right to move from the estate of one landowner to that of another during such years. This law was first applied in the year 1581. Following the death of Ivan a census of the population and a survey of lands in the Moscow state were made; and the peasants were registered as being fixed to the land which they then occupied, and were thenceforth regarded as serfs.¹² The peasants were thus fixed to the land, but not to the proprietor. The serf was not the personal property of the landowner, or a slave, as were the house slaves or *kholops*. Even after the institution of serfdom, the peasant retained his civil rights: he could sue in court, and own both land and slaves.

7.

ONE of the consequences of the political division of Russia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was a separation of the Russian church into two parts: the Moscow and the Lithuanian

¹¹ This was called *pomiestie* and replaced the former patrimonial estate.

¹² The compulsory attachment of the peasants to the soil was reinforced by their indebtedness to the landowners. The majority of the peasants of any estate borrowed from the owner to build houses, purchase cattle, and so forth. Prior to the Government's action in fixing the peasants to the soil, the indebtedness of the peasants had been tending to the same result.

branches.¹³ As we have seen, unity of church organization in Russia was retained during the Mongolian period, but during the struggle between Moscow and Lithuania the preservation of this unity became increasingly difficult. In the middle of the fifteenth century Lithuania succeeded in establishing a metropolitan district in Kiev, independent of Moscow and dependent directly upon the patriarch of Constantinople. Thus the Russian church broke into two metropolitan districts, that of Kiev and that of Moscow, both of which, however, formed part of the patriarchate of Constantinople. Actually the Moscow church became autonomous, and the metropolitans were elected by a congress of Russian bishops following the year 1448.

With the fall of Byzantium, Moscow began to regard itself as the chief center of Orthodoxy. The Moscow church experienced during the sixteenth century a profound emotional upheaval and together with this an intensification of religious and nationalistic problems. The internal peace of the Moscow church was, however, greatly disturbed by the dispute over church property and the relation between church and state in the first half of the sixteenth century. One party, headed by Nil Sorsky, opposed the ownership of land and other forms of wealth by the church and the monasteries, and took a stand against close relationship between church and state. A second party, headed by Joseph Volotsky, defended the right of the church to own land and advocated close relationship between the church and the state. Permission to monasteries to own property was motivated not by considerations of personal interest, but by the social value of the monasteries and their benefit to the state. The struggle was won by the second party, and in the middle of the sixteenth century the principle of close relationship between church and state became firmly established. An important exponent of this view was Metropolitan Makary, one of the leading Russian churchmen who stood at the head of widespread cultural movement. Under his direction, and partly with his personal assistance, religious and secular historical material was collected. Metropolitan Makary called a congress of churchmen in 1551 to correct evils in the church, which were openly admitted in the resolutions

¹³ The Cossack states did not have separate church organizations. The Zaporog Host was connected with the Orthodox church of Lithuania, the Host of the Don, with Moscow.

of the congress.¹⁴ The religious and political views of Metropolitan Makary were derived from Byzantium. He believed that the Orthodox state should have two heads, the tsar and the patriarch. The institution of tsardom originated in Russia at the time of the coronation of Ivan the Terrible in 1547. In accordance with the Byzantine doctrine of the time, Makary urged that Moscow should have a patriarch—that is, that the metropolitan of Moscow should be raised to that dignity. In view of the fact that a long preparation in Constantinople was necessary before the program could be executed, the patriarchate was introduced in Moscow only following the death of Makary. In 1589, Jeremiah, the patriarch of Constantinople, agreed to the foundation of a patriarchate in Russia. During the next year a congress of eastern patriarchs in Constantinople confirmed the action of Jeremiah. The patriarchate of Moscow and All-Russia was placed in the fifth or last category.¹⁵

At the time that the Moscow church was experiencing its national and spiritual revival, the Metropolitanate of Kiev was fighting a battle for existence. The second half of the sixteenth century was marked in the history of Europe by the sudden revival of Catholicism. The order of Jesuits gave militant Catholicism new life and succeeded in regaining many countries where Catholicism seemed to have become so weak as to be obliterated by the reformed churches. Among these countries was Poland. Popular feeling in Poland changed rapidly in the middle of the sixteenth century. The Jesuits advanced Catholic propaganda in an energetic struggle with Lutheranism. They succeeded in arousing religious fanaticism in Polish society. This emotional upheaval coincided with the military success of Stephen Batory against Moscow. Batory patronized the Jesuits, considering their activity of great assistance to the energetic foreign policy of the Polish-Lithuanian state against Moscow. The Jesuits turned from a struggle against Protestantism to one against Orthodoxy. The situation of the Orthodox population in Poland became difficult. The political unification of Lithuania and Poland in 1569 was completed at a time when

¹⁴ The Congress was known as *Stoglav* or "Hundred Chapters," in view of its resolutions, which numbered one hundred.

¹⁵ The order of patriarchates was as follows: Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, and Moscow. Following the institution of the patriarchate in Moscow, four Russian bishops were raised to the rank of metropolitans.

the Lithuanian and Russian Orthodox population had no cause to fear religious oppression on the part of Poland; but following the victory of the Jesuits in Poland, such oppression became inevitable.

The nomination of Orthodox bishops was interfered with by political interests of the Polish state. The king chose bishops, not from among the best of the Orthodox, but frequently from among the worst. The highest religious authority, the patriarch of Constantinople, was too distant and too powerless to protect his subjects. The protection of the Orthodox church was left to the laymen. Some nobles who had remained Orthodox, such as Prince Ostrozhsky, and principally merchants in the cities, began to form unions or brotherhoods to support the church. The Ostrozhsky family gave it contributions and organized a printing establishment for the publication of church books. The Orthodox bishops, however, were dissatisfied with the excessive interference of laymen in church matters. The western Russian bishops met at a congress in Br est in 1591 and complained to the king. Two of them secretly announced to the king that they were ready to accept the authority of the Pope. In the end of 1594 several bishops signed a declaration expressing the desirability of union of the churches. At the end of 1595 the two bishops who had addressed the king at the Brest congress were received in Rome by Pope Clement VIII. Following their return the Polish king issued a manifesto announcing the union of the churches and called a church congress in Brest.

The congress met in October, 1596, and the irreconcilability of the Orthodox and Uniate churches became immediately evident. The Orthodox representatives broke away from the congress and met separately. The advocates of unity passed their resolution of submission to the Pope. The advocates of Orthodoxy denounced submission. There were thus two congresses at Brest in 1596, each having its own resolutions. Instead of unity there took place a schism of the western Russian church into Uniate and Orthodox groups. In the eyes of the king and of the Polish and Lithuanian governments, the Uniate congress at Brest was the only one that received official recognition. Basing his policy upon the resolutions of this congress, the king could pursue his bitter struggle against the Orthodox church.

8.

RUSSIAN literature from the sixteenth to the seventeenth century concerned itself with the political and religious problem which agitated the society of the time. We must distinguish during this period between the literature of Moscow and that of Lithuanian Russia. This difference, however, gradually disappeared toward the end of the seventeenth century. The literature of Moscow was saturated with national feeling. An effort was made to describe the earlier development of the state. The "Chronicle of the Princes of Vladimir" tells of the triumph of Prince Vladimir Monomakh in the twelfth century following a war with Byzantium in which he had won rich booty. The Byzantine emperor, desiring to be friendly with Vladimir, sent him expensive gifts and among them a crown.¹⁶

The most important historical work of the time was the "Book of Degrees" (*Stepennaia Kniga*), i.e., of generations. This work is not a mere chronological account of Russian history but a carefully analyzed Russian history, tracing the course of national and religious development.

The literature of Lithuanian Russia was devoted primarily to the problems of religious life. Western Russia, as we have seen, was forced to conduct a constant internal struggle in order to preserve its own church and nationality from the incursion of Catholicism and Polish nationalism. This struggle created a need for religious and historical literature. Another favorite subject was the analysis and rebuttal of arguments advanced by Catholic propaganda. The development of Russian theology was advanced by the foundation of seminaries. In the beginning of the seventeenth century a theological academy was founded in Kiev, following the model of the Jesuit colleges. In 1682 a Greek seminary was founded in Moscow, which five years later became known as the Greco-Slavo-Latin Academy.

The development of natural and mathematical sciences in Russia was greatly retarded during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The rather obvious development of astronomical science kept the form of medieval astrology.

¹⁶ This refers to the crown of Monomakh, part of the imperial regalia of the Moscow tsars, now preserved in Moscow.

Printing, which was the new technical means of advancing literature and education in general, came to Russia long after its invention in the west. The first printed Slavonic books were published in Cracow, Poland, in 1491 and in Prague, Bohemia, in 1517-19. In 1525 printing began in Lithuanian Russia in the town of Vilna. In the end of the sixteenth century there were ten printing establishments in western Russia. They worked slowly, however. The first printing establishment in Moscow was founded in 1553. Its work was soon suspended and started again only in 1568, after which it developed very slowly. Prior to 1600 hardly a score of books were published in Moscow. In the seventeenth century, following the "Time of Trouble," the work of the Moscow printers developed more rapidly. From 1613 to 1682, almost five hundred books were published, most of which were of a religious character and a smaller proportion of lay interest.

9.

WHILE Russian painting attained notable development during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the sixteenth century witnessed high achievements in architecture. Before the sixteenth century, Russian church architecture reflected for the most part Byzantine influences and, to a lesser degree, influences from the Near East. In the fifteenth century several Italian masters were called to Moscow, the most famous of whom was R. Fioravanti, nicknamed Aristotle. They were ordered to follow the existing architectural forms. For this reason the Moscow cathedrals of the fifteenth century are to a certain extent copies of the cathedrals of Vladimir of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Italian influence was more prominent in lay architecture, as witnessed by the style of the walls and towers of the Moscow Kremlin, and the palaces of the Moscow Grand Duke. A direct result of the labor of the Italian masters was the extraordinary beauty of the Kremlin, constructed in the Italo-Byzantine style. In the sixteenth century Byzantine influence in architecture disappeared. Russian churches of the next two centuries belong to an entirely new style of architecture, distinguished by a turret-like structure. The new Moscow architecture was a copy in stone of wooden buildings. Contemporary architecture in wood had developed in accord with the influence of popu-

lar tastes and needs. The Moscow architecture of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, therefore, is profoundly national in character; but the influence of the Near and Middle East cannot be denied, particularly in some of the architectural details.¹⁷

Russian painting did not pass through changes as far reaching as did architecture. The Novgorod school of icon-painting fell into decay with the general decline of Novgorod. A new center was founded in Moscow. In the seventeenth century the Moscow school became more and more subject to western, and particularly to Italian, influences. The icons of Simon Ushakov, who lived from 1626 to 1686, represent an effort to combine the new Italian and the old Byzantine styles of religious painting.

¹⁷ These influences came through Turkestan and probably also through the Crimea.

CHAPTER V.

RUSSIA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

(1598-1696)

I.

THE unceasing wars of the sixteenth century had an exhausting effect upon the Moscow state. The internal situation of Russia at the end of the sixteenth century was greatly confused. The social reforms of Ivan the Terrible had resulted in governmental patronage of the middle classes at the expense of the upper and lower classes. These reforms aroused keen dissatisfaction in both these classes: the *boyars* were discontented with the diminution of their political and social influence; the lower class, the peasantry, was discontented with the institution of serfdom.

Popular discontent was expressed in the events of the "Time of Trouble" in the beginning of the seventeenth century. An uprising occurred which appeared to be purely fortuitous. But the events leading to it were effective only because the ground had been prepared. In 1598, following the death of the childless Tsar Fedor, son of Ivan the Terrible, the old dynasty came to an end. This circumstance was of great importance in the eyes of people of the time. If the dynasty had continued, it could have endured for a long time by mere inertia; but the change of dynasty opened the doors to political speculation. The *Zemsky Sobor* elected a new tsar, Boris Godunov, in 1598. He had been the actual ruler during the last years of the reign of Ivan IV and the whole of the reign of the weak-willed Fedor. Godunov was one of the organizers of Ivan's social and administrative system and the policies of government therefore did not change when he ascended the throne. But Boris did not have the authority of the former tsars, despite his election by the *Zemsky Sobor*. Immediately following his election, the *boyars* commenced to plot against him. Their intrigues, becoming connected with foreign complications, endangered his position.

The Moscow *boyars* provided a new candidate for the throne, a young man of no prominence, who had been brought up under the delusion that he was the Tsarevich Dmitri, youngest son of Ivan IV.¹ The Pretender Dmitri announced himself in Poland. The Polish king and the Jesuits saw in him a powerful weapon for the furtherance of Polish diplomacy and Catholic propaganda. With Polish aid, the Pretender organized a small army of Russian refugees and Cossacks. Greatly inferior to the regular army of Moscow, it none the less succeeded, in view of the widespread discontent in Moscow, in reaching the capital. Boris, meanwhile, died, and Dmitri was victorious. The victory of the Pretender led to further uprisings. The original intrigue of the *boyars* and the Poles, having shaken the Government's authority, resulted also in stirring up a revolt among the lower classes against the middle and upper classes. In the ensuing conflicts, the false Dmitri was killed and the throne was occupied by a representative of the *boyar* party. Disorder, however, continued, and a new false Dmitri—a candidate not of the *boyars* but of the lower classes—advanced against the *boyar* tsar.

The social uprising had two phases: first, a radical movement of peasants and slaves, which was not unlike the Communist Revolution of 1917, whose object was to annihilate all the more wealthy people in the country. At the head of the uprising was a runaway slave, Bolotnikov. His army was, however, defeated by the troops of Moscow and he was executed. The second phase of the movement was of a more moderate character, and was conducted by the Cossacks, who succeeded in occupying half of the Moscow state. The civil war continued until the tsar, who was supported by the *boyars*, was forced to abdicate; the second false Dmitri was killed, and Russia fell into a frightful state of anarchy. Armed bands wandered about the country, robbing everyone on their way. The Poles and Swedes took advantage of the civil war to occupy Russian territory; the former seized Moscow and Smolensk, the latter occupied Novgorod. The patriarch of Moscow, Hermogen, having refused to recognize the legality of Polish dominion in the capital, was imprisoned by the invaders and died of starvation.

¹ The true Dmitri had been in fact killed when a child, in 1591, under circumstances giving rise to the belief that Boris Godunov was responsible for the murder.

The seizure of the capital by the Poles and the death of the head of the church, brought about a nationalistic and religious reaction. At the initiative of K. Minin, a Nizhni-Novgorod merchant, an army was mustered from among townspeople of the Volga and north Russia. The army was commanded by Prince Pozharsky who succeeded in securing the support of the Cossacks and with their aid in defeating the Poles and occupying Moscow in 1612. In the beginning of 1613 a *Zemsky Sobor* was called, which elected a young *boyar*, Michael Romanov, tsar of Russia.

2.

THE suppression of the uprising was effected primarily through the initiative of government officials and townspeople, that is, the middle classes of society. Thus it may be said that the social program of Ivan the Terrible and Boris Godunov triumphed in spite of all difficulties. The new government, however, ceased to struggle against the upper class or *boyars*. They had no important political position in the seventeenth century, but retained their social privileges. The *boyar* Duma or council continued to function, but its composition was changed by the admixture of recently created noblemen.

The new government was on friendly terms with the Don Cossacks, assisting them with grain and weapons,² but it continued the earlier policy toward landowners and peasants. The members of the government service class were supplied with land. Control over all lands was vested in a special estates office in Moscow (*pomestny prikaz*). This government agency controlled both the *pomesties* and the patrimonial estates (*votchiny*).³ Thus aristocratic landownership was combined with the *pomestie* system. The Government demanded military service from each land category.

In 1619 a new census of all the holdings in the state was made to bring order into the land question following the confusion of the "Time of Trouble." The state support of the land tenure was connected with the binding of the peasants to the land. As we have seen,⁴ in the end of the sixteenth century the Government had declared certain years "prohibited" (*zapovedny*), that is, it refused to permit peasants during these years to move to other lands. The

² See above, Chap. IV, Sec. 3. ³ For the meaning of these terms see Chap. IV.

⁴ See Chap. IV, Sec. 6.

same policy was pursued during the first half of the seventeenth century and freedom of movement was entirely forbidden to peasants in 1649. This led to increased peasant desertion. Escaping from serfdom, many peasants made their way to the Don or to eastern Russia, which at that time was sparsely populated and was a welcome hiding place from the Government.

It was only due to the discontent of the peasant masses and to the large numbers of outlawed peasants that the revolt of Stephen Razin could assume such large proportions. Razin was the ataman of the *golytba* of the Don.⁵ In search of plunder and food, a large number of Don Cossacks, headed by Razin, forced their way down the river Volga to the Caspian Sea and, crossing it, entered the mouth of the river Yaik (subsequently Ural) in 1667-68. They established friendly relations with the Kalmyks, and in 1668 attacked the Persian possessions on the southwestern shores of the Caspian Sea. The Cossacks occupied an island near the Persian shore and in the course of several months brought there a tremendous booty. In 1669 they returned with their booty to the Don. The representatives of the tsar in Astrakhan allowed them to pass and took only a number of the guns captured by the Cossacks. Razin returned to the Don with the reputation of a brilliant ataman. He now regarded himself as sufficiently strong to attack Moscow. In 1670 he opened his campaign on the Volga. The towns of Tsaritsyn, Astrakhan, Saratov, and Samara were taken. The government officials and all representatives of the central power were tortured and put to death by Razin. The lower classes were conscripted into the Cossack army. To give the appearance of legality to his movement, Razin spread rumors that he was accompanied by the tsarevich of Moscow and the patriarch. The revolt of Razin extended over an enormous area, including all the middle and lower Volga. The Cossacks were joined by peasants and by non-Russian tribes in these regions. Razin advanced as far as Simbirsk, where he was defeated by government troops. He fled to the Don, but was seized by the house-owning Cossacks and handed over to Moscow. In 1671 he was executed.

3.

FOLLOWING the disturbances of the beginning of the seventeenth

⁵ See Chap. IV, Sec. 3, on the "Golytba" of the Don.

century the importance of the *Zemsky Sobor* or assembly, which had been organized in the middle of the sixteenth century, grew considerably.⁶ The *Zemsky Sobor* was called by Minin and Prince Pozharsky when they were organizing their army in 1612. It elected a new tsar in 1613 and convened thereafter almost uninterruptedly until the middle of the century.⁷ It concerned itself with questions of foreign policy, such as the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace, as well as questions of internal policy, such as taxation and legislation. It had also the important right of petition, which it exercised freely. The *Zemsky Sobor* was divided into two *palaty* or chambers. The *boyar Duma* acted as the higher chamber in lay matters and the *Sobor* or assembly of churchmen in church matters. The lower chamber was composed of representatives of the people, chosen on a basis of combination of two different principles—representation of classes and professions as well as geographical representation. The *Zemsky Sobor* contained members of all classes of society—state employees, landowners, traders, craftsmen, and peasants—and also delegates of the provinces of which the Moscow state was composed. The franchise was given to house-owning heads of families.

The powers of the *Zemsky Sobor* were determined not by law but by custom. The tsar called it because he felt he needed its practical assistance. Especially important in the internal development of the Moscow state was the *Sobor* of 1648-49, by which the new code of laws was passed. The code of 1550, drawn up under Ivan the Terrible, had become antiquated. Especially following the "Time of Trouble," a great many new *ukazes* or decrees of the tsar and *boyar Duma* had accumulated. Part of these were inscribed in the books, but the books were inaccessible. The disorder in the recording of laws was the cause of irregularity in the courts. The malpractice of the courts evoked serious discontent among the people. Acceding to repeated petitions, the Tsar Alexis organized a commission under Prince Odoevsky to formulate a new code of laws. The code was examined and passed by the *Zemsky Sobor* and immediately published in two thousand copies. This work was a great novelty, as the previous code had never been printed. The

⁶ See Chap. IV, Sec. 5.

⁷ After the meetings of the council became rarer and its existence was terminated in 1682.

code of Tsar Alexis Michaelovich was drawn up under the influence of Lithuanian statutes and Byzantine law. The material in it was arranged strictly according to chapters and sections. The code had an immense significance in the history of the Russian state as well as in Russian law. It was the basis of Russian legal relations for almost two centuries until superseded by the code of 1832.

4.

IN the seventeenth century the economic development of Russia entered a new phase, for which conditions had been prepared in the sixteenth century and which reached its peak in the eighteenth to twentieth centuries. Prior to the sixteenth century the principal occupations were hunting, fishing, agriculture, and cattle raising. By the sixteenth century, wild animals had been almost completely driven out of central Russia. In search for fish and fur-bearing animals the Cossacks were forced to move farther and farther to the east and southeast—Siberia and Yaik. Central Russia was extensively cultivated in the sixteenth century. The soil was becoming poor and required a great deal of fertilization. The three-field system of agriculture, a more intensive form than the single field system, was widely applied in central Russia during this period and remained the prevailing system among the peasantry to the twentieth century.

From the middle of the sixteenth century the Moscow state entered into closer trade relations with western Europe.⁸ Those responsible for the improved contact were foreigners, principally the English, Dutch, and Swedes. The pioneers of sea trade with Moscow were the English. In 1553 an English expedition was organized to discover a northern sea route to India. Three ships, under Sir Hugh Willoughby, left England. Two were lost, but the third, under Richard Chancellor, succeeded in entering the White Sea and reaching the mouth of the northern Dvina. Instead of India the expedition "discovered" Muscovy. Chancellor visited Moscow, where he was received by Ivan the Terrible, and from that time close relations were maintained between Moscow and England. A new town, Archangel, sprang up shortly at the mouth of the

⁸ During the middle ages, in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, Russia traded primarily with central Europe through the Hanseatic League. The center of this trade was Novgorod.

Dvina, and in England the Muscovy Company was organized for trade with Russia. Ivan the Terrible gave this company the privilege not only of free trade with Russia but also of transit trade with Persia. Archangel was also visited by the Dutch and the Swedes, who received certain privileges but less than the English. Gradually the Dutch outstripped the English. In 1582 nine English ships entered Archangel to six Dutch, while in 1638 out of eighty ships entering Archangel, only four were English and the majority of the rest were Dutch.

In the middle of the seventeenth century, urged by the demands of Russian merchants, the Government took away from foreigners the greater portion of their privileges. The English lost the right to free trade. The foreigners were also deprived of the right to retail trade. Russian merchants desired to be the exclusive intermediaries between foreign merchants and the Russian consumers and producers.

The principal exports from Russia during this period were forest products, pitch and gum; the products of cattle raising, skins, fat, and bristles; of hunting, furs; of agriculture, grain and linen; and to a lesser extent manufactured articles, cloth and burlap.⁹ The chief imports into Russia were manufactured articles and arms. The annual volume of trade through Archangel during the second half of the seventeenth century probably reached the sum of a million rubles.¹⁰

The development of industry in Moscow was also due primarily to the enterprise of foreigners. In 1632 a Dutchman, Vinus, organized a metallurgical establishment near Tula. All the ammunition produced at the Vinus works was supplied to the state. Following this, other similar factories soon grew up. In the middle of the seventeenth century foreigners started several paper factories near Moscow. During this time home industries rapidly developed in the Moscow state.¹¹ In the northern wooded regions the peasants and enterprising individuals extracted pitch and potash; in Yaroslavl they manufactured burlap; and in many places the peasants

⁹ This in 1653 constituted only 2.5 per cent of the exports from Archangel.

¹⁰ The purchasing power of a Russian ruble at the end of the seventeenth century equaled approximately seventeen rubles of the twentieth century prior to the World War, or about \$8.50.

¹¹ Home industry in Russia is known as *kustarnaya*. This name is derived from the German *kunst*.

made nails and various metal articles. The productivity of Russian industry in the seventeenth century was, of course, not very great, but its steady growth cannot be questioned.

5.

THE "Time of Trouble" was terminated by the election of Michael as tsar of Russia in 1613; but the struggle with foreign enemies, the Poles and the Swedes, continued for several years longer. A peace was concluded with Sweden in 1617, by which Novgorod was returned to Russia but Sweden retained Ingria on the south-eastern shore of the gulf of Finland. The Moscow state was thus cut off from the Baltic Sea, and Archangel was its only port for direct communication with Europe.

A year after the peace with Sweden, the Government of Moscow concluded a temporary settlement with the Poles. Smolensk remained in the hands of Poland and another war in 1631-32 failed to change the situation. It was evident that the strength of the two opponents was approximately equal and the continuation of the struggle seemed to bring no benefit to either. The Polish state, however, was shortly afterward weakened from within. Following the Polish-Lithuanian union in 1569, a considerable area of western Russian lands was absorbed by Poland. The Russian peasants became the serfs of Polish landlords; and in addition to social oppression, the Russian population suffered religious persecution in view of the fact that the Orthodox church was regarded as an illegal organization after 1596.¹² The Polish Government further attempted to subject the Zaporog Cossacks to its control. The policy pursued by Poland stimulated hatred against Polish rule among the Russian population. This eventually led to a general uprising along the river Dnieper, headed by the Zaporog Cossacks with their Hetman, Bogdan Khmelnitsky, who had succeeded in concluding an alliance with the Crimean Khan against Poland.

At first the fortunes of war favored the Cossacks, but in 1650 the Crimean Tartars betrayed Khmelnitsky and he was defeated. A peace was concluded with Poland under terms which accorded to the Cossacks certain privileges but limited their numbers to 20,000. The peasants meanwhile remained in a state of serfdom.

The peasants were unwilling to accept this settlement and began

¹² See above, Chap. IV, Sec. 7.

to migrate in large numbers to the Moscow state, settling in unoccupied lands along its southern boundaries. They were joined by the Cossack Host. The *Rada* or council of the Ukrainian Cossack Host, which met in Pereyaslavl in 1654, unanimously decided to offer its allegiance to the Moscow tsar. Khmel'nitsky attempted to secure recognition of the privileged position of the Cossacks as a condition of allegiance to Moscow, but the Moscow envoy refused to accept conditional submission. The Cossacks abandoned their reservation and swore allegiance to the tsar. Later, the tsar of his own will granted the privilege of self-government to the Cossack Host. The annexation of the Ukraine was a very important event in the political history of Russia. It made the Moscow tsar the actual tsar of all Russia. The annexation of the Ukraine, moreover, granted to Moscow a decisive superiority over Poland.

Poland could not agree to the loss of Ukraine without war. At first Russia was successful in the conflict, but misunderstandings arose between the Moscow Government and the Ukrainian Cossacks. Hetman Ivan Vygovsky, who succeeded Khmel'nitsky, passed over to the side of the Poles. The changes in Cossack policy were due to internal dissension. The Cossack officers favored an agreement with Poland, as they were in sympathy with the aristocratic organization of Polish society and hoped to receive from Poland the privileges of their class. The mass of the Cossacks sympathized rather with Moscow. The pro-Polish policy of Vygovsky was, therefore, not supported by the Cossack troops. A considerable portion of the Host remained faithful to Moscow and elected a new Hetman. These events greatly lengthened the war with Poland, and it was only in 1667 that an agreement was signed to maintain peace for thirteen and a half years. Moscow abandoned its claims to Lithuania, but retained Smolensk and acquired the left bank of the Dnieper as well as the city of Kiev.¹⁸

6.

THE annexation of southwestern Russia by the Moscow state coincided with an acute crisis in the religious and political consciousness of the people. This was connected with the activities and the personality of Patriarch Nikon. The controversy took two forms:

¹⁸ Kiev, which is situated on the right bank of the river, was ceded by the Poles for a period of two years, but remained permanently in the hands of Moscow.

first, in regard to the relationship between church and state, or the tsar and the patriarch; and secondly, in regard to church ritual, resulting in the dissension of the "Old Ritualists."

The Metropolitan of Novgorod, Nikon, was elected patriarch in 1652. He was of peasant origin and started life as a village priest. He later came to Moscow where, following the death of his children, his wife entered a convent and he entered the Solovetsky Monastery in the White Sea. Subsequently Nikon was made *Igumen* or Abbot of the Kozhezero Monastery, and later *Igumen* of a monastery in Moscow. During his second sojourn in Moscow, Nikon acquired an extraordinary influence over the tsar, and ascended the patriarchal throne with thoughts of organizing an orthodox state in the basis of close coöperation between the tsar and the patriarch. His high opinion of the patriarchal power found expression in the conditions which he presented before accepting the throne. The tsar and the whole ecclesiastical *Sobor* or assembly promised Nikon "to obey him in everything as a shepherd and a father." Nikon officially took the title of Great Sovereign.

Nikon's conditions were accepted by Tsar Alexis. The policy of the state and the policy of the church were to be completely co-ordinated. Both were guided by the same ideas; both were conducted by the same individuals.

The delicate question of church policy was that of the Ukraine, which was a metropolitan district of the patriarchate of Constantinople. In the first half of the seventeenth century the Metropolitan of Kiev, Peter Mogila, brought about some changes in the ritual of his church, attempting to bring it closer to the Greek church. In order to annex western Russia to Moscow, Tsar Alexis and Patriarch Nikon had to create conditions which would induce the western Russian church to accept the sphere of authority of the Moscow patriarch. To do this it was necessary to alter the ceremony of the Moscow church along the same lines as that of Kiev. This reform in ritual was undertaken by Patriarch Nikon simultaneously with the efforts of Moscow diplomacy to annex southwestern Russia.

The first steps toward reform of the Moscow ritual were undertaken in the spring of 1653. One of the changes urged by Nikon was that the believers while crossing themselves should join three fingers symbolizing the Trinity, and not two fingers symbolizing

the dual nature of Jesus Christ as was the ancient custom in Russia. This question became a burning issue within the church and was more important to the masses than the reform of the service books carried through by Nikon. In 1654 a church council was called in Moscow which approved the reforms of Nikon in church books and ritual.

The reforms, however, aroused deep indignation among the Russian Orthodox masses, and the most devoted church people were the most irritated. The measures carried through by Nikon were directed against the whole idea of the "Third Rome" which dominated the Russian consciousness since the fifteenth century. Moscow, it was argued, was the Third Rome—Rome, Constantinople, Moscow. How could Moscow, the center of religious life, admit of mistakes which were to be corrected following the model of the Greeks, who from the time of the Florentine union were suspected of Romanism?

Nikon did not pay any attention to the opposition but used his authority to carry through his policies. The opponents of the ecclesiastical reforms were threatened with exile. But Nikon did not long remain patriarch. In the end of the sixteen-fifties he came into sharp conflict with Tsar Alexis, not so much over personal differences as over differences in principle. Nikon jealously held to the views which he had advanced regarding the authority of the patriarch at the beginning of his reign. He believed that his importance was no less than that of the tsar, and regarded it as his right and duty to take a hand not only in church affairs but also in the affairs of the state. He played an important part in the *Zemsky Sobor* and wished to have the tsar consult him in all important matters. Nikon's pretensions to power soon displeased Tsar Alexei and he began to drift away from the patriarch. When Nikon realized that Alexis had ceased to regard the patriarch as of equal power with the tsar, he protested by refusing to fulfil his functions as patriarch. He left Moscow for a monastery which he had constructed some thirty miles away. It was impossible to elect a new patriarch, as Nikon had not abdicated. The management of the Russian church passed to Tsar Alexis. In 1660 the ecclesiastical *Sobor*, by a majority of votes, deprived Nikon of patriarchal powers; but a minority protested so energetically that Tsar Alexis did not confirm the decision of the majority.

A "Great *Sobor*" was called in Moscow in the autumn of 1666, all the eastern patriarchates taking part. The patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch came in person. The patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem sent their representatives. The complainant against Nikon was Tsar Alexis himself. The *Sobor* unanimously decided against Nikon and deprived him of his patriarchal authority. He was exiled to a monastery in northern Russia.¹⁴ His condemnation was the outcome of the political questions arising from the relationship of tsar and patriarch. But the reforms in ritual begun by Nikon were not stopped, and after he was deposed the struggle with the "Old Ritualists" continued.

7.

THE schism of the "Old Ritualists" had far-reaching consequences in the spiritual development of the Russian people. The dissension consumed the most vital forces of the Orthodox church. To the reader of today the causes of the schism must seem small and unimportant, but to the Orthodox believer church ritual was the symbol of religious emotion. The feeling of the faithful was associated with the details of church ceremony. The alterations in ritual were made by Nikon in dictatorial and sudden manner. It was not surprising, therefore, that many believers defended their right to worship in their own way against the measures of either church or lay authorities. The opposition to "Nikonianism" spread not only among ecclesiastics but also widely among laymen. The Government met the dissenters with oppressive measures. The principal leaders of the opposition were exiled—such as Bishop Paul of Kolomna, who protested against Nikon at the *Sobor* in 1654, and Archpriest Avakum, the leader of the earliest "Old Ritualists."¹⁵ Following the anathematizing of the opposition at the *Sobor* of 1666-67, repression was redoubled. Some of the most stubborn dissenters were burned, among them Archpriest Avakum. The executions were carried out by the lay authorities.

When the monks in the Solovetsky Monastery in the White Sea refused to accept Nikonianism, troops were dispatched which sub-

¹⁴ Nikon was permitted to move to his monastery near Moscow in 1681 by Tsar Fedor Alexievich. He died in making the journey, near Yaroslavl.

¹⁵ Avakum wrote an autobiography, one of the outstanding works of old Russian literature.

jected the monastery to a siege which lasted eight years from 1668 to 1676.

The governmental persecution did not succeed in suppressing the movement, but on the contrary evoked a greater religious enthusiasm. The triumph of Nikonianism in the official court resulted in desperation among the dissenters. Great numbers of "Old Ritualists" began to think that the end of the world was coming and that the Antichrist was due to appear, and some began to wish that—since the end must come—it might be hastened. This tendency led many of the "Old Ritualists" to burn themselves. Many scores or hundreds of people would confine themselves together with their spiritual leaders in wooden barns and then set fire to the walls. Such acts of self-immolation were sometimes undertaken upon notice of the approach of government troops sent to arrest the "Old Ritualists"; but sometimes there was no ascertainable external cause. During the seventeenth century over twenty thousand people lost their lives by burning themselves to death; but toward its end the wave of suicidal hysteria began to pass.

8.

DUE to the schism of the "Old Ritualists," the Orthodox church lost many of its leaders. The gaps were filled by churchmen from southwestern Russia. These Ukrainian bishops, priests, and monks filled the churches and monasteries of the Moscow state. Their education bore a Polish impress. Having conducted a constant struggle with the Roman Catholic church, the southern Russian ecclesiastics had unconsciously acquired in part the mentality of their opponents. They brought with them the devices of formal argumentation and theological scholarship. The influence of the southern Russian churchmen imported into Moscow the culture of the Catholic church. But Polish influence had penetrated to Moscow independently. As a result of the long years of Russo-Polish warfare in the second half of the seventeenth century, Poland—defeated—won a spiritual victory over Moscow. Many of Russia's military and diplomatic officers, having been in constant contact with the Poles, were subjected to this influence. This relationship was strengthened by the conclusion of a diplomatic and military alliance with Poland in 1686. Polish customs became the fashion in the Moscow court in the seventies and especially in the

eighties of the seventeenth century. Once the national isolation of Moscow was broken, it was clear that the penetration of western influences would not be limited to the relations with Poland. It was possible to foresee the influence of central and western European powers as well. In Moscow of the seventeenth century there was a suburb where citizens of German and Anglo-Saxon countries lived. They were officers, doctors, craftsmen, and traders. A few foreigners had penetrated to Moscow in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but in the seventeenth century they were numerous. At the end of the seventeenth century many of the Russian political leaders were in contact with foreigners. A decisive moment arrived when these influences reached the tsar himself.

9.

TSAR ALEXIS was married twice. He had several children by his first wife and Peter, born in 1672, was a son by his second wife. Following his second marriage the court was divided into two parties, the first composed of those related to Alexis by his first marriage, the Miloslavskys, and the second of those related to him by his second marriage, the Naryshkins. Both groups had their followers. Each tried to secure the support of the Moscow garrison, called the *Streltsy*. These were infantry regiments organized by Ivan the Terrible. In their free time they engaged in trade and crafts. This created a close contact between them and the city population of Moscow, but it prevented the maintenance of strict discipline among the *Streltsy*. At the time of the death of Tsar Alexis in 1676, the discipline of the garrison was extremely lax. The nervous tension in Moscow caused by the religious disputes of the time was also felt by the *Streltsy*, who thus represented a convenient field for propaganda. Alexis' eldest son, Fedor, who succeeded his father, was a sickly and unenergetic man. Following his death in 1682 an encounter took place between the two court parties. The Naryshkins called the Moscow population to the Red Square to act as a substitute for the *Zemsky Sobor* and "elected" their candidate, the youngest son of Alexis, the ten-year-old Peter, to the throne. They passed by the seventeen-year-old Ivan, Alexis' son by his first marriage.

Two weeks later the opposing party of the Miloslavskys succeeded in arousing the *Streltsy* to mutiny. They broke into the

palace, killed several influential members of the Naryshkin party, and demanded that Ivan be named tsar. As a compromise the Moscow throne was occupied by two co-tsars. Actually, power passed to the Miloslavsky party.

Tsar Ivan was a weak man, incapable of ruling. His eldest sister, the Tsarevna Sophia, a woman of remarkable intellectual energy, was named regent. She attempted to introduce western Russian and Polish influences in carrying out a gradual cultural reform of the Moscow state. Polish influence found expression in questions of foreign policy. In 1686 Moscow concluded a perpetual peace with Poland and an alliance with her against the Turks and the Tartars. Moscow thus joined the great coalition of Christian states of eastern and southern Europe directed against Turkey. Venice and Poland played the leading rôle in the coalition. In 1683 the Polish king, Jan Sobieski, defeated the Turks before Vienna, thus delivering the first blow to the gradually declining power of the Turks. Moscow undertook to destroy the Crimean Tartar state, but the two campaigns of the Moscow troops failed to achieve their object.

Simultaneously with the failure in the south, Moscow's foreign policy suffered defeat in the Far East. During the first half of the seventeenth century Moscow was continually increasing its possessions in the east. Tradesmen and Cossacks, as well as government representatives, rapidly penetrated eastward. Their chief interest was in valuable furs, secured either by trapping or from natives by purchase or taxation. Following the individual pioneers, the administrative system of the Moscow state organized the new territories. As early as 1632 the town of Yakutsk in northeastern Siberia was founded, and in the sixteen-forties the pioneers reached the Sea of Okhotsk. At the same time, they penetrated to the valley of the Amur River, but here they soon met Chinese troops. In 1689 the Moscow state concluded a treaty with China by the terms of which the river remained Chinese.¹⁶

10.

THE failures in foreign policy resulted in a loss of popularity for Tsarevna Sophia's government. Meanwhile, Sophia realized that

¹⁶ The Russians returned to the valley of the Amur only in the middle of the nineteenth century.

with each year the younger of the tsars, in whose name she ruled, Peter was nearing his majority. She knew, as did all her courtiers, that Peter was endowed with extraordinary energy, intellectual curiosity, and a lively temperament. It was clear that as soon as he became of age he would seize power for himself.

During Sophia's rule Peter lived in a village near Moscow. He grew up outside the influence of official royal education, and left to his own resources he made the acquaintance of German technicians from the German suburb at Moscow. Alert and informal, he learned from them all that there was to know about shipping matters, which greatly interested him. Peter also studied arithmetic and geometry. He organized among his playmates unofficial regiments, similar to the Boy Scouts, and put them through military maneuvers.

This period of Peter's life was brought to an end by the news that the party of Tsarevna Sophia was preparing an attempt against his life. He was only seventeen years old at this time but he succeeded in carrying out a *coup d'état* with the help of part of the *Streltzy*. Tsarevna Sophia was arrested and shut up in a convent in 1689.

Peter began to occupy himself on a larger scale with military and naval matters.¹⁷ The direction of governmental affairs fell into the hands of Peter's mother and her group of supporters. An important part was played by the patriarch. The new policy was a reaction against western Russian and Polish influences. But the reaction did not last long. In 1695 came a new war with Turkey. It gave Peter the opportunity to apply his military and technical knowledge. He was anxious to avoid the military errors of Sophia's administration and chose for his point of assault the Turkish fortress of Azov at the mouth of the river Don. Peter attacked Azov with his new disciplined regiments which had formed from the play regiments of his boyhood. In Voronezh he rapidly constructed ships to descend the Don. The first attack upon Azov was unsuccessful, but in the following year, 1696, Peter succeeded in taking the fortress. The capture of Azov he regarded as a successful test of his new army and his new military methods.

From this time on Peter took the reins of power into his hands

¹⁷ He did some sailing in the White Sea near Archangel.

and carried through a policy of close political contact with Europe. The new policy was not merely to open the doors to Polish influence, as under Sophia, but to the countries of central and western Europe.

CHAPTER VI.

THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY


I.

THE reign of Peter the Great opened a new period in Russian history. Russia became a typical state following the European pattern. The administration and the judiciary, the army, and social classes, were reorganized along western lines. The industry and trade of the country developed rapidly, and a great improvement in technical training and sciences took place.

The Russian people in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries reached the natural geographic limits of their expansion: the Baltic and Black Seas in the west, the Pacific Ocean in the east, and the Pamir Plateau in the south. With the exception of the inhabitants of the regions in the southwest—Galicia, Bukovina, and Ugro-Russia—all the branches of the Russian people were united during these centuries in one single state.

But the great triumphs of the imperial period in the history of Russia were accompanied by profound internal disorders. The chief crisis was in the development of the national psychology. The Europeanization of Russia brought with it new political, religious, and social ideas, which were absorbed by the governing and upper classes of society before they reached the masses of the people. Consequently a split occurred between the top and the bottom of society, between "the intellectuals" and "the people." The chief psychological basis of the old Russian state, found in the Orthodox church, was shaken in the course of the seventeenth century, and rapidly lost its influence from the beginning of the eighteenth until the Revolution of 1917.¹ Together with the religious problem, political and social problems took on an acute

¹ At this time an intensification of religious feeling took place principally in the higher ranks of society.



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character. The political emergency was brought about by the cessation of the *Zemsky Sobors* after 1682, which defined the people of political power, and the abrogation of local self-government in 1708.

The Government keenly felt its lack of contact with the people following the reforms of Peter. It soon realized that the majority did not sympathize with the program of Europeanization.² To carry out its reforms, the Government was consequently forced to act harshly, as, in fact, Peter the Great did. Later the concept of absolutism became habitual and traditional. Meanwhile western political thought influenced the Europeanized circles of Russian society, which absorbed ideas of political progress and rapidly became ready to fight absolutism. Thus the reforms of Peter set in motion political forces which the Government later was not capable of controlling.

The political crisis was complicated by social instability. The barriers between classes became sharper as time went on, and the stage was finally reached where only autocratic government was capable of mediating between the various groups in society.

2.

THE character of Peter the Great reached its full development following the Azov campaigns in 1695-96.³ His chief traits were enormous physical energy and persistency combined with intellectual activity and determination. Peter had no respect for traditions and authority. His mind was as constantly in search of knowledge as his hands were of work. Peter could not be inactive for a moment. He was not content with theoretical knowledge, he wanted to try everything himself. For this reason he worked as a carpenter on the docks when he was building the new Russian navy, and pulled teeth when he wanted to learn medicine. But for all that, Peter was of an imperious nature that brooked no contradiction. He demanded that everyone submit without question to his will, and he was capable of great cruelty.

Primarily his concern was the good, not of the Russian people, but rather of the Russian state. His famous order before the Battle of Poltava illustrates this principle: "Do not think of Peter, if

² See below, Secs. 3 and 5, regarding the opposition to Peter.

³ See above, Chap. V, Sec. 10.

Russia remains alive." He made exacting demands both on himself and on others, and stopped at nothing in pursuing the interests of the state as he conceived them. Having acquired a great respect for European sciences and technology, Peter expected the same from all his subordinates. Peter acted impulsively. He succeeded in doing great things: he created a first-class army and the best state chancellery that Moscow had ever had. He also turned his attention to details: he demanded that all his subjects dress in European clothes and shave off their beards.⁴ He personally supervised the exact execution of his orders, making no distinction between large matters or small, and threatened severe punishment for their non-fulfillment.

In carrying out his reforms, Peter completely overlooked the national psychology. For this reason both his admirers and his enemies regarded him as a man foreign to the Russian spirit. But with all his apparent opposition to Russian tradition and habits, Peter was a typical Russian.

3.

THE capture of Azov was the first test of the new "regular" army. Peter realized that Russia was capable of fighting Turkey and securing a foothold on the coast of the Black Sea. He wanted to continue the war with Turkey on a large scale and for this purpose considered it essential to enter into alliances with European states. Thus arose the idea of the Extraordinary Russian Embassy which was to tour the chief courts of Europe. The Embassy left Moscow in the spring of 1697. The personnel included Peter, who traveled *incognito* under the name of Peter Michailov. The route taken by the Embassy was first, Riga, at the time a Swedish town, then Courland, the Electorate of Brandenburg (Prussia), Holland, England, and back through Holland to Vienna. From Vienna Peter was to have continued to Venice, but news arrived from Moscow that the *Streltzy* had again revolted, and Peter hurriedly returned to his capital in the summer of 1698.⁵

The Embassy was not successful in accomplishing what had been planned by Russian diplomacy, namely, the creation of an all-

⁴ Peter succeeded in this only as far as the military officers and civil servants and nobles were concerned.

⁵ Regarding the earlier uprisings of the *Streltzy*, see above, Chap. V, Sec. 9.

European alliance against the Turks. The moment was ill-chosen. Europe was occupied by the struggle between the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons. The only state directly interested in the struggle against the Turks was Venice, and it was just this state that Peter failed to visit. While not succeeding in its purpose, the Embassy of 1697-98 had important consequences. It brought a number of talented Russians into direct contact with Europe and particularly influenced Tsar Peter. He had the opportunity of satisfying his thirst for learning European technique. In Holland and in England, Peter had time to study shipbuilding—in Holland he worked as a carpenter in the shipyard. The Embassy made decided advances toward the cultural Europeanization of Russia.

The Embassy also had diplomatic consequences. It drew the attention of Peter away from the Turks to other matters. He observed that in a number of Baltic states, among them Brandenburg (Prussia), Poland, and Denmark, there was growing the idea of a war with Sweden which then controlled the greater part of the coast of the Baltic Sea. Peter decided to take advantage of this situation and to participate in the struggle. Thus it turned out that Peter went to Europe with the idea of fighting the Turks and returned with the idea of fighting the Swedes.

On his return to Moscow in August, 1698, Peter first investigated the uprising of the *Streltsy*, which had been suppressed before his return. He then began to prepare for a war with Sweden. A treaty was concluded with the Polish king, Augustus II, and King Christian of Denmark, but Peter refused to begin a new war before making peace with the Turks. In the summer of 1700, a Russian plenipotentiary concluded a treaty of peace with Turkey in Constantinople, under which Azov was annexed by Russia. Immediately upon receiving news of peace with Turkey, Peter moved an army to the Swedish town of Narva in the Gulf of Finland.⁶

The war with Sweden began very unfavorably for Peter and his allies. The young king, Charles XII, vanquished Denmark at one stroke and then turned against Russia. The Russian army was defeated at Narva. Charles, thinking that he had finished with the Russians, then turned against Augustus. This drew him away from Russia, and in the expression of Peter, "He got 'stuck' in

⁶ This was the customary move of Moscow in all its wars with Sweden.

Poland." This circumstance was the salvation of Peter. The defeat at Narva did not break his military ambition, but on the contrary gave it a powerful stimulus. There began the feverish activity of Peter in organizing the Russian army along new lines. He dispatched auxiliary forces to Poland and Lithuania to aid Augustus, but his attention was chiefly directed to the Baltic coast.

In the course of 1701-04, Peter conquered Ingria. In May, 1703, he founded the new city of St. Petersburg. Its construction in the swamps of the Gulf of Finland, the conscription of recruits for the army, the supply and transportation of foodstuffs for the army—all demanded great sacrifices from the population. Peter demanded constantly more money and men. Popular discontent found expression in a series of revolts. In 1705 an uprising took place in Astrakhan against "the *boyars* and the Germans."⁷ At the same time another occurred among the Bashkirs, which was suppressed only in 1709. In 1707 the Don Cossacks rose when Peter sent an army to the Don to recapture escaped robbers and runaway slaves. The poorer Cossacks under the leadership of Bulavin overpowered the house-owning Cossacks and the uprising took on a threatening aspect. Peter was forced to send large forces to the Don. Bulavin was caught in Cherkassk, where he committed suicide in 1708. His accomplices took refuge in the Kuban. All these uprisings were suppressed with great difficulty. At one time it seemed that the whole of the southeast of Russia would revolt. The situation was saved by the Astrakhan Kalmyks, whose Khan sent a large military force of over twenty thousand men to aid in restoring order.

Simultaneously the foreign danger grew. Charles drove Augustus from Poland, pursued him to the boundaries of Saxony, and compelled him to conclude a separate peace in 1707. Poland elected a new king, Stanislaw Leszczynski, under the pressure of Charles whom he supported. At the end of 1707 the Swedes moved against Russia. In the beginning of 1708 Charles took the town of Grodno and the Russian army barely escaped a crushing defeat. From Grodno Charles attacked Mogilev; Peter expected a further advance against Smolensk and Moscow, and Moscow was hurriedly fortified. But Charles unexpectedly turned south to the Ukraine without awaiting the arrival from Latvia of an auxiliary corps that

⁷ The term *Niemetz* (German) in popular parlance meant any foreigner.

accompanied large quantities of military supplies and provisions, and relying upon the treachery of Hetman Mazepa.⁸ Charles wisely planned to supplement his military attack upon Russia by an organized political uprising against the Russian Government.⁹ But Charles overestimated the strength of Mazepa, who joined him with an insignificant force of Cossacks. In not waiting at Mogilev, Charles had committed a great mistake. In September, 1708, Peter defeated the auxiliary force near the village Lesnaya and captured the whole Swedish supply train.

In 1709 came the climax. Peter considered it necessary to save Poltava from Charles and Mazepa, for this city was the key to the route to Voronezh, the chief base of Peter's southern fleet, containing large reserve stores of grain. The battle of Poltava was decided principally by the superiority of Peter's artillery. The Swedish army was completely defeated. Several days afterward, the remnants gave themselves up to Menshikov who overtook them at the crossing of the Dnieper. Only Charles and Mazepa succeeded in crossing the Dnieper with a small following and escaped to Turkey. The victory of Poltava had great consequences. Stanislaw Leszczynski was forced to leave Poland and Augustus, regaining the throne, declared war upon Sweden.

Charles did not hasten to return from Turkey to Sweden, but attempted to use his presence there to draw Turkey into war with Russia. His intrigues met with success. Toward the end of 1710 Turkey declared war upon Russia. Peter decided to undertake an offensive war. A European alliance against Turkey proving impossible, Peter returned to the program of his predecessor, Alexis Michaelovich, and utilized for his purpose the sympathies of the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan—the Slavs, Rumanians, and Greeks. He received promises of assistance from the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia, and moved toward the Danube with a small army of not more than forty thousand men. His troops soon began to suffer from lack of provisions which had been promised by the princes but which never came. Having reached the river Pruth, Peter found himself surrounded by a great Turkish army

⁸ Mazepa, planning to abandon Peter, opened negotiations with the new Polish king Stanislaw as early as 1707.

⁹ In this respect the Austro-German forces during the World War followed the precedent of Charles.

of two hundred thousand men. He considered it a stroke of luck that the Turkish vizier agreed to enter into peace negotiations, in which he had to cede to the Turks the town of Azov, secured earlier with such extraordinary efforts.

The Turkish campaign of Peter undermined the military prestige he had acquired by the victory at Poltava, and this protracted the Swedish war. Peter, however, continued it with great energy. In 1714 the Russian fleet was completely victorious over the Swedish fleet at Gangut. Peter also captured the Aaland Islands, and from them he was able to threaten Stockholm. This was the turning point of the war. In 1717-18 peace parleys began between Peter and Charles.¹⁰

These negotiations were broken by the death of Charles, and the war continued for another three years. In the end Sweden was forced to conclude peace. The treaty of Nystadt of August 30, 1721, ceded Ingria, Esthonia, and Latvia to Russia. St. Petersburg—which in the words of Peter was “a window to Europe”—was formally secured. Russia gained easy access to the shores of the Baltic Sea. The struggle of centuries, it seemed, had at last given her a favorable position.¹¹

The Senate presented Peter with the titles of “Father of his Country, Emperor, and Great” (*Pater Patriae, Imperator, Maximus*). The Byzantine idea of the tsar was exchanged for the Latin idea of the emperor. Peter hastened to make secure the position of Russia in the Baltic Sea by a series of diplomatic marriages. One of his nieces was married to the Duke of Courland, and another niece, Catherine, to the Duke of Mecklenburg. Peter also arranged the marriage of his daughter Anne to the Duke of Holstein.¹²

4.

THE great tension caused by Peter's policy of unceasing war called forth constant disorders, first in Moscow, as in the uprising of the *Streltzy* in 1698, and later in the provinces those led by Bulavin,

¹⁰ Charles meanwhile had returned to Sweden from Turkey.

¹¹ By the Brest-Litovsk peace of March 3, 1918, Russia lost all the Baltic acquisitions of Peter with the exception of Ingria.

¹² These Baltic relations of the Russian imperial house later gave considerable anxiety to Russia and frequently exercised an unfortunate influence upon Russian foreign policy.

Mazepa, and others. All these rebellions were successfully suppressed by Peter, thanks to the new organization of the army and of the state. Peter had combined the new European technique with the old Muscovite organization of the army. The secret of the discipline of his army lay in the exceptional importance of the Guards regiments, composed entirely of nobles.

The organs of government were also reformed to comply with European state principles. Russia was divided into governmental provinces in 1708. The Senate was placed at the head of the administration in 1711. Later, to direct the separate functions of the central government "*collegia*" were formed.¹³

In 1716 the Army Statutes were published. They were based on Swedish and German models. The harsh rules of military procedure were applied to criminal and civil offenses in general. Prior to these reforms, the new direction of policy was symbolized by the transfer of the capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg. The "regulated" state created by Peter was based upon the strictest subjection of all persons and classes to its interests. Peter regarded himself as its first servant. The nobility was called upon to give unlimited military service, the merchant and manufacturing classes to give economic assistance, the peasants to supply recruits and supplies to the army and all services connected with it, and also the workmen and horses for the construction of new towns and factories. Taxes were levied upon them. Peter regarded both the privately owned and government-owned peasant serfs as state property. Those belonging to the *pomiestchiks* merely paid smaller state taxes, since they had already had to pay a part to their masters so that these in turn could serve the Government.

The increasing burden of services to the state created extensive dissatisfaction among the people. This reaction was perhaps even more dangerous to Peter than open uprisings. Both the lowest and the highest classes were seething with discontent. The higher circles of the Moscow aristocracy—the *boyars*—were especially disturbed because Peter did not pay respect to seniority, but only to individual capacities.¹⁴ This attitude of Peter was later formulated in the Table of Ranks published in 1722. The lowest rank as an

¹³ The *collegia* were supervised by councils and not by individual Ministers.

¹⁴ Peter in this respect continued along the path set by Ivan the Terrible. See above, Chap. IV, Sec. 6.

officer, that of lieutenant, conferred hereditary nobility on the holder. The aristocracy of service or *dvoriantstvo* replaced the aristocracy of birth. Naturally the hereditary nobles were displeased with Peter's reforms.

The church was also disaffected, as its position was lowered by Peter. He was not an atheist, but his faith was not the traditional Russian faith. Greatly influenced by Protestantism, he believed that the Russian church should be reorganized in accord with the new European models. Protestantism, furthermore, helped to subject the church to the emperor—"Cujus regio, ejus religio."

Under the influence of Protestantism, Peter came to the conclusion that the independence of the church was harmful and that the church should be subordinated to the civil power. Following the death of Patriarch Adrian in 1700, Peter refused to allow the election of a new patriarch. The patriarchal throne remained vacant, and only a guardian for it was appointed.

In reorganizing the higher branches of administration during the second half of his reign, Peter introduced a clerical *collegium* for the government of the Russian church. This body was later renamed the Holy Synod, but its character did not change. Thus, the highest organ of church government became a bureaucratic agency subject to the emperor. The number of the clergy was limited, and Peter passed a number of laws against monasticism.¹⁵ This explains the opposition of the church to Peter.

However, the opposition of the church, the nobility, and the peasantry, was not sufficiently well organized to lead to an uprising against Peter. But it did find a leader very close to the emperor. This was the Tsarevich Alexis, son of Peter by his first marriage.¹⁶ Peter soon separated from his wife and began living with a Latvian prisoner, Skavronskaya, whom he later married and who took the name of Catherine Alexeievna.¹⁷ The political rivalry led to a family tragedy. Following a quarrel with his father, Alexis fled abroad. Fearing that some foreign power would take advantage of Alexis as a means to disturb the internal situation in Russia, Peter

¹⁵ An "all-comic and all-drunken Council" was organized for the amusement of Peter, a grotesque parody of the church ritual. Its principal characters were "Prince Pope" and "Prince Patriarch."

¹⁶ His first wife was Eudokia Lopukhina.

¹⁷ Peter's daughters Anne and Elizabeth, were by his second marriage with Skavronskaya.

sent agents who succeeded by means of fraudulent promises in persuading Alexis to return to Russia. There Alexis was arrested, tried and sentenced to death in 1718.¹⁸ A number of his followers were tortured and executed. After this the opposition subsided, and even following the death of Peter in 1725 it did not immediately reawaken.

5.

At the insistence of the Guards regiments, the widow Catherine was named Peter's successor, but sovereignty passed in fact to the Supreme Secret Council which comprised the leading personages of Peter's new aristocracy.¹⁹ Only one member of the council, Prince Golitsyn, belonged to the old aristocracy. The Supreme Secret Council continued to control governmental affairs even after the death of Catherine in 1727, but very soon the political situation changed. The new emperor, Peter II, the son of Alexis, was only twelve years old. His coronation was followed by a reaction. The old opposition to Peter's reforms raised its head. The church and *boyar* parties reappeared in the political arena. The imperial court moved to Moscow, although St. Petersburg did not cease to be the capital. The membership of the Supreme Secret Council was completely changed by the intrigues of the reactionary group which succeeded in driving out its members one by one. The new members of the council were of the old aristocratic party. Soon, with the exception of Osterman, all the members of the council were of the Golitsyn or Dolgoruky families. When the young emperor died from smallpox before his coronation in 1730, the Supreme Secret Council acted as regent. It decided to invite to the throne one of the Baltic nieces of Peter the Great, Ann of Courland.

Prior to being vested with the imperial power, Ann was called upon to sign certain "Conditions," according to which the actual power in the state passed from the empress to the Supreme Secret Council. The Russian Empire thus became an oligarchy. The news of the "Conditions" in favor of the council aroused excitement among the Guards officers who had assembled in Moscow in great numbers to attend the coronation of Peter II. The city became the

¹⁸ The Tsarevich Alexis died several hours before the execution from nervous shock and the effects of torture.

¹⁹ Menshikov, Tolstoy, Osterman, and others.

scene of unusual political activity;²⁰ meetings were called; plans were made for a Chamber of Nobles in the Government to assist the Supreme Secret Council. It soon became apparent that the majority of the Guards officers were opposed to the oligarchical privileges of the council. They were greatly concerned with questions affecting the limitation of military service,²¹ and desired to end the service of nobles as ordinary soldiers in the Guards regiments. They likewise desired to repeal the restrictions upon the inheritance of noble estates.²² The new empress knew how to take advantage of the discontent of the officers, and promised them civil and economic privileges. The "Conditions" were torn up, the Supreme Secret Council dismissed, and autocratic power triumphed again.

6.

THE reign of Empress Ann was marked by the ascendancy of the German Baltic party at the Russian Court. The persons now favorites of the empress were Biren, Duke of Courland, Osterman, and Field Marshal Münnich. After the death of Empress Ann, during the short reign of Ivan VI, grandson of her sister Catherine, Duchess of Mecklenburg, the members of the ruling German group began to intrigue against each other.²³ This circumstance made a *coup d'état* possible. The officers of one of the Guards regiments called Peter's daughter Elizabeth to the throne and the youthful emperor, Ivan VI, was arrested on January 5, 1742.

The leading members of the group supporting Elizabeth—the Vorontsovs, the Shuvalovs, Chernyshevs, and others—belonged to the Russian nobility. The triumph of the "Russian" party over the "German" did not bring with it a return to the national ideals that prevailed before Peter's time. The German cultural influence at court was exchanged for French culture.²⁴

Russia during the reign of Ann and Elizabeth was not faced with any definite foreign problems and did not succeed in achiev-

²⁰ This excitement was shared only by the nobles. It did not affect the masses.

²¹ Under Peter the nobles were compelled to serve in the army without time limit.

²² See below, Chap. VII, Sec. 6.

²³ A similar circumstance, as we have seen, was the cause of the ruin of the ruling class of Peter's nobility of service, the first Supreme Secret Council.

²⁴ Henceforth French, English, and German influences maintained themselves at court to the middle of the nineteenth century.

ing permanent results with respect to Europe. Austrian and, later, French policies exercised their pressure upon Russia and in part determined Russian activity. During the reign of Ann, Russia interfered in Polish affairs and opposed the French candidate to the Polish throne. This struggle did not affect Russia's interests. War with Turkey also resulted in nothing, despite the brilliant victories of Münnich.²⁵

During the reign of Elizabeth, Russia participated with Austria and France in the Seven-Years' War against Prussia. The war was favorable to Russia. Eastern Prussia was occupied by the Russian army under General Saltykov who, together with the Austrians, inflicted a decisive defeat upon Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf in 1759. Russian troops occupied Berlin, but the death of Elizabeth in 1762 put an end to Russia's gains. The successor of Elizabeth, a nephew from Holstein, Peter III, was an ardent admirer of Frederick and immediately concluded a separate peace. Peter III desired to go even further and to send an army to the help of Prussia against Russia's recent allies, Austria and France. This intention, however, gave rise to an officers' riot, and the Russian throne was given to Peter's wife, Catherine, in 1762.²⁶

The period of almost forty years from 1725 to 1762 between the death of Peter the Great and the coronation of Catherine II was of little significance in the foreign policy of Russia with respect to Europe. Unproductive also in internal changes, it nevertheless had a great significance in the eastern policy of Russia. Precisely at this time a sound basis was laid for the new period of Russian expansion in the east. The main lines of the new eastern policy were laid down by Peter the Great, who set up the guideposts for it in both the Far and Middle East. He attempted to enter into relations with China. He sent a Russian embassy to Peking in 1720-22. He also entered into relations with Japan.²⁷ After the death of Peter Russia concluded a permanent treaty with China.²⁸ Trade relations between the Russians and the Chinese were limited to a single point—Kyakhta-Maimachin on the Siberian-Mongolian border;

²⁵ See the history of this war below, Sec. 9.

²⁶ By birth a German, Princess of Anhalt-Zerbst.

²⁷ When Russian Cossacks occupied Kamchatka in 1697, they met a Japanese survivor of a shipwreck. Peter called him to Moscow and ordered him to teach several Russian children Japanese.

²⁸ The treaty of Burin, confirmed by the treaty of Kyakhta in 1728.

Russia received the permanent right to have a religious mission in Peking, which was at first also a diplomatic mission.

Peter further organized the Behring Expedition which had as its problem to determine the question whether Asia and America were joined.²⁹ Behring's first expedition in 1724-30 had few practical results, but in 1732 the navigator Fedorov and the geodesist Gvozdev stumbled upon the "Great Land," the American continent, at Alaska. In the course of the next decade, from 1733 to 1743, the Russian Government organized the so-called "Great Northern Expedition," which was of immense scientific importance and one of the most remarkable undertakings in the history of science. In 1741 Captain Behring reached the shore of America at latitude 58° 28' N. Captain Chirikov, in charge of another ship, also reached America at latitude 56° N., but was not able to make a landing. From the islands near Alaska, Chirikov's crew brought many valuable furs, which stimulated the initiative of Siberian merchants. The first "merchant sea voyage" was undertaken in 1743, to be followed by many others.

The Middle East attracted Peter's attention no less than the Far East. The objective of his policy in this region was to establish direct trade relations with India. This was not easy to achieve. Peter's first plan consisted in attempting to conquer the central Asiatic Khanates, Khiva and Bokhara. The plan was unsuccessful. A Russian division of troops sent to Khiva was betrayed and destroyed in 1717.³⁰ But the failure did not put an end to Peter's hopes, and in 1721 a Russian envoy was sent to Khiva and Bokhara.

The policy pursued by Peter aroused the fears of Persia, which led to a war in 1722. Persia he regarded as a step on the road to India. One of his contemporaries expressed his policy as follows: "The hopes of His Majesty were not concerned with Persia alone; if he had been lucky in Persia and were still living, he would of course have attempted to reach India or even China. This I heard from His Majesty myself."

The Russian army moved from Astrakhan southward along the western shore of the Caspian Sea, occupying the cities of Derbent

²⁹ The fact that this problem had already been solved by Dezhnev in 1648 was not known in St. Petersburg.

³⁰ Equally unsuccessful was the attempted expansion of Russia into the Middle East from the Irtysh River.

and Baku. By the peace of 1723 Russia received from Persia all the western and southern shore of that sea.³¹ Following the Persian war Peter thought of opening a sea route to India. In December, 1723 two frigates were sent out from Revel. The commanding vice-admiral received two instructions, one ordering him to seize Madagascar, the other to sail to the East Indies and Bengal. The frigates were to sail secretly in the guise of trade ships. The expectation, however, was not carried out as the frigates turned out to be unfit for such a long voyage—one ship sprang a leak as soon as it entered the open sea.

At the time of Peter's death the frontier of the Russian Empire in the Middle East formed an angle from the Altai Range down the Irtysh River to Omsk, and from Omsk to the upper reaches of the Yaik River and thence along the Yaik to the Caspian Sea. The Middle Eastern steppe was at the very Russian frontier. The Yaik was a feeble barrier and the untamed steppe peoples entered and left the territories of the Russian Empire without even being aware of it.

Three leading ethnographical groups had to be taken into consideration at the time by Russian policy. The Bashkirs, the Kalmyks, and the Kirghiz moved over a huge area lying approximately between the Volga River and the Altai and T'ien-shan Mountains.³² The Kirghiz were divided into three hordes—the eldest, the middle, and the youngest. Pressure from the Kalmyks forced them to seek aid from the Russians.

Ivan Kirilov, one of the most outstanding Russian statesmen of the eighteenth century, took advantage of this situation. Kirilov regarded the Kirghiz horde as the key to all Asiatic lands, and insisted upon building a town at the mouth of the river Or in the southern Urals. His plan was to extend Russian domination to the east of the Aral Sea, and he dreamed of "picking up the provinces of Bokhara and Samarkand"—that is to say, of occupying Turkestan.

Empress Ann approved the policy of Kirilov, and he was made

³¹ Daghestan, Shirvan, Gilan, Mazenderan. After the death of Peter the Russian Government renounced these acquisitions in view of the great expense of defending them. They were returned to Persia (1729-35).

³² In the south the Kirghiz met the Uzbeks of Khiva and Bokhara and in the east the Djungar-Mongolians.

leader of the expedition to the river Or. He first suppressed an uprising of Bashkirs who opposed the extension of Russian dominion to the southern Urals and laid the foundation of a new town at the junction of the rivers Or and Yaik in 1736, which was named Orenburg and later Orsk.

Kirilov died in the spring of 1737, but his program was not abandoned. In 1742 the new government agent, who was also a pupil of Peter's, moved the town to another site near the mouth of the river Samara, and fortified lines from Orenburg to Samara and to the Caspian Sea were constructed to protect the unity of the Bashkirs, the Kalmyks, and the Kirghiz. In 1754-55 in view of the oppressive measures of the Russian Government against the Mohammedans, there occurred another Bashkir uprising under the leadership of Batyrsha, who attempted without success to arouse the Kirghiz. Nepliuev, the successor of Kirilov, succeeded in gaining the support of the people who occupied the Bashkir lands as tenants, but although he carried on the ideas of his predecessor, he did not succeed in advancing Russian power to the Aral Sea.

7.

THE reign of Catherine II, from 1762 to 1796, raised new problems in Russian foreign policy, and transferred the attention of Russian diplomacy from the Far and Middle East to the Near East and the west. The Far East was left to the initiative of individual traders. In the second half of the eighteenth century they founded Russian settlements in America, in Alaska, and the neighboring islands. Special energy was shown by the merchant Gregory Shelekhov, nicknamed "the Russian Columbus." He had migrated to Siberia at the age of twenty-eight; in 1777 he had chartered his first ship to the Kuril Islands, and then made voyages to the Aleutian Islands. In 1784 Shelekhov formed a trading company with the brothers Golikov and occupied the island Kadiak near Alaska. From this center the Shelekhov company rapidly increased its possessions on the continent. Its chief activity was the purchase of the valuable furs of seals and beavers from the natives.

In the Middle East the Government of Catherine II aimed primarily to maintain peace among the Turkish peoples by officially supporting the Mohammedan faith.⁸³ In 1785 Catherine published

⁸³ In opposition to the Russian policy during the reign of Empress Elizabeth.

a charter of religious toleration. The Russian Government began immediately to take a great interest in the education of the Kirghiz, and school books were published in the Kirghiz language together with Russian. Mullahs from Kazan were appointed teachers of the natives, in the absence of trained candidates among the Russians and Kirghiz. These measures led to the artificial encouragement of Mohammedanism and medieval Mohammedan learning among the Kirghiz.

8.

IN the west Catherine's foreign policy falls into two distinct periods. The first period, prior to 1780, was characterized by the existence of the so-called "northern alliance" between Russia, England, Prussia, and Sweden. The second period was marked by an understanding between Russia and Austria.⁸⁴ The turning point between the two periods of Catherine's diplomacy was the "Act of armed neutrality" of 1780. It was published in connection with the American War of Independence and favored the revolutionary colonies against England.⁸⁵

The European policy of Catherine was determined by the Polish and the Turkish questions. Her first problem was to determine the fate of the western Russian lands, a large part of which were in the possession of Poland in the beginning of the eighteenth century. The second was to extend the territories of Russia to the shores of the Black Sea, which formed the natural boundary of the Russian state.

The Polish question first arose with respect to the rights of the Orthodox population of Poland and Lithuania.⁸⁶ At this time the Prussian king, Frederick II, was protecting the rights of the Protestants in Poland. Russian diplomacy consequently sought an agreement with Prussia. Meanwhile, the Polish *Seim* rejected the petition of rights of the "dissenters."⁸⁷ This led to quarrels be-

⁸⁴ Austria was an ally of Russia during Catherine's second war with Turkey.

⁸⁵ The "Act of armed neutrality" insisted upon the right of neutral ships to enter into trade with belligerent states and to import all goods with the exception of arms and munitions.

⁸⁶ During the diplomatic *rapprochement* between Russia and Poland in the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Orthodox population of Poland was subjected to Polonization and forcible conversion to Catholicism.

⁸⁷ That is, the non-Catholic portions of the population.

tween the various parties of the Polish nobility, which in turn brought about an intervention of the powers and a partition of Poland. Prussia received western Poland, which was populated chiefly by Poles; Austria received Galicia, populated by Poles and Russians; Russia took Polotsk, Vitebsk, and Mogilev, populated exclusively by Russians. Several years later under the influence of revolutionary ideas coming from France, great changes took place in Poland. On May 3, 1791 the *Seim* adopted a new constitution. The right of *liberum veto* was rescinded; the central power was strengthened. The Constitution of May 3d turned the former loosely knit Polish state into a new centralized state. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was formally incorporated in Poland. In the development of Poland, this Constitution was a great forward step, but with respect to Lithuania and western Russia, it marked the culmination of the policy of forcible Polonization. While the Constitution protected the rights of Polish citizens, it disregarded those of the Lithuanian and Russian population. The publication of the Constitution provoked a civil war in Poland. The conservative sections of the Polish nobility, displeased with the Constitution, requested Catherine to intervene. Russia sent troops into Poland and occupied Warsaw. The second partition of Poland took place in 1793. Russia took a considerable portion of the western Russian lands—Minsk, part of Volhynia, and Podolia.³⁸ Prussia occupied Poznan. What remained of the Polish Kingdom was forced to rescind the Constitution of May 3d. In 1794 uprisings took place in Warsaw and Cracow, organized by Polish patriots, in protest against the plight of their country. The Russian garrison was forced to retreat from the city when about two thousand sleeping soldiers were killed in the night by rioters. A Polish revolutionary government, headed by Kosciuszko,³⁹ was formed. This government declared war upon Prussia and Russia. Catherine sent the best Russian troops, headed by Suvorov, against Poland. In 1794 Suvorov occupied Praga, a suburb of Warsaw.⁴⁰ After this Poland ceased to exist as a separate state. By the third partition

³⁸ The present boundary between Poland and the Soviet Union corresponds approximately to the Russo-Polish boundary after the second partition.

³⁹ King Stanislaw Augustus was arrested.

⁴⁰ Kosciuszko was previously taken prisoner by another detachment of the Russian army.

in 1795, Prussia received Mazowia, with the city of Warsaw; Austria took Little Poland, with the city of Cracow; Russia took Courland, Lithuania, and the western part of Volhynia—that is, territories populated by Russians, Lithuanians, and Letts. As a result of the partitions of Poland, Russia retook possession of all the southwestern Russian lands.⁴¹

9.

A SOLUTION of the Black Sea question was essential to Russia, both for economic and political reasons. Only by reaching the Black Sea and destroying the Crimean Khanate could southern Russia be freed from constant dangers which hindered economic development. As late as the middle of the eighteenth century, Crimean Tartars still made destructive incursions into the Ukraine. The expansion of the Russian state to its natural frontier at the Black Sea demanded great efforts, and took the greater part of the eighteenth century. Under Empress Ann the Government, following the old Moscow custom, constructed a fortified barrier. In 1731-35 the so-called Ukrainian barrier between the Dnieper and the northern Don was constructed. Twenty regiments of territorial militia were settled along this line. The fortress of St. Ann was constructed on the lower Don.⁴²

In 1736 a war with Turkey broke out. It was especially burdensome to Russia in view of the difficulty of conducting campaigns at great distances in the Crimea and Moldavia, but the Russian troops under the leadership of Field Marshal Münnich achieved a series of brilliant victories—the capture of Perekop, Ochakov, Azov, and the battles of Stavuchany and Khotin. The peace of Belgrade of 1739, however, did not adequately repay the enormous effort and the brilliant successes of Russia in the war. All Russia received was a portion of the steppe from the Bug River to Taganrog. It was agreed that the fort of Azov should be torn down and a neutral strip of territory left between Russia and Turkey. Russia, moreover, did not receive the right to have a fleet in the Black Sea. The Government of Elizabeth strengthened the southern boundary of Russia by extensive military colonization. In

⁴¹ With the exception of Kholm, Galicia, Ugro-Russia, and Bukovina.

⁴² This fortress was later renamed for St. Dmitri of Rostov and is now known as Rostov-on-the-Don.

1752 sixteen thousand Serbs settled on the right bank of the Dnieper, and were organized into two regiments. In 1759 new Serbian settlements were established at Lugan and Bakhmut, the settlers receiving liberal allowances of land.

The first Turkish war of Empress Catherine was connected with the Polish complications of the 1760's. When the Polish disorders drew away Russia's forces, Turkey decided to seize the moment for revenge. In 1768 she declared war upon Russia. Though completely surprised, Catherine succeeded in arousing great enthusiasm among her subjects for the conduct of the war. A daring plan of campaign both on land and sea was drawn up. The army under Count Rumiantsev moved to the Danube, while a fleet was sent from the Baltic Sea around the whole of Europe to the Mediterranean. In 1770 considerable success was achieved on both military fronts. Rumiantsev twice defeated the Turkish army, while the fleet occupied the Aegean archipelago, the Turkish fleet being destroyed in the Bay of Chesme. The Russian fleet did not succeed, however, in passing the Dardanelles.⁴³

In spite of the great success of the Russian army and navy, Turkey was far from destroyed. She did not plead for peace, and it was necessary to continue the war. It was concluded only in 1774 by the peace of Kuchuk Kainardji, a village beyond the Danube.

The terms of this treaty were of great importance in Russo-Turkish relations. Russia gave back Moldavia and Wallachia, occupied by the troops of Count Rumantziev, and also abandoned the Aegean archipelago. She received, however, the mouths of the Bug and the Dnieper on the northwestern shore of the Black Sea, as well as the mouth of the Don and the Straits of Kerch on the northeastern shore of the Black Sea. The Crimean and Azov Tartars were recognized as independent of Turkey. Russian traders in Turkey were accorded special privileges. As a matter of principle it was of great importance that the Sublime Porte in one of the articles of the treaty promised "protection to Christians and to their churches," while Russian envoys were given power to confer with the Sultan upon affairs concerning the Orthorox church. Following the Kuchuk Kainardji treaty, Russia established herself

⁴³ An effort to provoke a Greek uprising against the Turks in Morea did not meet with success. The Turks suppressed the rebels with great severity. The Russian forces landed in Morea were too feeble to oppose the Turks.

firmly on the Black Sea, both from a military and a diplomatic point of view. G. Potemkin was made head of the *Novorossiysky Krai* ("New Russian Territory") and showed unusual energy in organizing the territories and developing their economic resources. Security for southern Russia was further advanced by the destruction of the stronghold of the Zaporog Cossacks in 1775 and by the conquest of the Crimea in 1783. Russia sent armies to the Crimea at the request of the Khans, following an intrigue in the affairs of the Crimean Khanate. Several years later, in 1787, under the influence chiefly of English diplomacy, Turkey declared a new war upon Russia. Thinking that Russian forces would be diverted to the south, Sweden also declared war on Russia in 1788. Prussia likewise prepared to attack Russia. Finding herself surrounded by enemies, Empress Catherine II demonstrated a remarkable presence of mind and strength of character. All attacks by the Swedish fleet on St. Petersburg were repulsed in 1788-89. After a preliminary struggle on the coast of the Black Sea the Russian armies, under Suvorov, advanced beyond the Pruth River. Suvorov was victorious at Fokshany and Rymnik in 1789 and he stormed the chief Turkish fortress on the Danube, Izmail, in 1790. With respect to Prussia, Catherine succeeded well in taking advantage of the international situation. She directed the attention of Prussia to a struggle against France where the revolution had just broken out in 1789. Meanwhile, a peace was signed with Turkey in 1791. Russia expanded her possessions along the shores of the Black Sea and the Azov Sea.⁴⁴ The Crimea remained Russian, and new territories in the Kuban were settled by Zaporog Cossacks brought from the Dnieper.

10.

As has been said above, the Empress Catherine II was raised to the throne by an uprising of Guards officers. The Guards consequently became a "Praetorian" group, possessing power to dispose of the Russian throne as it saw fit. Having attained the throne, Catherine made it her object to strengthen her autocratic power and to free herself from all outside influences. She approached this objective first by making every effort to strengthen the state's ini-

⁴⁴ The mouth of the Dniester and Bug rivers in the west, a broad stretch of territory between the Azov Sea and Kuban.

tiative both in internal and foreign policy. According to her political views, the state was called upon to be the chief moving force in Russian education and progress. Second, Catherine attempted to make the imperial power the arbiter in conflicts of interest between the various classes in Russia.

From the very beginning of her reign, Catherine faced powerful political opposition from the nobility. Prior to her accession to the throne, under Peter III, a law had been passed giving its members the right to serve or not to serve in the army as they chose. This manifesto of 1762 also contained promises of political privileges in their favor. When Catherine overthrew Peter III, she had to take into consideration this promise. The nobility meanwhile was preparing plans for a Council of Nobles similar to that of 1730. Catherine, however, did not agree to adopt these plans, and so aroused widespread discontent among the nobles. A series of conspiracies took place, and Catherine decided to counterbalance the political ambitions of the nobility by those of other classes. In 1767 a commission in the nature of a national congress was called to draw up a new code. This commission contained representatives from the nobility, the towns, and the state peasants. It was divided by a struggle between the nobles and the representatives of the towns. At the initiative of Catherine, one of the more liberal nobles raised the question of revising the laws concerning serfdom. The commission was dissolved in 1768 without having come to any agreement.

For a time public opinion was diverted by questions of foreign policy rising out of the first Turkish war. Later, Russia entered into a critical period. The whole southeast of Russia, and the middle and lower Volga and Ural districts were stirred by a Cossack and peasant uprising under the leadership of Emelian Pugachov. An uneducated, illiterate Cossack, he declared himself to be the Emperor Peter III, saved from death. In his name Pugachov announced the abolition of serfdom, and the nationalization of all the peasants belonging to the estate owners. His movement had deep roots in the social unrest of the time, but it was doomed to failure in view of the absence of intelligent leadership. The troops collected by Pugachov were defeated. They had scarcely any officers, for the officer class on the whole remained loyal to the existing *ré-*

gime. Isolated peasant uprisings were suppressed. Pugachov himself was seized in flight, brought to Moscow, and executed in 1775.

The Pugachov rebellion had unexpected political consequences. Under the influence of the social danger, a reconciliation took place between the empress and the nobility. Catherine declared herself the "first landowner." The nobility abandoned their political opposition and received compensation in the form of a number of elective posts in local government and the courts established by the laws of 1775. After this the personal and class privileges of the nobility were confirmed by a special charter in 1785.⁴⁵

The Pugachov rebellion made evident to many Russian statesmen the necessity of solving the peasant question. A new group was formed in opposition to Catherine's policy.⁴⁶ The leaders of this group believed it necessary to limit serfdom and the privileges of the nobility while strengthening the imperial power. They grouped themselves around Catherine's son, the Tsarevich Paul.⁴⁷ A political situation was created similar to that under Peter the Great and Tsarevich Alexis. Paul feared for himself the fate of Alexis. As a matter of fact Catherine was preparing a manifesto depriving him of the succession and naming as heir to the throne her grandson, Paul's son Alexander. But death in 1796 came before she had time to put this plan into execution.

⁴⁵ Simultaneously a charter of privileges was issued to the cities.

⁴⁶ This group may be called the conservative opposition.

⁴⁷ Paul was officially regarded as Catherine's son by Peter III. Catherine herself in her diary names her favorite, Saltykov, as the real father of Paul. It is necessary, however, to note that both physically and mentally Paul closely resembled Peter III. It is also possible to find resemblance between many of the descendants of Paul and the ancestors of Peter III.

CHAPTER VII.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AND FIRST HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

I.

THE outstanding fact of the social history of Russia, in recent times, is the extremely rapid growth of her population. In this respect Russia was second only to the United States, but greatly exceeded all European states. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Russian population numbered approximately fifteen million. This figure varied from time to time in view of wars and revolutions, but the general total remained approximately the same.¹ During the first quarter of the eighteenth century the population did not increase; in fact, it probably decreased in view of the hardships of Peter's reign and its unceasing wars. At the time of Peter's death in 1725, Russia had a population of about thirteen million. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the total rose to forty million, while by the middle of the nineteenth century it had reached almost seventy million.

This rapid growth of population is partly explained by the annexation of new lands to the Russian Empire, but parallel with this there was a natural increase. The great majority of the people of Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth century lived in the country and engaged in agriculture; only a small part lived in cities. The urban population increased rapidly, however, both in absolute figures and in proportion to the whole population. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the population of the cities was only 325,000, of which Moscow had two hundred thousand—that is, no more than 3 per cent of the whole population. In the

¹ There was no accurate census of the population of Russia prior to the eighteenth century.

middle of the nineteenth century, the town population had risen to 3,500,000—that is, 8 per cent of the whole population.

2.

DURING the century and a half following 1700, the area of cultivated land had greatly increased. Not only had the agricultural population increased in size, but also new areas were invaded by the agriculturalists. The most important area so to be occupied was the black earth belt in the southern Russian steppes, which was cultivated following the conquest of the north shore of the Black Sea.

But at the same time the importance of industry also rapidly increased. In 1725 there were less than two hundred factories in Russia; in the beginning of the nineteenth century there were about twenty-five hundred factories employing a hundred thousand workmen; and in the middle of the nineteenth century, ten thousand factories and five hundred thousand workmen. Metallurgy and mining increased in importance from the time of Peter the Great. The chief metals worked were iron, copper, lead, and in later times, gold. The study of natural science in connection with the foundation of the Academy of Science in 1726 had considerable influence upon the development of mining enterprise in Russia.²

An important branch of industry was the manufacture of woolen cloth, and in the nineteenth century cotton goods. Simultaneously with the expansion of industry there developed peasant craftsmanship, brought into being chiefly by climatic causes. The long winter, especially in the north of Russia, gave the peasants an opportunity to employ their spare time in home industry. They did not need any complicated machinery in view of the primitive nature of their work. There were other reasons for the growth of this kind of small industry. The craftsmen were well acquainted with the needs of the peasant market and were quick to supply them. They manufactured a great variety of goods—wooden utensils, wheels, sleds, textiles, harness, knives, and small metal objects. Peasant craftsmanship continued to develop through the nineteenth century.

With the progress of agriculture and industry, trade also in-

² See below, Chap. VIII, Sec. 3.

creased. The trade turnover of the port of Archangel in the beginning of the eighteenth century reached 3,000,000 rubles.³ Following the transfer of trade to St. Petersburg, the importance of Archangel diminished, toward the end of the reign of Peter I, to 300,000 rubles, but the trade of St. Petersburg at the same time rose to 4,000,000 and that of Riga to 2,000,000 rubles. The annual turnover of Russian foreign trade in the middle of the eighteenth century reached about 15,000,000 rubles, and in the beginning of the nineteenth century about 120,000,000 rubles.⁴

In addition to the goods which Russia supplied to the world in the seventeenth century,⁵ she added all kinds of forest products and cast iron during the eighteenth century. In the nineteenth century, following the acquisition of the black earth belt of the south, Russia began to export grain. In 1760 this export reached 70,000 quarters, valued at 822,000 rubles. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the export reached 2,218,000 quarters, valued at 12,000,000 rubles.

During the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, the inland water routes were improved. The main rivers were joined by canals, but the construction of ballasted roads was commenced only in 1817. In 1813 the first Russian steamer was constructed in St. Petersburg, but free navigation along the rivers of Russia was permitted only thirty years later. The construction of railroads was first contemplated in 1835. The earliest railroad to be opened ran between St. Petersburg and Tsarskoe-Selo. It was built by a private company and opened in 1838. In 1842 the construction of a railroad joining St. Petersburg and Moscow was commenced by the state. In 1851 telegraphic communication was established between St. Petersburg and Moscow.

3.

In the development of its economic life, Imperial Russia had to take into consideration the peculiar social structure of the Russian state of the time. The social and economic tendencies noted in the

³ For the seventeenth century see figures, Chap. V, Sec. 4.

⁴ It must be noted that the value of the ruble in the middle of the eighteenth century was almost double that of the ruble in the beginning of the nineteenth century.

⁵ See above, Chap. V, Sec. 4.

Moscow state of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were now finally crystallized. The whole economic system of Russia was regulated primarily by the needs of the state. The first of these at the time was a permanent regular army, whose maintenance called for considerably larger funds than had the army of the Moscow state. The number of men in the permanent army under Peter reached two hundred thousand, that is, $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the population. By the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the size of the army had reached eight hundred thousand, that is, $1\frac{3}{4}$ per cent of the population. The soldiers had to have weapons, clothes, and food. For all these commodities were necessary, and money with which to pay for them. The state treasury was consequently one of the largest purchasers in the Russian internal market, and the largest client of Russian industry. The supply of products of agriculture and industry to the treasury was the typical form of Russian economic turnover. The state needed iron, cast iron, and steel for army munitions, which led to patronage of the metal industry. The state needed cloth for the soldiers' uniforms, which led likewise to patronage of the cloth factories. The state required enormous amounts of grain, meat, and other foods for the army, and this brought about the organization of large farms—that is, an agricultural economy dominated by great landowners. Following the army-supply laws of 1758, these *pomiestchiks* received the exclusive right to supply the agricultural demands of the state. The needs of the army, moreover, were the chief cause of the financial reforms of Peter. In the year of his death, 1725, 65 per cent of the Russian budget was being expended upon the army and navy. To cover these costs, Peter introduced a head tax. The financial needs of the army were calculated at 4,000,000 rubles, and this sum was distributed over a male population of about five million, each of whom had to pay eighty kopeks a year.⁶

The collection of the head tax from the individual subjects of the state was impossible in view of the inadequate development of the administrative organization. For this reason the Government encouraged the formation of peasant communities (*obshchiny*), and conducted its financial affairs directly with them. On the estates of private landholders, the tax was collected by assessing them for the number of "souls" they owned. Thus they became

⁶ The head tax in 1725 made up 54 per cent of the state revenues.

both the economic and financial agents of the Government. But in spite of all efforts, the Government was not able to purchase necessary supplies at the market price.⁷ For this reason the state was forced to supply the factories and the landowners with cheap labor in the form of serfs. In the course of the eighteenth century, about 1,300,000 peasants were forcibly apportioned to factories and estates. Almost half of Russia's economy during the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century was based on serf labor.

4.

In the seventeenth century the *boyar* landowners on their patrimonial estates were chiefly military agents of the Government. In the eighteenth century, on the other hand, the landowning nobles considered themselves primarily the economic and financial agents of the Government. They also bore administrative responsibilities. In the words of a government official of the beginning of the nineteenth century, each *pomiestchik* was a "free policeman." In particular the *pomiestchiks* were responsible for supplying recruits to the army from their estates. These functions explain to a considerable degree the Government's encouragement of the growth of the landowners' authority over the peasants during the eighteenth century. The institution of serfdom in the eighteenth century was completely different from what it had been in the seventeenth century, when it merely consisted in fixing the peasant to the soil but not to the person of the landowner. As we have seen,⁸ this policy toward the peasants was motivated by the needs of the state. Peter the Great, even more than his predecessors, stressed the importance to the state of the institution of serfdom. But beginning with his reign, serfdom was rapidly transformed into slavery. The peasants became bound not to the land, but to the landowner. One of the reasons for this was the merging of the serfs and the former slaves or *kholopy* into one social category. We have seen above⁹ that in the Moscow state there were both serfs and real slaves who had no juridical identity and were regarded not as individuals but as chattels. For considerations of fiscal policy, Peter ordered that in drawing up the head tax, slaves were to be listed with serfs. The

⁷ With the assumption that there existed a free market for labor.

⁸ Chap. V, Sec. 2.

⁹ See Chap. IV, Sec. 6.

pomiestchiks paid the tax for both, and thus, first in practice and later by legislation, received complete authority over both groups. In the middle of the eighteenth century, the *pomiestchiks* received the right to punish their serfs and to exile them to Siberia, and laws were passed giving them the right to sell serfs.¹⁰ Although the laws provided that the *pomiestchiks* should not misuse the power of punishment, the serfs were completely defenseless. They were divided into two groups—the “house serfs” who lived in the household of the owner, and the peasants. The position of the house serfs was particularly burdensome, and they were completely unprotected. The peasants were usually better off for the reason that their owner cared for them at least because of their economic value. The arable land of an estate was usually divided into two parts, the owner’s personal fields and the peasants’ fields. In large estates the peasants of each village usually formed a separate community (*obshchina*), with an elected elder at its head.¹¹ All the duties of the individual serfs were allocated by the *obshchina*. The peasant duties consisted either in payment of a rent—this being the custom in northern provinces of Russia—or in working on the owner’s land during a fixed number of days a week, usually three.

Serfdom reached its fullest development in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, after which the Government began to take measures modifying the institution.¹²

5.

IN view of the evolution of serfdom in the eighteenth century and the prevailing system of recruiting and supplying the army, the Government became dependent upon the nobility. At times such dependence was a great inconvenience, because of the political opposition which frequently arose among the nobles.¹³ This explains the efforts of the Government during the first half of the nineteenth century to free itself from dependence upon the nobility in matters concerning the army. The most significant of these efforts were the so-called “military settlements” introduced by Alexander I.

¹⁰ Only in 1827 was a law passed making it necessary to insure a sufficient quantity of land for the serfs; and in 1833 another forbade the partition of families by sale.

¹¹ The elections were confirmed by the *pomiestchiks*.

¹² See below, Chap. IX, Secs. 3 and 5.

¹³ See above, Chap. VI, Sec. 10, and below, Chap. IX, Secs. 3 and 4.

The plan was that the army should support itself economically and supply itself with recruits. This was to be the function of the military settlements. They could be created by two means: either by settling soldiers on farms and making them agriculturalists, or by militarizing the peasant villages and making the peasants into soldiers while they continued to be peasants. In either case the life of the peasant-soldier was subjected to strict discipline. The military command had authority not only over military instruction but also in the household of the soldier. The settlements were an experiment in a sort of military socialism.¹⁴

The application of strict military discipline to peace-time life made existence in the military settlements very hard, and they were consequently shaken on many occasions by terrible riots. The Government suppressed the riots with great cruelty, and did not abandon its policy. At the end of the reign of Alexander I, one-third of the Russian army, more than two hundred thousand men, were transferred to military settlements.¹⁵

6.

THE military settlements were the most obvious expression of the general tendencies of the Russian Government during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the direction of state socialism, together with which there developed an opposite tendency toward middle-class individualism. The spread of the idea of property in land is indicative of the growth of the latter movement. We have seen that in the early Moscow state there were two types of property in land: the patrimonial estates (*votchiny*) and the tenure estates (*pomestia*), which were held on the condition of government service. In the seventeenth century these two types practically merged into one, for the Government then demanded service both from the patrimonial estate and from the *pomestie*, while on the other hand temporary and conditional possession of the *pomestie* was gradually being transformed into hereditary ownership. In the beginning of the eighteenth century, the two types of possession were finally merged by legislation. By the law of 1714 a single concept of real property was introduced.

¹⁴ They were the forerunners of the military workers' communes of 1920. See below, Chap. XVII, Sec. 1.

¹⁵ The system of military settlements remained in existence during the reign of Nicholas I and was terminated by Alexander II.

Neither under Peter the Great nor under his immediate successors, did the owners of real property have full possession of it. The legislation of Peter and Ann introduced material limitations upon the right of property. Thus title to subsoil rights was vested in the state, and their exploitation was granted to all who desired on the payment of a small sum to the owner of the land. Lumber suitable for the construction of ships was also declared government property. The owner of the land had no right to fell oak on his own land, under the threat of the death penalty. These examples demonstrate how circumscribed was the right of private property in land in the first half of the eighteenth century, and to what an extent the state interfered in private matters. Only in the second half of that century were protests heard against this interference, and in 1782 Catherine II rescinded the limitations.¹⁶

The struggle which this legislation involved affected only the nobility, for in the middle of the eighteenth century the right to private property in land became a privilege of the nobility.¹⁷ The next phase was the extension of property rights to other classes of society. In 1801 Alexander I issued a manifesto granting the right to own land to individuals of all classes, except serfs.¹⁸

This was a tremendous step forward in the development of modern juridical concepts and in the creation of a new type of middle-class society. The recognition of the right of all classes, except the serfs, to private property in land was evidence of the fact that new groups in Russian society were acquiring full civil status. The tenth volume of the *Russian Code of Laws* of 1832, devoted to civil rights was to a considerable degree an echo of the Napoleonic *Code Civile*. The principles of the tenth volume were in contradiction to the institution of serfdom.

7.

THE social changes of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries intimately affected the Russian state budget. The constant growth of population and of the national economy permitted a steady increase

¹⁶ It was at this time that the modern Russian word "property" (*sobstvennost*) first appeared in Russian jurisprudence.

¹⁷ The Cossack lands and the lands of the state peasants were not owned by individuals.

¹⁸ From this time the only remaining privilege of the nobility was the right to private property in "populated" lands—that is to say, to own land with serfs.

in the whole budget, together with which the relative weight of budgetary items underwent modification. While the expenses of the army grew, its proportion to total expenditure steadily decreased. Military expenses in 1725 swallowed up 65 per cent of the budget. In 1801 the proportion had decreased to 50 per cent and in 1852 to 42 per cent. Thus it may be said that the Russian budget gradually became demilitarized. This greatly relieved the Government of anxiety about sufficient means for the support of the army.

The sum derived from the head tax decreased in importance as a source of revenue. In 1725 the head tax brought in 54 per cent of all state income. In 1801 it only accounted for 30 per cent of the income, and in 1850 for 24 per cent. In place of direct taxation the chief income was made up by indirect taxation, and, in particular, the tax on spirits.¹⁹ The changes in the budget made the former system of state economy less necessary and permitted the Government to undertake the fundamental reconstruction of the whole social system begun by the reforms of Alexander II.

¹⁹ In 1725 indirect taxation accounted for 33 per cent of the income, in 1801 about 47 per cent, and in 1850 52 per cent.

CHAPTER VIII.

SPIRITUAL CULTURE OF RUSSIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND THE FIRST HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURIES

I.

THE Europeanization of Russia, begun under Peter, consisted primarily of the secularization of Russian culture. The church, which had played such a leading part in Russian life before his time, rapidly lost its importance. The upper circle of society, which came under European influence, no longer needed a church, or, at any rate, the church definitely lost its position as the chief source of cultural life. In the eighteenth century, the aristocratic and official classes of Russian society were educated in the spirit of French "enlightenment." They were devoted to Voltaire and had no real respect for the church.

For the lower classes of society the church also lost its original meaning. Following the schism of the "Old Ritualists" of the seventeenth century, almost half the population of north Russia turned away from it. Thus, the Orthodox church in the eighteenth century lost the support of a large part of the noble classes and a considerable portion of the trading and peasant classes.

It has been pointed out above that the church was made subservient to the state by Peter's reforms. The management of the church became one of the functions of a special government department. Important positions in the new ecclesiastical hierarchy were given to supporters of Peter's reforms, such as Archbishop Theophan Prokopovich, who drew up the new "Spiritual Regulation" which determined the activity of the Holy Synod. A government appointee, the Over-Procurator of the Holy Synod, had almost complete authority in church affairs. During the eighteenth century, the Government ceased to value the church as a moral authority either with regard to its own activities or as a force in so-

ciety at large. The church was considered essential only for the moral education of the lower classes.

A change in the Government's attitude toward the church took place at the end of the eighteenth century during the reign of Emperor Paul. But Paul, while recognizing the moral value of the church, regarded it as subject to his authority. It was he who gave voice in 1797 to the formula that "The tsar is the head of the church." This formula under Nicholas I found its way into the laws of the Russian Empire in the form of a note to one of the Articles of the basic law.

In the course of the whole eighteenth century, the Government did not hesitate to limit the material rights of the church. Its land was secularized by Empress Catherine II in 1764.¹ At the same time a large number of monasteries were closed. But while the Government itself felt no compunctions in its dealings with the church, it demanded obedience from the masses of the people to the institution whose moral authority it was itself destroying. "Old Ritualists" and the sectarians who desired to leave the church were subjected to government oppression during the greater part of the eighteenth century. It was perfectly natural that these forcible measures did not prevent the further widening of the schism and the growth of sectarianism.

The movement of the "Old Ritualists," by the end of the eighteenth century, ceased to be a unit and broke into several separate sects. It was essentially a protest against the innovations of Nikon by defenders of the old ritual; but the break-up of the old organization of the church forced the "Old Ritualists" to enter upon paths of even greater innovation. Thus, it became necessary to decide in a new manner the election of priests. The Greek Orthodox church held that only the bishop could name new priests and that the priest could not transfer his office to another person. Meanwhile, the "Old Ritualists" had no bishops. The priests named before the schism were gradually growing old and dying and there was no way in which to secure new ones. The "Old Ritualists" were faced with the possibility of remaining without priests. This

¹ The Archbishop of Rostov, Arseni Matseevich, who protested against this measure, was deprived of his office and imprisoned in a fortress where he subsequently died.

question served as a basic ground of difference between the two chief sects of "Old Ritualists." One decided to be consistent in its conservative beliefs and to remain without priests. The other sect sought a bishop outside of Russia.²

The break-up of the "Old Ritualists" into sects was only one of the sources of weakness of the opposition to the Russian church. Another source was the rapid growth of various other sects. One of the very oldest Russian sects, the "*Khlysty*" (flagellants), originated at the end of the seventeenth century. The *Khlysty* were mystics who believed in the possibility of the permanent incarnation of God in the individual. They repudiated the official church and its organization and also denied marriage. They organized secret meetings in which they attempted to call forth the presence of the Holy Spirit by means of ecstatic dances. These meetings at times terminated in orgies.³

At the other extreme, seeking liberation from the darker aspects of the *Khlysty* sect, was "Spiritual Christianity," the *Dukhobors* who arose in the middle of the eighteenth century in central and southern Russia.⁴ In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, among the Spiritual Christians of the Tambov province, there originated a sect of "Evangelical Christians" who received the name of *Molokane*, that is, people who drank milk during Lent, which was forbidden by the rules of the Orthodox church.

Prior to the nineteenth century, the "Old Ritualists" and the sectarians converted many of the trading and peasant classes. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, under Alexander I, sectarianism, especially the *Khlysty*, began to penetrate into the higher circles of society. Branches of *Khlysty* were organized in the time of Alexander I by the higher groups of society in St. Petersburg.⁵

All the dissenters, as has been said above, were subjected during the eighteenth century to constant repression on the part of the

² It was only in the nineteenth century that they succeeded in creating a bishopric beyond the limits of the Russian Empire, Bukovina, which in the nineteenth century formed part of Austria, now included in Rumania.

³ The sect of *Khlysty* was in general associated with sexual license. Gregory Rasputin, who played such a tragic rôle in the fall of the imperial régime in Russia, was associated with the *Khlysty*.

⁴ In Tambov and Ekaterinoslav provinces.

⁵ These were forerunners of Rasputin's activities.

Government.⁶ It began to be more tolerant toward the "Old Ritualists" only in the second half of the eighteenth century; but the repression of sectarians was terminated only at the beginning of the nineteenth century under Alexander I.⁷ Under Nicholas I, in the middle of the nineteenth century, a reaction set in and the Government again pursued the policy of repressing religious dissenters.

2.

THE secularization of Russian culture in the eighteenth century was noticeable first in education. In the early Moscow state, education was of a narrow religious character. Practical needs during the reign of Peter the Great brought about a new system of education which was to serve the purpose of preparing officers for the army and the navy. In 1700 he founded in Moscow a "School of Mathematics and Navigation" and invited a Scotchman, Henry Fargwarson, to direct it. In 1715 the school was moved to St. Petersburg and named the Naval Academy. The pupils of the Academy became teachers in the mathematical schools instituted in the principal cities of Russia. In these schools children were taught arithmetic and geometry. In the last years of the reign of Peter there were about forty of them, with two thousand pupils, part of whom came of their own free will while others were taken forcibly from soldiers' and civil servants' families.

In Peter's reign plans were made for the foundation of an Academy of Science which was to direct the new scientific training. The project was carried out after the death of Peter in 1726. The first academicians were called from abroad, chiefly from German states. They were accompanied by eight students to be instructed in the University opened by the Academy. This University, however, was soon closed. The Academy also opened a "Gymnasium" or upper school where a number of Russian boys, chiefly the sons of government servants and merchants, received their education. The nobility showed more willingness to send boys to the Cadet Corps or military school opened in 1730 to prepare officers for the army. Further steps in public education were made in the

⁶ The leaders of the *Dukhobors* in southern Russia were sentenced to be burned as late as 1792, but Catherine II replaced the death sentence with exile to Siberia.

⁷ On the advice of Senator Lopukhin, who conducted an investigation in one of the southern governments in 1801.

second half of the eighteenth century. In 1755 the University of Moscow was founded. This was the first real Russian university. In the beginning the professors were chiefly Germans, but later Russian professors also appeared. The Moscow University had as adjuncts two Gymnasiums—one for the children of nobles and one for those of all other classes. In 1782 a Commission for the Creation of Public Schools was called. This Commission, under the direction of Jankovich de Mirievo, a Serbian educator brought over from Austria, drew up a plan for the development of public teaching in Russia. High schools were to be opened in the chief cities and primary schools in the small cities; but this was prevented by inadequacy of funds. The obligation of maintaining the schools was left to philanthropic departments of the provincial governments, whose budgets were very small. By 1800 there were in Russia 315 schools with twenty thousand pupils, for the most part children of merchants and craftsmen. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ministry of Public Education was founded, in 1802, and Russia was broken up into six educational districts, each of which was placed under a superintendent. The first appointments to these posts were very successful and the reform greatly helped the development of education. According to the plan, in each educational district there was to be founded a university; in each provincial capital a gymnasium; and in each county (*uyezd*) a school.⁸ This program was practically completed toward the end of the reign of Alexander I. Russia then had 6 universities,⁹ 48 gymnasiums, and 337 schools. There were 5,500 students in the gymnasiums and about 30,000 in the schools. The chief progress compared with education in the eighteenth century was in the development, not of primary, but of secondary and higher education. Private initiative aided the Government in the educational movement, for instance, in opening the Kharkov University. Furthermore, two higher schools, the Demidov Law School in Yaroslavl in 1805 and the Historico-Philological Institute of Prince Bezborodko in Niezhin in 1820, were opened by private means.

⁸ The county schools were those founded in the eighteenth century by the Commission for the Creation of Public Schools.

⁹ Moscow, Derpt, Vilna, Kazan, Kharkov, and St. Petersburg. The University of Derpt was German until the end of the nineteenth century. The University of Vilna, prior to its closing after the Polish rebellion in 1831, was Polish. Instead of it, a Russian university was opened in Kiev in 1833.

During the reign of Nicholas I, several technical schools were opened, among them the Institute of Technology of St. Petersburg in 1828 and the Institute in Moscow in 1844. Several military schools of secondary education were founded. There were eleven of these in the reign of Nicholas I.

3.

THE organization of the Academy of Science before that of either universities and schools seems at first sight to have been an impractical idea; but it had a great influence upon the development of Russian learning, and particularly in mathematics and natural science. Russian scientists had a center of organization at a time when the west was beginning a particularly intensive study of the natural sciences. The Academy immediately took an important place in the world of learning of the eighteenth century. The first members of the Academy were imported from abroad, chiefly from German states.¹⁰ But very soon there appeared learned men of Russian origin, among them an outstanding and universal genius, M. V. Lomonosov, the son of a peasant shipbuilder from the north of Russia, who lived from 1711 to 1765, and made himself equally proficient in chemistry, physics, mineralogy, history, philology, and poetry.

Of immense importance was the work of the Academy of Science in making a geographical survey of Siberia, and its support of the great Siberian expedition of 1733 to 1743.¹¹ At the end of the eighteenth century and during the first half of the nineteenth century, the rôle of the Academy of Science in directing the development of Russian learning declined.¹²

The new cultural forces which took the place of the Academy were the Russian universities. The greatest Russian scholar of the first half of the nineteenth century was not an academician, but a university professor from Kazan, N. I. Lobachevsky, who lived from 1793 to 1856. He began teaching in 1811. At first his new ideas were not understood by his contemporaries, either in Russia

¹⁰ Among them were two well-known scientists and mathematicians, Bernouilli and Euler.

¹¹ See above, Chap. VI, Sec. 6.

¹² The Academy of Science again increased in importance in the end of the nineteenth century. See below, Chap. XII, Sec. 6.

or abroad. It was only after some time that his originality was understood. Lobachevsky's mind was one of the most productive in the history of mathematics. He created a new geometry which uses a hypothesis of space differing from that of Euclid.

The study of social sciences and history was less developed in the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, than the natural sciences. The Academy of Science produced in the eighteenth century an energetic collector of historical documents, G. F. Miller, a naturalized German. The greatest Russian historians of the period were, however, not professional men of learning. During the eighteenth century, one of Russia's historians was an administrative official; another, a politician; and a third, a military man. The leading Russian historian of the nineteenth century, N. M. Karamzin, who lived from 1766 to 1826, was also unassociated with any institution of learning. The publication of his exhaustive *History of the Russian Empire*, the first edition of which appeared in 1816, was a great event in the spiritual life of Russia. The breadth of his learning and his deep knowledge of sources were combined in a masterly literary presentation. The saying was current that Karamzin had discovered ancient Russia as Columbus had discovered America.

Evidence of the growth of interest in science in Russian society, at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, is to be observed in the foundation of several learned societies. Such were: "The Free Economic Society," founded in St. Petersburg in 1765; "The Friendly Society of Learning" of Moscow, founded in 1782; and "The Society of Russian History and Antiquity" and "The Society of Experimental Science," both opened in 1805. Very significant, also, was the activity of private individuals in organizing scientific investigations. Particularly noteworthy was the work of Chancellor Count N. P. Rumiantsev, in the beginning of the nineteenth century. He was a man of unusually wide interests both in the fields of geography and history. At his initiative and expense, a valuable collection of ancient Russian documents was brought together and published. Rumiantsev gave his money for geographical expeditions and historical research. He conducted an extensive correspondence with many Russian scholars, took an interest in the details of their work, and stimulated them to further activity. The collections acquired by

Count Rumiantsev are housed in the Rumiantsev Museum in Moscow.¹³

4.

BEFORE the reforms of Peter the Great, literature and art had an equal appeal to the upper and the lower classes of Russian society, as both groups had a religious training. Conditions, however, had completely changed. The upper circles of society had broken away from the church, whose creative powers had at the same time been materially weakened. The upper classes began to create for themselves a new art and literature, while the lower classes remained without the leadership they had formerly had in their aesthetic life. The new literature had already come into demand by the great mass of Russians in the middle of the nineteenth century. The rift between the "intellectuals" and the people, in literary matters, was being gradually closed. But in the eighteenth century, this literature was available only to the highest groups of society educated in cities—the nobles and the merchants. A characteristic "poet of nobility" in the eighteenth century was Derzhavin who, in some of his verses, achieved real artistic merit. The first half of the nineteenth century saw the rise of a number of writers and poets who attracted wide circles of readers, among them Pushkin, Lermontov, and Gogol.

A. S. Pushkin, who lived from 1799 to 1837, the "Sun of Russian Poetry" as he was justly called, is the greatest genius of Russian literature. Pushkin wrote chiefly in verse, and for this reason he is more difficult to appreciate in translation than Russian prose writers. This partly explains the fact that his works are little known outside Russia. Pushkin had an unusually harmonic personality. He was endowed with a sharp and brilliant mind. He could both feel and express the most intimate experiences of the human soul, as well as manifestations of group life. Pushkin had a great interest in history and in contemporary political questions. His political ideas passed through two phases. During his youth, up to the second half of the reign of Alexander I, he was filled with sympathy for liberalism.¹⁴ During his later life, in the reign

¹³ The Soviet Government has renamed the Rumiantsev Museum the Lenin Museum—a completely unjustified act of disrespect to the memory of Rumiantsev, who was a great figure in the development of Russian learning.

¹⁴ Pushkin was close to many of the so-called "Decembrists." See below, Chap. IX, Sec. 4.

of Nicholas I, he held moderately conservative views. But, both in his youth and in later years, Pushkin was to the highest degree a sincere humanitarian. At times, he was unhappy in the world of politics and personal intrigue which characterized the higher Russian society of the day. He was ultimately ruined by intrigue. Defending the honor of his wife, he was killed in a duel at the age of thirty-seven.

M. Y. Lermontov, who lived from 1814 to 1841, was a brilliant poet, but a more one-sided individual than Pushkin. An ancestor of his was George Learmont, a Scottish adventurer who, in the early seventeenth century, entered the Russian service. In his poetical work, Lermontov was strongly influenced by Byron. The source of his poetic inspiration was the Caucasus, with its natural beauty, the primitive customs of its mountaineers, and its state of constant war. Lermontov took part in the Caucasian War as an officer of the Russian army.¹⁵ His most famous poem, "The Demon," is set in the Caucasus. The Demon was the Spirit of Negation and Doubt which had fascinated Lermontov from his early youth. Lermontov died in a duel as did Pushkin, at the age of twenty-seven.

N. V. Gogol, who lived from 1809 to 1852, was of Ukrainian origin and introduced many Ukrainian words and idioms into the Russian language. In his first stories, he chose for his subjects incidents in the life of the people of southern Russia. Later he described the world of *pomiestchiks* (landowners) and *chinovniks* (civil servants) in his comedy, *The Government Inspector (Revizor)*, and in his novel, *Dead Souls*. The characteristics of Gogol's work are realism and humor. But behind his humor lies a profound sense of grief for the imperfection of human society. It is laughter through tears. Through his realism in the description of the external world, one feels his search for spiritual values as the real basis of life.

Pushkin, Lermontov, and Gogol laid the cornerstones of the foundation upon which all subsequent Russian literature arose.

5.

THE art of ancient Russia, even more than literature, was depend-

¹⁵ He was transferred to the Caucasus in punishment for his verses "On the Death of Pushkin," blaming court society for the death of the poet.

ent upon the church. Architecture, painting, and music served first of all the needs of the church. For this reason instrumental music and sculpture were very little developed in ancient Russia.¹⁶ Russian art did not cease to serve the church in the eighteenth century, but religious art became only one of the branches of a general development.

Imperial palaces and the houses of nobles in town and country became the chief objects of the endeavor of artists. This explains partly the character of Russian art during the eighteenth and the first part of the nineteenth century. Catering to the tastes of society, it became subject to western influences. An important rôle in the development of the fine arts in Russia was played by the Academy of Arts, founded in 1757, which introduced the technique and ideals of western art.

Western architects and painters, among them many Italians and Frenchmen, were called by the court to construct and decorate the imperial palaces and, to a certain extent, the churches as well. Among the western architects working in Russia were the well-known Italian, Rastrelli, and the Scotchman, Cameron. Many of them became naturalized, like Rossi in the nineteenth century, and must be regarded as Russians. Gradually native Russian artists and architects appeared, possibly the most gifted one of this period being Bazhenov. The new architecture was exemplified first in the new capital, St. Petersburg, as well as the imperial palaces in the surroundings of the capital. The favorite style of architecture during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was classical. Columns of different types became an essential part both of lay and church architecture of this time. The style set by the imperial palaces was followed by the nobles. During this period many of the noble estates were adorned by architectural masterpieces.¹⁷ The classical style of architecture soon became adapted to the Russian environment and ceased to appear foreign. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, a Russian variant of this style, known as Russian "Empire" style was developed.

The most famous sculptural work of the time was the monument to Peter the Great in St. Petersburg, cast by two French sculptors,

¹⁶ See above, Chap. II, Sec. 6.

¹⁷ The design of Russian manorial houses of this period was similar to the colonial style in the United States, but was usually executed in stone.

Falconet and Marie-Anne Collot. Russian sculptors contributed several good pieces of sculpture of less renown. The portrait busts of Shubin were talented pieces of work, as were the monuments of Martos. Russian sculpture, like the architecture of the period, was inspired by classicism. Kozlovsky represented Marshal Suvorov as a youthful Mars,¹⁸ while Martos represented Minin and Pozharsky as citizens of ancient Rome.¹⁹

Several remarkable portrait painters appeared, among them: Levitsky, Borovikovsky, and Kiprensky, and a landscape painter of great talent, Shchedrin, who died at an early age. The most famous painter of the early nineteenth century was K. P. Brullov, who painted in 1830 the "Last Day of Pompeii," a theatrical and cold picture, which nevertheless produced a great impression. More important than Brullov, and more profound in his work, was A. A. Ivanov, who was moved by deep religious sentiment. His picture "Christ Appearing before the People" combines depth of feeling with high technique. Ivanov spent more than twenty years, from 1833 to 1855, in completing this work.

6.

In the seventeenth century, new melodies entered into the Moscow church service, which came from the south—Kiev and Greece. These were accepted by the Russian church universally at the end of the seventeenth century, and were only rejected by the "Old Ritualists," who retained the ancient forms.

In the eighteenth century, church singing fell under Italian influence. An Italian operatic troupe performed in St. Petersburg and the court singers took part in the choruses. Italian influence may be noted in Russian spiritual compositions of the period. The most famous and competent composer of the period was Bortniansky, who lived from 1751 to 1825, and was trained in St. Petersburg by an Italian master and studied in Italy. In 1796 he was appointed director of the court choir. This choir had succeeded even before his appointment in reaching a high degree of excellence, so Bortniansky directed his attention to the selection of

¹⁸ The statue of the Russian marshal at the Field of Mars in St. Petersburg. On Suvorov, see above, Chap. VI, Sec. 9 and Chap. IX, Sec. 1.

¹⁹ The heroes of 1612, in the Red Square in Moscow. See above, Chap. V, Sec. 1.

voices and to the perfection of the *ensemble*. He sought singers in southern Russia and the Ukraine, where the people were famed for their voices. As a result he achieved enormous success.²⁰

During the eighteenth century, secular music, both instrumental and vocal, flooded Russia from the west. The music of the eighteenth century was valued in Russia as an entertainment, accompanying banquets, dinners, balls, and performances of all kinds. Many landowners, imitating the court, organized orchestras and choirs among their serfs. In 1735, in the reign of Empress Ann, the Italian Opera was invited to visit St. Petersburg. Soon afterward the first attempts were made to organize a Russian opera, combining the Italian manner with Russian songs. In the nineteenth century, the musical life of Russia became more serious and significant. In 1802 the Russian Philharmonic Society was founded. Following the War of 1812, many operas of a patriotic character were written. Textbooks on music became available; the number of serious professional musicians increased; and musical education improved.

This atmosphere of interest and creativeness in music made possible the appearance of the real founder of Russian national music, M. J. Glinka, who lived from 1803 to 1857. He occupies in the history of Russian music the same central position that Pushkin holds in the history of Russian literature. They were contemporaries; and Glinka, who had a great respect for Pushkin, composed accompaniments to a number of his poems. He was of an aristocratic family from Smolensk province. His first musical impressions were received in listening to an orchestra of serf musicians belonging to his uncle. From childhood Glinka had heard Russian popular songs sung in the country, and they had a great influence upon the character of his later work. He studied in Berlin, and having acquired high proficiency in musical technique, he developed a Russian symphonic and operatic style entirely his own in conception. He composed two operas, *A Life for the Tsar*, in 1836, and *Ruslan and Ludmila*, in 1842, the latter written on the theme of a poem by Pushkin and expressing a brilliant eastern element of fantasy.

²⁰ The successor of Bortniansky as director of the choir was Lvov, the author of the Russian national anthem composed in 1833. The French composer, Berlioz, when he heard the choir under Lvov, found it superior to the papal choir.

A decade later than Glinka was born the second great Russian composer, A. S. Dargomyzhsky, who lived from 1813 to 1869. He is representative of realism and of the declamatory style in music. He sought a perfect union between speech and music. As he expressed it: "I desire that the sound directly express the word. I desire the truth." His highest achievement in this direction was his opera on the theme of Pushkin, *The Stone Guest*.

CHAPTER IX.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN INTERNAL AND FOREIGN POLICY UP TO THE MIDDLE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

(1797-1857)

I.

EMPEROR PAUL, who reigned five years from 1796 to 1801, came to the throne with many brilliant conceptions in mind concerning Russian policies, domestic as well as foreign, but his despotic caprices marred all efforts to realize these plans.¹ The program of the conservative circle which was formed around Paul before his coronation, primarily intended to procure fundamental laws which would define the imperial power, was carried into execution by the acts of April 5, 1797. The following laws were promulgated: the Law of Succession to the Throne, laws Concerning the Imperial Family (the internal organization of the imperial house), and, finally, an *ukaz* which limited serf labor for the landowner to three days a week. This last law was the first serious attempt at imperial legislation to limit serfdom.² Simultaneously, the privileges granted by Empress Catherine to the nobility were suspended.³ The Government of Emperor Paul also began reforms in the governmental departments, to replace collective responsibility by personal leadership.

Foreign policy under Emperor Paul was significant, particularly with respect to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. The anti-Turkish policy of Empress Catherine had secured for Russia a part of the coast of the Black Sea. This had very great value for

¹ At the time of his accession Paul was undoubtedly mentally unbalanced.

² The *ukaz* concerning the three-day obligation of the serfs was of small practical importance, as the Government did not have enough agents to secure the enforcement of the law. However it had great significance as a matter of principle.

³ At the same time, the privileges granted to the towns were suspended.

the development of Russian trade and the prosperity of agriculture in the south. Meanwhile there appeared the possibility of developing relations with Turkey on entirely new lines. The Government of Emperor Paul succeeded in taking advantage of this opportunity in a manner which gave its foreign policy special importance in the history of Russian diplomacy. Its guiding principle was the extension of Russian influence in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, by means not of war but of cordial relations with Turkey. In 1798 Russia and Turkey joined England, Austria, and the Neapolitan Kingdom in a coalition against France, motivated by the common purpose of resisting her expansionist policy which had brought Switzerland, northern Italy, and the Ionian Islands⁴ under her sway.

In 1798 France sent General Napoleon Bonaparte to Egypt to seize the route to India. Russia concluded a special convention with Turkey for united action. The Turks agreed to allow the Russian fleet to pass through the Bosphorus and the Straits of the Dardanelles, while undertaking to hold them closed to the warships of other nations. The Russian Black Sea squadron, under Admiral Ushakov, together with certain Turkish vessels, were sent into the Adriatic Sea. He drove the French from the Ionian Islands, where he organized a republic formally under the patronage of Turkey, but actually under the control of Russia.

Ushakov succeeded in securing great influence in the Adriatic Sea. In 1799 Montenegro offered its allegiance to Russia. Thus policy under Emperor Paul led to the foundation of a firm Russian base in the Adriatic Sea, from which actual control over the Orthodox and Slavonic peoples of the Balkans could be secured. Desirous of extending Russia's power still further in the Mediterranean Sea, Paul became patron of the order of Knights of St. John, known as the Maltese Knights, who owned the island of Malta.

The naval campaign in the Mediterranean Sea was supplemented by a military campaign. Emperor Paul sent to Austria's aid in 1799 Russia's best general, Suvorov, who succeeded in a short time in defeating the French armies in Italy and forcing them to retreat into Switzerland. Subsequently Suvorov entered

⁴ The Ionian Islands were populated by Orthodox Greeks and had belonged to Venice since the Middle Ages.

Switzerland after an extremely difficult march across the Alps by the St. Gothard Pass.

The brilliant activities of Suvorov were not sufficiently appreciated by Austria. Paul became convinced of the selfishness of both Austria and England, and not wishing to be a toy in their hands he broke relations with them. Russia then began to enter into close relations with her recent enemy, France. Paul's sympathy for Napoleon Bonaparte followed his return from Egypt, to become First Consul of France.

Russia's change of policy with regard to France, however, did not lead to altered relations with Turkey. The alliance of Russia and Turkey continued, and the Adriatic base was retained for the further development of Russian policy in the Balkans. The alliance with Napoleon automatically led to a complete break with England. Paul imposed an embargo upon all English goods in Russia and the Don Cossacks received an order to enter upon the conquest of India. This, however, only proved the unbalanced condition of Paul's mind. The march of the Don Cossacks was ordered without any preparation. There were even no maps, and the Cossacks before reaching the Russian frontier lost half their horses in the desert. The march was not a serious undertaking and necessarily failed.⁵

England's reply to Paul's new policy was the dispatch of the British fleet to the Baltic Sea. At the same time the British representative in St. Petersburg attempted to utilize the discontent, which Paul's *régime* had aroused in court circles and among the officers, to organize a *coup d'état*. This plan did not prove difficult of execution. Paul's insanity expressed itself in constant attacks of wild fury from which none about him could feel entirely secure. For a mistake at a military parade, Paul would send the responsible officers into exile;⁶ the most highly responsible governmental officials were constantly in fear of retirement and displeasure.⁷ The result was an unceasing change of personnel in high military and civil posts.

It is not surprising, in view of these circumstances, that the

⁵ The Don Cossacks were ordered back immediately following the assassination of Paul.

⁶ During Paul's reign, twelve thousand officers and civil servants were exiled.

⁷ Paul used to say, "In Russia he is great with whom I speak, and that only while I speak with him."

courtiers and officers who plotted against Paul were led by the Military Governor of St. Petersburg, Count Pahlen. In the night of March 24, 1801, Paul was assassinated by conspirators who succeeded in entering his bedroom.

The new emperor was Paul's son Alexander. He had given his consent to the overthrow of Paul, but had not supposed that this would be carried out by means of assassination. There is evidence to the effect that Alexander suffered a nervous collapse when he received the news of the assassination. He was brought back to himself by the angry remark of Count Pahlen, "*C'est assez faire l'enfant, allez régner.*"

2.

ALEXANDER I had one of the greatest political minds of his time. Its power found expression in his judgment on questions both of internal and foreign policy. His brilliancy lighted the whole diplomatic world of his time. The outstanding traits of Alexander's mind and character were his ability to visualize plans of the widest scope and to execute them without the knowledge of those around him.

He has been regarded as a weak man, frequently changing his policies. On the contrary, Alexander was unusually stubborn in reaching his objectives, but he did so, not by direct means, as did Peter the Great and Alexander's chief opponent, Napoleon, but by devious methods—first instilling his ideas into the minds of those around him and then pretending that he was following their views. Alexander had an unusual ability of charming his auditors. He was particularly attractive to women and succeeded in attaining many results with their aid.⁸ Only a few contemporaries saw through his diplomatic methods.⁹

The principal concern of Alexander's diplomatic activity during the first half of his reign, from 1801 to 1815, was his struggle with Napoleon. This required the conclusion of a series of alliances, sometimes with Austria, sometimes with Prussia. It was broken by periods of friendship with France, the most important

⁸ The "romantic friendship" of Alexander with Louise of Prussia helped him in subjecting Prussia to his policies.

⁹ Hence the accusation, "Alexander is as sharp as a pin, as fine as a razor, and as false as sea foam." Napoleon referred to him as a "*Grec de Bas Empire*" (Byzantine).

of which followed the failure of the first coalition against Napoleon and the Peace of Tilsit in 1807. The struggle was decided by a gigantic duel between Alexander and Napoleon in 1812 and concluded by the organization of an all-European coalition against Napoleon which led to his downfall.

Alexander succeeded in finding a great principle on which to base his struggle with Napoleon. As opposed to Napoleon's world empire resting on the principle of civil equality, Alexander brought forward the idea of a liberal federation of national states. This he expressed clearly in a remarkable document of 1804—the diplomatic instructions to Novosiltsev for his extraordinary mission to England.

Alexander did not succeed in realizing his program fully, but, nevertheless, the long period of struggle with Napoleon was concluded by the creation of the first European League of Nations, the Holy Alliance.¹⁰

A part of Alexander's general program of federation was his policy with respect to the Slavs. The southern Slavs in the Balkans and Poland were to be freed from Turkish, Austrian, and Prussian rule, and to form a federation under the leadership of Alexander. These ideas were at the foundation of Alexander's policy up to the Congress of Vienna, 1815, but the actual course of events prevented their realization. The inevitable military alliance with Austria and Prussia made it impossible to raise the Polish question in all its breadth prior to the Peace of Tilsit, but the south Slavonic question was raised in connection with Russia's policy in the Mediterranean Sea.

The Mediterranean policy of Paul lay at the basis of Alexander's policy. It is true that on June 5, 1801, a convention of friendship was concluded with England whereby Russia abandoned her pretensions to Malta, and this renunciation constituted a material breach in Russia's Mediterranean front. But in general Paul's program was not abandoned. The principal factor was now the Ionian archipelago which became the center of Russian diplomatic and military interest.¹¹ In September, 1805, a small Russian squadron

¹⁰ The Holy Alliance later became a reactionary combination of emperors against peoples, but originally—and particularly in the eyes of its founder, Alexander—it did not have this character.

¹¹ The constitution of the Ionian Islands of 1803-1804 was in the nature of a test of Alexander's liberal international policy.

under Admiral Seniavin left the Baltic Sea. In January, 1806, Seniavin reached the island of Corfù. With the Ionian Islands and Montenegro as bases, he fought against the superior forces of France and Turkey for a year and a half.¹²

However, the Peace of Tilsit between Napoleon and Alexander in 1807 brought about a complete collapse of Russian plans in the Mediterranean Sea. The Ionian Islands were handed over to France. But Alexander did not abandon Paul's hope of realizing Russia's aspirations in the Balkans and the Adriatic Sea and of improving the lot of the Balkan Slavs by means of direct agreement with Turkey. It was precisely this mission that Admiral Chichagov was to fulfill in replacing Kutuzov in 1812 as chief of the Russian army on the Danube. But Kutuzov, prior to the arrival of Chichagov, had had time to make peace with Turkey without concluding an alliance.

The Peace of Tilsit, insincere both on the part of Alexander and Napoleon in spite of the advantages which each of them received from the agreement,¹³ was broken by the War of 1812. That war was carefully prepared by Napoleon from the point of view of military technique. The march of Napoleon to Moscow was strategically brilliant,¹⁴ but owing primarily to the policy of retreat which was adopted by the Russian commanders-in-chief, Barclay de Tolly and Kutuzov, Napoleon did not succeed in destroying the Russian army.¹⁵

With the active force of the Russian army still undefeated and all classes of Russian society aroused by an enormous patriotic outburst, Napoleon could conquer Russia only by bringing about a social revolution. The elements for such a revolution were then present even to a greater extent than in 1917, particularly in view of the existence of serfdom. Among the Russian people there were still alive eyewitnesses of the Pugachev rebellion. It is now known that several Russian statesmen of the time feared war, especially

¹² Turkey declared war upon Russia in the end of 1806. In June of 1807 Seniavin defeated the Turkish squadron in the Aegean Sea near the island of Imbros.

¹³ Because of the Tilsit agreement, Russia was enabled to settle her differences with Sweden. As a result of the Russo-Swedish War of 1808-1809, Finland was annexed by Russia.

¹⁴ From this point of view Napoleon undoubtedly secured greater success than did Emperor William of Germany during the World War.

¹⁵ The excellent condition of the artillery in the Russian army was also an important consideration.

for the reason that they expected Napoleon to bring about another similar rising. If he had succeeded in this, he would of course have subjected Russia completely to his control.

There were evidences of unstable conditions among the Russian peasants in 1812. Several revolts occurred among the recruits. Napoleon either did not wish, or did not know how, to take advantage of this situation. Moreover, he did not have at hand a Lenin or a Trotsky.¹⁶ But without organizing a social revolution, Napoleon could not hold Moscow, hundreds of miles away from his base. Retreat was inevitable. It became a rout, with the French soldiers exposed to hunger and cold and to the attacks of the Russian army and of guerrilla bands. Russian society regarded Napoleon's expulsion as the end of Russia's part in the war. The further struggle with him must be attributed to the personal initiative of Alexander. He was the soul of the European coalition against Napoleon, and the chief manager of all military activities.¹⁷ The resistance of Napoleon was broken only after a stubborn struggle. The Russians and the allied troops entered Paris in the summer of 1814.¹⁸

The Russian foreign policy during the first half of the reign of Alexander also extended to the Pacific Ocean. Under Paul in 1798 Shelekhov's¹⁹ trading company was reorganized into the Russo-American Company and received a trading monopoly, as well as the power to administer justice in the Russian colonies on the Pacific Ocean. Under the charter granted by Paul, the chief director of the company had to be a member of the Shelekhov²⁰ family. N. P. Rezanov was appointed, but the leading rôle in the company was played by the manager of the company, A. A. Baranov.

In 1805 the fortress Novo-Archangel was built and became the chief center of Russia's possessions in Alaska. Baranov was not content with Alaska, but formed extensive plans. In 1812 he or-

¹⁶ The unfounded and unjustifiable arrest and exile immediately prior to the War of 1812 of a leading Russian statesman, "the right hand of Alexander," Speransky, may be explained by the panicky fear of the ruling group in Russia that Napoleon had a man capable of organizing a revolution in Russia.

¹⁷ Actually the chief organizer of the military campaign was the Russian general Barclay de Tolly, a descendant of a Scottish family, Kutuzov having died in the beginning of 1813, soon after the expulsion of the French from Russia.

¹⁸ The forces of Napoleon, following his return from Elba, were defeated by the British and the Prussians before the Russian troops had arrived at Waterloo, 1815.

¹⁹ See above, Chap. VI, Sec. 7.

²⁰ Gregory Shelekhov died in 1796.

ganized a Russian colony in California and dreamed of making the Pacific Ocean a Russian sea. In 1815 he sent an expedition to the Hawaiian Islands. However, this expedition failed.²¹ The far-reaching Pacific policy of Baranov was not continued after his death.

3.

THE constant state of war with Napoleon did not draw Alexander's attention wholly from questions of internal policy. The eighteenth century left two problems to be settled in the course of the nineteenth—political reorganization of the state, and the condition of the peasantry. During the reign of Alexander I, the solution of both these problems was considerably advanced. The reorganization of the structure of the state was attacked in two ways: first, in improvement of the bureaucratic organization of many of the Government departments; second, in partial agreement as to the principles underlying the reorganization of the state.

With respect to the first point it is necessary to note the new organization of the Senate and the Ministries in 1802. The Senate became primarily a judicial body.²² The creation of ministries completed the reform commenced by Paul.²³ Finally, an improvement in the technique of preparing laws was secured by the creation of the State Council in 1810. In addition there were the reforms affecting local government, which consisted of subdividing the territories of Russia into provinces under the control of governors-general in 1819 and the reorganization of local administration by the creation of special councils to advise the governors in 1823.

The second point concerns the constitutional reorganization of the state. Several projects of reform were made. The basic purpose of all these programs was the introduction of representative government in legislative matters. The projects were prepared under the influence of Anglo-American or French political experience.²⁴

²¹ In 1818 Baranov was to retire; he died while returning to Russia on a ship of the Russo-American Company in the Sunda Straits, and was buried at sea according to custom.

²² The reorganization of the Senate was completed along these lines by the judicial reform of Alexander II in 1864.

²³ See above, Sec. 1.

²⁴ Novosiltsev was representative of the Anglo-American influence as Speransky was of the French.

It is necessary to mention those of Speransky in 1809 and of Novosiltsev, the latter known as the Imperial State Constitution, in 1819-20. According to the plan of Speransky the representative body, the state Duma, was to be composed of deputies indirectly elected by the population. Each township was to elect a Duma, each township Duma was to elect a delegate to a county Duma, each county Duma to a provincial Duma, and each provincial Duma to an imperial Duma.²⁵

Besides the creation of an imperial Duma, it was proposed to create an imperial Council. This bureaucratic organ would have as its chief function the coördination of the work of the various government organs. The Council was, as we have seen, brought into existence in 1810. The rest of the plan was not executed.

Speransky's plan was based upon the idea of a centralized state. The plan of Novosiltsev, on the other hand, had as its basic concept the creation of a federal state within the territories of the Russian Empire. The plan was partly inspired by the example of the United States of America.²⁶ According to Novosiltsev the Russian Empire was to be divided into provinces or states. The fundamental idea of Novosiltsev was the coördination of the original Russian Empire with the later accessions, particularly those which possessed local rights and peculiarities, such as the Baltic provinces and the region of the Don Cossacks, and those which were in fact constitutional states, such as Finland from 1809 and Poland, annexed at the Vienna Congress in 1815.²⁷

According to the plan of Novosiltsev, the border states were to

²⁵ This plan served a hundred years later as the basis for the elective system of the Soviet Government.

²⁶ Aside from the influence of books on the subject of federal government, there was also a personal influence. In 1806 Emperor Alexander entered into correspondence with President Jefferson of the United States about the question of the governmental structure of the United States.

²⁷ As early as 1807, under the Treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon—having borrowed the idea from Alexander—organized the Grand Duchy of Warsaw out of those parts of Poland that had been seized by Austria and Prussia in the partitions of the eighteenth century. Following the defeat of Napoleon in 1812, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was occupied by Russian troops, and according to the resolutions of the Vienna Congress the greater part of the Duchy was annexed by Russia, while the smaller part was returned to Prussia and Austria. Alexander granted Poland a constitution on November 27, 1815, which was one of the most liberal European constitutions of the time.

be joined to the states of the new federated empire.²⁸ The plan of Novosiltsev, just as the plan of Speransky, was not put into practice, but in 1819 preparatory steps to its execution were taken in reforming local government. Novosiltsev's plan was not completely abandoned until the death of Alexander in 1825, and if Alexander had continued to reign it might have been put into practice.

The social policy of Emperor Alexander I was important. As under Catherine II,²⁹ the peasant question was a weapon in the hands of Alexander against the aristocratic movement of constitutionalism. The frightful after-effects of the Pugachev rebellion were forgotten in the nineteenth century, and the political opposition of the nobles again expressed itself in 1802 in demands that the Senate be made a Council of Nobles, and even in advocating a limitation of imperial power. In the decree concerning the reorganization of the Senate in 1802, Alexander did not follow the plans advocated by the nobles, but he did leave the Senate a shadow of a political authority. This was the right to protest against imperial decrees which were at variance with the established laws.³⁰

The Senate soon desired to take advantage of its right when it felt that the Government was destroying the privileges of the nobility. In December, 1802, the Council of Ministers approved, and the emperor confirmed, a report of the Minister of War which demanded that nobles who had served in the army without securing promotion to the grade of officer could not retire until they had served at least twelve years as non-commissioned officers. The report was sent to the Senate for publication. A few days later one of the Senators expressed the opinion that the new regulation was at variance with the fundamental privileges of the nobility.³¹ At the end of January, 1803, the Senate supported this opinion. In March a deputation of Senators was received by the emperor who told them dryly that special legislation would be promulgated. At the beginning of April, 1803, a decree was published announcing

²⁸ A project was drawn up for harmonizing the Polish constitution of 1815 with Novosiltsev's plan.

²⁹ See above, Chap. VI, Sec. 10.

³⁰ Something in the nature of the *droit de remontrance* of the French parliament of the eighteenth century.

³¹ The charter of privileges suspended by Paul was reaffirmed by Alexander at his coronation.

that the right of the Senate to protest was limited to laws and decrees published before 1802. The decrees submitted following that year were to be accepted without qualification.

In answer to the pretensions of the Senate and to warn the nobles, Alexander raised the peasant question. On March 4, 1803, a decree was published regarding "free landowners." This decree concerned the rules for emancipating serfs with land; the granting of liberty was left to the free will of the estate-owners.

The practical significance of the decree was not great. The total number of serfs freed following its publication was about fifty thousand, but it had great significance in principle. The nobles saw the possibility of Alexander's granting privileges to the peasants to counterbalance the privileges of the nobility. The nobles retired, and Alexander remained victor in the political duel.⁸²

The law on free landowners was obviously only a first step. Alexander had to take further steps to deal with the peasant question. Without this it was impossible to advance political reform, plans for which were supplemented by plans for the solution of the peasant question. In the Baltic provinces the emancipation of the serfs was actually carried out in practice in 1819.

4.

THE attempts at internal reorganization during the second half of the reign of Alexander I were accompanied by changes in his foreign policy. The central factor of this policy was the "Holy Alliance." Its purpose was the unification of the policies of the European states. It was based upon a religious foundation—the unification of the Christian states without differentiation between creeds.⁸³ The Alliance was to regulate, not only the foreign relations of states, but also to suppress internal uprisings in each state. During the first years of its existence, the Holy Alliance met in several Pan-European congresses, Aachen in 1818; Troppau (at present Opava) in 1820; Laibach (at present Ljubljana) in 1821; and Verona in 1822. The Alliance succeeded in preventing war be-

⁸² After that time nobles desiring to advance a practical political program were forced to include in it a solution for the peasant problem. This was done by the "Decembrists" at the end of the reign of Alexander I. See below, Sec. 5.

⁸³ The Alliance was joined by all the rulers of Europe excepting the Pope and the Turkish Sultan.

tween member states for a long period of time. There were no important wars in Europe for almost forty years, from 1815 to 1853.

The policy of the Alliance with respect to the internal affairs of its members was the subject of a keen difference between the more liberal group headed by Alexander I and the reactionaries led by the Austrian Minister Metternich. During the first years of its existence, the Liberal party was paramount. The years 1819-20 were years of crises.³⁴ Following them, the reactionary party triumphed and the Holy Alliance gradually became an alliance of kings for the suppression of the liberal movements in various countries. Alexander made one concession after another to Metternich. The opinion was expressed that Alexander had completely lost any independence of view. This seemed to be confirmed by the events of the Greek revolution against Turkish rule. The revolution broke out in 1821. Public opinion in Russia demanded support of the movement. Metternich, on the other hand, saw in it only a rebellion of the subjects of the Sultan, their legal ruler, and on this basis the Holy Alliance expressed itself against support of the revolution.

Alexander did not want to quarrel with the Alliance, which had come into existence at his own initiative, but his diplomacy during this period sought for independent means of expression outside the Alliance. He sought separate agreements with its members.³⁵

Simultaneously, in view of the possibility of war with Turkey, Russian troops were concentrated in the south. In the midst of the new diplomatic and military policy, Alexander fell sick of a fever which he contracted in the Crimea and died in Taganrog on December 1, 1825.³⁶

³⁴ Alexander threatened even to "*lâcher la bête*," to release Napoleon from his captivity at St. Helena.

³⁵ Metternich attempted to prevent Alexander's abandonment of the Alliance by a direct agreement between Russia and Austria, at the meeting of Emperors Francis and Alexander in Chernovtsy in 1823. It is doubtful whether such an attempt could have had a permanent result.

³⁶ The unexpectedness of the death of Alexander gave rise to a popular legend that he had not in fact died, but had taken refuge in the disguise of a pilgrim who many years later appeared in Siberia as an old man under the name of Fedor Kuzmich. The popular legend holds Alexander to have been this old man. In fact, Fedor Kuzmich was a mysterious personage who may have been a scion of the highest Russian aristocracy or an illegitimate son of Emperor Paul. The reason for his retirement from the world is not known.

5.

THE death of Alexander almost led to a revolution in Russia. During the second part of his reign, there had been a high degree of restlessness among the nobles and the officers. The extraordinary part played by the Russian army in the European wars of 1813-14 had aroused patriotic feeling among the officers. The subsequent policy of Alexander seemed to the majority of them contrary to the interests of Russia. His concessions to Metternich were severely criticized. The rôle of "policeman" in suppressing popular movements in Spain and Italy, which was delegated to Russia by the Holy Alliance following 1821 was not attractive to the Russian officers. Finally, the refusal to aid the Greek revolution was taken to be a betrayal of the interests of the Orthodox church. Also fears were current regarding alleged pro-Polish inclinations of Alexander.⁸⁷

These considerations drove the younger officers into political opposition. Soon after 1815 secret societies having as their object the reorganization of internal affairs in Russia began to be formed.⁸⁸ The lessons of history were not missed by the Russian liberal nobles who formed the opposition. The program of all the secret societies included the abolition of serfdom and the solution of the land question. Among the secret societies, two had especial importance, the Southern Society which was composed of officers of the southern army and was headed by Colonel Pestel, and the Northern Society of St. Petersburg. The plan of a future Russian constitution drawn up by Pestel was known as the *Russian Pravda* (Russian Justice). Pestel visualized the future Russian state as a centralized republic with democratic or even socialistic policies. He also recognized the necessity of a powerful dictatorship in the revolutionary government.⁸⁹ The Northern Society had planned a constitution written by Colonel Muraviev. This plan considered it possible to retain a liberal monarchy, but gave primary importance

⁸⁷ Alexander's speech at the opening of the first Polish *Seim* in 1818 was regarded as an indication that Poland would receive the Russian western provinces taken in the eighteenth century.

⁸⁸ These societies were organized partly under the influence of Masonic lodges and in some connection with them.

⁸⁹ In these matters Pestel was the pupil of the French Jacobins and a forerunner of Lenin.

to the rights of the individual. According to this plan Russia was to be organized along federal lines.⁴⁰

The secret societies waited several years for a convenient time to start a movement. The proper occasion arose at the time of the death of Alexander. The reason for this was confusion in the matter of the succession to the throne. According to the law of succession of 1797 Alexander, who died childless, should have been succeeded by his brother Constantine, who held the post of commander-in-chief of the Polish army after 1815. But Constantine was not inclined to accept the responsibilities and risks of the imperial office.⁴¹ Moreover, he was not married to a lady of a reigning house, and this, by the law of 1797, would prevent his children, if he had any, from succeeding him on the throne. This circumstance also served to make the office less tempting in the eyes of Constantine.⁴²

At the request of Constantine, Alexander signed a manifesto in 1823 confirming the refusal of Constantine to assume the throne, and appointed as his successor a third brother, Nicholas. For unknown reasons, Alexander did not publish this manifesto but deposited three copies in sealed envelopes in various places.⁴³

At the time of Alexander's death, Constantine was in Warsaw and Nicholas in St. Petersburg. Both of them knew of Alexander's manifesto, but only Constantine acted in accordance with it. Upon receiving news of the death of Alexander, he ordered the military and civil officials of Warsaw to swear allegiance to the new emperor, Nicholas, who on the other hand, did not dare to demand allegiance to himself in St. Petersburg and had the officials take their oath to Emperor Constantine.⁴⁴

With no telegraph service or railroads, connections between St.

⁴⁰ The constitution of Muraviev was written under the direct influence of the constitution of the United States of America.

⁴¹ Like Alexander, Constantine was informed somewhat of the opposition movement of the officers.

⁴² Constantine was married to a Polish lady.

⁴³ One of the reasons may have been his fear of irritating the officers and bringing about an uprising which Alexander hoped to prevent by publication of the constitutional project of Novosiltsev. Nicholas was very unpopular among the officers in view of his Prussian contacts and sympathies, since he was married to a Prussian princess, as well as for his conservative point of view.

⁴⁴ The military governor of St. Petersburg informed Nicholas of his unpopularity among the officers of the Guard.

Petersburg and Warsaw being maintained by post horses, the crisis was drawn out over a long period of time. The news of Alexander's death was received in St. Petersburg, December 8, 1825. Only two weeks later was the correspondence between Nicholas and Constantine concluded, and Constantine renewed his categorical refusal to accept the throne. The 26th of December was appointed as the day for taking the oath of loyalty to Emperor Nicholas I. This moment was chosen by the plotters for an uprising.⁴⁵ The plotters succeeded in convincing the soldiers of several regiments that the oath demanded of them was illegal and that it was necessary to uphold the rights of Emperor Constantine and to demand a constitution.⁴⁶

The rebels occupied the Senate square and efforts to send negotiators to them failed. The military governor of St. Petersburg, one of the heroes of the War of 1812, who approached them to enter into negotiations, was killed. The rebels, however, displayed no plan of action and limited themselves to forming a square in the middle of the city.⁴⁷ Nicholas succeeded in bringing together the remaining loyal troops and in planting cannon at the important points in the capital.⁴⁸ Toward evening the rebels were asked to surrender. When they refused, they were fired upon with shrapnel. The square broke, and the rebels fled. The uprising was immediately suppressed.⁴⁹

Immediately, arrests and investigations were started. A hundred and twenty men were committed to trial, among them many members of leading noble families in Russia. The decision of the Court was commuted by Nicholas. However, five of the prisoners were hanged, among them Colonel Pestel; thirty-one were condemned to hard labor in Siberia; the remainder were exiled to Siberia or committed to prison for various periods of time.

⁴⁵ For this reason the participators in the movement are known as "Decembrists."

⁴⁶ The anecdote was current that the simple soldiers thought that "Constitution" was the name of the wife of Constantine.

⁴⁷ According to the decision of the leaders of the plot, a dictator, Colonel Prince Trubetskoy of the Guards, was appointed, but he did not appear at the scene of the revolt.

⁴⁸ The rebels had no artillery.

⁴⁹ The attempt at a military uprising in southern Russia also failed.

6.

NICHOLAS I was quite unlike his elder brother Alexander. He had a very much more primitive nature, with more limited interests and not the slightest shade of liberalism in his political views. He was not lacking entirely in diplomatic ability in his relations with people, but even here his capacities were very limited. He loved to play the rôle of a simple, honest officer and servant of the state.

His political wisdom consisted primarily in imposing strict discipline in military and civil matters. Nicholas was guided by the same idea of a "regulated" or "policed" state as was Peter the Great, but of course he was a far less capable man than Peter.⁵⁰ Nicholas undoubtedly felt responsible before the bar of history and desired to be of service to Russia, but as he had received no education except in military matters, he was unprepared for the task of ruling.⁵¹ Nicholas, nevertheless, attempted to take part in all the departments of government. He did not share the liberal ideas of his brother. As he distrusted liberalism in general, he brought to an end all preparations for constitutional reform and in connection with this revoked the new experiments in the realm of local administration. None the less, it is impossible to deny his efforts to introduce improvements in the governmental and social organization of Russia. He ordered that a summary of the views of the "Decembrists" regarding the need for change in governmental affairs be drawn up, and studied them carefully.

One of the principal deficiencies of the Russian political system in the eyes of the "Decembrists" was the absence of any system in the laws and the consequent confusion of procedure in the courts. In order to correct this deficiency, Nicholas called a committee to codify the law and to compile the *Svod Zakonov* (Code of Laws). In charge of this work was placed one of the greatest Russian statesmen and jurists, Speransky.⁵² After several years of concen-

⁵⁰ A contemporary of Nicholas, the great Russian poet Pushkin said of him: "*Il y a beaucoup d'enseigne en lui et un peu de Pierre le Grand.*"

⁵¹ For the reason that prior to 1823 he was not the heir.

⁵² As we have seen above, Speransky was exiled in 1812. In the second half of the reign of Alexander, Speransky was admitted into the Civil Service in the provinces; he became governor-general of Siberia in 1821-22, and later was allowed to return to St. Petersburg but did not have the same importance as before. Nicholas tested his loyalty by appointing him as one of the judges in the trial of the "Decembrists."

trated work, Speransky succeeded in publishing forty-two volumes of "The Complete Collection of Russian Laws" in their chronological order from the Code of Tsar Alexis Michaelovich of 1649 to the coronation of Emperor Nicholas. On the basis of this work, a systematic Code of Laws of the Russian Empire was compiled in 1832.⁵³ Thus under Nicholas I was accomplished the codification of laws which neither Catherine II nor Alexander I had been able to achieve.

Another serious deficiency in Russian life noted by the "Decembrists" was the institution of serfdom. We have seen how, under Alexander I, the Government thought seriously of abolishing or at least limiting serfdom. Nicholas I continued to work in the same direction. To both Alexander and Nicholas the peasant question was of political importance in the struggle with the opposition of nobles. Nicholas was distrustful all his life of the political intrigues of the nobility following the "Decembrists" movement which was primarily a movement of the nobility.

Under Nicholas I several measures were taken to limit serfdom. One was the law of 1827 forbidding the purchase of peasants without a sufficient quantity of land for their sustenance; another was the law of 1833 forbidding the separation of families by sale. The Government was motivated by the idea of regulating the exploitation of peasant labor by the landowners. The law concerning peasants bound to the land, proclaimed in 1842, was in accordance with this purpose. It called for a definition by the landowners of the duties of the peasants.⁵⁴ The attempt to impose fixed responsibilities in respect to serf labor was made only in certain districts of Russia. In the kingdom of Poland the so-called "tables" were introduced in 1846;⁵⁵ in the southwestern provinces "inventories" were introduced in 1853.⁵⁶ Everything pointed to a general peasant reform, but this actually took place only in the next reign.

Another evil in the governmental system of Russia pointed out by the "Decembrists" was the confusion in finances, and the depreciation of the ruble caused by the paper money inflation as a

⁵³ A second edition of this Code was published in 1842 and a third in 1857.

⁵⁴ This law, however, like the earlier law of "free landowners" in 1803, did not have any great effect.

⁵⁵ This law was passed in view of the peasant uprisings in Austrian Galicia.

⁵⁶ The "tables" as well as the "inventories" were lists of peasant liabilities.

result of the prolonged wars under Alexander I. The financial reforms of Nicholas were carried out by Kankrin, his Minister of Finance. The first measure introduced by him was the stabilization of the value of paper money in 1839 at the rate of $3\frac{1}{2}$ paper rubles to one stabilized ruble. Following this, new paper currency backed by a gold reserve and maintained at parity was introduced; the old bills were purchased by the State Treasury.

After acceding to many of the wishes of the "Decembrists" in carrying out reforms in the judicial and administrative machinery of the state and in accepting some of their suggestions regarding social and economic matters, Nicholas reasserted the principle of autocracy. All manifestations of liberalism were mercilessly suppressed. The press was limited; the universities were placed under strict supervision; a specied "Third" division of the imperial chancellory was organized for the suppression of political unrest. This particular body was known as the *gendarmérie*. The slightest suspicion of political untrustworthiness terminated the career of any civil or military official, however talented. As a result of this, the proportion of capable officers and civil servants in higher posts decreased considerably. Arrest and exile threatened anyone having independent political views. The brilliant conservative political thinker belonging to the "Slavophile" group, George Samarin, was imprisoned for a short time in 1851 for opposing the German party in the Baltic provinces. The young author Dostoievsky, a genius of the first rank, was exiled to Siberia in 1848 for being a member of a group interested in French socialism.

The system of Nicholas I was enforced harshly and without right of appeal. When the military collapse of Russia in the Crimean War showed it to be poor, its creator was incapable of surviving it.⁵⁷

7.

IN his foreign policy Emperor Nicholas I followed the same firm principles as in his internal policy. The basic concept of his foreign policy was legitimism, hence his opposition to all liberal and revolutionary movements. His first move in foreign policy—

⁵⁷ Nicholas I died in the midst of the Crimean War, on March 2, 1855, ostensibly from a cold, but actually from nervous fatigue. There was a rumor to the effect that he poisoned himself.

the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29—was not, however, in complete consistency with this principle. In supporting the Greek revolution he was guided not by his general principles of foreign policy, but by the traditional objectives of Russian diplomacy in the Balkans. Moreover, the war had been prepared in the preceding reign. Nicholas really followed his brother by inertia.⁵⁸ In 1827 an agreement was concluded by Russia, England, and France to aid Greece. In the autumn of 1827 the combined Russo-Anglo-French squadron destroyed the Turko-Egyptian fleet at Navarino. The immediate consequence of this was a war between Russia and Turkey in 1828-29.⁵⁹

According to the plan of Emperor Alexander, the Polish army was to take part in the war in the Balkans, the object of which was to free the southern Slavs. But the Grand Duke Constantine did not consent to the dispatch of the Polish army to the Balkans. Its participation in the war, however, was symbolized by the presence of an Extraordinary Mission of Polish officers. The war progressed slowly in 1828; only in the course of the next year did the Russian commander-in-chief, General Diebitsch, deliver a telling blow to the Turks at Kulevche and enter the Balkans. At the same time General Paskevich succeeded in capturing Erzerum on the Caucasian front. Turkey was forced to conclude peace at Adrianople. According to the treaty of peace, Russia took possession of the mouth of the Danube and the whole coast of the Black Sea to Poti. The independence of Greece was secured as well as the autonomy of Serbia, Moldavia, and Wallachia, the Danubian principalities.

The conditions of the Peace of Adrianople astonished the diplomats of Europe by their moderation. This was not the result of weakness or of error, but of farsightedness and strength. It was a continuation of the Turkophile policy of Emperor Paul. The moderation of the Peace of Adrianople bore fruit several years later in the famous Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi between Turkey and Russia. Several years after the Peace of Adrianople, Turkey found herself on the verge of disruption in view of civil war. The Egyptian

⁵⁸ Also probably because of his desire to divert the attention of Russian society from the effects of the "Decembrist" uprising by a foreign war.

⁵⁹ Prior to this war Russia had been at war with Persia over the incursions of Persians into Transcaucasia. The fortunes of war were favorable to Russia, and the result was the annexation of Armenia, north of Arax, including the town of Erivan.

Pasha, Mechmet-Ali, rose against the Sultan, and his son Ibrahim succeeded in defeating the Sultan's army. Turkey was saved by the intervention of Russia. A small corps was sent under the direction of General N. N. Muraviev to the Bosphorus for the defense of Constantinople against the Egyptian army.

General Muraviev was one of the most outstanding military personages of the reign of Nicholas. He had prepared himself for activity in the east by learning several oriental languages, which enabled him to carry on conversations without interpreters. The result of his expedition to the Bosphorus was the conclusion of the Unkiar-Skelessi treaty which placed Russia in the position of protector with respect to Turkey. The gist of the treaty consisted in the provision that the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were to remain closed to all military vessels except those of Turkey and Russia. The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi was a great victory for Russian diplomacy, but Russia did not succeed in utilizing its benefits. Emperor Nicholas tied his own hands with an agreement concluded the same year with Prussia and Austria at München-grätz. In turning away from France and England, he made the representatives of these countries open enemies of his policy in Constantinople.

Even prior to the conclusion of the Unkiar-Skelessi treaty, Nicholas had the opportunity of demonstrating the true nature of his foreign policy. This was the revolution of July, 1830, in France, which overthrew the legitimate power of the Bourbons and replaced it by the liberal monarchy of Louis-Philippe of Orleans. Nicholas decided to intervene in favor of the Bourbons and prepared to dispatch Russian troops to the Rhine. The intervention was prevented, however, by a revolution in Poland. This uprising cannot be explained by the Polish policy of Nicholas, for while he never sympathized with constitutional principles, he was particularly careful to maintain the Polish Constitutional Charter. But the nationalistic policy pursued by Nicholas made it evident to the Poles that there was no hope of the annexation to the Polish Kingdom of the Lithuanian and the western Russian provinces for which they still had hope during the reign of Alexander I. The Polish uprising was suppressed only in 1831, after a year of heavy fighting. The Polish Constitution was then repealed. The Organic Statute of 1832 left Poland with only a few political privileges.

Thus, contrary to the original intentions of Russia, a considerable portion of Poland was annexed. This further confused the Polish question both in the opinion of Russians and Poles.

The reactionary foreign policy of Nicholas found expression a second time in 1848-49, when the whole of the European continent was swept by a new wave of revolution. On this occasion he took part in its suppression. Following the personal request of the young Austrian emperor, Francis Joseph, Nicholas moved an army of one hundred thousand Russians under General Paskevich to suppress the Hungarian uprising against Austria in 1849. Paskevich soon succeeded in forcing the Hungarian army to surrender. Austria was saved. The Austrian Minister Schwartzemberg immediately took steps to forestall excessive Russian influence upon the subsequent policy of Austria. His expression is famous: "Austria will surprise the world with her ingratitude." An opportunity for this soon arose with a new turn in international affairs.

It was easy already in the 1840's to foresee a complete breach between Russia on the one hand and England and France on the other, over the Eastern Question.⁶⁰ The French Revolution of 1848 completely disrupted the relations between Russia and France. The situation was not improved when the French Republic became the Empire of Napoleon III. On the other hand, Napoleon attempted to strengthen his internal power by an effective foreign policy. In the hope of attracting the French Catholics to his side, he demanded that Turkey grant privileges to Catholics in the Holy Land. The keys of the Church of Bethlehem were taken away from the Orthodox Greeks and given to the Catholic church. Emperor Nicholas, in his capacity of patron of the Orthodox population of Turkey, under the provisions of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji of 1774, demanded the reëstablishment of the rights of the Orthodox church. Having been refused by the Sultan, he sent Russian troops to the autonomous principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which were under the suzerainty of the Sultan.

In the autumn of 1853, Turkey declared war against Russia. In November the Russian Black Sea squadron destroyed the Turkish fleet at Sinope. Following this the British and French squadrons entered the Black Sea and a breach occurred between Russia and the western European states. England and France were later joined

⁶⁰ Notwithstanding the agreement of 1841.

by Sardinia. The position of Russia became difficult when Austria demanded the abandonment of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. This was the beginning of Schwartzenberg's prediction regarding the ingratitude of Austria. Nicholas submitted to the demands, as he considered that Russia was not prepared to fight Austria as well, the more so since Prussia was acting in an unfriendly manner toward Russia.

War on the Danube, which formed the basis of the Russian military plan, became impossible. The chief forces of the Russian army were brought back for the defense of the Russian frontiers against the possibility of attack by Austria and Prussia. Meanwhile, the Russian fleet could not oppose the united and incomparably stronger Anglo-French fleet.⁶¹ During the autumn of 1854 the allies landed their troops in the Crimea near Eupatoria and moved against Sevastopol. The city was hurriedly fortified by General Todtleben, and the Russian fleet was sunk at the entrance of the harbor to prevent the entrance of the Anglo-French fleet. The siege of Sevastopol began. The city could have been saved, perhaps, if Paskevich had agreed to send reinforcements from the main Russian army which was defending the Russian frontier against Austria, but Paskevich did not agree to take this risk.

On March 2, 1855, Emperor Nicholas I died, but the accession of Alexander his son, was not accompanied by a change in military plans. Sevastopol was in fact left to take care of itself. On September 8, 1855, the French succeeded in taking Fort Malakoff, the key to the fortress of Sevastopol. After this the Russian troops left the southern side, which comprised the principal part of the fortified town, and crossed the bridge to the northern side.

After the fall of Sevastopol, the Russian troops were victorious on the Caucasian front, where General N. N. Muraviev took by storm the fortress of Kars, regarded as impregnable by the Turks.⁶²

In the beginning of 1856, by the invitation of Austria and Prussia, peace negotiations were opened between Russia and her enemies. The Treaty of Paris was concluded on conditions highly un-

⁶¹ The Russian fleet consisted of sailing vessels while the fleet of the allies contained a number of steam vessels.

⁶² Russia had taken Kars in 1829, but it had been returned to Turkey by the Treaty of Adrianople.

favorable to Russia. Russia received back Sevastopol in return for Kars, but lost the right to maintain a fleet in the Black Sea. The Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were closed to military vessels of all nations. Finally, Russia had to abandon the right of exclusive protection over Orthodox peoples in Turkey. All the Christians in Turkey were placed under the protection of the Great Powers.

The foreign policy of Nicholas I thus ended in a complete catastrophe. The military prestige of Russia was destroyed. The extraordinary influence exercised by Russia in European affairs was terminated. This was a severe blow to national self-esteem. Russia's defeat in the Crimean War was one of the causes of the series of internal reforms which were carried out by Alexander II.

CHAPTER X.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

(1857-1905)

I.

IN 1857 the third edition of the *Code of Laws* of the Russian Empire was published. While it contained several changes with respect to the first two editions of 1832 and 1842, the basis remained the same. The *Code of Laws* of the first three editions formed the juridical basis of the old *régime*,¹ but the third edition was the last which bore this character. At the time when the third edition of the laws was published, the basis of the old *régime* was changing. Public sentiment, influenced by the failures of the *régime*, demanded reform. Public opinion had already made itself felt during the life of Emperor Nicholas, despite all the efforts of censorship and police. Following his death, it could no longer be restrained, the more so because the new emperor, Alexander II, was by nature different from his father. It cannot be said that the political views of Alexander II differed greatly from the views of Nicholas. Alexander II had, in fact, the same ideals of enlightened absolutism as Nicholas I; but Alexander was of a much gentler and more tolerant disposition than Nicholas. Alexander had been educated in much more humane spirit. His preceptor was the poet Zhukovsky, one of the most noble characters of the first half of the nineteenth century.

The patriotic feelings of Alexander, as of many of his contemporaries, were deeply hurt by the outcome of the Crimean War. Reforms in Russia seemed inevitable, as the old *régime* had proved itself incapable of organizing the defense of Russia.² The basic

¹ With the exception of Volume X containing the civil law. See Chap. VII, Sec. 6.

² This was admitted prior to his death by Nicholas I, who told Alexander: "I am handing you command of the country in a poor state."

defect of the old *régime* was the institution of serfdom. It was consequently natural that the reforms of Alexander II should start with this matter.³

In January, 1857, a secret Committee on Peasant Reform was organized. It was composed of several of the highest officials of the Government, but the fear of taking decisive action retarded its work. A decisive step was taken at the initiative of Alexander in the late autumn of 1857, when the emperor ordered the governor-general of Vilna to organize "Provincial Committees" of the nobility in the Lithuanian provinces for the discussion of the terms of the proposed peasant reforms on December 2, 1857. Following this move there was no possibility of retreat; the reforms became inevitable. The nobles of other provinces were forced to request the Government's authorization to form similar committees. Their motives were clearly expressed in the famous speech of Alexander II to the nobility of Moscow: "Better that the reform should come from above than wait until serfdom is abolished from below."

The working out of a general plan of reform and of detailed provisions for its execution occupied more than three years. The work of the Provincial Committees was revised by special commissions in St. Petersburg. These "Revising Commissions" consisted primarily of partisans of reform. They were composed of government officials, from ministries directly concerned in the proposed reform, and experts drawn from progressive estate-owners. Y. I. Rostovtzev was at the head of the Commission.⁴ One of its leading members was the Vice-Minister of Internal Affairs, N. A. Miliutin. Great influence was exercised by several leaders of the Slavophile movement notably Prince V. Cherkassky and G. Samarin. The Revising Commission showed the greatest initiative in developing the project of reform which went much farther than the proposals of the majority of the Provincial Committees. The project of the Committee was partly reduced in the "Main Committee,"⁵ and by the State Council. After this the project was confirmed by the emperor in a manifesto regarding the abolition of serfdom which was signed on March 3, 1861.

³ The more so because the solution of the question had been prepared during the reign of Nicholas I.

⁴ Died in 1860.

⁵ The Main Committee on Peasant Reform replaced the earlier "secret Committee."

The basic principles of the reform were as follows: Household serfs were to be freed within a period of two years without redemption, but were to receive nothing on gaining their freedom. Peasant serfs were to receive not only their personal freedom, but also certain allotments of land. In determining the dimensions of each peasant's share, the amount of land worked by peasants for their own use under conditions of serfdom was taken into consideration.⁶ The serfs had worked both their own lands and the lands of their owner. The area of the allotments granted to the peasants following the reform was equal approximately to the area retained by the landowner.⁷ Thus, under the terms of the reform of 1861, the peasants received grants of land which, prior to the reform, had absorbed only half of their labor.

By the terms of the emancipation, the land which the peasants received did not become their private property. It continued to be regarded as the property of the landowner, but was held for the benefit of the peasant. The peasants, though now freedmen, were called upon to pay for the use of this land or to perform certain services for the landowner. The Government, however, was willing to help, if both the landowners and the peasants desired to terminate this relationship. Help was provided in the form of a long-term credit to purchase the land. In those cases where estate-owners agreed to sell the land to their former serfs, the Government paid the landowners the cost⁸ of the land with an interest-bearing bond, and this sum was imposed upon the peasant in the form of deferred payments over a period of years.⁹ Even in this case the peasant did not receive the land in complete personal ownership, but each peasant commune or village received the whole area of land in communal ownership under collective responsibility for the redemption payments of all the members of the commune. Special government

⁶ The allotments were cut down by the Main Committee and the State Council.

⁷ In view of the approximate equality of the land operated by the peasants for themselves, and the land cultivated for the landowners, the *ukaz* of Paul, 1797, insisted that the estate-owners would limit their demands of serf labor to three days a week, leaving the balance to the peasant for the cultivation of his own land.

⁸ The cost was computed on the basis of the annual payment of the peasant, being worth 5 per cent of the cost of the land.

⁹ These deferred payments were added to the head tax of the peasant. The appointed period was forty-nine years. Within twenty years following 1861 about 85 per cent of landowners actually sold to the peasants their part of land in each estate with the above-mentioned assistance of the Government.

agents named for the purpose of putting the reform into operation, called mediators, drew up charter deeds for the land in the name of a whole commune. The commune itself divided the land among its members according to the size of families. These subdivisions took place periodically every few years.

Thus, even following the reforms, the peasant did not become an individual property owner or an individual possessing full civil rights, but remained subject to the authority of the commune.¹⁰ This situation is important for the understanding of future events. This situation explains the continued juridical isolation of the peasants even following the reform. It also preserved in the consciousness of the peasant the memory of his condition of serfdom. The firm bonds of the commune did not permit changes in the manner of owning land. In the consciousness of the peasant of each commune the memory was thus retained of the fact that the commune had only half of the former estate. The reform of 1861, having granted only a half, seemed incomplete. The peasants dreamed of completing the reform. Another idea connected with the land commune was that the land was not the property of individuals but was granted in the form of an allotment to serve the uses of the individual. Thus, land within the whole state was regarded by the peasant as a fund which could be drawn upon for further allotments until it was used up. These were the embryonic ideas of the subsequent revolution.

The reform of 1861 was tragically inadequate. There were two ways of really final solution of the question. The first was to leave the possession as well as the ownership of the land with the landowner. The peasant in this case would have received merely his personal freedom. In the majority of cases, however, under the pressure of necessity, the landowner would have been forced to sell part of his land to his former serfs. The Government could have assisted in this transaction, in the favor of the individual peasants, and not of the communes. The actual result would have been almost the same as it was by the reform of 1861, but the psychological results would have been quite different. Instead of thousands

¹⁰ Actually the peasants became dependent upon those government bureaucratic agencies which concerned themselves with peasant affairs. It is necessary to add that outside of the commune each peasant could purchase land on the basis of full-ownership.

of peasant communes there would have been created millions of peasant landowners. The ideas of a "general fund" and of "allotments" would have been avoided. It was toward this result that the later reforms of Stolypin were directed,¹¹ but the reforms of Stolypin came forty-five years too late (1906).

The other possibility, in introducing the reform of 1861, was to take all the land away from the estate-owners and to divide it among the peasants. This would have been the simplest solution, which would have prevented all the later upheavals in Russia. If the partition of land had been completed in 1861, there would have been no need for it in 1918 and in that case the Russian revolution would never have been accompanied by such disastrous results.

However, overlooking its incompleteness, the reform of 1861 was an ambitious effort which changed the whole old order. After the peasant reform, it seemed easier to start with other reforms which, taken together, completely changed the nature of the Russian state. The other leading "great reforms" of Alexander II were the reforms of the Zemstvo, the towns, the courts, and the military service.

The reform of the Zemstvo in 1864 created for the first time following the early Moscow state, real local self-government without regard to class. The basis of the reform consisted in granting to elected representatives of each county (Uyezd) control over the schools, medical affairs, and roads. The elective law provided for the division of electors into three *curias*: the private landowners (nobles and merchants); peasant communes; and townspeople. The representatives elected an "Executive Committee" known as the *Uprava* for a term of three years. The representatives of the Uyezd formed a provincial assembly which elected a provincial Zemstvo Committee (*Uprava*). Following the general spirit of the Zemstvo reforms, similar measures were introduced for town government in 1870. The electors were likewise divided into three *curias*, according to a property census;¹² the amount of taxes paid was totaled and divided into three equal parts, each having an equal number of representatives.¹³ Both the Zemstvo and the town authorities

¹¹ See Chap. XI, Sec. 3.

¹² This was the Prussian "class system."

¹³ In the higher or first *curia* there were usually a very small number of individuals.

succeeded in carrying out work of great cultural importance in Russia prior to the Revolution of 1917.¹⁴

Of no less significance was the new judicial reform of 1864. The basic principles were: the improvement of court procedure; the introduction of the jury and the organization of lawyers into a formal bar. Despite some drawbacks of the Russian courts following 1864, they undoubtedly reached considerable efficiency, and in this respect Russia could be favorably compared with the most progressive European countries.¹⁵ Finally, the last of the major reforms was the introduction of universal military service in 1874. The law of military service was practically the only one of the laws of this time which affected equally all the classes of the Russian people. Here there was no difference between the façade and the foundation; it was profoundly democratic in spirit. The recruits were granted privileges only according to their family position. The only son, the only grandson, or only supporter of a family, received full privileges and were registered in the reserve of the second category, that is, in practice, prior to the World War, they were never called into service. With respect to the term of service and promotion, special privileges were recognized in favor of individuals having secondary education. Class differences were not in any way reflected in privileges of military service.¹⁶

The society created by the reforms of Alexander II lasted in its general character until 1905, and in part until 1917.

2.

THE foreign policy of Emperor Alexander II may be divided into two main periods. During the first, Russian policy was inspired primarily by the idea of revising the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and particularly of abrogating the humiliating clause regarding the prohibition of maintenance of a Russian fleet in the Black Sea.

¹⁴ Regarding the changes in the Zemstvo and town laws under Alexander III see below, Sec. 4.

¹⁵ It is necessary, however, to note here the difference between the façade and the foundation of the new Russian state. The peasants in the vast majority of small civil litigations did not use the new courts and had to be content with the "volost" courts, especially organized for the peasants, and from the reign of Alexander III until 1912, also had to accept the jurisdiction of the "Land Captains."

¹⁶ With the exception of the selection of the Guards officers from the aristocratic circles of society.

Taking advantage of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, Russia succeeded in overthrowing the limitations of the Treaty of Paris. Then began the second period of Alexander's foreign policy. Russia's policy now sought further success in the Near East. But the union of Europe against Russia at the Berlin Conference in 1878 deprived Russia of the fruits of her efforts. This marked a new turn in Russia's policy.

Finding herself thrust out of the Near East as a result of the Crimean War, Russia attempted to carry on an active policy in the Caucasus, in the Middle East, and in the Far East. In all these directions the preparations had been made during the reign of Nicholas I. The Government of Alexander II succeeded in achieving its most important successes in the Caucasus and in the Middle East.¹⁷ Throughout the reign of Nicholas I Russia was forced to maintain troops in the Caucasus to protect its possessions from incursions of the mountaineers. An exhausting mountain war continued for many years.

The conquest of the Caucasus was concluded only in the reign of Alexander II. From 1857 the new viceroy in the Caucasus, Prince Bariatsky, began a methodical advance into the hills of Daghestan against the leader of the mountaineers, Shamil. Shamil conducted a heroic defense which was, however, overcome by the Russian armies. In 1859 Shamil was taken prisoner. After conquering the eastern Caucasus from the Georgian military road to the Caspian Sea, Bariatsky turned to the western part of the Caucasus. The Circassian tribe was ordered either to move to the valleys where it could be controlled or to move out into Turkey.¹⁸

The renewal of Russian activity in the Middle East commenced, as has been said above, during the reign of Nicholas I. The energetic governor-general of Orenburg, Count Perovsky, in the winter of 1839-40, opened a campaign against Khiva in order to punish

¹⁷ The conquest of the Caucasus had been commenced by Alexander I. General Ermolov, appointed viceroy in the Caucasus in 1816, had gone far in the conquest of Caucasia and Transcaucasia in the second half of the reign of Alexander I. Ermolov was one of the prominent Russian statesmen of the nineteenth century and had a recognized talent for military and administrative matters. Personally of a modest and simple nature, Ermolov was known as a harsh and even cruel man when he considered such action necessary in the interests of Russia. However, neither Ermolov nor his immediate successors succeeded in finally subjecting the Caucasus to Russia.

¹⁸ About two hundred thousand went to Turkey.

the Khivans for their raids. The campaign, however, ended in failure, owing to the severity of the winter. But in 1847, a Russian army reached the Syr-Darya, not far from its mouth in the Aral Sea. Here a fortress, Aralsk, was constructed. This event marked the turning point in Russia's policy in the Middle East.

The fortress of Aralsk became the basis of Russian domination of the Aral Sea. Two military vessels were brought in sections from Orenburg, and a Russian flotilla was organized on the Sea of Aral. The dream of Kirilov of seeing the Russian flag float over the Aral Sea became a reality in less than a hundred years.¹⁹

In view of the incursions of Khokands, it was decided to move up the Syr-Darya to the fortress of Ak-Mechet. This was seized and renamed Fort Perovsk in 1853. Following the conquest of the lower Syr-Darya and the bringing of a flotilla into the Sea of Aral, the Russian frontier moved from Orenburg to the boundary of Turkestan. The fortified line of Orenburg became obsolete. At the same time the eastern Kirghiz line was advanced by the occupation of the basin of Balkash Lake. The frontier was carried from Irtysh to Semirechie. Thus, less than one hundred and twenty years after Kirilov, the provinces of Bokhara and Samarkand could be annexed. But these provinces were no longer lacking in unity as they had been in the time of Kirilov. In the beginning of the nineteenth century a new dynasty of Khans in Bokhara had succeeded in strengthening their power by means of a cruel despotism. The new center of government was in the valley of the Fergan where one of the local Uzbek princes took the title of Khan, having founded his capital in Khokand. The Khanate of Khokand was a troublesome neighbor. The Khokands attempted to conquer the Kirghiz, who had long ago become Russian subjects. The ensuing struggle made it necessary for Russia to intervene and connect the Syr-Darya and the Semirechensk lines. In 1865 the occupied territories were united to form the province of Turkestan and were made part of the region under the control of the governor-general of Orenburg. General Cherniaiev was made head of the new territories. On June 27, 1865, he captured the largest Khokand city, Tashkent. The capture of Tashkent by a small force had a tremendous effect upon the whole of Turkestan and decided the fur-

¹⁹ See above, Chap. VI, Sec. 6.

ther course of the struggle.²⁰ The emir of Bokhara attempted to assist the Khokands and demanded that the Russian troops immediately leave the territories they occupied. A struggle began with Bokhara which was conducted by General Kauffmann, who had been appointed governor-general of Turkestan in 1867. In 1868 Kauffmann occupied Samarkand, and the emir of Bokhara recognized the suzerainty of the Russian tsar.

The attention of the Russian Government and public opinion was attracted to the Far East in the 1840's. At this time the basin of the Amur River, ceded to China at the end of the seventeenth century, had not been occupied by the Chinese. It was an almost uninhabited region. In the beginning of the 1840's, the academician Middendorf headed a scientific expedition into Siberia. On his way home he passed through the region of the Amur and was convinced that it was actually not occupied by anyone. Middendorf's report created a strong impression in St. Petersburg. In 1847, in appointing N. N. Muraviev governor-general of eastern Siberia, Emperor Nicholas I mentioned the "Russian" river Amur. In the naval and diplomatic circles of Russia, the Amur was not regarded as having a great value, since it flowed only into the Sea of Okhotsk and Sakhalin was believed to be connected with the mainland, so that the Sea of Okhotsk seemed to have no direct outlet to the south. Captain Nevelskoy, sent to the Sea of Okhotsk on the brig "Baikal," decided to investigate at his own risk the mouth of the Amur and the shores of Sakhalin. Nevelskoy left Petropavlovsk (Kamchatka) June 11, 1849, and sailed to the eastern shore of Sakhalin. On September 15 he passed through the Straits of Tartary to the Bay of Aian. Sakhalin was proved to be an island and the importance of the river Amur as a line of connection became evident. On August 19, 1851, Nevelskoy raised the Russian military flag at the mouth of the river Amur. For these acts "of the greatest impertinence" Nevelskoy was sentenced to being demoted to a sailor's rank. Only the personal intervention of Nicholas I saved him from the punishment.²¹ The region of Amur was occupied by Russia in

²⁰ The population of Tashkent was one hundred thousand. The garrison of Khokands was thirty thousand with sixty-three guns and Cherniaiev had less than two thousand and only twelve guns.

²¹ Nicholas I said at that time: "Where once the Russian flag has flown it must not be lowered."

1858 by the Treaty of Aygun, while in 1860 the northeastern half of Sakhalin and the region of Usuriisk were granted to Russia.²²

Russian success in the Middle and the Far East increased the international importance of Russia and aroused concern among the Great Powers, particularly Great Britain. This situation was attested by the events of 1869 when Great Britain, increasingly concerned at the success of Russia in Turkestan, entered into negotiations with the Russian Government. Great Britain proposed to form a neutral zone between Russian and British possessions in the Middle East, providing that Afghanistan would be included in the sphere of British influence and that the sphere of Russian influence would extend to the river Amu-Darya. The Russian Government long refused to answer this offer, perhaps awaiting an offer of compensation in the Black Sea.

Meanwhile, the desire to secure allies against the European powers induced Russian diplomats to reach an understanding with the United States. The tradition of Russo-American *rapprochement* goes back to the eighteenth century.²³ During the Crimean War of 1853-56 the United States Government gave moral support to Russia. On its part, Russia gave a similar support to the Union forces during the Civil War of 1861-65. The Russian fleet was sent to the northern states as an expression of sympathy and support of the Federal Government in its struggle against the Confederate South. When Alexander II barely escaped an attempted assassination in 1866,²⁴ the United States Assistant Secretary of the Navy, G. V. Fox, was sent to Russia to extend congratulations on account of Alexander's escape from death. The social life of the two countries at this time had certain common characteristics. Serfdom had just been abolished in Russia while slavery had been abolished in the United States. This circumstance, it seemed, led to a mutual understanding and sympathy. The desire to meet the interests of the United States was one of the basic reasons for Russia's sale of her American possessions. In 1867 Alaska was sold to the United States for \$7,200,000, a nominal sum considering the natural wealth of Alaska.²⁵

²² The southern half of Sakhalin remained in the possession of Japan.

²³ See above, Catherine's attitude to the question of armed neutrality, 1780, Chap. VI, Sec. 8.

²⁴ See below, Sec. 3.

²⁵ The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs did not know of the gold in Alaska,

The *rapprochement* of the United States, however, could not serve as a firm support to Russia against Great Britain and France in her Near Eastern policy. Russia took advantage of the helpless condition of France during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 in order to announce her determination to abrogate the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris. Great Britain alone, without France, was not feared by Russia. Alexander II also attempted to strengthen his position in European diplomacy by means of an understanding with Germany and Austria. (The League of Three Emperors, 1872.)

Having achieved success in the Black Sea, Russia was ready to make concessions to Great Britain in the Middle East. Russia agreed to the demands of Great Britain. Prince Gorchakov announced Russia's willingness not to seize Khiva. Events, however, proved otherwise. A struggle with Khiva was unavoidable in view of increasing raids of the Khivans. In 1873 thirteen thousand Russian troops under the command of Kauffmann moved against Khiva from Turkestan and the Caspian Sea. Khiva was conquered. Part of the Khivan territory was merged with Russia and part became a vassal state.²⁶ In 1871 the Kuldja region on the Chinese frontier was occupied on account of the disturbances which threatened the peace of the Kirghiz.²⁷ Kuldja was occupied by Russia for ten years and in 1882 was returned to China. In the middle of the 1870's the Khokand Khan rose against Russia. The uprising was suppressed and the Khanate was incorporated in Russian territory.²⁸

The attention of Russia was again directed toward the Near East in the latter 1870's. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 was caused by serious internal complications in the Balkans. The Turkish oppression of the Slavs in collecting taxes led to uprisings against the Turks in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in Bulgaria. The Turks attempted to suppress the uprising with extraordinary cruelty. As the Great Powers did not intervene, Serbia

although Russian scientists did. A score of years prior to the sale of Alaska, the Russian colony of Ross in California had been ceded to the United States.

²⁶ At the taking of Khiva a great number of Persian slaves were released.

²⁷ In Kuldja uprisings of Dungan (Chinese Mohammedans) and of Taranchis (Sarts) took place against China. The Chinese Government proved itself unable to suppress this uprising.

²⁸ In 1876 the Fergan region was organized.

and Montenegro declared war on Turkey in 1876. The Serbian Government invited General Cherniaiev, famed for his Turkestan campaigns, to command the Serbian army. Cherniaiev was accompanied by a considerable number of volunteers from Russia; but the forces of the Serbs and the Turks were too unequal, and after a heroic resistance at Alexinac, Cherniaiev was forced to retreat. Serbia was saved from a complete defeat by the timely intervention of Russia. When Turkey refused to carry out the demands of the conference of European diplomats in Constantinople in 1877 respecting the reform of government over the Slavonic lands, Alexander II declared war on Turkey, April 24, 1877. Russia was joined by Rumania, a Grand Duchy formed in 1859 from the union of Moldavia and Wallachia. The war was difficult, especially because it began when the reorganization of the Russian army on the basis of universal service was far from completed. In the autumn of 1877 Russian troops achieved considerable success both on the Balkan and Caucasian fronts. In the end of November Kars was taken by the Russian troops for the third time in the nineteenth century.²⁹ In December, Plevna, where the main Turkish army of Osman Pasha was besieged, fell to Russia. During the winter Russian troops crossed the Balkans. In February, 1878, they reached Constantinople. The success of the Russian armies led to the interference of Great Britain. The British fleet entered the Sea of Marmora. On March 3, 1878, at a small village, San Stefano, near Constantinople, the preliminary conditions of peace between Russia and Turkey were signed. Turkey agreed to form a new principedom, Bulgaria, including the river Vardar and the whole of Macedonia, of its Balkan possessions between the Danube and the Aegean Sea. Turkey further agreed to recognize the independence of Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania. Russia received the mouth of the Danube, ceded by her in 1856, Batum, and Kars in Transcaucasia. But the Treaty of San Stefano aroused the opposition of Great Britain and Austria. Russia was threatened with a new war. Desiring to avoid a new struggle, Alexander II accepted the mediation of the German Chancellor, Bismarck, and agreed to revise the conditions of the treaty at a European Congress in Berlin. The Congress of Berlin was a complete defeat of

²⁹ Kars was returned to Turkey by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918.

Russian diplomacy in Slavonic affairs. The territory of Bulgaria was reduced to half, Macedonia being left to Turkey. Furthermore, this territory was cut in two forming the Duchy of Bulgaria and the Autonomous Region of Eastern Roumelia, both remaining vassal to Turkey. Furthermore, without any good reason, Bosnia and Herzegovina were "temporarily" occupied by Austria. The foreign policy of Alexander II terminated in failure.

3.

THE internal policy of Alexander II did not bring about political peace in Russia. In spite of his far-reaching social and administrative reforms, he had to face bitter political opposition and direct revolutionary movements. The political opposition to the Government came primarily from the nobility. The idea was current that the nobility, having been deprived of its social and economic privileges, should receive in exchange political privileges, that is, a part of the governing power. This idea appeared during the preparation of the peasant reforms among members of the Provincial Committees who were discontented with the radicalism of the Revising Commission.⁸⁰ In addition to the political programs of the nobles, other plans, looking to the reorganization of Russia along constitutional and democratic lines, were advanced.⁸¹

The revolutionary idea was chiefly current among the "Raznochintsi"—that is, individuals of no definite class: the children of peasants and merchants having received secondary or higher education; the children of the clergy who did not desire to enter the church; the children of small civil servants who did not desire to continue the vocation of their fathers; and the children of impoverished nobles. These Raznochintsi rapidly formed a new social class, the so-called "intellectuals," which included many members of the nobility.⁸² The intellectuals consisted of intellectual people in general, but at first it consisted primarily of people connected with the publication of papers and magazines or connected with universities.⁸³ The university students contributed the greatest

⁸⁰ See above, Sec. 1. ⁸¹ This was a continuation of "Decembrist" tradition.

⁸² The intellectuals grew rapidly with the reforms of Alexander II. The institution of the legal bar, the growth of newspapers and magazines, the increased number of teachers, etc., contributed to the growth.

⁸³ Regarding the growth of the universities in the nineteenth century see above, Chap. VIII, Sec. 2, and below, Chap. XII, Sec. 7.

number of radical and revolutionary leaders.³⁴ These leaders desired not only radical political changes, but also a social revolution, in spite of the fact that Russian industry was too undeveloped to supply a firm basis for socialism.³⁵ The Government was criticized for not being radical enough.³⁶ Revolutionary propaganda against the Government immediately took a harsh tone. In 1862 there appeared a proclamation to the youth of Russia calling for terrorism and the murder of members of the Government and supporters of its policy. The appearance of this proclamation was contemporaneous with a number of cases of incendiarism in St. Petersburg. The Government took decisive steps; several individuals were arrested and exiled. At the same time the Polish revolutionary leaders were preparing an uprising in Poland. The activity of the Russian revolutionary leaders was connected with the Polish movement. The Polish revolution broke out in 1863.³⁷ The uprising was suppressed by military force, after which the last remnants of Polish independence were abrogated. Instead of the "Kingdom of Poland" the official title of the territory became the By-Visla Provinces. At the same time, a land reform was introduced in Poland in 1864 under the management of Miliutin and Cherkasky, who had been the chief figures in the Russian reform movement. They succeeded in carrying out the land reform in Poland more successfully than in Russia. Thanks to this measure, the great mass of Polish peasants, almost to the World War, remained loyal to the Russian Government.

The Polish uprising had an important influence on the evolution of the opposition and revolutionary movements in Russia. It aroused the patriotic feelings of the great majority of the Russian

³⁴ The majority of the students consisted of men who had no means whatsoever. The average student lived in a state of semi-starvation, earning his way through the University by giving lessons or by copying. The majority of the students had no notion of sport and no taste for it. The absence of physical exertion and the consequent ill-health, had a crushing effect upon the psychology of the students.

³⁵ Regarding the industrial development of Russia see above, Chap. VII, Sec. 2, and below, Chap. XII, Sec. 3.

³⁶ The more moderate criticism was expressed in the legalized press, while the more bitter criticism appeared in revolutionary organs published abroad, the best known of which was "Kolokol" (The Bell), published by Herzen in London.

³⁷ Just prior to this uprising the Russian Government had started a more liberal policy in Poland. The introduction of reform in Poland had been put in the hands of a prominent Polish statesman, Marquis Wielopolski. The radical elements in Poland decided to *sabotage* the policy of moderate reform.

people and thus strengthened the position of the Government.³⁸ Following the Polish uprising, the revolutionary and opposition movements in Russia for some years did not receive the support of any important groups in Russia.³⁹

A new wave of antigovernment activity arose in the 1870's. Among the liberal circles of society, the desire grew for elective representation not only in local self-government (Zemstvos and towns) but also in the central agencies of government. The institution of a parliament was to complete the unfinished reforms. This movement became particularly strong following the Turkish War of 1877-78, when the liberated Bulgaria received a constitution. The desire for a constitution in Russia became clearly expressed. The activity of the revolutionary organizations in Russia during this period likewise increased. Their activity may be divided into two periods. From 1870 to 1875 the radical intellectuals abandoned the direct struggle against the Government, but undertook preparatory propaganda among the masses of the people. Many members of the intellectuals of that time went "to the people," living among the peasants and workmen, teaching schools or becoming agricultural or industrial laborers.⁴⁰

The Government, fearing the results of the propaganda, oppressed the movement by arresting participants in it.⁴¹ In many cases persons were tried and imprisoned or exiled on the mere suspicion and action by the police. The Government's measures aroused the bitterest feeling among the radical intellectuals. In the middle of the 1870's, the revolutionaries began to use terrorism and to make attempts against members of the Government. In 1879, in Liepetsk in central Russia, the leaders of the revolutionary movement met in secret conference. An Executive Committee was elected at this meeting for the purpose of opposing the Government. This Executive Committee decided to abandon all at-

³⁸ The Russian revolutionary leaders who had been connected with the Polish uprising rapidly lost all prestige in Russia. The circulation of Herzen's "Kolokol" fell from three thousand to five hundred.

³⁹ The attempt of Karakozov against Emperor Alexander II in 1866 was an isolated fact and the work of a very small group of conspirators.

⁴⁰ Many of them forgot the primary purpose of their propaganda and became interested in social work among the masses.

⁴¹ At times the peaceful members of the movement suffered arrest together with the real propagandists.

tempts against individual members of the Government and to bend every effort upon assassinating the head of the Government, Emperor Alexander II. From that time on, Alexander II was the object of a man hunt by revolutionaries. Attempts were made in rapid succession, one after the other, but were without success until the attempt made in St. Petersburg in the spring of 1881, which resulted in the death of Alexander II on March 13, 1881.

The assassination of Alexander II occurred on the very day when the emperor signed a *ukaz* calling for Representative Committees to advise the State Council. This was the "constitution" drawn up by Loris Melikov, the Minister of the Interior. Melikov's idea was that the revolutionary activity of the intellectuals could not be stopped by police measures alone. In his opinion the revolutionaries had the moral support of the moderate classes of society who were discontented with the autocratic policy of the Government. Melikov believed that the Government should placate the moderate elements of the opposition by means of granting a moderate constitution. This measure, he believed, would deprive the revolutionaries of the moral support of these classes. The assassination of Alexander II prevented the execution of this plan. His son and successor, Alexander III, withdrew the constitution of Melikov, and the *ukaz* signed by Alexander II was never published.

4.

THE impression made upon Alexander III by the assassination of his father lasted during his life. He retained a distrust for all popular movements, and expressed a firm belief in the infallibility of the principle of autocracy. The political program of Alexander III was extremely simple. It consisted in opposing all liberal and revolutionary movements in Russia and in satisfying, to the greatest possible degree, the economic demands of the Russian people. These principles of policy were handed down by Alexander to his son Nicholas, who ascended the throne on the death of his father in 1894. It was only under the pressure of the revolution of 1904-1905 that Nicholas agreed to grant a constitution; but up to the second revolution of 1917, and probably to his very death in 1918, Nicholas retained a belief in the principles of policy laid down by his father.

During the twenty-five years between 1881 and 1905, the political program of the Russian Government remained unchanged; but while the general policy remained unchanged, the actual course of events took different directions during the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II. Both father and son had common traits: simplicity in their private life and a love for their home. Both Alexander and Nicholas were model husbands and fathers. Coupled with these qualities was a certain cautiousness and stubbornness. In spite of these similarities, the son did not closely resemble the father. Alexander III had a masterful nature and knew how to secure obedience both from his ministers and from the members of the imperial household—the grand dukes. Alexander was not particularly well educated, but he had the instinct and the tact of a statesman and could grasp without difficulty the essential points of questions presented to him. Alexander had a simple nature; but he was a born emperor.

Nicholas II, on the other hand, had a more complex and delicate personality. His education had not been very complete, but he loved knowledge and books. In private life Nicholas II could have succeeded easily in applying his knowledge and his gifts; but he totally lacked the qualities of a statesman and a leader. Nicholas had a weak will and was not interested in political matters. His mind slipped along the surface of political questions and seized only their superficial aspects. Nicholas never attempted to penetrate into the substance of the matters submitted to him. Not having a firm will, Nicholas, as many weak men, attempted to hide this fact by stubbornness.

Soon after Nicholas' coronation, intrigues sprang up among his ministers and the grand dukes, whom Nicholas never succeeded in mastering and putting in their proper place. Nicholas did not like to admit that anyone exercised any influence upon him. In fact, however, he was constantly under someone's influence, until he became completely dominated by his wife, Alexandra Feodorovna. An episode illustrating Nicholas' character took place in Moscow during his coronation. Because of the incompetence of the police, a panic occurred at the distribution of gifts in honor of the occasion, in which about three thousand people were crushed to death. This accident took place at the very height of the coronation festivities. There is no doubt that if it had occurred at the

coronation of Alexander III, he would have immediately canceled all further celebration. Nicholas, however, had the idea of showing his firmness and did not cancel any of the coronation festivities.⁴² As a matter of fact, this was not firmness, but tactlessness.

While it is possible to define the internal policy pursued by Alexander III, the same cannot be done for the reign of Nicholas II. His policy consisted simply in continuing by inertia the policy of his father. The internal policy of Alexander III consisted first of all in strengthening governmental control in all directions where free public opinion could be expected to manifest itself. Pursuant to this policy, the laws regarding local self-government were revised. The power of the Government, in the person of the provincial governors, was strengthened as against the power of the *Zemstvos*.⁴³ In order to extend governmental supervision over the peasants, the office of "Zemsky Nachalnik" or Land Captain, appointed by the Government from the nobility, was created in 1889. The Zemsky Nachalniks had administrative power in local affairs as well as the function of judge over the peasantry.

Many measures were also taken to repress the intellectuals. The universities were reorganized in 1884. Education became subject to government control. Censorship of the press was strengthened and the majority of newspapers and magazines became subject to the "preliminary censorship" of government agents. The political tendencies of the intellectuals became subject to redoubled watchfulness by the police. Persons who were suspected were subject to police supervision. Attempts at political conspiracies were mercilessly crushed.⁴⁴ In order to grant the police greater freedom, many provinces of Russia were declared in a state of "special protection." This enabled the administration to suspend the normal laws of procedure with respect to political prisoners. Several of the territories of Russia, inhabited by non-Russian peoples, also fell under suspicion. The Government began a policy of forcible "Russianization." This policy was applied particularly to Finland and Poland. Measures were also taken against the cultural dominance

⁴² The ball at the French Ambassador's the same evening was not canceled.

⁴³ According to the new laws of 1890, the peasants elected only candidates for the *Zemstvo*, while the governor chose representatives from among these candidates. This law was repealed in 1906.

⁴⁴ In 1884 the police discovered a plot to assassinate Alexander III. The guilty parties were executed, among them Ulianov, Lenin's eldest brother.

of the Germans in the Baltic provinces.⁴⁵ The religious life was also subject to restrictions. The Christian dissenters, the "Old Ritualists," the evangelical sects, Stundo-Baptists, and Catholics were equally affected. Particular suspicion was leveled against the Jews.

The Jewish question had arisen in Russia in the eighteenth century. A great many Jews had become subjects of the Russian state, following the division of Poland and the annexation of the southwestern Russian territories, which had a large Jewish population.⁴⁶ According to the laws of 1804, the Jews were forbidden to settle in the central Russian provinces. The statutes fixed a "pale of settlement" where alone Jews could live. This included the western and southern provinces. Under Alexander III the conditions under which the Jews lived were subjected to further restriction. They were forbidden to settle outside the towns and villages, even within the territories which they might inhabit. The line of demarcation was further restricted in 1887 when the city of Rostov-on-Don was excluded from the pale. In 1891 seventeen thousand Jews were deported from Moscow. Furthermore, a quota of Jews, limited to their proportion of the population, was introduced in government educational institutions. The legal profession was closed to the Jews.⁴⁷

Seeking to hold the various classes under close observation, the Government searched for a group in society upon which it could itself depend. This group was the Russian nobility. During the reign of Alexander III and Nicholas II, the Government attempted to secure the support of the nobility by granting it special privileges in respect to local self-government and local justice.⁴⁸ In addition a number of financial privileges were granted to the nobility. The dependence of the internal policy upon the nobility was a fatal political error. The Russian nobility was politically dead after the reforms of Alexander II and the beginning of the democratization of Russian life. The attempt to bring it back into political life was an attempt to revive a corpse. Even when the nobility

⁴⁵ The Germans formed a minority of the population of these provinces. Only the landowning class, the Barons, were Germans.

⁴⁶ The number of Jews in Russia was further increased following the annexation of the "Kingdom of Poland," in 1831.

⁴⁷ However, they retained the right to be assistants to lawyers.

⁴⁸ See above regarding the Zemstvo laws of 1890 and the Land Captain of 1889.

had been a powerful force in Russia, in the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century, the interests of the imperial power seldom agreed with those of the nobility.⁴⁹ It was an act of political madness to seek to establish a close union between the Government and the nobility at a time when the nobility no longer possessed any vitality. This mistaken policy only brought about further discontent with the Government on the part of other classes.

However, it would be unjust to point only to the negative aspects of Russian policy in the last quarter of the nineteenth century for it must be admitted that the Government also carried out reforms improving the social and economic conditions of the majority of the people. Many measures were directed toward the improvement of the condition of the peasantry. First, in the beginning of 1882, a decree was issued ordering compulsory sale to peasants of land on those estates where the sale had not been completed following the emancipation.⁵⁰ Furthermore, the instalments to be paid by the peasants for the land were lowered and the head tax was abolished (1886). New regulations were issued making it easy for peasants to rent government lands, and aiding the migration of peasants to the free lands in the eastern part of the Russian Empire.⁵¹ The reign of Alexander III also marked the beginning of labor legislation in Russia. In 1882 government inspection of factories was instituted and the Government undertook to regulate the conditions of the workers. At the same time the working day of minors and women was limited by law. Labor legislation was continued during the reign of Nicholas II.⁵²

The Government also undertook reforms of the finances.⁵³ The Government was fortunate in having such a brilliant statesman as Count Witte. He succeeded in reorganizing Russian finances and in reintroducing gold into circulation in 1897.

All these government measures directed toward improving the

⁴⁹ See above, Chap. VI, Sec. 10 and Chap. IX, Sec. 5.

⁵⁰ This affected about one-seventh of all the estates. See above, Sec. 1.

⁵¹ It was partly to further the peasant migration that the Siberian railroad was begun in 1892.

⁵² See below, Chap. XII, Sec. 4.

⁵³ We have seen above, Chap. IX, Sec. 6, that the finances of Russia were greatly improved under Nicholas I, but since that time two wars and expensive internal reforms had succeeded in shaking the government finances and the currency had already depreciated.

economic condition of the country could not, however, outweigh the irritation caused by the police supervision instituted by the Government. The internal policy of Alexander III succeeded in suppressing social discontent and political opposition only for a short time. Actually, in the course of the reign of Alexander III and the first half of the reign of Nicholas II, everything was quiet; but during the second half of the reign of Nicholas II, the accumulated social discontent expressed itself in a violent explosion. The immediate cause of this was the failure of Nicholas II's foreign policy.

5.

THE foreign policy of Russia following the Congress of Berlin of 1878 was characterized by fatigue and disillusionment. The Congress of Berlin was a serious defeat of Russian diplomacy. The sacrifices borne by Russia during the Turkish War of 1877-78 seemed to have been useless. The emancipation of the Balkan Slavs was only halfway accomplished. Furthermore, there soon arose misunderstandings in Bulgaria, which further diminished the rôle of Russian diplomacy in the Near East.⁵⁴ In 1879 an alliance was concluded between Austria and Germany, directed against Russian influence in the Balkans. Despite this, Bismarck succeeded in 1881 in reviving the League of Three Emperors (Russia, Germany, and Austria) which had been first organized in 1872.⁵⁵ The success of Bismarck may be explained by the fact that Russia at this time was looking for an ally against Great Britain. Relations between Russia and Great Britain each year became worse. The reason for this was the continued advance of Russia in central Asia.⁵⁶ In the beginning of the 1880's, a punitive expedition was sent against the Tekins and the capture of the fortress Geok-Tepe by Skobelev took place in 1881. In 1884 the lower reaches of the river Murgab, with the town of Merv, were annexed by Russia. In 1885 Afghan troops were met and defeated on the river Kushk. In 1885-88 the Trans-

⁵⁴ The cause of this misunderstanding was partly the tactlessness of the Russian advisers who took too imperious a tone with respect to the Government of Prince Alexander Battenberg, a German nephew of Alexander II who had been placed upon the Bulgarian throne in 1879.

⁵⁵ This alliance was concluded only for a period of three years with the option of renewal. The alliance was renewed in 1884.

⁵⁶ See above, Sec. 2.

Caspian railroad from Askhabad was extended to Samarkand. The construction was in charge of General Annenkov, who carried it out with extraordinary rapidity, despite the natural barriers of desert and windswept sands that had to be overcome. The Russian policy of expansion aroused great excitement in Great Britain. The battle of the river Kushk almost led to war between the two powers. Russia was enabled to retain her acquisitions, thanks to her alliance with Germany.

The Russo-German understanding could not, however, be permanent if Germany continued to support Austria in the Balkans. The unreliable character of the German alliance forced Alexander III to seek for other allies. This prepared the ground for a Franco-Russian understanding. The *rapprochement* between Russia and France started in the realm of finance. Russia needed loans to develop her industries and to improve her armaments. Prior to 1880 Russia's foreign loans had been floated chiefly by German bankers. After 1880 Germany was herself in need of funds for the development of her fleet and colonies, and was, for this reason as well as for other reasons political in nature, less anxious to extend loans to Russia. In 1888 a group of French bankers offered to grant Russia a loan. The offer was accepted, and in 1890 three loan agreements were concluded.⁵⁷ The financial *rapprochement* was followed by a political and military understanding. On July 25, 1891, a French squadron visited Kronstadt. The French sailors were cordially greeted. The visit made a great impression upon Russian society. It seemed strange that the autocratic tsar should order the playing of the revolutionary *Marseillaise*.⁵⁸ A month later a military agreement was concluded between Russia and France, August 22, 1891. After several years of exchange of good feelings, the French Prime Minister, Ribot, brought about an official Franco-Russian *Entente*, June 10, 1895. The agreement with France was not, in the eyes of the Russian Government, a direct threat to Great Britain or Germany. It was regarded rather as a measure preventing the possibility of an attack by one European power upon an-

⁵⁷ From that time France repeatedly extended loans to Russia—1883, 1894, 1896, 1901, 1904, and 1906.

⁵⁸ The *Marseillaise*, written during the French revolution in 1789, is filled with revolutionary sentiment. Among Russian revolutionaries the *Marseillaise* was regarded as their hymn. The Russian text called for a revolution in Russia.

other. For this reason, several years after the conclusion of the alliance with France, Russia made the proposal for a general agreement by the European powers. At the initiative of Russia a peace conference was called at The Hague in 1899. The conference met for two months, May 18 to July 29, but led to no practical results. Its only significance was one of principle. For the first time since the Holy Alliance, an attempt had been made to bring about international peace; and again, as in 1815, the initiative had come from the Russian emperor.

6.

THE failure of The Hague Conference was due primarily to the general distrust felt by the Great Powers toward each other. Clashes took place between France and Great Britain and between Great Britain and Germany. In this condition of affairs there was little opportunity for creating international order. Possibly the only way to guarantee peace would have been an understanding between the chief continental powers: Russia, France, and Germany. In Russia this scheme was supported by Count Witte. But an understanding between Russia and Germany was rendered difficult by the competition in the Balkans between Russia and Germany's ally, Austria.⁵⁹ The efforts of German diplomacy were consequently directed toward transferring Russia's attention from the Near East to the Middle and Far East. At the same time Germany attempted to restrain Austria and to discover a *modus vivendi* between Russia and Austria in the Balkans.

To a certain extent German diplomacy was successful. In 1897 there began in the Balkans a decade of coöperation between Russia and Austria. Meanwhile, even without German encouragement, Russia's economic interests attracted her to the Middle and Far East. Here, too, Count Witte was the chief exponent of Russia's new policy. Witte's policy was to encourage Russia's economic penetration in the east. In the early 1890's Witte first directed attention to Russia's economic interests in Persia. A Russo-Persian bank was organized, supported by the Russian Government. This bank was interested in financing Russian concessions in Persia and in aiding Russian trade with Persia. Somewhat later, Witte turned his attention to the Far East. In 1895 a war took place be-

⁵⁹ Not to speak of the difficulties in the way of a Franco-German understanding.

tween China and Japan. Japan was victorious and China was forced to cede the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan. China's finances following the war were completely disrupted. Witte urged Russia's interference in favor of China. Japan was forced to abandon the Liaotung Peninsula; and with the aid of France, Russia extended China a loan of 400,000,000 francs.⁶⁰ Soon after this, upon the occasion of the visit of the Chinese Minister, Li Hung-chang, to Russia, a treaty of friendship between China and Russia was concluded (1896). Russia undertook to aid China in case of aggression by a third power, it being understood that the treaty had special reference to Japan. At the same time China agreed that Russia should have the right to construct railroads in Manchuria. A company was organized for this purpose, known as the Chinese Eastern Railroad Company.⁶¹ France and Germany participated in the financing of this project.⁶²

Russian diplomacy, however, did not confine itself to economic penetration, as advised by Count Witte. At the suggestion of Germany Russia took a more aggressive tone. Germany advanced the idea that the European powers should guarantee their financial interests in China by occupying several Chinese ports. Germany took Kiao-chao, leaving the Liaotung Peninsula to Russia and Weihaiwei to Great Britain. Russian diplomacy fell into the German trap. The Liaotung Peninsula was forcibly occupied by Russian troops and taken from China under the terms of a twenty-five-year lease, March 27, 1898. This move, as might well have been expected, aroused the keenest dissatisfaction in China. All the favorable effects of the Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1896 were obliterated.

The next Russian move in the Far East occurred when the Russian forces in 1900 took part, together with the forces of the European powers, in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion. At this time Manchuria was occupied by Russian troops. These events did not advance friendly relations between Russia and China. They resulted, moreover, in straining Russo-Japanese relations. Japan had

⁶⁰ Germany and Great Britain also granted Chinese loans of £16,000,000 each. The Russian loan was at the rate of 4 per cent, the British $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, and the German 5 per cent.

⁶¹ The Chinese Eastern Railroad, according to the original plans, was to pass through northern Manchuria only, connecting Chita and Vladivostok.

⁶² Thus, the railroad construction plans in the Far East constituted a practical preparation for a Russo-Franco-German understanding which Count Witte desired.

been deeply offended by Russia's seizure of the Liaotung Peninsula. She also feared Russia's economic competition in Korea. These fears were stimulated by the acts of an irresponsible group of Russian concessionaires on the river Yalu,⁶³ as well as by the tactless policy pursued by Admiral Alexeiev, the Russian viceroy in the Far East. Russia did not succeed in solving her difficulties with Japan by peaceful means. On February 9, 1904, without warning Japanese armed vessels attacked Russian armed vessels in the outer harbor of Port Arthur. This immediately led to war.

7.

THE war with Japan in 1904-1905 resulted in a series of defeats for Russia. The Japanese fleet showed itself to be incomparably stronger than the Russian, whose vessels were less well constructed and had weaker armaments. The Japanese fleet soon succeeded in blockading Port Arthur. Soon after the Japanese troops were landed on the mainland.

The Russian army was immensely stronger than the Japanese in numbers. As regards quality, the Russian troops were not inferior to the Japanese. Nevertheless, the war on land was as unfortunate for Russia as the war on the sea. The first failures might be explained by the difficulty of rapidly concentrating Russian troops at the distant battlefield. The whole army depended upon the Siberian railway, which was not even completed.⁶⁴ But the subsequent defeats must be explained on psychological grounds. The Russian army went into battle without enthusiasm. The deep dissatisfaction of the Russian people with the Government could not fail to be reflected in the army. The war was unpopular in Russia from the very beginning. Its objects were not understood by the Russian people. It did not seem to them to affect the vital interests of the country, while every Japanese soldier understood that the war concerned the vital interests of Japan.

The Russian army was led by inferior commanders. At its head was General Kuropatkin, who had a high reputation, having been chief of staff for the popular general Skobelev in the reign of Alexander III. But while he had been an excellent chief of staff,

⁶³ The group of concessionaires consisted of a number of doubtful personages who were influential at the Imperial Court.

⁶⁴ There was no line around Lake Baikal.

he did not possess the qualities of a commander-in-chief. He did not possess the necessary initiative or strategic ability.⁶⁵ After several failures Kuropatkin was dismissed and his place was taken by the old general Linevich, a brave soldier, but, likewise, an inferior strategist.

Soon after the beginning of the war, the Japanese succeeded in cutting off Port Arthur and forcing the Russian army back to the north. A great battle at Liaoyang in the autumn of 1904 was lost by the Russians as a result of Kuropatkin's mismanagement. Early in 1905 Port Arthur surrendered to the Japanese, and several months afterward Russia suffered two new defeats. The army was crushed at Mukden, and the fleet, sent under the command of Admiral Rozhdestvensky from the Baltic Sea to the Far East around Africa, was defeated by the Japanese in the battle of Tsushima.

The defeats in the war led to internal disorders in Russia. The financial condition of the country was greatly disturbed. These conditions led the Russian Government to accept the mediation of President Roosevelt and to agree to negotiate with the Japanese at Portsmouth. At the head of the Russian peace delegation was Count Witte, who succeeded in concluding peace on more favorable conditions than were generally expected. Japan abandoned her original demand for a money indemnity; but Russia agreed to cede to Japan the southern half of Sakhalin.⁶⁶ Russia also ceded to Japan the "lease" to the Liaotung Peninsula. The Peace of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905, was concluded just in time to save the Russian Government from a complete internal catastrophe. Russia was already in a state of revolution.

⁶⁵ Following the appointment of Kuropatkin as commander-in-chief, a leading Russian general said to a friend who expressed his opinion that Kuropatkin was made commander-in-chief because he had been chief of staff for Skobelev: "Who, then, is going to take the place of Skobelev?"

⁶⁶ The southern half of Sakhalin had been Japanese up to 1875, but was then granted to Russia in exchange for the Kuril Islands.

CHAPTER XI.

THE FIRST RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND RUSSIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM

(1905-1914)

I.

THE Japanese war was the outward cause of the first Russian revolution. Its inner causes lay very deep in social conditions. The widespread dissatisfaction among the most diverse groups of the population in Russia during the period preceding 1905 has already been described. In 1904-1905 this dissatisfaction showed itself in overt acts. Political parties were formed, but in view of the long period of suppression of all parliamentary government and the absence of freedom of political expression, it was impossible to establish large political groups. Consequently, political organizations in Russia were illegal or "underground" agencies. The programs and the activity of these groups did not express the real needs of the people, but were in the nature rather of theoretical declarations. Political platforms originated primarily among the intellectuals, who were isolated from the actualities of life and were often forced into exile for their activities against the Government. Russian Jews played an important rôle among political émigrés abroad. This resulted partly from the fact that, finding difficulty in obtaining university education in Russia, they attended foreign universities in Germany, Switzerland, and France.¹

The conditions of the period of "underground" development of Russian parties go far to explain their activities. Because of this imposed secrecy and restriction they were forced to stress theoretical discussion rather than to face practical problems. The Russian political parties did not seek to understand or to express the real

¹ The number of Jews permitted to enter the universities in Russia was limited by their proportion to the whole population. This number, being small, forced many Jews to seek education abroad.

desires of the people, but rather to utilize popular emotion in order to achieve success for their programs.

The first Russian political party was the Workers' Social Democratic party, organized in 1898, on the model of the German Social Democratic party, which followed the teachings of Karl Marx. The party attempted to get into touch with the workers through party "cells" in the principal industrial centers of Russia.²

At the congress of (1903), the Social Democratic party split into two groups. The larger group, subsequently known as Bolsheviks, sought to realize a social revolution in Russia by violent means. The minority, subsequently known as Mensheviks, insisted that before the social revolution could be effective, a *bourgeois* or democratic *régime* had to develop. At the head of the Bolsheviks was Ulianov, whose pseudonym was Lenin. He was born in 1870, the son of a nobleman, and both he and his brother engaged in revolutionary activity at an early age. Lenin's brother became a well-known terrorist and was executed for his connection with a plot against the life of Alexander III. In 1900 Lenin escaped from Russia and remained abroad until 1905.

At the head of the Mensheviks was Plekhanov, a theoretical Marxist, who during almost the whole of his political career was in opposition to the policies advocated by Lenin. While the attention of the Social Democratic party was directed exclusively to the workers, another socialist group, calling itself the Social Revolutionary party, undertook to defend the interests of the peasants. They tried to organize "cells" among the peasantry but with little success. In their policy of opposition to the Government, they differed from the Social Democrats. The latter advocated a mass movement; the former contented themselves with terrorist acts against government officials. The theory of the terrorism practiced by the Social Revolutionaries was that the people would be stirred into activity mainly by example. Their revolutionary theory was derived not only from Marx, but also from French socialism of the "utopian" school as well as from some Russian writers.

² The party "cell" was a peculiar form of political organization in Russia. It was a secretly organized group of trusted party members who maintained contact with the party organization. Its purpose was to diffuse the ideas of the party among non-members.

Both of these socialist groups succeeded in obtaining a large following among university students of both sexes; they also attracted members of the professions: lawyers, doctors, and teachers.

In 1903 liberal groups also organized an illegal party consisting primarily of professors and liberal estate-owners. The real *bourgeois* classes, the merchants and manufacturers, did not enter into any political organizations at this time. In 1905 this illegal union formed the Constitutional Democratic party. Their program was based not upon Marx and western socialism, but upon the political teachings of constitutional and democratic groups of western Europe and America. This party attempted, not to reach the masses of the people, but to influence the thought of the government employees and the petty bourgeoisie in the cities. It was the political organization of the middle classes.

All these parties were united in desiring the end of autocracy and the introduction of a representative government elected by universal, direct, equal, and secret ballot. But between the programs of these political parties and the concrete needs of the people, there was no relation. The Social Democrats regarded themselves as the representatives of the workers, but were interested only in the propaganda of socialism among the workers; the Social Revolutionaries regarded themselves as representing the peasants, but advocated the nationalization or socialization of all land, including that of the peasants, in spite of the fact that the peasants desired only the division of the large estates for the purpose of creating peasant landownership. The Constitutional Democrats advocated a parliamentary government following the French or British model, and the destruction of centralized executive power, while the interests of Russian democracy in fact dictated a combination of popular representation and strong government.

In view of the theoretical character of the activities of these parties the Imperial Government could easily have continued to dominate by rapidly and energetically introducing political reforms; but being under the influence of the reactionary nobility, the Government was incapable of undertaking this task. The Government always retreated in the face of overwhelming criticism, but never undertook action on its own initiative. Its indecision was the principal factor in the success of the revolutionary groups.

2.

THE revolutionary sentiments of the Russian people in 1904-1905 expressed themselves in the most diverse forms. The political activity of the intellectuals took the form of lectures on politics, the organization of societies of a semipolitical nature, and, in some cases, of riots on the part of students. The liberal landowners, members of the local (Zemstvo) administration, organized conferences to discuss reforms and a deputation from one of these congresses was sent to the emperor on June 19, 1905. The workers took recourse to strikes, the chief aims of which were political rather than economic, reforms. The discontent of the peasantry found expression in agrarian riots, which resulted frequently in the destruction of landowners' houses or even in the murder of the landowners. Finally, following the termination of the Japanese war, disorder spread to the army. The soldiers were affected by socialist propaganda and in many cases revolted against their officers. Socialist agitators urged the formation of councils composed of soldiers, an idea which in 1917 proved fatal to the Russian army. Riots spread from the army to the navy, and on the battleship *Potemkin* the sailors succeeded in temporarily seizing control in June, 1905. The whole period was characterized by a series of assassinations of governmental officials by terrorists. The Government first attempted to deal with the revolutionary sentiments of the people by suppressing disorders with armed force and by disrupting the revolutionary organizations. The Department of Police introduced secret agents in revolutionary organizations for the purpose of securing evidence against their leaders. The government agents sometimes became leaders of the revolutionary parties and took so active a part in the movement that it became impossible for the Government to determine where revolution began and where provocation ended. It was under circumstances of this kind that the Minister of the Interior, Plehve, was assassinated. The Department of Police also attempted to get control over the workers' movement by satisfying their economic demands and thus drawing them away from political activity. Zubatov, an agent of the secret police, succeeded in the spring of 1902 in organizing the workers along purely economic lines in Moscow and was ordered by Plehve to introduce his system all over Russia. Following the death of Plehve and the dismissal of Zubatov, the workers' organization

continued to develop of its own momentum. Its new leader, the priest Gapon, thought of petitioning the tsar in person to effect the reforms demanded by the workers. On January 22, 1905, a huge crowd of workmen made their way to the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg to appeal to Nicholas II. The day had a tragic end, for, notwithstanding the fact that the workmen were peacefully inclined and unarmed, the crowd was dispersed by gunfire, which killed several hundred people. "Bloody Sunday," as this day came to be called, became a decisive turning point in the history of the opposition of the working classes. It had as its immediate result their alliance with the socialist working class parties. The Government by this time realized that it had no plan to alleviate the situation and no firm support among the people. It consequently decided upon concessions in the matter of political reform. But even in this it moved unwillingly. On August 19, 1905, the order was given to call a national congress, the imperial Duma, which was to have deliberative, but not legislative, functions. This was, however, a half-measure which satisfied no one. In the autumn of 1905, the situation became critical. A general strike was called throughout Russia. In the cities even the electricity and water supply were cut off; all railroads came to a standstill, with the exception of the line between St. Petersburg and Moscow. The leadership of the revolutionary group in St. Petersburg was taken by a special council composed of the leaders of the Socialist parties and representatives of the workers. This was the so-called Soviet of Workers' Deputies which was to take a prominent part in the events of 1917.³ The chairman of the Soviet was a lawyer, Khrustalev-Nosar, but the actual leader was the vice-president Bronstein, subsequently known as Trotsky.⁴

The majority of the Soviet was in the hands of the Mensheviks, of whom Trotsky was a prominent member. The Bolsheviks failed to capture control of the first Soviet and regarded it with suspicion. Soviets were formed in some other cities, Moscow, Odessa, and elsewhere; but before they achieved any important results, the

³ At the first session of the Soviet the number of workers' representatives was only forty. It was increased later to five hundred.

⁴ The pseudonyms employed by many revolutionary leaders were assumed for self-protection against the espionage of the government police. All revolutionary instructions were signed by fictitious names.

Government decided to make far-reaching political concessions. At the initiative of Count Witte,⁵ a manifesto, which amounted practically to capitulation by the Government, was issued October 30, 1905.

By this manifesto the imperial Government promised that it would grant to the Russian nation: (1) the fundamental principles of civil liberty—inviolability of person, and liberty of thought, speech, assembly, and organization; (2) democratic franchise; (3) the principle that no law could henceforth be made without the consent of the Duma. A new Prime Minister, Count Witte, with power to appoint assistants from opposition circles, was named to carry the manifesto into effect. This was the first time in Russia that a united cabinet was formed.

The manifesto was an embodiment of the principal demands of the liberal opposition. The hope was that it would stop the revolutionary activity of this opposition. In this regard the manifesto was an attempt to unite the Government and the Liberal parties against the imminent social revolution. For this reason leaders of the social movement who desired revolution at all costs were opposed to the manifesto. Their arguments were that the Government was not sincere in its promises, that it desired only to stop the revolutionary movement, and that as soon as conditions permitted, it would rescind the manifesto. The Government indeed did hope that the manifesto would stop the revolution; but it was not true that it wished to withdraw the concessions. In fact, it did not do so after its real victory over the revolutionaries. Count Witte, the head of the Government and the author of the manifesto, personally believed in the necessity for reform and had naturally no intentions of retraction. Only the inexperience of the leaders of the Russian liberal movement can explain the decision of the liberal groups to decline all the invitations of Count Witte to enter his ministry. The result was that the manifesto of October 30 did not stop the revolutionary movement at once.

The Socialist parties desired only the triumph of their revolutionary doctrines. The leader of the Bolsheviks, Lenin, who came to Russia following the manifesto of October 30, became the staunchest opponent of the Government's policy. The strikes went

⁵ Witte was raised to the rank of Count as a recognition of his services in concluding the Portsmouth treaty.

on; a second railroad strike lasted from the end of November to the middle of December, and an armed insurrection occurred in Moscow at the end of December, 1905. The irreconcilable policy of the revolutionaries was not supported, however, by the majority of the people, who were fairly well satisfied with the program set forth in the manifesto. The Government was enabled to retake control of the situation. The Soviets were disbanded and the riots were suppressed by force. In several cities *pogroms* against Jews took place, partly organized by the police to prevent revolutionary demonstrations.

The insurrection at Moscow was not fully suppressed when the Government published a decree on December 24 on the procedure for elections. At the beginning of March, there appeared a manifesto concerning the organization of the new Parliament, which was to be formed of two Houses: the state Duma and the state Council, the first consisting of members elected by the nation, and the second of members half of whom were appointed by the emperor, and half elected by the nobility, Zemstvos, and university faculties. The electoral law gave the right of suffrage to the majority of the people, but it was neither equal nor direct. The voters were divided into groups: The workers in several large cities chose their electors to the Duma separately; the peasants chose electors who formed electoral colleges together with the electors chosen by the large landowners. These councils selected the deputies to the Duma. The electoral law artificially isolated the peasants and the workers and gave them a considerable rôle in the elections. This policy was prompted by the desire on the part of the Government to draw the peasants and the workers away from the opposition parties. As a further means of appeasing the peasantry, Count Witte had the idea of expropriating the large estates and handing over the lands to the peasants. This project was developed by one of Witte's ministers, Kutler, who subsequently took a prominent part in the financial reorganization of the Soviet Government. The expropriation of large land holdings, however, was bitterly opposed by the estate-owners. Witte did not have enough power to insist upon the measures he proposed, and was forced to cancel his project. This failure reacted upon the operation of the electoral law which was primarily a bid to the peasantry. Just as in the case of the earlier attempts to organize the workers in a manner favor-

able to the Government, it merely succeeded in stirring up social movements without either satisfying or being able to control them.

3.

THE elections to the first Duma took place in March, 1906. On May 10 the state Council and Duma were opened by Nicholas II. The majority of the Duma consisted of opposition deputies; of 490 members, 187 belonged to the Liberal party and 85 to the moderate labor group. The Constitutional Democrats, led by I. Petrunkevich (the other leader, P. Miliukov being removed under a specious pretext from the list of voters), was the strongest party represented. The Socialist parties boycotted the elections, while the Nationalist and Conservative parties were defeated at the polls and secured only a small number of seats. The results of the elections were disappointing to the Government.

Finding a hostile group in control of the state Duma, Nicholas II immediately dismissed Count Witte and appointed Goremykin in his place. The new Prime Minister was a typical civil servant of the old *régime*. He was chosen, not because he had initiative and political convictions, but, on the contrary, because he lacked these qualities and was ready to execute the orders of the emperor. The appointment of Goremykin was a great political error. The relations between the Government and the Duma rapidly took on an unfriendly character.

The principal point of dispute between the Government and the Duma was the agrarian problem.⁶ Its discussion in the Duma aroused the passions of all groups. An agrarian bill, sponsored by the Constitutional Democrats, proposed the expropriation of the large estates and the transfer of land to the ownership of the peasants, granting compensation to the owners. This led to increased agitation against the Duma by the reactionaries. Nicholas II faced the problem of either submitting to the Duma and displeasing the nobility, or of dismissing it and provoking the hostility of the Liberals. On July 21 the Duma was dissolved. As a concession to the Liberals, Goremykin was dismissed and a new man, Stolypin, was appointed Prime Minister. Stolypin had been Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet of his predecessor in office. He began his service to the Crown as a governor of one of the southern provinces.

⁶ See above, Sec. 2.

Before that he had managed his own estates. He had a profound comprehension of the agrarian problem in Russia and possessed the qualities of an outstanding statesman. He was firm, patriotic, and a man of ideas. The opposition parties did not support Stolypin and his program, but they were obliged to reckon with him. Following the dissolution of the Duma, the opposition groups were undecided as to their course. Their psychology was not that of peaceful parliamentary opposition, but that of revolution. They dreaded the possibility of the Government's canceling the whole program of reform and plainly distrusted the emperor. After the dissolution, members of the Duma issued an appeal to the Russian nation to resist the Government by refusing to pay taxes and to refuse conscription into the army. The appeal had no effect upon the people. Its only result was that its authors lost the right of voting in the subsequent elections.

Stolypin first tried to attract some of the leading members of the moderate liberal groups into his Cabinet. They refused to cooperate with him, and he was obliged to draw upon professional bureaucrats. His agrarian policy consisted primarily in destroying the communal ownership of land instituted by the reforms of 1861, and in encouraging peasant ownership of individual farms.

On November 22 the decree abrogating the peasant commune was published. Each peasant was given the right to receive his share of the common land in full ownership. Simultaneously, measures were taken to finance the purchase by the peasantry of Crown lands. Stolypin's measures were an attempt to repair the defects in the reform of 1861 and to create in Russia a new class of small landowners to form the basis for the new state. This program was deemed incompatible with the agrarian bill introduced by the first Duma. The expropriation of nearly all land, the basis of that proposal, was calculated to solve the whole agrarian problem at one stroke. Stolypin's reform required a score of years to produce lasting results.

When the second Duma gathered on March 5, 1907, it proved to be even more hostile to the Government than was the first. The second Duma had a stronger left wing than the first one (180 Socialists); Lenin had abruptly changed his tactics, and the Socialists did not boycott the Duma. The conflict between the Government and the Duma in 1907 was more acute than in 1906. The

Government now had a practical program of reform which the Duma did not possess. Fifty-five socialist deputies were charged with organizing a plot against the emperor and the second Duma was dissolved in June, 1907. In order to suppress similar expressions of opposition, the electoral law was changed. The large land-owners were given preference over the peasants in selecting representatives to the electoral colleges. The third Duma, elected in November, 1907, had a membership different from that of its predecessors. The majority of deputies now belonged to parties of the right, and the liberal and socialist deputies were in the minority. The result of the two years of political conflict was the victory of Stolypin and the Moderate parties. The new *régime*, it seemed, had succeeded in entrenching itself firmly. However, it was not a true parliamentary government that emerged from the revolutionary period of 1905-1906.

4.

SIMULTANEOUSLY with the internal political struggle, important events were shaping Russia's foreign policy. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the international situation had not as yet taken the form of alliances of mutually antagonistic states. Germany was allied to Austria and Italy, Russia to France, but Great Britain had no political ties with Russia. Germany was seeking an agreement with Russia. During the Japanese war, Russia needed an ally to counterbalance Great Britain which, in 1902, had entered into an alliance with Japan. A commercial treaty was signed with Germany in July, 1904, greatly favoring German trade and quite unprofitable to Russia. This treaty was an expression of Russia's fear of Great Britain. It had as its result the strengthening of German foreign policy. In the spring of 1905, the German Government demanded an open door in Morocco against the privileges of France. This gave rise to the famous Tangier incident. In July, 1905, Emperor William II visited Nicholas II at Björkö and concluded a secret alliance with Russia. Nicholas II regarded this as a move against Great Britain and not against France. The Björkö agreement was to take effect immediately following the Japanese war, but after the conclusion of the Portsmouth peace, it became evident that the friendship of France would be lost if the Björkö

agreement was maintained. In choosing between the two, the interests of Russia following the war dictated a French alliance for purely financial reasons. The expense of the war and the economic instability caused by the revolution, made foreign borrowing absolutely necessary. A tentative effort made by Count Witte to secure funds in the United States did not lead to success. Russia's strained relations with Great Britain closed the London market. Only France could supply the necessary loans. As compensation for financial support, France demanded Russian support against Germany. The result of this international tangle was Russia's decision to cast her lot with France. At the Algeciras Conference Russia and Great Britain supported France, and Germany was forced to recede before the united pressure of the three powers. Nine days after the Algeciras Conference, France agreed to extend the necessary loans to Russia.

The French loan of 1906 exceeded two billion francs. It came at a critical moment in the Russian Government's struggle with the political opposition, and served to strengthen the bonds that tied Russia to France. At the same time, Russo-British relations took on a more favorable character. Russia's position in the Far East had been materially weakened by the Japanese war. The weakening of Russia's military prestige also affected Great Britain in central Asia. In August, 1907, a convention was signed between Great Britain and Russia concerning Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. Afghanistan was recognized as being within the exclusive sphere of British influence; Persia was divided between Great Britain and Russia into two spheres of influence; and Tibet was recognized as being neutral territory. By this convention Russia openly abandoned her pretensions in central Asia and opened the way to further agreements between the two countries.

At the suggestion of President Roosevelt, a second world peace conference was called at The Hague. Pursuant to this suggestion, in 1907, Nicholas II invited the representatives of all the powers to discuss the problem of disarmament. The Hague Conference failed to achieve its purpose and gave evidence only of the new political alignments in Europe. On one side stood Germany and Austria; on the other France, Russia, and Great Britain. A clash between the two groups was now almost inevitable.

5.

FOLLOWING the revolutionary period, characterized by the bitter struggle between the Government and the Duma, there began a period of relative quiet. The third Duma sat without interruption through the whole period of its legal existence, from 1907 to 1912, and the elections of 1912 resulted in a triumph of the conservative nationalist groups.

While the political conflict between the Government and the Duma was temporarily solved by the reformed electoral law of 1907, there remained the more troublesome question of dealing with the aftermath of the revolutionary spirit of 1905. The dissatisfaction of that period found continued expression in a number of assassinations of prominent government officials. Premier Stolypin adopted a course of merciless suppression of revolutionary terrorism. Those accused of political crimes were subject to trial by a court-martial, and when found guilty were punished by death. Stolypin's policy in this regard met with severe criticism from the opposition, but was supported by the majority of the conservative members of the Duma.⁷ The greatest number of executions during this period occurred in 1908, when the total number reached 1,340. After this year the number steadily decreased, and in 1911 seventy-three sentences were passed.

Just as political equilibrium seemed to have been reached, Stolypin was assassinated in September, 1911. His place was taken by the Minister of Finance, Kokovtsev. Like his predecessor, he was a Moderate Constitutionalist. He was faced with the constitutional problem of overriding the power of veto vested in the state Council organized at the same time as the Duma, and consisting only partially of elected members. One-half of the members of the Council were appointed by the emperor, and the Prime Minister had little influence in their selection. The Court circles of reactionary aristocrats were irreconcilably opposed to the Duma and succeeded in carrying out their policies without consulting the Prime Minister.

⁷ It is scarcely necessary to point out that the measures of repression under the Stolypin *régime* are not to be compared with the terrorism undertaken by the Bolsheviks ten years later. During the five years of Stolypin's administration about four thousand persons were executed, while during the first two years of the Bolshevik *régime* about one million suffered the same punishment. Furthermore, the measures undertaken by Stolypin were directed against active revolutionaries, while the Bolsheviks executed all opponents of their *régime* without discrimination.

by direct influence upon the emperor. But notwithstanding irritating incidents of this kind, the Duma proved itself capable of bringing about many favorable changes in the country. Of great importance was the legislation concerning the peasantry, by which the precarious legal status of the peasants was done away with and their civil rights were equalized with those of other citizens.

The reform of local justice was an important measure in this connection. By virtue of the law of June 28, 1912, the general judicial system was to be gradually extended over the peasant population. The Land Captain was displaced in judicial matters by a justice of the peace. The Duma also undertook to organize the educational system and provided for an annual increase of 20,000,000 rubles in the educational budget, which grew steadily from 44,000,000 in 1906 to 214,000,000 in 1917. The number of pupils in the primary schools rose from 3,275,362 in 1894 to 7,236,000 in 1913. Thus on the eve of the war about half of all children of school age in Russia were receiving instruction. It was estimated by the educational committee of the Duma that universal education in Russia would be reached in 1922. The war and the revolution, however, prevented realization of this program.

6.

THE defeat of Russia in the Far East and her agreement with Great Britain in matters concerning central Asia had the effect of stimulating Russian diplomacy in the Near East. Great Britain now showed signs of abandoning her traditional fear of Russia's seizure of Constantinople. This may be explained in part by the fact that Great Britain now feared Germany more than she did Russia. This change in policy became evident following the Turkish revolution of 1908, which brought a pro-German group into power in Turkey. In the autumn of 1908 the Central Powers opened a diplomatic offensive in the Balkans. On October 6, 1908, Austria, supported by Germany, announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The leader of Austria's foreign policy, Aehrenthal, used some preliminary parleys with the Russian foreign secretary, Izvolsky, very skilfully. Izvolsky was himself surprised by Austria's step. France and Great Britain were caught fully unawares; not one of the members of the Triple Entente desired war or was prepared for it. Meanwhile it appeared that any effective protest

against the Austrian move might lead to war. Nothing could be done but to accept the *fait accompli*.

The incident, however, had one important consequence—the beginning of an armament race between the two groups of powers. In 1911 Germany decided to interfere again in Morocco and dispatched the gunboat “Panther” to Agadir to protect German interests. The diplomacy of the Entente on this occasion, however, was more effective than in 1908 and presented a united front to Germany. The result was that the German Government was forced to recognize a French protectorate in Morocco.

The tension in Europe increased following this incident. A new move by the Central Powers was to be expected, and did in fact take place three years following the Agadir incident. In July, 1914, Austria presented an ultimatum to Serbia which led to the World War.

CHAPTER XII.

THE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA FROM THE MIDDLE OF THE NINE- TEENTH CENTURY TO THE WORLD WAR

(1857-1914)

I.

A GREAT change occurred in Russia between the reigns of Nicholas I and Nicholas II. In half a century, Russia underwent a complete social reconstruction. The Russia of Nicholas I had a *régime* based upon serfdom and *sui generis* state socialism. As a result of the reforms of Alexander II, there arose on the ruins of the earlier *régime* a capitalist economy. The tenth volume of the *Code of Russian Laws* now became a reality and was made to correspond with the actual structure of society. The change was witnessed by the abolition of the head tax in 1886. As we have seen, the financial importance of the head tax fell rapidly in the middle of the nineteenth century, when it comprised only 24 per cent of the total income. In the beginning of the 'eighties its importance was lessened; but its complete abolition had great importance. This tax was directly associated with the old *régime*; the repeal of the tax terminated the division of the people into two radically different classes: the head-tax payers (*podatnoe sostoianie*) and those exempt from paying this tax. However, with the rescission of the tax there appeared a substitute in the form of payments for the lands given to the peasantry at the time of their emancipation. These payments were the chief financial reason for the continuation of the special legal condition of the peasantry. For this reason, notwithstanding the reforms of Alexander II, a considerable part of the Russian people was isolated from the new citizenship and placed in a special category. This was the chief social anachronism of Russia prior to the Revolution

of 1905. The introduction of complete legal equality for the Russian peasantry was directly connected with the discontinuance of payments for land. These, by calculations of the Treasury, were not to end until 1931, but in 1905 a revolution took place which led to far-reaching changes in the social structure of Russia and in 1906 the Stolypin legislation concerning the peasantry went into effect. An inevitable part of this legislation was the termination of the payments for land, in 1906. This step was followed by the replacement of Land Captains by justices of the peace, in 1912. Thus it was only after the Revolution of 1905 and the legislation of Stolypin and the Duma that the Russian peasantry became fully endowed with equal rights of citizenship. It was only on the eve of the World War that the Russian people became a society of citizens with full equal rights.

2.

THE creation of the new capitalist structure was accompanied by a rapid economic development of the country. The basic factor of economic development, as in the preceding period, was the rapid growth of population. From the middle of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century, the population of Russia doubled.¹ During the first fifteen years of the twentieth century, the population increased 30 per cent. In 1914 it totaled 175,000,000.

Particularly significant was the growth of city population. In 1851 there were less than three and a half million people in the towns or less than 8 per cent of the total population. In 1897 the town population had risen to sixteen and one-third millions or 13 per cent of the whole population, and in 1914 to 17.5 per cent. These figures indicate the growth of the industrial population as compared with the agricultural. According to the census of 1897, 74.2 per cent of the population was agricultural, and 13.3 per cent industrial. Thus, in spite of the growth of the cities and of industry, about three-quarters of Russia's population before the World War was occupied in agriculture.

Agriculture remained the foundation of the economic life of Russia. The area under cultivation increased rapidly. In 1905 it amounted to 92,690,000 desiatins; in 1914 this had risen to 109,-

¹ The population of Russia in 1851 was 67,000,000; in 1897 it was 129,000,000.

670,000 desiatins. The grain harvests in Russia were considerably smaller than in other countries.² However, the harvests in Russia gradually increased, thanks to the introduction of modern methods of cultivation.³

The total production of grain in 1913 reached 5,637,000,000 puds. In view of the occasional droughts, the harvest of grain in Russia was not steady but subject to wide variation.⁴

Russian economic life up to very recent times was dependent directly upon "his excellency the harvest," as the Minister of Finance Kokovtsev said in one of his speeches in the Duma in 1911.

The ownership of land in Russia, following the peasant reforms of 1861, underwent great changes. Land rapidly passed into the ownership of the peasants. The peasantry not only retained the lands distributed in 1861, but also acquired new lands by purchase.⁵ Thus, simultaneous with the growth of area under cultivation in Russia during the fifty years preceding the war, a radical change in the social structure of the agricultural population took place. As a result of the Stolypin reforms of 1906, the peasant communes began to disintegrate, and in 1911 six million households had acquired personal possession of the land. Russia was moving with great strides toward small landownership by citizens possessing equal rights with the rest of the population.

3.

THE industrialization of Russia which began in the second half of the nineteenth century increased rapidly until 1914, and in some branches of industry until 1917. We will trace this process briefly in three of the most important branches of Russian industry: textiles, metallurgy, and food products.

² The average harvest for a hectare of land in quintals of wheat during the period 1901-15 was: England 21.8, France 13.6, United States 9.9, Russia 6.6.

³ The average annual harvest of grain in European Russia in the decade 1861-70 was thirty puds per desiatin. In the decade 1901-10 it increased to fifty puds per desiatin.

⁴ The years of poor harvest led to insufficiency of food or even to starvation of part of the population, as in 1891, 1906, etc. The tragic extent of the famine of 1921-22, however, was due not only to natural, but also to social and political conditions.

⁵ In 1862 the peasants owned 5,700,000 desiatins in excess of the communal land. In 1905 this increased to 24,600,000 desiatins and in 1911 to 30,000,000 desiatins while the area of communal lands was 138,000,000 desiatins in 1905.

The Russian cotton industry, prior to the war, occupied fourth place in world production. It was exceeded only by Great Britain, the United States, and Germany. In 1905 the Russian cotton industry employed 7,350,683 spindles and 178,506 looms. By 1911 the productive forces of the industry had grown to 8,448,818 spindles and 220,000 looms. The increased production of Russian cotton factories was absorbed partly by the home market and partly by foreign trade. The increase of internal consumption may be illustrated by the fact that in 1890 the per capita consumption of cotton cloth in Russia was 2.31 pounds and in 1910, 4.56 pounds. The principal foreign market for Russia's cotton industries was Persia where they competed successfully with British goods.⁶ The growth of cotton manufacture in Russia led to a rapid increase in the area of cotton cultivation in Turkestan and Transcaucasia, where, prior to the war, over 1,500,000 acres were planted in cotton.

The metallurgical industries showed a similar development. In 1900, 91,000,000 puds of cast iron were produced in Russia. By 1914 production had grown to 223,700,000 puds.

The principal products produced by Russian food manufacturers were sugar, alcohol, flour, and tobacco. Sugar was an important commodity both of internal consumption and of export. In 1909-10 over 5,000,000 puds of sugar were exported. In 1911-12 exports reached 31,000,000 puds.⁷

The growth of industrial production was reflected also in mining. Eighty-five per cent of the coal used in Russia was of domestic extraction. The chief center of coal mining was the Donets basin which supplied 55 per cent of Russia's needs for coal. In 1900, 11,000,000 tons were mined in the Donets basin and in 1913 the production rose to 25,000,000 tons.

The exploitation of forests served both domestic needs and foreign trade. In 1904, 13,200,000 rubles worth of lumber was exported. By 1913 exports reached 164,900,000 rubles. Of great importance also was the production of oil, chiefly in the neighborhood of Baku. In 1860 oil production in the Baku area did not ex-

⁶ The cotton exports from Russia to Persia in 1906-1907 totaled 10,189,000 rubles. British exports to Persia for the same period totaled 13,999,000 rubles. In 1912-13 Russian exports rose to 16,180,000 rubles as against British exports of 14,238,000 rubles.

⁷ The following year exports fell to 10,000,000 puds, chiefly on account of a poor harvest of sugar beets in the autumn of 1912.

ceed 2,500,000 puds. In 1905 production rose to 455,900,000 puds and in 1913 to 561,300,000 puds. As world production of oil in the twentieth century grew by gigantic strides, the proportion of Russian production to the total fell during the years preceding the war. In 1905 Russia supplied 27 per cent of world production, but in 1913 only 16.5 per cent.

Even more rapid than the expansion of industry was the development of railroads in Russia. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the total length of railroads in operation in Russia did not exceed 660 miles. In 1912 the Russian railroad system comprised 40,194 miles and was second only to that of the United States. The greatest achievement was the completion of the great Trans-Siberian Railroad, from 1892 to 1905. Its construction was one of the most daring railroad projects of our time. The length of the line from Moscow to Vladivostok is 5,542 miles. In the construction of this line it was necessary to overcome the greatest natural and technical difficulties—the frozen subsoil and the wildness of the territories penetrated. The cost of the Trans-Siberian Railroad exceeded \$200,000,000.⁸

4.

THE rapid expansion of Russian industry was accompanied by the creation of a working class on a scale previously unknown in Russia. Gradually the social character of the Russian laboring class changed. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the majority of Russian workers were still connected with the peasantry. They were in fact peasants temporarily engaged in factory work. This partly explains the psychology of the Russian worker, who had little interest in his occupation or his factory. The worker almost always could, if he wished, return to his village where he could secure an allotment of land. But with every year conditions changed. The Stolypin reforms, in creating a new class of small landowners, cut off the village peasants from those who had become factory workers. Thus they stimulated the growth in Russia of a city proletariat. Among Russian workers a stable professional psychology was only beginning to be formed when the war broke out.

The organization of labor unions also was very recent. For this

⁸ The Trans-Siberian Railroad was originally a single-track line, but during the World War a second line was laid down.

the Government was at fault in fearing any kind of organization. It was only in 1902 that the Government assented to the legalization of some unions⁹ and it was only after the Revolution of 1905 that labor unions were permitted on a large scale by the Law of March 4, 1906.

The Government artificially retarded the development of labor unions and thereby unwittingly fostered the formation of illegal revolutionary organizations. But while restricting the development of labor unions, the Government made efforts to satisfy the principal needs of the workers by means of legislation. Labor legislation in Russia goes back to the 1880's in the reign of Alexander III. In 1897 day work was limited to eleven and a half hours and night work to ten hours. Night work was forbidden for children under seventeen, and children under twelve were not allowed to engage in industrial work of any kind. The legislation of the twentieth century introduced workers' accident compensation in 1903, health insurance in 1912, and accident insurance in 1912. The condition of the working class gradually improved, thanks to increasing wages, particularly in Petrograd and Moscow. At the end of the nineteenth century, the average wage of the Russian worker was only 187 rubles a year. By 1913 it had risen to 300 rubles and in some branches of industry in Petrograd and Moscow to five times this sum. In many factories the low money wages were augmented by free lodgings, hospital services, and factory schools.

5.

DURING the reign of Alexander II, the Government apparently desired to refrain from interference in economic matters and to allow the highest degree of private initiative. These principles were expressed in the policy stimulating the construction of railroads by private companies on the concession basis. A number of government-owned factories in the Urals were sold to private individuals and the salt mines in the southeast were leased to private capital. At the same time a policy of free trade was instituted in 1865. The Government's policy, however, led to confusion in many branches of Russian industry. In railroad administration chaos reigned. In 1871 there were 174,000,000 rubles worth of unpaid railroad

⁹ See Chap. XI, Sec. 2.

shares. The sum rose in a few years to 500,000,000 rubles. As a result of this, the Government changed its policy. In 1876 the tariff on imports was raised and continued to be raised steadily until the World War. The Government also started buying up private railroad lines and undertook the construction of new railroads. In 1889 the Government controlled 23 per cent of the railroads while in 1900 Government control extended to 60 per cent of the roads. The Government constructed the Trans-Siberian Railroad and the Orenburg-Tashkent Railroad in Turkestan. The Government also reassumed its position as factory owner.

The most energetic organizer of government control was the Minister of Finance Witte, in the period from 1892 to 1903. Following Witte's initiative, the Government undertook the ambitious proposal of introducing the alcohol monopoly.¹⁰ The consumption of alcohol in Russia in 1905 totaled 75,000,000 *vedros* and in 1913 amounted to 104,000,000 *vedros*. The income from the monopoly in 1905 was 443,200,000 rubles and in 1913, 675,100,000 rubles. Closely allied to the industrial policy pursued by Witte was his financial policy. The state was the chief banker of Russia and under his administration the State Bank assumed the leading position in the money market. The State Bank was made a "bankers' bank." Its turnover in 1909 amounted to 162,324,000,000 rubles and in 1913 to 234,009,000,000 rubles.

The steady growth of the budget was a reflection of this economic policy. Government expenditures in 1900 were 1,889,000,000 rubles and in 1913, 3,382,000,000 rubles. About one-third of the budgets of the twentieth century were appropriated for government-operated industries and less than one-quarter for the army and navy. If the budgets of the Russian Empire in the time of Peter I could be called military budgets, the budgets under Witte may be termed industrial budgets. In the twentieth century the Government regained the position of leadership in economic matters that it occupied in the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century.

6.

IN the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century, Russian culture centered chiefly around the large cities and the nobles'

¹⁰ The reform begun in 1894 gradually spread over the whole country.

estates. From the middle of the nineteenth century, the basic elements of modern civilization, as, for example, education and medical care, spread far and wide, reaching the lowest levels of the city population and the peasant huts. A prominent part in this movement was played by the Zemstvos and city organizations introduced by the reforms of Alexander II. Notwithstanding the imperfections in the electoral law, local self-government in Russia in the half century preceding the war fulfilled an immense cultural task. The Zemstvos were first introduced in thirty-four provincial governments. The reform did not extend to Turkestan, Siberia, the Caucasus, Poland, the Baltic provinces, the western Russian provinces, or the Cossack domains. By the Law of 1864 the Zemstvos were given the task of supervision of public education, public health, charity, care of roads, fire insurance, in fact, all questions relating to local life and economy. The budget of the Zemstvos was organized along the lines of self-assessment and was derived chiefly from the taxation of real property.

The Zemstvos first directed their attention to the development of public education and to matters of sanitation. The population of the country districts of Russia which, prior to the reforms of Alexander II, had been almost entirely illiterate and lacking in medical care, was rapidly provided with schools, hospitals, and dispensaries. In 1895, in the regions having Zemstvos, there was one hospital bed to every 6,500 inhabitants, while in the regions where there were no Zemstvos there was only one hospital bed to every 41,000 inhabitants. The expenditure of the Zemstvos on public health increased each year. In 1892 the average expenditure on medical assistance was thirty-four rubles per hundred inhabitants and in 1904 it rose to fifty-six rubles per hundred inhabitants.

The same tendency may be observed in the activity of the Zemstvos in public education. In 1911, in provinces having Zemstvos, there were forty-six pupils in Zemstvo schools for every one thousand rural inhabitants. In non-Zemstvo provinces of European Russia there were thirty-four per thousand receiving schooling and only eighteen per thousand in Siberia. By the laws of 1911-12, Zemstvos were introduced in nine additional provinces.

The total budgets of the Zemstvos steadily grew. In 1875 the expenses of all the Zemstvos in thirty-four provinces totaled 28,870,000 rubles. In 1905 the expenditures rose to 124,185,000 ru-

bles. In 1914 the budget of the Zemstvos of forty-three provinces reached 347,512,000 rubles and if the sums expended upon the commercial undertakings of the Zemstvos and insurance be included, the 1914 budget approximated 400,000,000, i.e., one-ninth of the total state budget.¹¹

Over two-thirds of the expenditures of the Zemstvos were for public health and education. The Zemstvo department of Public Health in 1914 expended 82,000,000 rubles. The rural population, prior to 1864 when the Zemstvos were introduced, was almost wholly lacking in medical care. Fifty years later, at the eve of the war, the Zemstvos had covered the rural territories with hospitals and dispensaries. The average radius of the medical districts was ten miles. In 1914, in the forty provinces having Zemstvos, there was a total of 3,300 medical districts. Many Zemstvos introduced special organizations for the supply of medical materials—pharmacies and stores of medical supplies—and in some cases stations for vaccination against smallpox and rabies.¹²

The expenditure of the Zemstvos on public education in 1914 was 106,000,000 rubles.¹³ Almost all these sums were expended upon primary schools. In 1914 there were fifty thousand Zemstvo schools with eighty thousand teachers and three million school children.¹⁴ The Zemstvos paid particular attention to the construction of new schools corresponding to modern pedagogical ideas and hygienic requirements. Besides primary education, the Zemstvos also organized their own system of secondary education for the training of teachers and organized courses for the improvement of teaching methods. The Zemstvos likewise organized extension courses and built libraries.¹⁵

Besides their activity in public hygiene and public education, the Zemstvos undertook to assist the population in agriculture, insurance, and the development of roads and telephones.¹⁶

¹¹ The state budget for 1914 totaled 3,600,000,000 rubles.

¹² Sixteen of the twenty-nine Pasteur laboratories in Russia were under the management of the Zemstvos or city organizations.

¹³ Twenty-eight million rubles of this sum was contributed to the Zemstvos by the Government for public education.

¹⁴ Thus prior to the war, the Zemstvos were given control over half of all the primary schools in Russia. See Chap. XI, Sec. 5.

¹⁵ In 1914 there were 12,627 rural public libraries in thirty-five of the forty-three Zemstvo governments.

¹⁶ In 1914 the Zemstvos were authorized to open 219 telephone systems and

The work of the Zemstvos, in spite of its undisputed usefulness, was little appreciated by the peasant population for whose benefit it was directed. This may be explained partly by the poverty of the Russian peasant, who first of all thought of the Zemstvos in connection with the payment of new taxes. Moreover, as has been explained above, the electoral law on the basis of which the Zemstvos operated until 1917, gave little actual responsibility to the peasants in the election of representatives in the Zemstvos. In view of the deficiencies of the electoral law, the Zemstvos and city organizations did not have a real contact with the masses. In spite of the fact that the Zemstvos were operating for the benefit of the people, they were regarded not as popular, but as aristocratic, organizations.¹⁷

The coöperative societies reached nearer to the popular masses than the Zemstvos. Their rapid development, however, began only in the last years preceding the war. On January 1, 1915, there were 32,300 coöperatives with a membership of twelve million, most of whom were peasants.

7.

THE development of higher education in Russia during the half century preceding the Revolution of 1917 was likewise of considerable importance. First of all, the number of students increased. In the second half of the nineteenth century, three new universities were founded.¹⁸ In the twentieth century one more was opened prior to the war and one during the war.¹⁹

The total number of universities in Russia in 1917 was eleven, to which must be added a number of technical schools which were separated from the universities: institutes of technology,²⁰ mining

there were 163 systems in operation with a total length of about 42,900 miles of lines with about 100,000 miles of wire.

¹⁷ This may be the reason that the Zemstvos were not supported by the people in 1917 and that the Bolsheviks were able to abolish them.

¹⁸ Odessa 1865, Warsaw 1869, Tomsk 1888.

¹⁹ Saratov 1909, Perm 1916. The University of Simferopol (Crimea) was opened during the revolution in 1918. During the war the Warsaw University was transferred to Rostov and the Yuriev University to Voronezh.

²⁰ There were polytechnic institutes in Petrograd and Riga, institutes of technology in Petrograd, Kharkov, and Tomsk, and a superior technical school in Moscow.

academies, land survey institute, institute of roads and communications, institute of forestry, and several law schools and philological schools, several women's universities and four theological academies.

The character of the instruction in Russian universities in the twentieth century reached a very high level and cannot be considered inferior to the universities of Europe and America. Nearly all the above institutions were under state control, although some received assistance from private individuals.²¹ The number of students of both sexes in the universities of Russia in 1912 totaled one hundred and thirty-seven thousand. The universities of Russia played an important part, not only in extending higher education, but also in the political development of the country. The professors mostly took part in the liberal movement and a considerable portion of the students were Socialists. In 1905 some liberal groups were organized by students, but in 1917 the political rôle of the universities was of little importance.

The control over university life under Alexander III was closely regulated by the Law of 1884. In 1905, however, the management of the universities was handed over to the professors.²²

The Academy of Science at the end of the nineteenth century again began to participate actively in the development of Russian culture. The various institutes of the Academy of Science, prior to the war, grew into large institutions enjoying a high degree of autonomy in their scientific research. At the end of the nineteenth century many learned organizations came into existence. Their activity spread, not only to the natural sciences and mathematics, but likewise to historical and philological fields. In the beginning of the twentieth century, Russia was covered with a network of the most diverse learned societies, and Russian science held an important place internationally. In the learned circles of various countries, such names as those of the chemist Mendeleiev and the physiologist Pavlov, have acquired high prestige.

²¹ The Shaniavsky University in Moscow, the Makushin Science School in Tomsk, and several others were purely private universities.

²² The restrictions remaining in the academic organization of the universities in 1905 led in 1911 to a dispute between the Government and the professors, which resulted in the resignation of the greater number of the professors of the Moscow University.

8.

THE flowering of Russian literature in the second half of the nineteenth century was an event which has been fully recognized both in Europe and in America. The works of the Russian authors, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Turgeniev, have been translated into all languages and doubtless have found their way to the hearts and minds of foreign readers. It is consequently unnecessary to give here any characterization of these writers. Of sufficient note also are some Russian authors of the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, e.g., Anton Chekhov.

Of less fame abroad are the Russian poets of this time. In the late nineteenth century and in the beginning of the twentieth century, Russian poetry was dominated by a movement known as symbolism. The whole world, according to the view of this school, is merely a combination of symbols. The poets of this movement attempt to combine verse and music so that the one supplements the other. The founders of this tendency in Russian poetry were K. D. Balmont, born in 1867, and V. I. Briusov, who lived from 1873 to 1924. At first misunderstood and laughed at by the public, they finally secured recognition. Of the younger symbolist poets the most important was A. A. Blok, who lived from 1880 to 1921. The next generation of Russian poets moved away from symbolism: "We want to admire a rose because it is beautiful, not because it is a symbol of mystical purity." At the head of this movement was M. S. Gumilev, who lived from 1886 to 1921,²³ and Anna Akhmatov, born in 1889.

A certain analogy may be found between the development of the new Russian literature and painting.²⁴ The second half of the nineteenth century was the period of the rise of a new group of artists who broke with the traditional Academy of Arts in 1870. The ideal of this new movement was to depict historical subjects and scenes of everyday life and history realistically. Some were guided by an inclination to reveal social evils. Among these artists

²³ Subsequently shot by the Soviet Government under suspicion of taking part in a counter-revolutionary organization.

²⁴ We speak specially of painting and not of art in general because Russian sculptors in the prewar period did not form any recognizable movement. Prominent among them was Prince P. P. Trubetskoy. Russian architecture was at the cross-roads and partly engaged in imitating sixteenth and seventeenth century architecture.

was one of the most famous of Russian painters, I. E. Repin. A special place among these artists was held by V. M. Vasnetzov, who attempted to combine modern realism with the manner of the old Russian and Byzantine religious painting. His murals in the cathedral of St. Vladimir in Kiev, painted from 1885 to 1895 are the best known of his works.

By the end of the nineteenth century, a new movement was to be observed in Russian painting devoted to "pure" art. According to the artists of this school, art must not serve any social or political purpose, but must tend only to beauty. The new tendency in Russian painting centered around the magazine *Mir Iskustva* (*The World of Art*). The group of artists around the *Mir Iskustva* included: V. A. Serov, Russia's greatest portrait painter, M. V. Vrubel, a painter of mysterious subjects, whose *chef d'œuvre* is *The Demon* of Lermontov,²⁵ and N. Roerich, many of whose pictures are now in a special museum in New York devoted to the exhibition of his work.²⁶

Distinct from the "intellectual" painting of the above groups was the popular art. Down to recent times, peasant artists continued painting icons in the traditional manner, particularly in the province of Vladimir. A great interest in this work was shown by the archaeologist N. P. Kondakov. A special committee was organized at his initiative, under the patronage of Nicholas II, to promote the icon painting (1901). The committee succeeded in aiding the peasant iconographers and providing them with special training.

9.

RUSSIAN music in the second half of the nineteenth century entered into a period of great creative activity. In the early 1860's a group was formed in St. Petersburg, having as its object the development of Russian music. This group became known as the "Mighty Band" (*Moguchaiia Kuchka*). The leading spirit was M. A. Balakirev, and the group included N. A. Rimsky-Korsakov, M. P. Mussorgsky, and A. P. Borodin. The name of "Mighty

²⁵ See Chap. VIII, Sec. 4.

²⁶ Many of the artists of this group designed stage settings. The Russian theater became known abroad together with Russian painting (*The Salon d'Automne*, Paris, 1906).

Band" given them by their admirers was seized upon by their enemies, who for many years taunted them with it. But time has justified this name and it is now seriously accepted by everyone. The basic idea of the "Band" was, first, the utilization of folk song themes and, second, realism in music. In their first idea the "Band" followed the views of Glinka. Their realism, on the other hand, was a continuation of the views of Dargomyzhsky. They drew upon popular music and popular fantasy for their themes. The operas composed by the "Band" have as their libretto historical or mythological subjects. Russian folk songs and eastern themes were frequently at the basis of their composition.

The leader of the group, M. A. Balakirev, who lived from 1836 to 1910, left several songs, symphonies, and masterly piano compositions. He himself was a remarkable pianist. Balakirev was for many years the director of the court choir.²⁷

M. P. Mussorgsky, who lived from 1839 to 1881, is perhaps the most famous of all the members of the "Band."²⁸ He opened the way to new paths in music. The operas *Boris Godunov* and *Khovanstchina* have historical themes. The first concerns itself with the troubled epoch of the seventeenth century and the second with the *Streltsy* and "Old Ritualists" of the end of the seventeenth century.²⁹ Mussorgsky succeeded in giving to his music, which is full of drama, the pathos of great popular movements.

The music of Borodin and Rimsky-Korsakov is more quiet and clear than that of Mussorgsky. Borodin, who lived from 1834 to 1887, was both an outstanding composer and a great scientist. His opera *Prince Igor* is composed around the theme of the old Russian heroic song "Slovo O Polku Igorevi" ("The Campaign of Igor").³⁰ Borodin left three symphonies, the last of which is unfinished, and a symphonic picture entitled *In Central Asia*, where two themes meet, the Oriental and the Russian.

Rimsky-Korsakov, who lived from 1844 to 1909, was the youngest of the members of the "Mighty Band." He was the chief technician of the group and completed as well as orchestrated the unfinished works of Borodin and Mussorgsky. The music of Rimsky-Korsakov is characterized by the brilliance of his instrumentation.

²⁷ See Chap. VIII, Sec. 6.

²⁸ His work had an influence upon modern French music.

²⁹ See Chap. V, Secs. 9 and 10.

³⁰ See above, Chap. II, Sec. 6.

Most of his fifteen operas deal with mythical and eastern subjects, such as *Sadko*,³¹ and *The Golden Cock*.³² His best opera—*The Invisible City of Kitezh*, deals with the epoch of the Mongolian invasion of Russia.

Unrelated to the "Mighty Band" P. I. Tchaikovsky, who lived from 1840 to 1893, wrote his great masterpieces. His music is of a totally different character. It concerns itself with the spiritual experiences of a man of the nineteenth century. The music of Tchaikovsky bears fewer national traces in the sense of describing national character and popular movements. Like Dostoievsky, he looks deep into the human soul and expresses the struggles and sufferings there. In the blind and helpless moods of the Sixth Symphony there may be a prophetic and sorrowful utterance of approaching calamities. He composed many songs, some of which are of inferior quality while many demonstrate a remarkable depth of feeling. His operas, *Eugene Onegin* and *The Queen of Spades* are two of the most popular in Russia. His soft lyricism is universally understood and appreciated.

The scene of the activities of the "Mighty Band" was St. Petersburg. Tchaikovsky, on the other hand, lived for the most part in Moscow; the majority of Russian composers of the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century were also connected with Moscow.

The leading composers of recent time are A. N. Skriabin and S. V. Rachmaninov. A. N. Skriabin, who lived from 1871 to 1915, was a mystic and a theosophist. He never composed vocal music as he considered it as too materialistic. The finest of his symphonic pieces are the *Poem of Ecstasy* and *Prometheus*. Skriabin attempted to find the relationship between sounds and colors and to complete musical symphony with color.³³ His final objective was to write "Mysteries," which was to lead to the reformation of the world by sound. He did not, however, have time to compose even the prelude to this composition.

S. V. Rachmaninov, born in 1873, now at the height of his power, is well known in this country, both as a composer and as a pianist. His first opera *Aleko*, with a libretto based on a poem by

³¹ On the subject of an old Novgorod trading song.

³² On the theme of a story by Pushkin.

³³ Just as the poet symbolists tried to complete words with sounds.

Pushkin, was composed in 1892. In the beginning of the twentieth century, he produced a number of orchestral as well as chamber compositions.

A decade younger than Skriabin and Rachmaninov, I. F. Stravinsky, born in 1882, was a pupil, though not a follower of Rimsky-Korsakov. Stravinsky, prior to the war, moved to Paris, where in 1911 his ballet *Petrushka* was given for the first time.

10.

Most characteristic of Russian religious life prior to the war was the wide spread of evangelical teachings denying the complex dogmatism and ritual of the Orthodox church. The movement of rationalism among the intellectuals took on the form of Tolstoyism, following the religious teachings of Leo Tolstoy. Among the popular masses, especially in the south of Russia, this tendency found expression in a Stundo-Baptist movement. The term "Stunda" was derived from the German *stunde* (hour), and signified to certain German evangelical and reforming groups of the eighteenth century, the hour of religious congregation. The Stundites appeared in the south of Russia in the first half of the nineteenth century and expanded rapidly in the second half. In the 1870's they fell under the influence of the Baptist teachings coming from Bessarabia and Transcaucasia. In the end of the nineteenth century, the Stundo-Baptists spread over more than thirty provinces of Russia.

The Government attempted to put a stop to the movement by means of police measures.⁸⁴ In 1894 the sect was recognized as a "specially harmful" one and they were forbidden the right to congregate. The natural consequence of the police measures was to stimulate the growth of the movement. It was only following the Revolution of 1905 that the policy of the Government with respect to dissenters changed. In 1905 a manifesto was issued permitting religious freedom.

The manifesto of 1905 was the beginning of the liberation, not only of the dissenters, but also of the Orthodox church itself. In the years preceding the war a great internal upheaval took place in the Orthodox church. This upheaval was a sign of life. The church, notwithstanding the fall of its moral authority in the

⁸⁴ As has been pointed out above, the police persecution of dissenters was strengthened under Alexander III. See Chap. X, Sec. 4.

eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century, was alive and capable of assuming the religious guidance of its members. A proof of the continued vitality of the Orthodox church, even in the most lifeless period of the eighteenth century, was the appearance of a man of such outstanding character as the Bishop Tikhon Zadonsky, one of the first Russians to raise his voice against serfdom.

In the nineteenth century the Russian church produced a number of outstanding elders who exercised a great influence upon members of both the upper and lower classes by the purity of their moral life. The *startzi* (elders) were monks of strict habits to whom believers came for advice and consolation in their spiritual as well as their practical difficulties. The cell of the elder was always open to anyone coming for such advice, no matter from what class of society. Especially famous in the nineteenth century were the elders of the monastery *Optina Pústyn*, which was visited by Gogol, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy. The elder Amvrosy served as the prototype of Dostoevsky's character of the monk Zosima in *The Brothers Karamazov*.

In the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the members of the Orthodox church raised the question of calling a council (*sobor*). The purpose was to secure the final liberation of the church from the guardianship of the state and also to carry out internal reforms in its organization. One of the chief internal reforms sought was the right of the congregation to self-government. In times before Peter the Great in Russia the congregations had had self-government. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the congregation became merely a section of people living in the vicinity of a given church and possessing no right of self-government in church affairs. The liberation of the church from government interference also had a bearing on the revival of the institution of the patriarchate abolished by Peter the Great. No Council was called prior to the Revolution of 1917, and up to that time the Russian church continued to be under the official guardianship of the Government through the Holy Synod.

CHAPTER XIII.

RUSSIA IN THE WORLD WAR

(1914-1917)

I.

THE main features of the diplomatic background of the World War have already been treated. Russia was destined to participate in the war, since she formed part of one of the great groupings of powers in Europe. After the formation of the alliance of the Central Powers and the triple *entente cordiale*, it became only a question of time as to which would be ready to attack first. In the year preceding the war, Germany felt herself better prepared for war than the Allies. She realized, moreover, that the forces of her two probable enemies, France and Russia, were rapidly growing.

Not only the growth of Russia's military force, but also the rapid economic and cultural development of Russia was obvious to Germany. The execution of the Stolypin agrarian reforms was rapidly strengthening the new social basis of the Russian state in organizing a new class of peasant owners. In 1914 it was still possible to count upon internal difficulties in Russia, as the new constitutional *régime* had not as yet been fully carried out. Within ten years, however, the possibility of a revolution in Russia would have been very slight. The plans of the General Staff of Germany, in the event of a struggle with Russia, took into consideration both the strategic problem and the internal weakness of the Russian state. Germany hoped to take advantage of this weakness in two ways: First, by stimulating separatist feelings among subject nationalities of the Russian Empire; second, by arousing social and economic friction within the Russian state. The most sensitive point in Russia's problem of nationalities was the Polish question, the origin of which may be traced back to the Congress of Vienna. Germany, however, was not free to stress this question since part of Poland had been appropriated by Prussia at the time of the

partition of Poland in the eighteenth century. While Austria had encouraged a degree of autonomy to her section of Polish population at the end of the nineteenth century, she, too, could not easily raise the Polish question; she would have met with resistance, not only from Germany, but also from Hungary, which strongly opposed any growth of Slavonic influence in the Hapsburg monarchy.

A more fertile field for German and Austrian activity was to be found in the Ukraine. Galicia and Bukovina were territories of the Hapsburg Empire, populated by Slavonic peoples kindred in blood and language to the population of Russian Ukraine. Austria's policy prior to the war was to patronize the "Ukrainian" cultural movement in Galicia in contradistinction to the Russian policy of stemming the Ukrainian movement within the boundaries of Russia. From the middle of the nineteenth century and through the beginning of the twentieth century, the Russian Government opposed all separatist movements of the Ukrainian people and suppressed all literature published in the Ukrainian language. This policy aroused widespread ill feeling in the south of Russia although the separatist movement was actually confined to a small number of intellectuals. The policy pursued by the Russian Government succeeded only in strengthening the Ukrainian movement. Austria and Germany succeeded in profiting by the mistakes of the Russian Government, but they erred in overemphasizing the danger to Russia of the Ukrainian movement.¹ This movement became a reality only following the defeat of Russia in the war, and even then Ukrainian sovereignty existed only so long as it was supported by German arms.

Another weak spot in Russia, in the opinion of the Central Powers, was social unrest. Germany supported revolutionary propaganda against the Imperial Government in Russia during the war. But even the undeniable social weakness of Russia did not bring about the hoped-for results. Germany expected a revolution in Russia at the very outbreak of the war. It occurred, however, only in 1917 at a time when Germany was already greatly enfeebled by the struggle and had little, if any, chance of defeating the Allies. Within eighteen months of the fall of the Russian Empire, a suc-

¹ They repeated the error made by Charles XII in the beginning of the eighteenth century when he relied upon the Ukrainian Cossacks to help his cause.

cessful revolution took place in Germany and overthrew the German Imperial Government.

2.

THE whole political atmosphere of Europe in the last years before 1914 was permeated by the presentiment of imminent war. The immediate cause was furnished by events which took place in the Balkans.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the diplomacy of Russia and Austria in the Balkans had succeeded in dividing the peninsula into two spheres of influence, Russia being supreme among the eastern Balkan Slavs, particularly in Bulgaria, while Austria was dominant in the west of the Balkans, particularly in Serbia and Bosnia. Rumania had been allied since 1885 to Austria. The situation was changed in 1908 when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbs could not reconcile themselves with this step which resulted in the complete domination by Austria of territories peopled by Serbs. Prior to the annexation, when Austrian influence in Bosnia had not yet been legalized, the Serbs could still secretly hope that the Slavs of the western Balkans would yet achieve unity. The annexation of 1908 deprived them of these hopes and the national feelings of the Serbs against Austria were greatly stimulated.

In view of these circumstances, after 1908, the object of Russian diplomacy became the emancipation of the Balkans from Austrian influence. By 1912 this aim seemed near to realization. Three Balkan states, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, united in an alliance against Turkey. The Balkan War which followed ended in the complete triumph of this alliance. Turkey was deprived of almost all European possessions populated by Slavs or Greeks. Then a disagreement between the allies arose. A second war immediately followed between Bulgaria on the one hand and Serbia and Greece on the other. The enemies of Bulgaria were joined by Rumania. Bulgaria was defeated, and, finding herself alone, turned to look for new allies. Serbia had now gained the patronage of the *Entente*, Bulgaria, therefore, joined the Central Powers.

The diplomatic situation in the Balkans in 1914 was thus radically different from that of the beginning of the twentieth century. Bulgaria was now on the side of Austria, while Serbia and Ru-

mania were on the side of Russia. The general condition was characterized by extreme instability. The Balkans were like a powder magazine ready to explode at any moment. The Bulgarians hoped for revenge against Serbia and Rumania. The Serbs thought only of emancipating their brothers by race from Austrian rule, just as they had succeeded against Turkey. The national feeling in Serbia threatened at any moment to provoke a revolution among the Serbs in Austria. There began a number of attempts at assassinating prominent members of the Austrian Government. One of them was directed against Archduke Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian throne.

On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated in a Bosnian town, Sarajevo. A month after the Sarajevo murder, on July 23, Austria presented an ultimatum to Serbia, impelled by the idea that the murder was sanctioned by the Serbian Government.

Serbia's reply was practically a complete submission to Austria's demands. Nevertheless, the Austrian Minister in Belgrade declared the Serbian reply unsatisfactory and immediately left for Vienna.

It was quite clear that Russia would not leave Serbia without help at this moment and remain an indifferent spectator of Serbia's annihilation by Austria. It was also quite plain that in case a war broke out, France would side with Russia against the Central Powers. The position that England would take was not clear, and Germany might have reasonably hoped that she would not enter into the struggle. British diplomacy and Sir Edward Grey, personally, worked hard to avert the war, but the only means which might have succeeded during these fatal days would have been to declare Britain's complete solidarity with France and Russia. This Great Britain did not do.

Russian diplomacy, within the bounds of what was possible, tried to avoid the war.² However, all attempts to settle the Austro-Serbian dispute by diplomacy failed, and on July 28 Austria declared war on Serbia. After this had taken place, Russia had the choice either of doing nothing and seeing Serbia invaded, or of ordering the mobilization of the army. The original proposal was

² It is impossible to enter here into a discussion of the "war-guilt" question. The point of view expressed above, as to Russia's part in the events that led to the war, seems to me to be corroborated by the evidence so far available; but the controversial nature of the topic is recognized.

to compromise and order only a partial mobilization in the south of Russia, thus clearly directing it only against Austria and not against Germany. Sazonov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, immediately announced this decision to the governments of Europe. This idea, however, met with vigorous objections on the part of the General Staff and the military experts in Russia. The reason for these objections was that a partial mobilization of the Russian army would, for technical reasons, delay and complicate a subsequent complete mobilization. If after some days Germany were to declare war, it was held that a general mobilization would be disorganized by any partial steps taken earlier, which would considerably weaken Russia's position. The question of Russian mobilization is one which must be approached, not only from the point of view of its effect upon international relations, but also from the practical viewpoint of military efficiency. It must not be forgotten that, granting the instability of the general situation and the high degree of preparedness of all the powers for a general conflict, a delay of a few days or the confusion of a prearranged program of mobilization might have created a situation in which the Power so taken unawares would be incapable of resisting the first onslaught of the enemy.

On July 29 Count Pourtales, the German Ambassador, called at the Russian Foreign Office and informed Sazonov that even a partial mobilization of the Russian army would lead immediately to a German mobilization. In the light of these circumstances, a general mobilization of the Russian army was ordered on July 29 at 5 P.M. At 9.20 P.M. Emperor Nicholas received a telegram from Emperor William promising that he would do his utmost to promote a direct understanding between St. Petersburg and Vienna. Emperor Nicholas immediately canceled the order for the general mobilization and a partial mobilization was substituted instead, orders being given accordingly to the commanding officers of the four military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, at midnight. On July 30 partial mobilization commenced. Following these orders information was received by the Russian War Office that Germany was already starting secret mobilization. Simultaneously, the last effort of Sazonov to find a satisfactory basis for negotiations was rejected by Germany and Austria. Sazonov, after conferring with the Minister of War, and the Chief of the Gen-

eral Staff, decided to advise the emperor to order general mobilization. Sazonov was received by the Emperor Nicholas at 4 P.M. on July 30. The emperor unwillingly gave his consent to the general mobilization. Sazonov issued appropriate instructions to the Ministry of War and the General Staff. Thus, on July 31, general mobilization began. This, however, did not mean war—a fact specifically explained in the telegram of Emperor Nicholas to Emperor William II on July 31, and by Sazonov, who, at the initiative of Sir Edward Grey, expressed readiness to continue diplomatic negotiations. All that Sazonov demanded was that Austrian troops should not invade Serbia.

Simultaneously with the order for Russian mobilization, and before the news of this act reached Berlin, the *Kriegsgefahrzustand* was decreed by the German Government. This order, except in name, was the same thing as mobilization. On the morning of August 1, Emperor Nicholas once more telegraphed to Emperor Wilhelm asking him to give assurance that German mobilization did not mean war. Before anything resulted from this correspondence, at 7 P.M. on August 1, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, after demanding that Russian mobilization cease immediately, informed Sazonov that Germany declared war upon Russia.

3.

GERMANY's declaration of war aroused in the Russian people entirely different feelings from those caused by the beginning of the Japanese war ten years previously. The gravity of the situation was universally realized. In the main cities of Russia, patriotic manifestations took place. A strike that had been taking place in Petrograd during the days preceding the rupture of diplomatic relations, ceased immediately.

The Duma met in a special session and expressed complete agreement with the policy pursued by the Government. This declaration was evidence of the accord between the Government and the representatives of the people. On August 12 the representatives of the Zemstvos created an All-Russian Union of Zemstvos for the aid of the wounded. Thus the war opened under the best political auspices—all of Russia was united. The rise of national feeling was further aided by the policy of Slavonic emancipation declared by the Government. The war was commenced avowedly to free the Serbs,

and at the outset the Russian Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nicholas, called for the liberation of another Slavonic people—the Poles. Russian diplomacy did not avoid this troublesome question, but went straight about cutting the Gordian knot. The Russian proclamation to the Poles promised the reconstitution “of the living body of Poland cut into three parts.”³ A little later an appeal was made to all the oppressed peoples of Austro-Hungary.

Germany had calculated that disorganization would develop in Russia immediately following mobilization, but the mobilization of the Russian army, following the plan prepared by General Lukomsky, was carried out with unexpected rapidity and with no difficulties. It was materially aided by the promulgation of prohibition of all alcoholic beverages and the closing of all wine shops.

During the course of the first months of the war, it became evident that Russia had profited greatly by her experiences in the Russo-Japanese War. Save for that, the Russian armies could not have withstood the German forces. But in the course of the ten years following the Japanese war, the effectiveness of the Russian army, in view of a complete reorganization, was increased at least threefold.

4.

THE German declaration of war against Russia was followed on August 3 by a declaration of war against France. Within two more days Austria declared war on Russia and, following the German breach of Belgian neutrality, Great Britain declared war on Germany. In October, 1914, Turkey entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. The forces of the *Entente* seemed to be greater than those of the Central Powers, but this inequality of man power and wealth was compensated for by the unity of the Central Powers under the direction of Germany. The forces of the Allies were not united under a general military command and the military activities of the separate *Entente* states were not harmonized. In the beginning the forces of the *Entente* were divided into three unequal parts: one on the western front, composed of France and Britain; another on the eastern front, Russia; and a third on the southeastern front, Serbia. The Serbian forces were so much

³ This has reference to the three parts of Poland in the possession of Russia, Germany, and Austria, which were to be united under a Russian protectorate.

weaker than those of the Central Powers opposing them that the Serbian front could be effectively maintained only in case the forces of the Central Powers were attracted by the struggle on the main fronts. The progress of the war, therefore, depended primarily upon the success or failure of the opposing sides on the main fronts.

The principal feature of the German military plan in case of a war against France and Russia simultaneously was first of all to throw almost all her forces against France and leave merely a small force to oppose Russia, and only after defeating France to throw her main forces on the eastern front and engage in what was not expected to be a long campaign against Russia. In view of this it was of the greatest importance to France that, immediately following the commencement of hostilities, Russia should attack Germany and thereby force the German Command to withdraw some of the forces taking part in the western offensive. In accordance with the military convention with France of 1913, Russia undertook in case of war to start an offensive against Germany on the sixteenth day following mobilization. Russia fulfilled her undertaking exactly on schedule. The war started on August 1. On August 17 a Russian army under General Rennenkampf started an offensive in East Prussia. In a few days a second army under General Samsonov advanced into East Prussia from the south. The movement of the Russian armies was hastened by the insistence of the French who by this time were heavily pressed by the German offensive on the western front. In view of the imminent necessity of action on the eastern front, the Russian forces entered East Prussia without effective preparation. The second Russian army was in a particularly precarious situation, having begun to advance before the required quantity of military supplies had been received. The Germans, in accordance with their plan, prepared to retreat beyond the Vistula River, leaving East Prussia to Russia. However, the Russian advance into Prussia had so strong an effect upon German public opinion that the Supreme Command of Germany was forced to change its plan and oppose the Russian attack. A new commander, General Hindenburg, with Ludendorff as Chief of Staff, was appointed on the northeastern front and a part of the troops engaged against France were withdrawn to stem the Russian tide. At the most decisive moment of the German ad-

vance against France, six divisions of troops and one cavalry division were ordered to Prussia. Ludendorff succeeded in surrounding and annihilating five Russian divisions of Samsonov's army at the battle of Tannenberg on August 31, 1914, at the same spot where in 1410 the Polish, Lithuanian, and Russian troops defeated the German Knights. During the following weeks Ludendorff succeeded in driving the Russian armies out of East Prussia.

The transfer of German troops from the western front directly contributed to Germany's successful repulse of Russia; but it upset the whole plan of German offensive on the western front and had a profound influence upon the general course of the war. The weakening of the German army on the eve of the Marne enabled the French to arrest the German advance.

While the first engagement between Germany and Russia resulted in a German victory, Russia succeeded in defeating the Austrian army on the southeastern front and occupying Galicia. During this operation of General Alexeiev, the Russian army occupied important strategic posts in Austria and took over two hundred thousand prisoners. Following her success in East Prussia, Germany was forced to engage in further operations on the eastern front in order to support Austria. In the end of September, 1914, Ludendorff moved fifty-two divisions of German and Austrian troops in the direction of Warsaw. After nearly a month of bitter fighting, the battle was won by the Russian troops and on October 27 Ludendorff gave the order of retreat. This battle of October, 1914, was the high point of Russia's military effort in the World War. However, it did not result in a complete defeat of the German troops. In order to undertake an offensive, Russia required preparation; but the French and British military command insisted upon an immediate Russian advance to draw away the German reserves from the western front. The Russian Command yielded to the insistence of the Allies, although the attraction of new German forces to the east at this time did not correspond with the main strategic interests of the common cause of the Allies. This operation was primarily favorable to France and Britain as it enabled them to give their troops a needed rest and to replenish supplies and munitions. Meanwhile, the Russian army, after suffering enormous losses in the course of the first three months of the war, needed rest more than the French and British. Meeting the de-

mands of the Allies, however, the Russian troops were ordered to attack Silesia and Poznan on November 14, 1914, but Germany acted first. Fourteen divisions were drawn from the western front in November, 1914, and thrown against Russia. The proposed Russian advance failed after considerable losses had been suffered.

The failure of German offensive in France led to a reversal of Germany's military plans. It was decided that now Russia would be attacked, and only following success in the east would offensive operations be resumed in the west. In the spring of 1915, following a short suspension of active military operations, Germany brought thirteen new divisions originally intended to be used on the western front, to the eastern front. A great quantity of heavy artillery was concentrated on the Russian front and General Mackensen took charge of operations. It soon became apparent that the Russian troops could not withstand the furious attack of Mackensen in view of an almost complete depletion of supplies. A general retreat during the whole summer of 1915 resulted not only in the loss of all enemy territory occupied, but also of Poland, Lithuania, and Courland, and a huge stretch of purely Russian provinces in the west.

The inadequacy of supplies was keenly felt during the whole of 1915. In August the number of unarmed Russian soldiers reached 30 per cent and the troops had to depend upon the arms of those wounded or killed in order to continue fighting. The German advance came to an end when the increased distances from bases in Germany made it impossible to supply the German troops with sufficient provisions and ammunition. In the autumn of 1915 the German advance stopped along the line Riga-Dvinsk-Tarnopol.

Meanwhile, the supply of munitions of the Russian army, following the great retreat, rapidly improved. The reason for this was the increased production of Russian munition factories and the relative quiet on the line of battle. The supplies from abroad began arriving only in 1916. At no time during the retreat of the Russian army in the summer of 1915 nor during the collapse of Serbia in the autumn of 1915 did the French and British undertake large-scale operations on the western front to draw away the forces of the Central Powers. They tried to help Russia and Serbia by attacking the Dardanelles, but this attack failed. The entry of Italy into the war in May, 1915, could give no more help. Thus, during

1915, Germany had the opportunity of delivering a terrific blow to the military power of Russia.⁴ While successful in driving back the Russian armies, Germany failed in obtaining its objective—the destruction of Russia's military power. At the same time, the fighting on the eastern front allowed the British and French to concentrate their forces for the continuation of the struggle.

5.

A CRISIS in the supply of munitions was experienced by all warring countries. Not one of the powers engaged in the war had taken due account of the duration of the struggle or of the quantity of materials necessary to conduct it. As it became evident that the war would be prolonged, measures were devised to supply a sufficient quantity of munitions. The result was the militarization of industry in Germany, Great Britain, and France. Russia's position was harder than that of the other powers, as Russian industry, in spite of its great progress in the decades preceding the war, remained comparatively feeble. The Russian army, moreover, being larger than those of the other Allies, was in greater need of supplies. During the first year it was engaged in fighting almost without an interval, while the British and French, following the battle of the Marne, dug into permanent positions. The Russian situation was further complicated by an internal political conflict. The failures of 1915 created a rift between the Government and the Duma. The inadequacy of munition supplies was attributed to the shortsightedness of the Government and the General Staff. This was in part true. Moreover, the retreat of the army led to the evacuation of the abandoned territories by great numbers of the population. This evacuation was undertaken at the command of the army authorities, who followed the policy pursued by Russia during the Napoleonic invasion of 1812. It was, however, a great mistake and brought to the attention of public opinion in Russia the defects in the military Command.

In order to aid the Government in dealing with the problems which it faced, the Union of Zemstvos and towns as well as other

⁴ At the beginning of the war the Central Powers had sixty-three divisions on the eastern front and ninety-three on the western front. In September, 1915, the Central Powers had concentrated one hundred and sixty-one divisions against Russia and eighty-four on the western front.

public organizations took over the relief of refugees and the furnishing of the army with necessary supplies. Industry was mobilized by a War Industry Committee and the Duma became the center of a vast system whose object was to assist the Government in dealing with its war problems. The work of the various agencies soon brought relief to the army, but as their work grew in popularity, the prestige of the Government fell. In the most of this internal transformation, the Allies found themselves unwillingly on the side of the Duma. They could not help seeing that its activities were of the greatest assistance to Russia in waging the war. The Duma, on the other hand, felt that only the Allies could satisfy Russia's demands for munitions, as Russian industry alone was not capable of dealing with this problem. There grew up an important relationship between the Duma and the public organizations, on the one hand, and the representatives of the Allies, on the other. This aroused political jealousy prompted by justifiable fears in court circles. The political rift was widened by personal animosities. The head of the Government was Goremykin, whose part in the dissolving of the first Duma made him unpopular in duma circles. The Government agreed to a short session of the Duma in August, 1915, and dismissed the Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, who was held responsible for the military setbacks experienced by the Russian army. But very soon Emperor Nicholas showed his unwillingness to accept the leadership of the Duma in directing the organization of the army and the country. There followed a split between the Duma and the Government, reminiscent of the condition during the first two Dumas of 1906-1907. At the initiative of the liberal leader, Miliukov, a progressive "bloc," composed of Moderate Rights, and Liberals, was formed, which controlled a majority in the Duma. The Duma now demanded a Cabinet having the confidence of the country. Nicholas II had only two courses of action open to him: either to yield to the Duma or to end the war even at the cost of betraying the Allies. The emperor could not reconcile himself to betraying the Allied cause and attempted to find a solution of the problem which would avoid yielding to the Duma, by taking over personally the Supreme Command of the Russian armies. It was hoped that this act would raise the prestige of the emperor in the country at large, in the army, and with the Allied Powers. It was, however, a risky undertaking, since fur-

ther failures would bring popular condemnation upon the personality of the emperor himself. On September 5, 1915, the Grand Duke Nicholas was transferred to the Caucasian front and Nicholas II became Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army. The political atmosphere in Russia thickened. The Duma was called for the shortest possible periods and a supreme effort was made by the emperor to find leaders capable of solving the problems which he faced without calling for aid from the Duma. Nicholas II failed to find competent assistance. For this reason, Ministry supplanted Ministry without apparent reason or improvement. The precarious internal situation in Russia resulted in arousing the suspicions of the Allies, particularly following the dismissal of Foreign Minister Sazonov and the appointment of Sturmer, who was suspected of being pro-German in his sympathies.

Gradually, the emperor found himself politically isolated. He was abandoned by the Left Groups and the Right and finally by the Allies. The Duma felt that he was incapable of conducting the war with sufficient energy. The members of the extreme right faction, on the other hand, desired a separate peace, and everyone secretly suspected that the real source of power was the Empress Alexandra Feodorovna, under whose sway the weak-willed emperor had completely fallen. The empress, in turn, was known to be under the influence of Rasputin, an uneducated peasant "prophet" who was regarded by the empress as a saint. The ascendancy of Rasputin was due to his magnetic personality and the neurotic condition of the empress. The empress credited him with the power to protect the health of the tsarevich, who suffered from an incurable disease.⁵

A chain of influence was thus created. In order to secure the confidence of the emperor, it was necessary to secure the favor of the empress, and in order to do this Rasputin's good offices had to be obtained. Unwillingness to ask favors of Rasputin on the part of most reputable individuals resulted in the isolation of the emperor. It was only in the army that Rasputin had no influence. The Chief of Staff under Nicholas II, i.e., the actual Commander-in-Chief of the army, was General Alexeiev, who demanded and secured freedom from outside interference. However, General Alexeiev could

⁵ The heir was born in 1904 with the hereditary disease of haemophilia. Rasputin appeared at Court several years later.

not keep secret from the emperor the plans of military operations. The emperor could not fail to impart so much as his own views to the empress. The empress could not hide anything from Rasputin. The question was who wanted the information from Rasputin and to whom Rasputin cared to give it.

On the other hand the army was closely allied to the interests of the whole country and any excitement in the country at large could not help but affect the morale of the troops.

6.

THE prospect of a political conflict between the Duma and the emperor was especially dangerous in that it weakened both sides. The disagreement tended to destroy authority in general and opened the path to the destructive forces of the social revolution which had taken cover since 1906. The situation became favorable for the spread of "defeatist" propaganda by the extreme Socialist parties. During the war the Socialists of all countries had abandoned internationalism in favor of nationalism. Among the Russian Socialists there were many patriots, but there was also a powerful group of Social Internationalists.

The most active agents of Russia's defeat in the war were the Bolsheviks. Their leader, Lenin, had been abroad since 1907, but continued to exercise a great influence over Russian politics. The Bolshevik members of the Duma first expressed their adherence to the "defeatist" policy of their leader in November, 1914. In the spring of 1915 they were arrested, and after trial for sedition, imprisoned or exiled. There is no doubt that their ideas slowly sank into the minds of the mass of Russian labor. Lenin continued his preparatory work in Switzerland and in 1915 proposed the foundation of the Third International. During 1915 and 1916 he succeeded in reasserting his "defeatist" policy at two International Socialist conferences. He now openly advocated civil war of the lower classes against the higher classes to end the "imperialist" war between peoples.

7.

THE political conflict between the representative organs and the Government, which has been referred to, prepared the ground for revolutionary propaganda. In addition to this conflict, the economic

condition of the country contributed to the demoralization of the popular morale. The war called for the mobilization of vast numbers of men in all countries. The Russian Government, under the influence of the Allied policy, likewise called to the colors almost all those capable of carrying arms. By the beginning of 1917, over fifteen million men had been recruited. The Government did not have any immediate need for all these men or sufficient munitions to arm them effectively. Millions of soldiers lived in the rear of the battle line in complete inactivity and presented a convenient fertile field for political propaganda. The mobilization of such large numbers led to economic difficulties. The expense of caring for the millions of recruits called for enormous expenditures by the Government and increased the difficulties of transportation and production. The cities, which depended entirely upon foodstuffs imported from the country districts, were the first to suffer. In the autumn of 1916, Petrograd had difficulty in securing sufficient supplies. In calling the reserves, the Government was forced to undertake the support of the families left at home, which increased the administrative and financial burdens of the Government. Finally, the two million refugees from the abandoned areas of western Russia were also dependent upon government aid.

In order to supply the army with munitions, the Government subsidized industry. In the end of 1916 more than 73 per cent of the industrial workers were exclusively engaged in military production. The state expenses increased and the income decreased. The families of those called to the front could not pay the usual taxes, while in introducing prohibition the Government also lost the proceeds of the largest indirect tax.

The Treasury was compelled to issue paper money. In 1915, 2,946,500,000 rubles were in circulation. In 1916 the amount increased to 5,617,000,000. The increased amount of paper money in circulation led to an increase in prices, which in turn necessitated constantly increasing the pay of all officials and workers. The impression of economic insecurity was produced all over the country. This demoralized the population.

8.

FOLLOWING the setbacks of 1915, the condition of the army began to improve. In March, 1916, an offensive against the center of the

German front was tried, but failed in its objective. The plan of attack was ill prepared, being scheduled just when the spring thaw set in. The Russian troops were defeated by mud rather than by the efforts of the German army. The failure of the offensive had fatal effects upon the attitude of mind among the Russian troops. The impression was created that the German positions were impregnable.

Operations were undertaken in the summer of 1916 against the Austrian army. The moment was chosen to relieve the pressure of Austria against Italy which in May threatened completely to disrupt the Italian army. In answer to the insistent requests of Italy, an offensive on the Russian southwestern front was started on June 4. This operation was successful to the highest degree. The Russian army under the command of General Brusilov succeeded in smashing the Austrian army and capturing over four hundred thousand prisoners. The Central Powers were forced to withdraw troops from other fronts to stem the Russian advance. In the autumn of 1916, Rumania entered the war against the Central Powers, but was soon defeated. The consequence of the Rumanian defeat was the further extension of the Russian front southward as far as the Black Sea in order to bring relief to Rumania.

The counter offensive against Brusilov and the Rumanian offensive called for extraordinary efforts on the part of Germany. In gaining Pyrrhic victories in the east, the Central Powers failed to secure decisive victory on the western front. In 1917 the position of Germany became critical. Meanwhile, the forces of the Allies in the west, now the principal opponents of the Central Powers, continued to grow. At the same time, owing to the arrival of supplies from the United States and Great Britain and the reorganization of Russian industry, the Russian army in the spring of 1917 was amply provided with munitions. In spite of all the hardships in the past, it was possible to expect that the new Allied campaign of 1917 would be successful in crushing the Central Powers.

9.

DURING the winter of 1916-17, the conflict between Nicholas II and the Duma became particularly acute. Some solution of far-reaching importance was inevitable. Both sides were embittered. The Duma feared the possibility of an alliance between Rasputin

and the reactionary circles for the purpose of concluding a separate peace with Germany. At the session of the Duma of November, 1916, several speeches were made attacking the influence of the empress. Meanwhile, in the highest circles of society, the decision was made to do away with Rasputin, who was regarded as the evil genius of the empire. On December 30 Rasputin was killed by a well-known aristocrat, with assistance of a conservative Duma deputy and of a member of the imperial family. The policy of the emperor, however, did not change following this act. A plot was formed in one of the court circles to overthrow the emperor and to substitute another member of the royal family in his place. However, the moment for such an act had already passed; before a court revolution could be effected a popular uprising took place.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE SECOND RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

(1917)

I.

THE revolution of March, 1917, broke out while a new Russian offensive against the Central Powers was in course of preparation. The revolution made the success of this offensive impossible, for it was accompanied by a complete collapse of the Russian army and led directly to Russia's defeat in the war.

The revolution was hailed, however, by men who desired to continue the war and who imagined that the overthrow of the autocracy would stimulate patriotic feeling in the Russian people, and thereby add to their effectiveness as fighters. The most influential group in sympathy with the revolution was the upper middle class, looking for leadership to the liberal members of the Duma. Many of the army officers, including the High Command, were also sympathetic. Finally, the revolution found favor with the representatives of the Allies—France and Great Britain.

The political opposition in the Duma conducted by the liberal forces against almost every measure of the Imperial Government, was motivated by the highest patriotic feeling, the common belief being that the best interests of Russia would be served by opposition to rather than by coöperation with the old *régime*. In surveying the history of the Russian revolution one is frequently struck by this curious disparity between the objectives of the various groups and leaders and the actual results of their policies.

The leaders of the opposition in the Duma desired only a political revolution, and not a social one, whereas the extreme tension of the years of war added to the peculiar conditions prevailing in Russia made far-reaching social changes inevitable.

The war broke out before the social reorganization of Russia—following the first revolution of 1905—had reached completion or

the agrarian reform had been carried to its necessary conclusion. The new principles of landownership introduced by Stolypin, sound as they were, had not had time to bear fruit. The land hunger of the peasants remained unsatisfied and their desire to divide the large estates manifested itself as soon as the Imperial Government collapsed. The solution of the land problem always meant more to the Russian peasant than mere political reform.

The Socialist parties immediately following the revolution started propaganda among the masses, advancing a program of extensive social reform. Since the army was composed largely of peasants recruited from the fields this agitation had a serious demoralizing effect. The liberal opposition in the Duma failed to realize the effect of this agitation. They had less contact with the people and completely miscalculated the degree of socialist influence upon the masses.

In view of the restrictions enforced against political organization under the old *régime*, the liberal parliamentary parties were not organized on a large scale. The Socialist parties, meanwhile, had direct contact with the city workers through their chain of secret groups or "cells."

The most serious effect of the radical program of social reform was to destroy the morale of the army. The collapse of the Russian army was not the cause, but the result of the revolution. The first troops to become disorderly were reserve battalions and not the active regiments at the front. The army of 1917 was tired, but it was still able for some time to continue fighting. Supplies were at last adequate,¹ and the morale of the active troops would have made possible an active campaign during 1917. But the agitation of the radical groups soon accomplished its purpose. The collapse of strong government, aggravated by the discussion of far-reaching social questions, completely deprived the troops of any desire to continue the war. Once started, the social revolution was destined to destroy the effectiveness of the Russian army.

2.

THE success of the revolutionary movement was greatly aided by the moral disintegration of the supreme authority in the Russian

¹ Shipments from abroad and the efforts of Russian industries had brought about a complete change from the conditions of 1915.

State. The court circle formed around the Empress Alexandra Feodorovna as we have seen was under the influence of Rasputin. This alienated the best elements from the Government. At the most tragic moment of Russian history, the Government was composed largely of incapable men having neither the ability nor the will to rule.

The murder of Rasputin, on December 30, 1916, did not improve the situation. On the contrary, it resulted in utter disorganization in the imperial household. After the murder of Rasputin the emperor ceased in fact to rule.

The disintegration of the Imperial Government and the attempts to create a new organ of power may be traced chronologically.

The emperor was in Mogilev, the Headquarters of the Russian army, when a telegram was received informing him of the murder of Rasputin in Petrograd. The same day, December 31, 1916, the emperor left for Tsarskoe Selo to join the empress.

In fact, this very day the emperor withdrew himself from power. It happened that the Chief of Staff, General Alexeiev, had previously fallen seriously ill and was also absent from the Headquarters.²

General Alexeiev arrived at Headquarters on March 3, 1917, but he had not completely recovered. Emperor Nicholas returned to Headquarters on March 9. On the following day a telegram was received at Headquarters telling of disorders in Petrograd caused by the insufficiency of food supplies. The first telegrams from Petrograd, however, were rather optimistic in tone. But the following days brought more alarming news about the disorders there. The president of the state Duma, M. V. Rodzianko, described the events very gloomily. He requested that a new Cabinet be formed to satisfy the Duma and command the full confidence of the people. On March 12, the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich, brother to the emperor, informed General Alexeiev that he believed that this alone could save the situation which had become further aggravated.

A few hours later a telegram arrived from the Prime Minister, Prince Golitsyn, asking for similar measures. It seemed that the only decision open to the emperor was to accept this advice. But he

² He was recovering in the Crimea. Alexeiev was temporarily replaced at Headquarters by General Gurko.

did not do so. The other alternative was to take very energetic measures to crush the uprising. Some measures were taken, but they were wholly inadequate to meet the situation. The new session of the Duma, which was to open on March 12, was postponed and General Ivanov was dispatched with one battalion to Petrograd with orders to suppress the revolt. But these measures were not sufficient.

The members of the Duma did not obey the Imperial *ukaz* and gathered on the morning of March 12 in the Tauride Palace. The measures taken having proved insufficient, the emperor could still try to take others more resolute. But at this very moment, the emperor left Headquarters again for Tsarskoe Selo, early on the morning of March 13, not wishing to be separated from the empress during these troublous days. Thus the emperor cut himself off from the current of events. Meanwhile events were developing with extraordinary rapidity.

The acts of the emperor were not sufficient to crush the revolution, but they were quite sufficient to prevent the Duma from assuming control of the forces now in motion. Very soon the Duma was no longer able to guide the revolution.

Neither the leaders in the Duma nor in the Socialist parties had called the soldiers and the workmen into the streets. The immediate cause of the rioting in Petrograd was the insufficiency of food. However, this did not affect the soldiers, who received their normal supply. On the morning of March 12, Petrograd was already overrun by the revolutionary mob. Policemen were killed in the streets, the Kresty jail was forced open, and the courthouse set afire. The soldiers of many reserve battalions staying in Petrograd joined the crowds. Some officers were killed. The Government, the military command, and the chief of police were helpless. Anarchy began.

It seemed that the Duma was the only authority which could control the situation. Crowds of soldiers and civilians rushed to the Tauride Palace where it sat.

About noon the members of the Duma decided to act. About 2 P.M. a Temporary Committee of the Duma was elected to lead the movement. The Committee numbered twelve members, with Rodzianko as chairman. The majority consisted of liberals and moderate conservatives. Besides these, two socialist members of the Duma

were elected—Alexander Kerensky and Nicholas Chkheidze. Chkheidze at once refused to serve. This refusal was significant. He wished to have his hands free to advance purely socialistic policies. The socialist leaders arrived at the Tauride Palace at the same time as the Duma members. Instead of joining with the Duma, they tried to create their own government on the pattern of 1905. During all of March 12, the Duma and the socialist leaders hesitated to break with the old *régime*. They merely followed the leadership of the mob, which arrested the Ministers and brought them to the Duma. It was only in the evening that the Temporary Committee of the Duma decided to take power in its hands. Commissaries were appointed to all government offices. It seemed for a moment as though the Duma would succeed in mastering the revolution.

But at the same time the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies was being organized. Deputies of workmen, one for each thousand, and of soldiers, one for each company, were summoned to gather at the Tauride Palace at 7 P.M. on March 12. The socialist chiefs who led them did not even ask the Duma Committee's permission to occupy the Duma hall. Chkheidze was chosen as chairman of the Soviet at its first meeting.

It was but natural under these circumstances that the emperor had not time to reach Tsarskoe Selo. The railroad staff was already informed of the revolution by a telegram of the deputy appointed Commissary of the Ministry of Communication. The emperor's train was stopped at the station of Dno. On the evening of March 14 the emperor arrived at Pskov. His will was broken and he decided to abdicate.

The Duma Committee was already taking the next step in the revolution. It appointed a Provisional Government of Russia, with Prince George E. Lvov as chairman, Alexander Guchkov as head of the War Office, and Paul Miliukov as head of the Foreign Office. Among other ministers there was one socialist deputy, Kerensky, as Minister of Justice.⁸

The first care of the new Government was to eliminate the emperor. On March 15 the new war minister, Guchkov, and the member of the Duma Committee, V. V. Shulgin, left for Pskov to se-

⁸ The Labor Office was offered to another Socialist, Chkheidze, but he refused again.

cure his abdication. The emperor did not wish to separate himself from his son. For this reason he did not abdicate in favor of his son and heir apparent, Alexis, but in favor of his brother, the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich. Before his abdication, the emperor appointed the Grand Duke Nicholas Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Army and named Prince Lvov Premier of the Cabinet. The Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich did not choose to accept the Supreme Power and passed it on to the Provisional Government. The Romanovs had ceased to rule Russia.⁴

3.

THE revolution which took place in Petrograd was accepted not only by army Headquarters, but by the whole of Russia. Supporters of the old *régime* made no sign of resistance. The revolution had acquired a legal character, owing to the manifestos of Emperor Nicholas and of his brother. This circumstance completely disarmed the enemies of the revolution.⁵ The overthrow of the empire and substitution of the authority of the Duma were tacitly accepted by the bureaucratic machine of the old *régime* both in the capital and in the provinces. But it soon became evident that the new Government did not possess real authority.

From the first hour of its existence the Provisional Government was hampered by the Workers and Soldiers' Soviets. The first decree it issued, on March 14, was written under the pressure of the Petrograd Soviet.

It laid down the following principles: (1) A general amnesty for all political, religious, and military prisoners; (2) freedom of speech and of the press, freedom for unions and strikes; (3) abolition of all social, religious, and national distinctions; (4) the summoning of a Constituent Assembly; (5) a people's militia to replace the police; (6) elections to be based on universal suffrage; (7) troops that took part in the revolution should remain in Petrograd and not be transferred to the front; (8) soldiers to have the same public rights as civilians when not in active service.

⁴ The late emperor was soon arrested, with the empress and their children, and then exiled in Siberia. In the spring of 1918, they were all transported to Ekaterinburg by the Soviet Government and brutally murdered on July 16, 1918. The Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich was arrested by Communists in Perm, also in the spring of 1918, and then disappeared, probably also having been killed.

⁵ There were, however, a number of cases of suicide by ardent supporters of the emperor.

In spite of the fact that this declaration was a compromise between the Provisional Government and the Soviet program, the Soviet issued another declaration independently and without the approval of the Provisional Government.

It was the famous "Order No. 1" of March 14 which was the principal agency in the destruction of the Russian army. The main features of this "order" were the following: (1) Soldiers' committees were to be chosen in each military detachment; (2) each military detachment was to obey its Soviet in its political decisions; (3) orders of the military commission of the state Duma were to be obeyed only if they did not contradict the Soviet's orders; (4) all weapons were to be under control of the soldiers' committees and were not to be delivered to the officers.

This order brought about confusion in the control of the army. It was issued without the consent of the High Command and was directed against the authority of the superior officers. It threatened with immediate destruction the whole organization of the army, by drawing the troops into the turbulent stream of politics and filling them with suspicion of the Duma. It was clear that the authors of this order desired to make the continuance of war impossible. After this order had been issued, the Provisional Government attempted to have it revoked, but this it failed to accomplish. It was now perfectly clear that the real administration was the Soviet and not the Provisional Government. Yet the Soviet did not wish to seize power openly because it feared a reaction among the liberal and conservative elements of society at this moment. The Provisional Government was indispensable to the Soviet because it was still the recognized authority for the country and the army. The Soviet preferred to maintain the Provisional Government in nominal authority as a bait for the anti-socialist groups, controlling it and checking its measures when they conflicted with Soviet policy.

Consequently, there were two governments in Petrograd from the very first days of the revolution: the Provisional Government representing the political revolution, and the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies representing the social revolution.

The helplessness of the Provisional Government is explained partly by the personal incapacity of its members and partly by the difficulty of the problems which it had to face.

Almost all the members of the first Provisional Government

were men of education and intelligence, of great and sincere love for their country, but none had a strong will nor the determination to suppress the enemies of order. Some of its members would perhaps have been excellent ministers under normal conditions; but during the war and in the time of upheaval they proved themselves unfit for their task.

The Premier of the Government, Prince Lvov, was a passive character, incapable of crushing his opponents. He was a Tolstojan type who believed in "nonresistance to evil." He frequently expressed a naïve faith in the "great bloodless" revolution.

The Ministers of War and Foreign Affairs, Guchkov and Miliukov, were perhaps the only men in the Government who supported an active foreign and military policy. It was this that centered the hatred of Soviet circles on these two men, especially Miliukov.

In their political views, most of the members of the Provisional Government belonged to the Constitutional Democratic party. Brought up in the principles of European constitutionalism, they tried to apply these principles to Russia, without taking into account the revolutionary temper of the time, which demanded rapidity of decision and not the minute fulfilment of constitutional procedure.

Both for the purpose of local Zemstvo and national elections, the Provisional Government formulated new laws involving universal, equal, direct, and secret balloting. First of all, reorganized local bodies or Zemstvos were to come into existence, to take charge of the lists of those voting for the members of the Constituent Assembly. Thus the election of representatives was delayed until the autumn of 1917.

The second Government of Russia during this period, as has been pointed out above, was the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies. This government, in the beginning, was also unorganized. The Petrograd Soviet consisted of 2,500 workmen and soldiers chosen without any technical formalities in the factories and by military detachments in Petrograd. Besides the real representatives of the soldiers and workers, the Soviet comprised the leaders of the Socialist parties who, ever since 1905, had regarded themselves as the real representatives of the interests of labor. The unwieldy body of the Soviet was actually incapable of carrying on political activity. It therefore formed a Central Executive Com-

mittee, consisting almost exclusively of the leaders of the Socialist parties. The principal measures to be taken by the Soviet were decided in an even smaller group—the Praesidium of the Central Executive Committee. Measures were frequently adopted by individual members of the higher organs of the Soviet and were only later subscribed to by the Central Executive Committee. All non-Socialist parties were classified as *bourgeois* or “capitalist” and were not admitted into the Soviet. The greater number of members of the Soviet were Socialist Revolutionaries, who regarded themselves as representing the peasantry. The next group in importance was the Socialist Democratic party which regarded itself as representing labor. This latter party was, as we have seen above, split into “Mensheviks” and “Bolsheviks.”⁶ After the arrival of Lenin,⁷ the Bolsheviks finally broke relations with the Mensheviks and organized a separate party which later was called “Communist” party. Lenin differed from the Mensheviks regarding a basic concept of policy. The latter believed that the socialist revolution in Russia was impossible until the country had become industrialized to a higher degree than it was. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, desired to bring about socialism in Russia immediately. The partisans of Lenin formed but a small minority of the Petrograd Soviet during the first months of the revolution, but owing to the disorganization of the Soviet and their own tireless activity, they managed to play a part far out of proportion to their numbers. While the more moderate Socialists desired to see the Provisional Government continue in control, the Bolsheviks loudly demanded that all power be given to the Soviets immediately.

The peculiar strength of the Soviet lay in the fact that, despite its clumsy size and heterogeneous membership, it had far closer contact with the masses than the Provisional Government. Very soon every town in Russia formed its Soviet. These were further supplemented by similar organizations in the army and in many villages.

The Provisional Government replaced the officials of the old *régime* in the provinces by the heads of the old Zemstvo Committees. But though generally of a liberal turn of mind, they had almost as little contact with the people as the authorities whom they dis-

⁶ The origin of these terms is explained in Chap. XI, Sec. 1.

⁷ Lenin came back to Russia from exile in April, 1917. See below, Sec. 6.

placed. But while the former officials had experience in ruling, the new ones had none. The central power in Petrograd thus found itself, from the beginning, without suitable representatives in the provinces. The Commissars of the Provisional Government found themselves forced to share power with the local Soviets. The conditions in Petrograd were reflected in every local capital.

No sooner had Soviets been formed all over the country than the Central Executive Committee called an All-Russian Soviet Congress. Everywhere the Socialists dominated the Soviets. The Congress which brought together all the central committees of the Soviets, was in fact a Congress of the Socialist party leaders.

The convention opened on June 16. The strongest party present was the Socialist Revolutionary party with 285 deputies. The Mensheviks were represented by 248 and the Bolsheviks were in a minority with only 105 delegates.

This Congress, in the eyes of the sympathizers of the Soviet, was the real representative organ of the new Russian state. The Bolsheviks demanded that it immediately seize power, but, being in a minority, they failed to carry through their wish. As a result of this early failure to overthrow the Provisional Government, Lenin set about creating conditions which would make it possible to seize power at the next Soviet Congress.

It must be admitted that the Soviet Congress was much easier to organize than the Constituent Assembly, and consequently it was a more practical organ of power during the revolution. The first success in calling the Soviet Congress forecast its victory over the parliamentary system borrowed from the west and advocated by the Provisional Government.

4.

THE leading political question of the time of the revolution was, of course, the question of war. There were two extreme views with respect to this question. The moderate elements in the Government desired to continue the war to a victorious end. This view was frequently expressed by Foreign Minister Miliukov, in his conversations with the Allied representatives in Petrograd, and in public statements.

The opposite view was held by the Bolsheviks and a number of other Socialist Internationalists. Representatives of these parties

argued the need of immediate peace and openly admitted themselves to be "defeatists."

Between these two extremes lay a group composed of a majority of the Socialists in the Soviets. They realized that popular feeling was not in support of a war policy, but they were unwilling as yet to accept the fact of the complete collapse of Russia's military power.

A weighty influence was also wielded by the representatives of the Allied Powers in Russia. It was quite natural that the continuance of Russia in the war was of the greatest interest to the Allies and they insisted that she must not on any account "betray the cause of Allied democracy."

From the very outbreak of the revolution the Allies were closely in sympathy with the new Government of Russia. The United States was the first to grant it official recognition, on March 22, and was soon followed by Great Britain, France, and Italy. But very soon the Allied Powers showed signs of anxiety as to the new Government's capacity to maintain order in Russia and continue the military campaign against the Central Powers. Seeing the success of the socialist leaders in organizing the masses, they urged the Government to compromise its differences with the Soviets and secure a unified and strong government. For this purpose a labor delegation led by Albert Thomas, the French socialist Minister of Munitions, was sent by France, and a similar delegation went from Great Britain, to effect a cordial understanding between the Soviets, the Provisional Government, and the western democratic groups.

The bitter opposition between the two views of Russia's war policy remained unreconciled. On March 18 Miliukov addressed the representatives of the Allies in Petrograd, assuring them that Russia "would fight by their side against the common enemy until the end." On March 27 the Petrograd Soviet issued a proclamation to the people of the world calling for "concerted and decisive action in favor of peace." From this day the socialist leaders began an intensive struggle against the "imperialistic policies" of Minister Miliukov. On May 3 the Bolsheviks organized their first demonstration against the Government under the slogan "Down with Miliukov." This demonstration led to a patriotic counter demonstration on the following night; but, to avoid further conflicts

with the Soviet, the Provisional Government accepted the resignations of the two ministers most severely criticized, and on May 17 formed a new Cabinet without Miliukov and Guchkov. The Government on May 18 also accepted the demands of the Soviet that peace with the Central Powers be signed "without annexations or indemnities on the basis of self-determination of peoples."

The new Government retained Prince Lvov as Premier, but its real leader was Kerensky, who was both War and Marine Minister. Albert Thomas supported Kerensky and, through him, the new Government, which included many Socialists. It was his belief that these were the only political leaders possessing sufficient authority to induce the Russian army to continue the war, but although the Soviets had secured the dismissal of their enemies, their opposition was not calmed.

5.

KERENSKY'S program with respect to the army contained two principles: the preparation of a general Russian offensive and a democratic reorganization of its command. The idea of an offensive against the Central Powers did not conflict in the mind of Kerensky with his earlier commitments to a purely defensive war or to his renunciation of imperialistic aims. The chief purpose of the offensive would be to force the Central Powers to abandon the territories of Russia which they then occupied. The chief defect in this policy was the failure to give due consideration to the new attitude of the Russian soldiers subsequent to the revolution.

The proposed reorganization of the army destroyed the last vestiges of discipline. On May 22 Kerensky approved an order to the army and navy known as the "Declaration of Soldiers' Rights." This order confirmed nearly all the points of Order No. 1 issued by the Petrograd Soviet on March 14, and in some respects went even farther.

A new feature in the organization of the army laid down by Kerensky was the appointment of commissars to represent the Government in the army, empowered with its political leadership. The High Command of the army found itself checked from above by the government appointees and from below by soldiers' committees organized at the outset of the revolution.

The High Command of the army received the orders of the Pro-

visional Government without protest after the tsar's abdication. The commanding generals of the Russian army were loyal to the revolution and the Provisional Government following the tsar's abdication. It was not until later that they realized the fact that the Government was subject to the destructive influence of the Soviet. Meanwhile, Kerensky extended the reorganization of the army to the command. General Alexeiev, who had replaced the Grand Duke Nicholas, was now removed by Kerensky and General Brusilov appointed in his place as Commander-in-Chief.

The dissolution of the Russian army reached a hopeless stage. The authority of the officers collapsed. The army Soviets issued orders contrary to those of the commanding officers, and the troops were subjected to a flood of "defeatist" literature. Very soon the soldiers began to fraternize with the enemy on the front. The German Command decided to suspend military operations, believing that it was the best method of furthering the disintegration of the Russian army. Meanwhile, Kerensky sincerely tried to accomplish the preparation of an offensive. After his tour of the front, which earned him the nickname of "Persuader-in-Chief," a Russian offensive was planned for July, 1917. The first days of fighting were successful. A great breach was made in the Austrian lines and the enemy put to flight, but very soon it became evident that the "reorganized" Russian army could not continue the advance. Whole regiments refused to carry out their military orders and even left the front when they felt tired. The successful phase of the offensive was due only to the enthusiasm of the officers and a small minority of the soldiers, most of whom perished in the first days of the fighting. The offensive was doomed.

A factor contributing to the failure of the Russian offensive was a lack of coöperation between the Allies. The British and French offensives on the western front took place early in May. By July the Allies were exhausted and the Germans succeeded in transferring two divisions from the western front to reinforce the crumbling Austrian forces. A counter-offensive broke the Russian line at a spot where one of the unruly regiments had abandoned the front. A complete collapse was imminent. The German troops stopped advancing after reaching the river Zbruch, but had they wished they could easily have occupied the whole southwest of Russia. The catastrophe compelled one of the commanding officers,

General Kornilov, to send a bitter message to the Government requiring the immediate restoration of military discipline and of capital punishment for all deserters. The government commissars supported the demands of General Kornilov.

This produced an immense impression over the whole country. It was the first time firm language had been used since the beginning of the revolution. In one day Kornilov became the center of patriotic feeling. Kerensky also was strongly impressed by his demands and on July 30 appointed him supreme Commander-in-Chief in place of Brusilov.

6.

SIMULTANEOUSLY with the collapse of the Russian offensive an armed uprising took place in Petrograd, the Bolsheviks leading a group of sailors and some of the regiments of the Petrograd garrison in an attempt to overthrow the Government, from July 16 to 18, but a cavalry division summoned from the front by the Provisional Government succeeded in suppressing the movement.

The chief purpose of the Bolshevik uprising in July was to seize power in the name of the Soviets. It had been prepared quite openly, but neither the Government nor the majority of the Soviet, who were in opposition to the Bolsheviks, took any serious measures to prevent the outbreak. On the contrary, the socialist leaders declared that the Government had no right to take any measures against the peaceful propaganda of the Bolsheviks.

The strength of the Bolsheviks lay in the force of their slogans and the efficiency of their organization. Their program contained three points: (1) Immediate peace; (2) immediate distribution of land to the peasants and the seizure of factories by the workers; (3) all power to the Soviets. Though they had only a minority in the Petrograd Soviet and the Soviet Congress, they played a dominant rôle in these bodies. Their activity became particularly effective following the arrival of Lenin and Trotsky from abroad. Both of these leaders were well-known "defeatists." Prior to the revolution Trotsky had been living in the United States. On his way to Russia through England he was arrested by the British as a dangerous propagandist, but was released at the insistence of the Provisional Government and allowed to proceed to Russia. Lenin, since 1914, had been living in Switzerland. He entered into negotiations

with the German Government through the mediation of Platten, a Swiss Socialist, with the purpose of being allowed to return to Russia through Germany. The German Government, desirous of using Lenin as a weapon to destroy Russia's military power, agreed to allow him passage from Switzerland to Sweden in a sealed railroad car. Lenin arrived in Petrograd on April 16.

A few days following his arrival, Lenin began to expound his ideas at meetings of workmen and soldiers. He appealed to the Socialists to discard their old-fashioned methods of parliamentary opposition and espouse the class war of communism.

The central ideas of his policies were "peace to the village huts, war against the palaces" and "rob the robbers." Lenin's speeches at first merely puzzled the Socialists. His opponents, after hearing him speak, declared: "A man who talks such nonsense is not dangerous. It is a good thing that he has arrived for now he is in full view." Lenin was very much in view. He worked in the open. With undaunted energy he began preaching his views and reorganizing the Communist party.

His attack against the "palaces" was forecast by the forcible seizure of a private house belonging to the dancer Kshesinskaya. Neither the Provisional Government nor the Petrograd Soviet succeeded in evicting him from the house which became the headquarters of the Bolshevik faction.⁸

The failure of the first Bolshevik uprising might have been a turning point in the history of the Russian revolution. It was the right moment to enforce the authority of the Government in Petrograd. But this opportunity was not seized by the Government. Some Bolshevik leaders, including Trotsky, were arrested; Lenin fled to Finland; but the Bolsheviks were not outlawed in the Soviet. The Government meanwhile was reorganized. Prince Lvov resigned; Kerensky became Prime Minister, and remained head of the War and Marine Ministries. The majority in the Cabinet was now Socialist.

7.

THE disorganization of the army and of the administration was accompanied by an economic crisis. Agricultural as well as industrial production declined, transportation became greatly disor-

⁸ Following the July uprising the house was recaptured by the Government.

ganized, and the finances of the Government rapidly grew worse. The agrarian situation was particularly confused. The Provisional Government hesitated to accomplish the redistribution of land before the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. Meanwhile the leaders of the Democratic and Socialist parties were promising the peasants that they would receive the land. Under such circumstances the peasants were unwilling to wait for the Constituent Assembly to divide the lands. In many places the lawless seizure of land commenced, accompanied by the destruction of the houses and even the murder of the owners.⁹

An effort was made by the Government to control the movement by organizing the Committee on Agrarian Reform and local committees composed of government officials and peasants. These committees, however, were helpless in their efforts to restrain the peasants from seizing the land. The Minister of the Interior, Tseretelli, a Socialist, in an official announcement of July 30, characterized the movement as follows: "Everywhere fields are being seized, peasants are making impossible demands upon landowners, live stock is being destroyed, property is being stolen, crops are perishing, forests are being chopped down, lumber and firewood in transit is being plundered. Private owners are leaving their fields unsown and are not reaping the harvest."

The agrarian crisis had an immediate effect upon the food supply. The supply of the troops and the cities during the war had required the careful attention of the Government. Insufficiency of food in the capital had served as the first pretext for the revolution. The Provisional Government attempted to solve the problem of food supply by instituting a grain monopoly on April 11, 1917. Every peasant household was rationed and the balance was to go to the Government at fixed prices. But the depreciation of the currency made the prices established far lower than the market value of the grain and the peasants refused to give up their grain. As a result of this measure and the disorganization of transportation, the proposed quotas of grain supply remained unfilled. The government purchases fell in July to 26 per cent and in August to 10 per cent of the needs of the army and the cities.

⁹ In many estates, which had supplied the Government with alcohol prior to prohibition in 1914, the cellars were broken into and the mob was driven to greater excesses by drink.

The condition of industry was no better. From the very first days of the revolution the workers put through their demands without consulting the management. The eight-hour day was introduced; managers were dismissed by the factory committees composed of workers. The result was the rapid breakdown of discipline and production. The output of the metallurgical industries of Moscow fell 32 per cent by April, 1917; in Petrograd production fell from 20 to 40 per cent; coal mining in the Donets basin had fallen 30 per cent by July. The workers in all branches of industry meanwhile demanded an increase in pay, without any regard to the income of the enterprises concerned.¹⁰

For example, in some of the enterprises of the Donets basin having a total profit during 1916 of 75,000,000 rubles, the workers demanded additions in pay totaling 200,000,000 rubles.

The decision had to be made whether industries would be run by the workers or by the state. The representatives of foreign shareholders in Russian industries seized upon the idea of "government control" as a protection against the excessive demands of labor. The idea of government control, as introduced in the Allied countries during the war, was supported by the delegate of British labor in Russia, Arthur Henderson, who arrived in Petrograd in May, 1917. The Russian Socialists took advantage of the support offered by Henderson to carry out their program of "social" control—that is, to introduce socialism and hand over the factories to the workers. This program was not in fact carried through under the Provisional Government, but in several instances control over factories passed into the hands of the workers, increasing the general confusion.

The railroads were likewise affected by the general disorganization. By an order of the Minister of Communications, of July 9, 1917, the administration of the Russian State Railways was handed over to the committees composed of railroad employees. An Executive Committee was created at the head of the committees of railroad workers, socialistic in temper and primarily interested in politics. The railroads soon showed the results of mismanagement. The number of locomotives out of repair increased. Car loading

¹⁰ The demand for increase in pay was caused partly by the depreciation of currency. But at the same time the increase of pay led to further issue of paper currency and to further depreciation.

decreased. During the first months of 1917, 980,000 fewer cars were loaded than for the same period of 1916.

The general collapse of economic life could not fail to react upon the condition of finances. As we have noted above, each year of war weighed down more heavily upon the state budget. The revolution did not decrease, but, on the contrary, increased the state expenses. The Provisional Government found itself compelled to subsidize industries which, due to the decrease in productivity and the rise in wages, failed to balance accounts. In the Donets basin the subsidy amounted to 1,000,000,000 rubles. The rise in pay to soldiers called for an additional 500,000,000 rubles; the increase in pay of railroad employees exceeded 350,000,000 rubles. Relief to soldiers' wives called for 11,000,000,000 rubles.¹¹

The rise of government expenditures was not accompanied by an increase in government income. The land taxes fell one-third in the first months of the revolution, city house taxes fell 43 per cent. The internal loans of the Provisional Government did not sell well. There remained the only one means of covering the deficit—by printing money. For the first half year of 1917, the issue of new paper currency totaled almost 4,000,000,000 rubles as against 3,500,000,000 for the whole of 1916.

The rate of exchange on Petrograd in London for cheques was (in rubles to £10) in July, 1917, 226.5 (lowest) and in September, 1917, 322.5 (lowest). The economic condition of Russia had become critical.

8.

IN the course of the first months of the revolution, the High Command of the army had passively submitted to all the measures of the Provisional Government. But after the collapse of the offensive of July, 1917, and following the appointment of General Kornilov as Commander-in-Chief, the attitude of the army changed. Army Headquarters became a political force. Kornilov accepted the post of the Commander-in-Chief only after laying down his conditions to the Government. These conditions were: (1) The new Commander-in-Chief would have full powers; (2) the Government would not interfere with the military orders of the Commander-in-

¹¹ This increase almost equals the whole of the national budget of 1915. From the beginning of the war to 1917 the relief to soldiers' families cost 2,000,000,000 rubles.

Chief; (3) military discipline would be restored. Kerensky accepted the conditions proposed by General Kornilov. In order to carry out his promise, it was clear that Kerensky would be forced to break with the Soviet. But even following the suppression of the Bolshevik revolt of July, he was unwilling to do so. The political situation became extremely confused. Prior to the Bolshevik uprising there were two powers in Russia: The Provisional Government and the Soviet. The main strength of the Provisional Government consisted in the loyal support of the army Command. The Soviet's active strength was in its left wing, the Communist party. Now both extreme groups broke away from the moderate forces. The Bolsheviks, while continuing to act in the name of the Soviets, carried out their own policies. The failure of their first uprising did not abate their energy. The army Command likewise prepared to act for itself.

In the past, during the political rivalry between the Provisional Government and the Soviets, it was possible to choose between the tactics of the Moderate Democrats and the Socialists, between Miliukov and Kerensky. But the situation had undergone a radical change. The opposing forces now were Lenin on the one hand and Kornilov on the other—communism versus military dictatorship. The country had to make a choice between the two.

In spite of his growing popularity, General Kornilov was not in a position to rely exclusively upon himself. He had to cloak his moves behind the authority of the Provisional Government, just as the Bolsheviks cloaked theirs behind the authority of the Soviets. Kornilov's plan of reinstating discipline in the army was based upon the coöperation of the Provisional Government. If he had had to deal with the first Provisional Government, headed by Prince Lvov, it is quite likely that his plan of subjecting the Government to his will would have succeeded. But unluckily for him, the head of the Government was no longer Prince Lvov, but Kerensky, who was not sufficiently strong to retain power for himself, but who had enough political cunning to prevent anyone else from taking it from him so long as the Provisional Government continued to exist.¹²

¹² In this respect the conflict between Kerensky and the High Command is reminiscent of the conflict between Nicholas II and the Duma. Nicholas II also was too weak to rule, but strong enough to prevent others from replacing him.

A rift soon opened between army Headquarters and the Government. While Kerensky was eager to end the interference of the Soviet and to allow Kornilov to restore discipline in the army, he feared the complete annihilation of the Soviet, which might lead to his own defeat by Kornilov and his supporters in the army. His fears were justified. The plan of Kornilov was to get rid of the Soviet by means of military force. He tried to win the coöperation of the Provisional Government for this purpose. But if the Government should be afraid at the last moment, Kornilov was ready to get rid both of the Provisional Government and of the Soviet.

On August 27 there was a "National Political Conference" in Moscow. Representatives of the main corporations of the country were summoned. Kornilov attended the Conference. He was applauded with enthusiasm by the conservative members. The socialistic half of the Conference accorded an ovation to Kerensky. Thus, the split was prepared. Both Kornilov and Kerensky foresaw that the announcement of the measures to secure discipline in the army might lead to a revolt of the Bolsheviks in Petrograd. To take care of the emergency, Kornilov, in agreement with the Provisional Government, moved the Third Cavalry Corps toward the capital. At the very moment when a solution seemed possible, a tragic misunderstanding occurred between Kornilov and Kerensky. It was brought about by a former member of the Duma, V. N. Lvov, who visited Headquarters in September.¹⁸ He attempted to play the part of an intermediary between the two men, representing to each that he was empowered by the other with full authority to negotiate. From a conversation with Lvov, Kornilov received the impression that Kerensky was prepared to hand over to him, Kornilov, dictatorial power in Russia, while Kerensky himself would be satisfied with a post in the new government. Kornilov approved of this proposal which Lvov advanced in the form of an offer from Kerensky. On his return to Petrograd, Lvov presented the plan as an ultimatum of Kornilov to Kerensky. On September 8 Kerensky called Kornilov by direct wire and asked him to confirm the report that he had actually charged Lvov to convey information of his plans and purposes. Kornilov replied affirmatively, but omitted to ask Kerensky what it was that Lvov had said to him.

On September 9 a telegram from Kerensky informed General

¹⁸ Not to be confused with the former Prime Minister, Prince G. E. Lvov.

Kornilov that he was dismissed from his post and ordered him to proceed immediately to Petrograd. It was an unexpected blow to Kornilov. It was also a violation of the first condition which Kornilov had required when he was appointed the Commander-in-Chief. He decided that it was the right moment to act. On September 10 Kornilov issued a proclamation by telegraph to all Russian citizens refusing to give up the post of Commander-in-Chief and asking for support against the Provisional Government. At the same moment he ordered General Krymov to move the Third Cavalry Corps against Petrograd.

Kerensky, meanwhile, joined forces with the Left groups of the Petrograd Soviet and ordered the Petrograd garrison to prepare itself to fight General Krymov. All the socialist organizations in Russia hastened to the support of Kerensky. A particularly important part was played by the Executive Committee of the railroad workers who had control over transportation. A battle between the two groups however was averted.

The official aim of General Krymov's mission was the suppression of the Bolshevik uprising which was expected to take place in Petrograd following the Government's approval of Kornilov's program. Kornilov's program was neither approved nor published and no such revolt took place. Krymov's troops were disconcerted and eager to hear the propaganda of their opponents. Simultaneously, the railroad workers refused to obey Kornilov's orders to transport reinforcements to Krymov. The latter feared to give the deciding order to open an offensive against the capital and accepted Kerensky's offer to report himself in Petrograd. The day following his arrival he committed suicide.

After the failure of General Krymov's mission, Kornilov and his assistants, Generals Denikin, Lukomsky, and Markov were arrested by order of the Provisional Government.

CHAPTER XV.

THE FORMATION OF THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT

(1917-1918)

I.

THE Russian revolution entered into a new phase with the collapse of the Kornilov movement. Apparently, Kerensky had triumphed over both his opponents: Kornilov was under arrest, Lenin was outside of Russia. This, however, was an illusory victory. Kerensky was no longer the real power, but a political ghost no longer able to control the political and economic anarchy which was rapidly overrunning the country. The defeat of the Military party reacted immediately against the Provisional Government. The dominating force now was not the alliance of the Government and the army, but the alliance of the Soviet and the Bolsheviks.

Kerensky's triumph over Kornilov led to the final collapse of the Government's prestige in the eyes of many of its most ardent supporters. Among the officers and in middle-class circles, the conviction grew that his *régime* was no better than that of the Soviet of Workers and Peasants and that Kerensky was no more desirable than Lenin. It was even noted that many reactionary groups desired the victory of the Soviets. No one believed at this time that such a victory would be durable and that the Bolsheviks could rule for any length of time. The initiative passed definitely out of the hands of the Provisional Government to the extreme radical factions of the Socialist party. Kerensky was forced to make concessions to these groups for their support against Kornilov. The Bolshevik leaders arrested following the July rising were soon released. Among them was Trotsky.¹

The Government did not make any serious plans for the future.

¹ Lenin, however, did not dare to return from Finland openly, but he secretly attended a number of Bolshevik meetings in Petrograd.

All it hoped for was to hold power until the Constituent Assembly met. The elections to the Constituent Assembly were to take place on November 25, and it was to be opened on December 12, 1917. As these dates approached, the Bolsheviks hastened to summon the second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The Congress was to meet on November 7, and the Bolshevik party planned to carry out its *coup d'état* immediately following the official opening and secure the approval of the Congress to the constitution of the new government.

In expectation of a decisive struggle for power the Bolsheviks extended their organization and their propaganda, so that they succeeded very soon in obtaining a following among the majority of the workmen of Petrograd and Moscow. The city elections showed their growing power. In Moscow the Bolsheviks had controlled only 11 per cent on the elections of the city Council in July; by September they controlled 51 per cent of the votes on the Council. A similar growth was witnessed in Petrograd. The results of the city elections indicated that the laboring classes had lost confidence in the Provisional Government and in the Moderate Socialist parties. The Communist party, with its strong organization and its simple program, appealed to the workers as the only political group capable of leading Russia out of the chaotic condition which prevailed. The same feelings found expression among the soldiers at the front.

Following the collapse of the Kornilov movement the conditions which prevailed at the front were neither those of war nor those of peace. The Bolsheviks, meanwhile, urged that a peace be signed and thus promised the end of the crisis. It became clearer, as time went on, that following the collapse of Kornilov they represented the only powerful group in Russia.

The Bolsheviks succeeded in entering into close relations, not only with the army Soviets, but also with the High Command of the northern armies. This was made possible by the measures of Kerensky, who had replaced all the partisans of Kornilov at Headquarters with generals of socialistic tendencies. The new Commander of the northern army, General Cheremisov, entered into relations with the Soviet and the Bolsheviks of Pskov, where his staff was situated.

The determining factor in the growth of Bolshevik power was

their victory in the Petrograd Soviet, where in October Trotsky was elected president. They also succeeded in getting control over the Military Committee of the Soviet, which by October, 1917, became in fact the instrument of their partisan policy. Most of the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison submitted to their authority. The Bolsheviks were now ready for the final blow.

2.

On the evening of November 4, the Military Committee of the Soviet, acting under Bolshevik influence, issued its first order to the Petrograd garrison. By this order the troops located in the capital were to transfer their allegiance to the Military Committee, that is, to the Bolsheviks. It was an act of open rebellion against the Kerensky Government. However, both Kerensky and the leaders of the Moderate parties, with quite incomprehensible blindness, continued their debates without taking practical measures of self-defense.

During the night of November 7, the principal government buildings in Petrograd were occupied by Bolshevik troops. Posters published on the morning of November 7 announced the following as the program of the Bolshevik party: (1) Immediate opening of peace negotiations; (2) partition of large estates; (3) control of all factories by the workers; (4) creation of a Soviet government.

Kerensky at last realized the danger and fled from Petrograd to rally troops against the Bolsheviks. He left the Government under the temporary leadership of one of his fellow Ministers. The Petrograd garrison having joined the Bolsheviks, the Government had no real military forces with which to defend itself. When the Bolsheviks attacked the Winter Palace, where the Cabinet was in session, only a few military cadets and a battalion of women attempted resistance. They were easily crushed and members of the Cabinet were arrested. The Government fell into the hands of Lenin.

The second Congress of Soviets opened immediately following the fall of the Provisional Government. Members of the Socialist revolutionary and Menshevik factions in the Congress protested against the Bolshevik rising, but did not succeed in preventing the meeting of the Congress. On the night of November 8 it approved the program advanced by the Bolshevik party.

A Cabinet was formed under the title of the Council of People's Commissars under the presidency of Lenin. Trotsky was appointed Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Rykov Commissar of Internal Affairs, Stalin Commissar of Nationalities, and Lunacharsky Commissar of Education.

The first acts of the Council were the unanimous adoption of the "Decree of Peace" and the "Decree of Land." The first decree proposed that all warring peoples and their governments begin immediate negotiations for a just and democratic peace, without annexations and indemnities. Although the "Decree of Peace" was addressed to all belligerent nations, it was evident that the former allies of Russia would pay no attention to it. It merely signified the impending cessation of hostilities on the Russian front, which the Bolsheviks desired.

The "Decree of Land" abolished private ownership of the soil, which henceforth would be shared equally by all agricultural laborers. So in the one night of November 8, the Bolsheviks succeeded, not only in organizing the Government, but in proclaiming new policies on the most important questions of the day.

Meanwhile, Kerensky reached Pskov, the seat of army Headquarters. The Commander of the northern front, General Cheremissoff, who was in contact with the local Soviets, refused him any aid in regaining power. Kerensky found everyone against him. General Krasnov, who commanded the Third Cavalry Corps, was a stubborn monarchist, and disagreed with the policies which Kerensky represented. His troops, moreover, were scattered over a large area and could not be effectively organized for an immediate attack. To make matters worse, the Council of Railroad Workers, which controlled communications with the capital, refused to aid Kerensky. However, Krasnov moved a small detachment of his troops against the Bolsheviks and reached Tsarskoe Selo, about fifteen miles from Petrograd. There they met the stronger forces of sailors, and some detachments of armed workers sent from Petrograd. Krasnov's contingents received no reinforcements and no decisive engagement took place. Instead, Dybenko, one of the Bolshevik military leaders, proposed to the Cossacks led by Krasnov that he would deliver Lenin to them in return for Kerensky.

On November 12 a small uprising was attempted in the capital. The cadets were the only anti-Bolshevik military force which par-

ticipated. After some street fighting they were disarmed and killed. Meanwhile, Kerensky was warned that Krasnov's troops wanted to deliver him to the Bolsheviks. Fearing execution, Kerensky fled and took no more part in the struggle which now commenced between the Bolsheviks and their opponents.

The disappearance of Kerensky left the partisans of the Provisional Government without a leader. There was no organization, either in the army or in the country at large, to oppose the Bolsheviks. The initiative of the High Command had been previously crushed by Kerensky. The soldiers now openly supported the Soviet; even the officers distrusted and hated Kerensky. In the country at large, the workers accepted Bolshevism. The *bourgeoisie* and the intellectuals opposed it, but were not organized.

The military garrisons in various cities were commanded by new men appointed by Kerensky following the Kornilov movement in August. They had been selected only for their political views which were in sympathy with the Provisional Government, and were distrusted by the majority of officers under their command. The soldiers who comprised the garrisons were quite indifferent to the political issues of the day or had been already converted by the Bolsheviks.

The only serious opposition which the Bolsheviks met in the early stages of their *coup d'état* was in Moscow. A few thousands of military cadets and volunteers, mostly students of the university, tried to stem the Bolshevik rising. After a week of bloody street fighting, the Bolsheviks succeeded in crushing their opponents. With the seizure of power in Petrograd and Moscow and in a large part of the army, the Bolsheviks became a strong force. The real opposition could now be expected only in the Cossack areas of southeastern Russia. In the center of the country they were supreme. In the course of a single week the Bolsheviks gained power. There followed a long period during which the new Government secured for itself actual control over the whole of Russia.

3.

THE Soviet Government was faced with the problems of terminating the war, suppressing the rapidly growing movement of counter-revolution in southern Russia, and the solution of an economic crisis. It had first of all to bend the vast governmental machinery

inherited from Kerensky to its will. So long as the Bolsheviks were the opposition, it had been easy for them to criticize the policies of the Government and to make attractive promises to the people. Now they had to carry out their promises.

In March, 1917, following the first revolution, the functionaries of the central state offices, as well as local authorities all over Russia, accepted the leadership of the new Government. Following the Bolshevik revolution, however, the new Government met with resistance from the regular government employees. In Petrograd the government agents struck against the Government. The reason for the opposition was that only a few among the educated classes accepted the Bolshevik *coup d'état*. Unlike the soldiers and the workmen, the intellectuals and the middle classes regarded it with distrust. In the eyes of many people, the Bolsheviks were simply agents of the Central Powers who were betraying Russia and the Allied cause, which still dominated the feelings of the *bourgeois* class in Russia. Moreover, no one believed in the permanence of the Bolshevik Government. It seemed as though it would be incapable of lasting more than two or three weeks.

In Petrograd it was hoped that Moscow would not fall to the Bolsheviks. In Moscow, meanwhile, it was hoped that the army Headquarters or the Don Cossacks would show strong opposition. The strike of government employees was an expression of these hopes. The employees of the State Bank refused to obey the commands of the new Government, and the Bolsheviks, having no experience in bureaucratic matters, were almost helpless. But the expected uprising to overthrow the Government did not occur and the Soviet Government rapidly extended its power. The Council of People's Commissars gradually mastered the situation. Some of the former government employees were dismissed, others entered into the service of the new Government. New men from the Communist party took over the important posts. Within a few weeks the Bolsheviks had mastered the governmental machinery in Moscow and Petrograd.

The Bolsheviks extended their authority from Moscow and Petrograd to the provinces for the greater part without exercising force. The fact that the Soviet Government was a dictatorship of the Communist party was evident only in the capitals. The Bolshevik revolution officially consisted merely in the transfer of power

from the Provisional Government to the Soviets. In the provinces the local Soviets merely deposed the Commissars of the Provisional Government. The authority of the Soviets extended only to the towns. The village communities, which even under the Provisional Government had shown opposition, were now entirely independent of the Government and were ruled by the traditional village assembly. Thus, local government varied with each province. The dependence of local Soviets upon the Soviet Government was purely nominal until the Bolsheviks gained control in each Soviet. This was accomplished by dispatching agitators and armed supporters to the provinces.

The chief measure used by the Government to suppress disorder was the institution of the political police. By order of Lenin on December 7, 1917, the Extraordinary Commission for the Suppression of Counter-Revolution (*Cheka*) came into existence. Its first head was Felix Dzerzhinsky. The "Red Terror" was proclaimed against all the enemies of the Soviet state. The "Red Terror" became most active in the autumn of 1918 following the attempts against Bolshevik leaders, the manifestations of counter-revolution in the South, and the intervention of the Allies in Russia. But during the winter of 1917-18 the "Red Terror" was already active and had claimed a considerable number of victims. The Bolshevik atrocities were not accidental abuses of authority. The "Red Terror" was an integral element of the Bolshevik Government.²

"No dictatorship of the proletariat is to be thought of without terror and violence," declared Lenin. Officially, the Cheka was directed against the *bourgeoisie* only. "We are not waging war against separate individuals; we are exterminating the *bourgeoisie* as a class," declared Latsis, one of the leaders of the "Red Terror." As a matter of fact, the Cheka exterminated without discrimination all those who were suspected of opposing the Bolshevik Government. This included members of the higher classes, as well as peasants and workmen. One of the methods favored by the Cheka was the taking of hostages among non-communist groups of the

² This is the principal difference between "Red Terror" and the "White Terror" of the counter-revolution. The "White Terror" was an abuse of power by single individuals and agents of the counter-revolutionary forces. It was never proclaimed or exercised by the White governments themselves. Further, the number of victims of the "White Terror" was far smaller than that of the "Red Terror."

population. These hostages, who were frequently persons who had done nothing to oppose the Government, were shot from time to time, particularly following the attempted assassination of communist leaders. Torture was at times resorted to by the Cheka to obtain information and confession.³

Besides the executions ordered by the Cheka, many were shot by order of individual Bolshevik groups in the provinces. Such was the case of the collective execution of officers in Sevastopol in the spring of 1918.

Besides the political police, the Government had the support of the "Red Army," or "Workers and Peasants' Army," which was organized in the beginning of 1918 and was composed of soldiers of the former army and young workmen. This "Red Army" consisted at the beginning of hired troops, who received good pay, special food rations, and were offered opportunities of legalized plunder. The discipline of this body was imperfect and it was an effective force only against the unarmed population. This army had to replace the old imperial army, which was completely disorganized after the opening of peace negotiations and was finally demobilized following the Brest-Litovsk peace.

During the winter of 1917-18 the Bolsheviks succeeded in subjecting entirely the governmental machinery of the country to their control. The solution of the economic difficulties facing the country was a more serious problem. They not only remained unsolved, but actually grew greater as time went on. The value of the ruble diminished; prices rose to higher levels than ever before; the condition of the railways grew worse; industrial production reflected the impracticability of workers' control. The only problem partly solved by the Bolsheviks was that of supplying the cities with food, particularly in feeding members of the Communist party, employees of Soviet institutions and workmen. This was accomplished by requisitioning all the food available in the cities and all foodstuffs brought from the country, and distributing it by means of ration cards to certain categories of the inhabitants.

³ It is impossible to estimate the number of executions performed by the central Cheka and all its local agents. During 1918-19 the number of "regular" death sentences must be numbered in the tens of thousands (about seventy thousand). There were also executions which were never recorded or expressly ordered. The commission of General Denikin, in investigating the activity of the Cheka in southern Russia, estimated the numbers executed at 1,700,000 persons in south Russia alone.

Members of Communist party and workers formed the best-fed category; government employees, the medium category; the unemployed as well as craftsmen, the third category. All others were proclaimed "unproductive elements" and were not objects of government care. The average ration was about half a pound of bread a day. It was impossible to purchase any food in excess of the ration by legal means. To be deprived of a ration card meant almost certain death by starvation. This circumstance placed great power over the city population in the hands of the Bolsheviks, who controlled the distribution of food. Its distribution, however, was only one side of the problem. Food had to be obtained in the villages. The peasants had already refused to coöperate with the Government during Kerensky's *régime*, owing to the inability of the Government to supply manufactured goods or pay in stable currency. The Bolshevik Government was even less capable of satisfying the demands of the peasantry.

The decree of November 8, nationalizing the estates as a measure for appeasing the dissatisfied peasantry, was important mainly on paper, the considerable part of the landowners' estates having already been partitioned by the peasants before November, 1917. Meanwhile, grain had to be obtained to feed the cities. The Government did not hesitate to take the grain away from the peasants by force. Special "food battalions," composed of Red Guards and Cheka employees, were organized and sent into the villages. The peasants tried to hide their grain or even to destroy it, but a quantity of grain was secured and sent to the cities.

It was natural that these measures evoked serious opposition among the peasants against the Government. This feeling led to the growth of armed opposition to the Bolsheviks in regions where the Government was weak, that is, principally in localities more remote from the center of power.

4.

ON November 20, 1917, the Bolshevik Government ordered army Headquarters to propose to the enemy a cessation of hostilities. The ~~Commander-in-Chief, General Dukhonin~~, replied that this was the task of the Government and not of the army. The next day he was dismissed and a new Commander-in-Chief, Ensign Krylenko, was appointed in his place. On November 22 Trotsky ad-

dress a note to the Allied Ambassadors in Petrograd proposing "an immediate armistice on all fronts and the immediate opening of peace negotiations." A similar note was addressed to the diplomatic representatives of the neutral nations in Petrograd.

The military agents of the Allied Powers in Russia protested against the idea of a separate peace with Germany. It seems, however, that they did not realize the seriousness of the situation. Some Allied representatives seemed to give credence to the Bolshevik proposal of a general democratic peace and did not believe that they were quite ready for a separate peace with Germany. On December 1 General Judson, Chief of the American Military Mission, paid a visit to Trotsky and declared "that the time of protests and threats addressed to the Soviet Government had passed, if that time had ever existed."

The elections of November 25 to the Constituent Assembly, called by previous decree of the Provisional Government which had not been canceled by the Soviet Government, showed that the Bolsheviks were in a decided minority. Out of 703 deputies, they controlled only 168 votes, the majority of the deputies being members of the Socialist Revolutionary party. It is probable that the results of the elections, showing the unstable position of the Bolsheviks, compelled the Germans to hasten peace negotiations. The negotiations for an armistice between the Central Powers and Soviet Russia began December 3. ✓

Meanwhile, the army as an effective organization had ceased to exist. The former Commander-in-Chief, General Dukhonin, had been killed, and the Bolshevik emissary, Krylenko, was in complete control at Headquarters. The final disintegration of the army took place. The millions of soldiers under arms in western Russia and on the Caucasian front abandoned their posts and started back to their native villages.

5.

Just at this moment, in December, 1917, an armed opposition to the Bolsheviks was in preparation in south Russia. This opposition consisted of two principal forces: Cossacks of the Don and Kuban areas and a body of officers of the old army. ✓

The Cossacks, as we have seen, represented traditionally a separate group in the Russian Empire. Wealthier than average Rus-

sian peasants and enjoying more real self-government, they were not at all inclined to submit to communist rule.

This made inevitable the armed struggle against the Bolsheviks. However, only the minority of the Cossacks understood the inevitability of the struggle. The majority hoped at the beginning that the Bolsheviks would not dare risk an offensive, and for this reason did not care themselves to mobilize for the imminent struggle.

Moreover, the position of the Cossacks in the Don and Kuban areas was weakened through the presence of a large number of peasants who did not possess the Cossack privileges. In addition to the peasants, who formed 48 per cent of the whole population, the industrial areas of the Don had attracted a great number of workmen and miners, who constituted an additional 11 per cent of the population and were for the most part in sympathy with the Bolsheviks.

These circumstances compelled the Cossack leaders to act secretly in preparing for the struggle. The Don Cossack leaders were afraid particularly that the officers' movement would provoke a Bolshevik offensive against the Don. The natural leaders of the officers' organization were the former commanders-in-chief of the Russian army, Generals Alexeiev and Kornilov. Alexeiev left Petrograd for the Don immediately after the Bolshevik uprising. Kaledin, the Ataman of Don Cossacks, was Alexeiev's personal friend and permitted him to organize a volunteer army, provided he kept the organization secret. Kornilov had been imprisoned by Kerensky after his rebellious movement of September, 1917. Within a few weeks after the Bolshevik uprising, Kornilov escaped and joined Alexeiev in the Don area. Simultaneously with the officers' organization in the Don, but independent of it, another officers' division was being organized on the Rumanian front of the Russian army. Besides the political considerations that moved them against the Bolsheviks, the officers had professional reasons for their opposition—the aspiration of rebuilding the Russian army and continuing the struggle against Germany in order to restore the national honor of Russia in the eyes of the Allies, who had been betrayed by the Soviet Government.

The Volunteer Army did not grow rapidly. About seventy-five volunteers enlisted daily, most of them officers, cadets, students, and high-school boys. The army had no guns, rifles, or ammuni-

tion. The funds it received had to come by secret channels from private donations of the inhabitants of Moscow and other cities. In all, about five million depreciated rubles were received by General Alexeiev in the course of the winter of 1917-18. The Supreme Command of the anti-Bolshevik movement was delegated to a triumvirate composed of Alexeiev, principal promoter of the movement, Kornilov, commander-in-chief of military operations, and Kaledin, Ataman of the Don Cossacks. It was only in the beginning of 1918 that the Volunteer Army was prepared to open a campaign against the Bolsheviks.

6.

WHILE the peace negotiations with the Central Powers were going on, the Constituent Assembly met in Petrograd on January 18, 1918. The Assembly had been postponed by the Bolsheviks in an effort to influence the delegates to support the Soviet Government. The Socialist Revolutionaries, being in the majority, were in a position to create difficulties for the Government. The first step on the part of the Bolsheviks to exclude opposition was to arrest all non-socialist deputies, two of whom, being ill, were brutally murdered in a hospital. The remaining non-Bolshevik deputies refused to acknowledge the Council of People's Commissars as the legal government of Russia. The Bolshevik delegates withdrew from the conference. Demonstrations against the Government took place in the streets, but were suppressed. At 1.30 o'clock in the morning of January 20, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet issued a decree disbanding the Assembly. The deputies were ejected from their place of meeting and the next morning a Bolshevik military force guarding it refused to allow any further sessions.

7.

THE disbanding of the Constituent Assembly strengthened the position of the Germans in their negotiations with the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk. They demanded that Russia accept the independence of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia. A delegation from the Ukraine also demanded the right of self-determination. The proposals were more than the Bolsheviks were ready to accept. On January 23 they protested by proclamation against the German peace conditions. In seizing power in Russia, they had

acted as agents of the Central Powers. Now the Bolsheviks tried to free themselves from their masters, but it was too late. Russia, with her army disbanded, was now helpless before the military power of Germany.

To complete the annihilation of Russia as a military power the Germans encouraged the Ukrainian movement for self-determination. On January 28, 1918, the Ukraine proclaimed itself an independent republic; actually, it was controlled from the start by representatives of the Central Powers. Strangely enough, France and Great Britain both recognized the independence of the Ukrainian Republic. Its existence was, however, very short. On February 8 the capital, Kiev, was occupied by Bolshevik troops.

The peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk meanwhile reached a deadlock. Trotsky, who was negotiating for the Soviet Government, refused to accept the German conditions but authorized a proclamation on February 10 that the war with Germany was at an end and the Russian army was demobilized. This sign of despair, curiously enough, created apprehension in Germany.⁴ German troops were ordered to advance into Russia, and occupied Kiev. Austrian troops reached the Black Sea at Odessa. Meanwhile the Soviet Government abandoned its resistance to the peace terms and signed the Brest-Litovsk peace on March 3.

The peace conditions were disastrous to Russia. The Ukraine, Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Esthonia, and Latvia received their independence. Part of Transcaucasia was ceded to Turkey. Russia lost 26 per cent of her total population; 27 per cent of her arable land; 32 per cent of her average crops; 26 per cent of her railway system; 33 per cent of her manufacturing industries; 73 per cent of her iron industries; 75 per cent of her coal fields. Besides that, Russia had to pay a large war indemnity.

⁴ General Ludendorff suggests in his *Memoirs* that Trotsky at this time was acting as an instrument of the *Entente*.

CHAPTER XVI.
THE CIVIL WAR
(1918-1920)

I.

THE peace of Brest-Litovsk, which terminated Russia's participation in the war, enabled the Bolsheviks to undertake the suppression of the counter-revolutionary forces in the south of Russia and to suppress the opposition in the rural districts.

The policy pursued by the Bolsheviks in the collection of food-stuffs brought about widespread discontent among the peasantry. A general uprising against the Government was avoided only in view of the lack of unity of the peasant masses, following the redistribution of lands seized from the landowners. In the summer of 1917 the anarchical seizure of lands had commenced. Those estates which escaped division and pillage before the Bolshevik revolution were taken by the peasantry immediately following the collapse of the Provisional Government. By the spring of 1918 almost all the land had been redistributed by the peasants. No distinction was made between land previously owned by the village Commune, the lands seized from landowners, and lands belonging to peasant farmers who had acquired private holdings following the reforms of Stolypin.¹

The whole land area within each county (*uyezd*) was thus redistributed on a purely numerical basis, former landowners frequently getting their per capita share with the rest. Since counties differed greatly in size and the amount of new land to be distributed varied with the number and size of estates within the county, the allotments received by the peasants differed greatly as between counties. This distribution of lands was carried through by the peasants themselves; only in rare cases did the Government take any part in the process. The measures of 1918 destroyed individual land-

¹ See Chap. XI, Sec. 3. There were over six million such farmers by 1917.

ownership, vesting it in the community. This solidified the interests of the village.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Government had every reason to fear peasant opposition to the policy of seizing necessary grain reserves for the use of the army and the city proletariat. A means was found whereby the peasants in the villages could be divided into groups and set against each other, thus neutralizing the political influence of the whole of the Russian peasantry. The means used was the creation of "Committees of the Poor." The population of each village was divided into two groups, one composed of richer peasants (*kulaki*, rich peasants, and *seredniaki*, or middle peasants), and the other of poor peasants (*bedniaki*, who possessed no cattle or stores of grain). The Bolsheviks delegated authority in village affairs to the poor peasants, who were to form committees and see that the richer peasants did not hide grain from government collectors. They were empowered to seize any surplus grain or cattle discovered. These measures in fact carried the "class warfare" of communism to the village. The slogan of "rob the robbers," which had justified the first seizures of land from the large landowners, was now turned against the peasantry owning but a few acres and two or three head of cattle.

The activity of the Committees of the Poor brought about serious disorganization in agriculture. The richer peasants sold or hid their grain and slaughtered their cattle rather than have it seized by the poorer ones. The revolutionary struggle brought into the very center of the village community completely absorbed the powers of the peasantry as a whole, leaving the hands of the Bolsheviks free to carry out their other plans. The Committees of the Poor were the chief support of the Bolsheviks in the villages.

2.

By the middle of 1918 the Bolsheviks had extended their power, not only to the towns, but to the rural districts of Russia. Meanwhile the extent of Russian territory subject to the power of the Bolsheviks was limited by the outbreak of counter-revolutionary movements in the south, the southeast, and the east of Russia.²

In order to regain these regions, the Bolsheviks needed to reorganize their Red Army, which was not yet an effective fighting

² See below, Secs. 3 and 4.

force. In June, 1918, the Soviet Government set about the reorganization upon a basis of compulsory conscription. Trotsky was appointed Chief of the Military Revolutionary Committee—the War Office. Generals of the old Russian army and officers of the former general staff were given charge of the new organization of the Red Army, which followed the pattern of the Imperial Russian Army. The Soldiers' Committees, formed in 1917, were abolished and "communitistic cells," composed of members of the Communist party were substituted in their place, with authority to maintain strict discipline. The greater part of the officers of the Red Army were line officers of the old army. Some communist officers were promoted from the ranks by the Communist party.

The fear of the Cheka, the lack of other means of support, and the habit of professional military service were perhaps the main reasons impelling the old army officers to serve in the Red Army. Upon enlisting, many officers were afraid of reprisal by the anti-Bolshevik forces in case of capture and this was a strong incentive to serve the Red Army in good faith.³ On the other hand, treason to the Soviet Government entailed retaliation against members of the officer's family who were held by the Cheka as hostages for his loyalty.

The High Command of the Red Army during the civil war was composed mostly of trained officers of the imperial army, among them the best Soviet strategist, Colonel S. S. Kamenev, formerly of the Imperial General Staff.⁴ But there rose also some new chiefs, among whom Lieutenant Tukhachevsky and Sergeant Budenny are the best known. The conscription of 1918 succeeded in raising only half of the numbers called. By November, 1918, the Soviet Government had an army of about four hundred thousand men.

The second phase of the evolution of the Soviet Government was a direct result of the military conquest of Russia during 1918 to 1920. The civil war transformed the Red Army into a powerful organization and the Soviet Government into a strong centralized government. The efforts of the anti-Bolsheviks thus produced a result quite contrary to their intentions. They directly provoked the formation of a strong military power in Russia subject to the will of the Soviet Government.

³ There were many cases of captive Red officers being shot by anti-Bolsheviks.

⁴ Not to be confused with L. B. Kamenev (Rosenfeld), prominent communist leader, subsequently a leading member of the Opposition.

3.

DURING the first months of 1918, at the same time as the negotiations with the Central Powers were being carried on at Brest-Litovsk, the Bolsheviks attempted to crush the opposition in the south of Russia. The Don and Kuban areas were occupied by troops returning from the western front and from the Turkish front in the Caucasus. The chieftain of the Don Cossacks, Ataman Kaledin, discovering the complete demoralization of the Cossacks, shot himself on February 11, 1918.

The only organized opposition to the Bolsheviks that existed at this time was the newly formed Volunteer Army, composed of no more than four thousand men, poorly armed and equipped, and possessing very little money. The Volunteer Army, though led by brilliant chiefs, the best generals of the old Russian army, and composed almost exclusively of officers, military cadets, and university students, was too small to oppose the Bolshevik forces on the Don. On February 22 the Volunteer Army, under the leadership of Kornilov, invaded the Kuban district, in order to support the isolated Cossack forces which had risen in opposition to the Bolsheviks. After heavy fighting against immeasurably superior Bolshevik forces, Kornilov succeeded in joining the small Kuban army on March 27, 1918. After the fusion with the Kuban army, General Kornilov decided to attack Ekaterinodar, the center of the Bolshevik forces in the Kuban region. The first assault failed. The day before the second, General Kornilov was killed and General Denikin became Commander-in-Chief. The Volunteer Army retreated from Ekaterinodar and proceeded to the Don area where the Bolshevik *régime* had become very unpopular. The army was now larger than at the beginning of the campaign, in spite of heavy losses. It numbered five thousand fighters, besides more than fifteen hundred wounded.

In the middle of April, the Don Cossacks rose against the Bolsheviks and drove them out of Novochoerkask. The city was taken and retaken several times and finally secured by the Cossacks, thanks to the timely arrival of a division of volunteers from the Rumanian front⁵ which appeared at Novochoerkask at the critical moment of the struggle, after a difficult campaign through the

⁵ See above, Chap. XV, Sec. 5.

whole of southern Russia. A Cossack assembly, called on May 11, elected General Krasnov Ataman of the Don Cossacks.

Meanwhile, the German troops, in spite of the Brest-Litovsk peace, were advancing toward the Don, evidently intending to penetrate into the northern Caucasus. The city of Rostov was occupied on May 8. Ataman Krasnov entered into negotiations with the Germans, who expressed a willingness to support him with arms and ammunitions in his struggle against the Bolsheviks, in view of their desire to engage in economic exploitation of south Russia. It is important to notice that at the same time the Germans were expressing their friendship toward the Soviet Government through their first Ambassador, Count Mirbach, in Moscow. The German forces of occupation concluded an economic treaty with the Ukrainian Government on April 23, securing for Germany the right to the exploitation of the rich economic resources of southern Russia. They reestablished the landowners on their estates in this area and soon overthrew the half-socialistic Ukrainian Government. General Skoropadsky was proclaimed head of a government which was in fact controlled by Germany.

4.

DURING the summer of 1918, the Don and Kuban regions were cleared of Bolsheviks. The Don was cleared by the Don Cossacks under the leadership of General Krasnov, the Kuban by the efforts of the Volunteer Army, which now numbered ten thousand men, and the Kuban Cossacks. But a still more serious menace to the Soviet Government was growing in the east of Russia beyond the Volga. Armed opposition to the Bolsheviks in eastern Russia was first started by the Czechoslovak forces. Former Austrian war prisoners of Czechoslovak nationality had been organized for active service prior to the Russian revolution and had taken part in the Kerensky offensive against the Central Powers in the summer of 1917. Following Russia's withdrawal from the war, these Czechoslovak troops, numbering forty thousand, requested that they be transferred to the western front to continue the struggle against the Central Powers. To accomplish this they were transported across Siberia. In May, 1918, the first sections of the Czechoslovak troops reached Vladivostok, while the last had not yet crossed the Volga. Apparently under the influence of the German Ambassador

in Moscow, Count Mirbach, the Soviet Government ordered the Czechoslovaks to disarm. They agreed, but when a new order came from Moscow that they were to be interned as war prisoners, they rose against the Bolsheviks. In the beginning of June, 1918, the Czechoslovaks took possession of all the principal cities between Samara and Vladivostok. The Czechoslovak stroke was followed by a political revolution against the Bolsheviks all through eastern Russia and Siberia.

The plot to overthrow the Bolshevik Government in Siberia was organized by secret associations of ex-officers and by the Socialist Revolutionary party which had been excluded from power by the Soviet Government. These two forces acted in close coöperation. The ground was prepared for an uprising by the activity of the Soviet Government in confiscating grain from the peasantry and the widespread discontent with Soviet policies among the Ural Cossacks. The majority of the employees of the powerful peasant coöperatives were Socialist Revolutionaries. They entered into close relations with the leaders of the Czechs, who were themselves for the most part Socialists. In Samara a government was formed under the leadership of V. A. Chernov, formerly president of the Constituent Assembly of 1918, and composed of thirty-four socialist members of the Assembly. This government was weak. It attempted to organize a "People's Army" which had all the defects of the Kerensky army. The peasants did not trust the government since the agrarian program of the Socialists was scarcely distinguishable from the program advocated by the Bolsheviks in Moscow.

The People's Army, however, had the support of the Czechs and the local Cossacks. In August, 1918, the fighting line between western and eastern Russia extended along the rivers Volga and Kama. At the beginning the forces of the Samara Government met with success. In occupying the city of Kazan, they seized the gold reserve of the State Bank of Russia, amounting to \$317,000,000. Later the counter attack of the Red Army compelled the Samara army to retreat. Meanwhile, another government, formed at Omsk, gradually gained power. This government was composed of more conservative elements and received the support of the Peasants' Coöperatives in Siberia. The Siberian Government, as it was called, mobilized two hundred thousand men, and, following the defeat of

the People's Army in the autumn of 1918, took command of the anti-Bolshevik forces over the whole length of Siberia up to Lake Baikal. The Samara Government united with the Siberian Government on September 23, forming a Directorate consisting of five members, with the Socialist Revolutionaries playing the leading part. Efforts were made to secure as leader General Alexeiev, who was then in southern Russia, but before any definite moves were made, he died. The Government, therefore, remained without effective leadership. Complete confusion reigned in the far east of Russia, where several local governments were disputing power.

5.

THE Czech uprising and the formation of the new Russian Government in Siberia produced a great impression in western Europe. The Allies even thought that it might be possible to reconstruct a Russian front against Germany on the Volga. The favorable impression created by these hopes led to the Allied intervention against the Soviet power.

The decision to intervene against the Bolsheviks was carried out after many months of hesitation and efforts on the part of the Allies to reach an understanding with the Bolsheviks. Not until after the signature of the Brest-Litovsk peace did they lose hope of seeing Bolshevik Russia reënter the war. The French, especially, tried to coöperate with Trotsky. For this reason the Allies did not extend support to the Volunteer Army in southern Russia. The American Military Mission in Petrograd issued an official denial of the presence of any American officers in Ataman Kaledin's army. On January 23 the acting head of the American Red Cross Mission in Russia urged Washington to grant immediate recognition to the Soviet Government and to establish a "*modus vivendi* making possible generous and sympathetic coöperation."

The diplomatic corps of the Allies in Russia, however, was soon obliged to take steps against the Soviet Government. On January 14 it protested against the arrest of the Rumanian Minister in Petrograd. On February 8, following the abrogation of Russia's foreign indebtedness by the Soviet Government, an indignant note was sent by the diplomatic corps to the Government. One of the most important reasons for opposing the Bolsheviks was the question of the disposal of munition supplies sent by the Allies to Rus-

sia and now under the control of the Bolsheviks. Because of fear that these would be transferred to Germany, Allied marines were landed at Murmansk on the Arctic Ocean in the spring of 1918. These operations were not officially directed against the Soviet Government, but as the tension increased, the Allied Missions moved from Petrograd to Vologda and Archangel.

Following the arrival of Allied forces in Archangel on August 2, an uprising against the Bolshevik authorities took place in that city. A provisional government of the northern area was organized under the protection of the Allies.

The intervention of the Allies in Russia was not well defined in character; it was a halfway intervention. This circumstance was made clear by an official statement of the American Government on August 3, 1918, declaring that military action was admissible in Russia only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czechoslovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. To these ends the American Government proposed to Japan that each should send a force of a few thousand men to Vladivostok.⁶

In the autumn of 1918 the position of the Soviet Government seemed quite desperate. It controlled only the central part of European Russia. In the south the Ukraine was under German and Austrian occupation; the Don area was independent of the Bolsheviks and friendly to the Germans; the Kuban area was cleared of Bolshevik forces and opposed to the Germans; the southern Ural and Siberia were in the power of the Czechs and the Directorate—a potential menace to Germany; the extreme north and the extreme east were occupied by Allied forces. Russia, under the Soviets, was reduced to the boundaries of Muscovy of the early sixteenth century. At this moment the World War ended. Germany capitulated on November 11, 1918.

6.

THE armistice produced an unexpected result in Russian affairs.

⁶ The Japanese Government was eager to play a political rôle in Siberia and sent a considerable force to Vladivostok. On September 15, 1919, there were 60,000 Japanese troops in Siberia as against 8,477 Americans, 1,429 British, 1,400 Italians, and 1,076 French.

Although the Bolsheviks were to a certain measure German agents and had betrayed the *Entente* in concluding a separate peace at Brest-Litovsk, they profited greatly by the collapse of the Central Powers. First of all, the Germans who had occupied the Ukraine and supported the ephemeral Ukrainian Government were withdrawn, and this territory was left exposed to the Bolshevik armies. The anti-Bolsheviks hoped that the Allies, in requiring the German evacuation of southern Russia, would themselves occupy that area. The German forces withdrew from the Ukraine in a condition of complete demoralization, as had the Russian army a year before, but no Allied troops made their appearance. The Ukrainian Government under Skoropadsky had not been allowed by the Germans to maintain any armed troops. It fell within a few weeks following their evacuation, before the socialist Ukrainian chieftain Petlura. The first detachments of French troops occupied Odessa on December 18, 1918, but they had come too late to seize the power left by the Germans. To conquer southern Russia a military campaign was necessary, but this the Allies had no desire to undertake.

The soldiers of the Allied armies were not eager to enter into a new war. Complications arose between the British and the French as to the policy to be pursued and neither the French nor the British had complete faith in the Russian anti-Bolshevik movement in southern Russia. These circumstances made real military intervention impossible. The British did not attempt military operations on any scale and limited themselves to an occupation of the Transcaucasian area. At the end of November, 1918, a British detachment occupied Baku, the center of the oil industry on the Caspian Sea, and a month later Batum, the terminus of the Transcaucasian oil pipe line. Assistance in the form of war supplies and arms was offered to the Volunteer Army in southern Russia by representatives of the British Government. This was accepted.

Meanwhile, the French proclaimed themselves the supreme authority in the Odessa area, on March 13, 1919, and attempted military operations against the Bolsheviks with the support of Russian forces. Southern Russia was divided by the British and French into two zones of influence, the boundary between which was the Don area. While the British limited their intervention to supplying the Volunteer Army with munitions, the French tried to attack the Bolshevik armies directly. The result of the latter

policy was complete failure. The French troops were affected by Bolshevik propaganda and refused to fight. The French Command could no longer trust the soldiers. A comparatively feeble Bolshevik army succeeded in driving the French out of south Russia.

The armistice on the western front affected also developments in Siberia. With the termination of the World War the Allies lost interest in creating a front on the Volga. At the same time the Czech troops lost interest in their struggle with the Bolsheviks, which to them was but an episode in their struggle against the Central Powers. They were induced to remain in Siberia only to protect the Trans-Siberian Railroad line. The Allies now tried to settle Russian affairs by diplomatic means. In the winter of 1918-19, the Peace Conference in Paris discussed the Russian question. On January 22, 1919, President Wilson issued an invitation "to every organized group that is now exercising or attempting to exercise political authority or military control in Russia" to send representatives to a conference to be held at Prinkipo in the Sea of Marmora, a truce of arms to be operative meanwhile.

Thus within a few months the desperate situation faced by the Soviet Government had changed entirely. The Bolsheviks were now invited as well as the anti-Bolsheviks, to attend the conference. President Wilson's proposal was accepted by the Soviet Government, but rejected by all the anti-Bolshevik forces. The Bolsheviks accepted because the proposal promised them relief against the terrific pressure they were under, both within the territories they occupied and from the circle of enemies whom they faced. The anti-Bolsheviks refused because of the Soviet's usurpation of power, their betrayal of Russia to the Central Powers, and the intolerable policy pursued by the Bolsheviks within the territories they controlled. From their point of view, the proposal was an insult. It amounted to indirect recognition of the Soviet Government by the *Entente* and gave significant moral support to the Bolsheviks.

7.

IN contrast to the Soviet Government which, being a dictatorship of the Communist party, was a strong centralized power, the anti-Bolshevik governments were neither unified nor centralized.

During the civil war there were many different kinds of anti-

Bolshevik organizations in Russia. Besides those that existed merely as shadows of foreign powers, like Skoropadsky's government in the Ukraine during the German occupation, there were two principal types of government. The first type resembled local administrative organs elected by population. The Cossack organizations in the Don and Kuban areas in southern Russia belonged to this class. The second type was a government established by some Pan-Russian organization. Such was the government of General Alexeiev in southern Russia and headed by the leaders of the old Russian army. Such were the governments backed by the Socialist Revolutionary party at Samara. In addition to these examples of Pan-Russian administration was the personal dictatorship as organized by Admiral Kolchak in Siberia.

The aim of the principal anti-Bolshevik governments was to set up a new Pan-Russian government in Moscow in accordance with the wishes of a national assembly to be convened immediately following the overthrow of the Bolshevik power. This aim was plainly expressed by both Kolchak and Denikin. There is no reason to suspect the sincerity of these statements.

The principal defect of the anti-Bolshevik governments was the same as that of the Provisional Government set up following the collapse of the empire. They indulged in disputes when circumstances demanded action. The moderate conservative and liberal leaders in Denikin's Cabinet discussed the details of future laws. For example, the agrarian question was discussed at length on the principle of expropriating the large estates of private owners and distributing the lands among the peasants. Meanwhile, proprietors of estates enforced their former rights whenever they received the protection of the anti-Bolshevik government. The peasants were dispossessed of the lands they had appropriated in the Ukraine and this was one of the reasons for their opposition to Denikin's government in the summer of 1919. But while this was an important element of weakness in the anti-Bolshevik governments, the peasants were not entirely reconciled to the policies of the Soviet Government. In spite of being assured of the possession of all the land, the peasants in the Ukraine rose against the Bolsheviks in 1920, in protest against the seizure of grain.

The head of the financial department of Denikin's government was careful to restrict the emission of paper currency as far as he

was able according to the principles of rational financial administration. The result was that the Denikin government was short of tokens and could not pay its officers and soldiers adequately. This in turn led to unlawful requisitions and sometimes open robbery. The peasants upon whom the burden fell most heavily resented this policy.

Not one of the anti-Bolshevik governments succeeded in using for their purposes the peasant opposition to Bolshevik policies. The economic life of the regions occupied by the anti-Bolshevik forces was almost as completely disrupted as that of central Russia. Tariff barriers were erected to raise funds, currency depreciated, the transportation facilities were almost completely monopolized by the armies, and the countryside was subjected to unceasing ravages by both contestants. The one element in the economic field favoring the anti-Bolshevik forces was the absence of any efforts to introduce socialism. Private trade was permitted and the peasant coöperatives expanded their activities.

In order to obtain a fair picture of the economic condition of the south of Russia and Siberia occupied by the anti-Bolshevik forces, it is necessary to compare it with that of central Russia controlled by the Soviet Government. The population of those areas did not appreciate their better conditions until after they were absorbed by the Moscow Government and experienced the chaotic ruin of 1921.

8.

THE end of the World War, as we have seen, had a most favorable effect upon the condition of the Soviet Government. While saved from imminent destruction, it still had before it, however, the problem of subjecting the whole of Russia to its control. The year 1919 was a critical period from the military point of view. The Soviet Government was helped in its victory over the anti-Bolshevik forces by the lack of any coöperation between the activities of Denikin in southern Russia and Kolchak in Siberia. Each of these two forces tried to achieve the same purpose, that is, the occupation of Moscow directly, instead of first unifying their forces. The Soviet Government, acting against them separately, was able to defeat both in succession.

Following a *coup d'état* of November 18, 1918, Kolchak assumed the leadership of the Siberian Government. He was a brave

and patriotic man with the highest purposes in directing the struggle against Moscow. Nevertheless, he was not fit for the difficult task of dictator. In the first place, although a capable naval commander, he was not a land strategist; neither was he a diplomat, and in his position diplomatic subtlety as regards the relations with the Czech legionaries and the Allies was of great importance. Furthermore, Kolchak was unacquainted with the people and customs of Siberia. His subordinates were not held to him by strong bonds of personal affection, as was the case of the commanders of the southern Russian armies. His *coup d'état* of November aroused the opposition of the Socialist Revolutionary party, which immediately set about undermining his power by propaganda. They used their influence among the Czech leaders to the detriment of Kolchak. In spite of these drawbacks, he launched an offensive against the Soviet Government.

During the first months of Kolchak's dictatorship, the fortunes of war favored him. The city of Perm was taken. In March, 1919, Ufa fell. The Bolshevik armies retreated in disorder. In May Kolchak's armies reached the line Glazov-Buzuluk-Orenburg-Uralsk.

Kolchak's military success impressed the Allies. On May 26, 1919, the Supreme Council sitting in Paris informed him that the Allies were "disposed to assist the government of Admiral Kolchak and his associates with munitions, supplies and food to establish themselves as the government of all Russia." The Allies merely asked Admiral Kolchak and his associates to agree to certain conditions under which they would accept continued assistance from the Allied powers. These conditions were: (1) To summon a Constituent Assembly; (2) to permit immediately throughout their areas free elections in the local assemblies; (3) not to revive the special privilege of any class or order in Russia; (4) to recognize the independence of Finland and Poland; (5) to recognize the Baltic and Caucasian territories as autonomous; (6) to recognize the right of the Peace Conference to determine the disposition of Bessarabia; (7) to enroll the future Russian government in the League of Nations. Admiral Kolchak answered that the summoning of a Constituent Assembly would be his first order after the Bolsheviks would be crushed; the independence of Poland would be beyond objections, but the future Russian-Polish frontier, as well as the problem of Finland and Bessarabia would be decided by

the Russian Constituent Assembly. Kolchak accepted the autonomy of the Baltic and Caucasian areas. As concerned internal problems of Russian policy, Kolchak gave assurance that no return to the old *régime* would be allowed. The Supreme Council "welcomed" Admiral Kolchak's reply. The Allies, therefore, were "willing to extend to Admiral Kolchak and his associates the support set forth in their original letter" of June 12, 1919. On the same day General Denikin proclaimed his submission to Kolchak as the Supreme Ruler.

The diplomatic position of Kolchak seemed to be excellent, but the support of the Allies did not prove to be a real factor in the struggle. The determining point was one of military strategy as between Admiral Kolchak and the Soviet armies.

The armies of Kolchak totaled about 125,000 men as against 110,000 Soviet troops. The northern army, under the command of General Gayda, a Czech, was the strongest and the best equipped of Kolchak's forces. The military plan of Kolchak was based upon the operations of this northern army with a view to joining with the British and Russian forces on the littoral of the White Sea. The adoption of this plan was a great mistake. First, it was a rejection of the alternative scheme of effecting a juncture with Denikin's forces in the south; second, it created a weak spot in the very center of Kolchak's front. The Soviet Commander-in-Chief, Kamenev, formerly of the Imperial General Staff, realized the mistake of his enemy and immediately delivered a counter attack against the center of Kolchak's front. The move was successful and necessitated immediate retreat. Kolchak's northern army, fearing to be cut off, retreated likewise. The Kolchak offensive collapsed.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Government appointed Kamenev Supreme Commander-in-Chief of all military operations. The most trustworthy Soviet troops were taken from the Siberian front and directed against Denikin in the south. The second operation against the anti-Bolshevik forces commenced.

9.

DURING the winter of 1918-19, the Volunteer Army of Denikin engaged the Bolshevik forces in the western Caucasus. In the middle of May, owing to the widespread rising of peasants against the

Soviet Government, the Denikin armies, numbering now about 150,000, were enabled to direct an offensive against Moscow. During June important cities of southern Russia—Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, and Tsaritsyn—were occupied by the Volunteer Army. At this point Kamenev, who had already stopped Kolchak's offensive, turned his attention to Denikin. However, the first counter attack of the Soviet army failed. In the middle of October, the extreme limits of the Volunteer Army's advance had been reached. The line stretched through Voronezh-Orel-Chernigov-Kiev-Odessa. At the same time, in the north, the army of General Yudenich, with its base in Esthonia, attacked Petrograd, and occupied Gatchina.

With active fighting on four fronts, Siberia, South Russia, Petrograd, and Archangel, the Soviet Commander-in-Chief crushed Denikin's forces. The peasant uprising against the Bolsheviks turned against Denikin. The Volunteer Army was forced to retreat rapidly, and was finally driven to the Black Sea ports and compelled to ask the British to help evacuate the troops, their families, and the wounded. On March 30, 1920, Novorossisk was abandoned. The remnants of the Volunteer Army, the Don and Kuban Cossacks, were transported by sea to the Crimean Peninsula. Denikin resigned his position as commander-in-chief and appointed General Wrangel his successor.

Meanwhile the fate of Kolchak was already sealed. The complete collapse of his forces was only a matter of time. The support of the Allies, which had been expected following their declaration of June, 1918, never materialized. Outbreaks among the peasantry, stimulated by the Socialist Revolutionaries, occurred throughout Siberia. To add to the confusion the only means of communication—the Trans-Siberian Railroad—was controlled by the Czechs who were in opposition to Kolchak. He was cut off from his troops. The Revolutionary Committee in control of Irkutsk seized him, with the connivance of the Czechs and with the consent of the French General Janin. A few days later Kolchak was shot.

Within two weeks the Soviet troops reached Irkutsk. Siberia was divided into two main areas. The Soviet Government controlled all territories as far as Lake Baikal. The Far East was practically under the control of Japanese troops. It was only after two years of fighting and diplomatic negotiations that the Soviet Government occupied the whole of Siberia.

The collapse of the anti-Bolshevik forces compelled the Allies to alter their stand in regard to the Soviet Government. As early as November 8, 1919, Lloyd George declared that the Bolsheviks could not be conquered by arms. On January 16, 1920, the Supreme Council of the Allies withdrew the economic blockade of Russia. Archangel was evacuated by Allied forces and all Allied troops were withdrawn from Russian territory.

10.

FOLLOWING the evacuation and defeat of the anti-Bolshevik forces in the north and east of Russia, there remained one center of active opposition to the Soviet Government. General Wrangel, Commander-in-Chief of the remnants of Denikin's army, occupied the Crimean Peninsula. He immediately undertook to reorganize the army and continue armed opposition to Moscow. The troops were given a rest; discipline was reinstated; severe measures were taken against forced requisitions of food from the peaceful population. Relying upon the support of the peasantry of southern Russia, General Wrangel declared as his basic policy the satisfaction of their demands. His new agrarian law of May 25, 1920, vested ownership of the land in the peasants. This reform was to be carried out by the former Imperial Minister of Agriculture, Krivoshein, who had taken a prominent part in the Stolypin reforms. But the expected effects of the new policy did not appear. The peasants remained passive. In his search for allies against the Bolsheviks, Wrangel made overtures both to Poland and to the leaders of the peasant movements in southern Russia. He dispatched a representative to Makhno, the leader of the anarchical peasant bands, for the purpose of making an alliance with him. His representative, however, was killed by Makhno and no reply was received.

Wrangel did not believe that his army, which consisted of only seventy thousand men, could defeat the Soviet Government alone. He placed his trust in his new agrarian policy, which he believed would secure the support of the peasantry as they became acquainted with it and undermine the discipline of the Soviet armies. But his hopes were not realized. The peasants, weary of the civil war, were not attracted by the new agrarian laws. In many localities of southern Russia, moreover, no news of Wrangel's agrarian policy reached the peasantry. An uprising of the Don and Kuban

Cossacks against the Soviet Government failed, while the Red Army itself was at this moment at the high point of moral exaltation and remained unaffected by Wrangel's program.

The war waged by Poland against Soviet Russia, instead of strengthening the anti-Bolshevik movement, had the opposite result. The Soviet Government took advantage of the national feelings in Russia aroused by the Polish intervention and secured the cooperation in Russia of many of its staunchest enemies.

At the invitation of the Soviet Government the World War veteran, General Brusilov, who was living in retirement in Moscow, issued a proclamation to all Russian officers to support the Russian army against Poland. The proclamation had great influence.

The first steps taken by Poland were successful. On May 6, 1920, after a brief campaign, Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, was occupied. Immediately, however, a counter offensive was organized by the Soviet Government and the Poles were driven out of Kiev and to the outskirts of Warsaw. On July 10 Poland appealed to the Allies for assistance. A French Military Mission was sent to Warsaw under General Weigand. Simultaneously, the Allies attempted to reconcile the Soviet Government and Poland.

In view of the ever increasing military power of the Soviet Government, France decided to support General Wrangel. On August 12, 1920, Wrangel's administration was recognized as the *de facto* government of south Russia. Meanwhile, with the arrival of French officers, a Polish counter attack against the Soviet armies was commenced. The Soviet troops were driven back in disorder almost as far as Minsk. There the Poles stopped and both sides opened negotiations for peace. A preliminary peace was concluded October 12, 1920. The cessation of military activities on the Polish front enabled the Soviet Government to throw its forces over to southern Russia and attack General Wrangel. A fierce battle took place in November on the isthmus of Perekop, connecting southern Russia with the Crimea. Wrangel realized that he could not withstand the assault of the Red Army and ordered the evacuation of all anti-Bolshevik elements from the Crimean Peninsula. About 130,000 soldiers and civilians, with their families, took ship and sailed for the Bosphorus. The civil war was over.

Peace between Soviet Russia and Poland was finally signed in

Riga on March 18, 1921. The conditions of the settlement were extremely unfavorable to Russia. The eastern frontier of Poland was drawn along the line of the German front at the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution. This meant that about four million Russians became subject to Poland. Russia was required to restore to Poland all military trophies, libraries, and works of art taken from Poland since 1772. Thus Russia emerged from the period of civil war, not only with a loss of men and wealth, but also of important territory.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

I.

THE termination of the civil war enabled the Soviet Government to occupy itself with internal affairs. The chief problem was its economic policy. In 1920 the Soviet Government unified and brought up to date the measures promulgated in this field since the revolution. The result was a finished system of socialistic economy. Although known by the name of "War Communism," it was completed only after the termination of the civil war. This system was constructed on the basis of a complete denial of the right to hold private property and of the other principles of capitalist or *bourgeois* economy. The Soviet Government attempted to take complete control of production. Accordingly, the whole mechanism of trade and money exchange, credit and banking, became useless.

The Government first seized industry. Soon after the November revolution, all large-scale industry was concentrated in its hands. The nationalization of industry gradually spread to small machine shops. In 1920 a decree was issued nationalizing all industries employing more than five laborers and using mechanical power.¹ Industries smaller than these were declared to be under government control. This included all peasant craftsmanship.

Following its seizure of industry the Soviet Government began to apply similar measures to agriculture. It regarded the peasant, not as a proprietor of the land, but as a workman operating government-owned land. All his produce was regarded as government property, subject to government seizure by means of a levy in kind.² The peasant was left only a quantity sufficient to satisfy the immediate needs of his family, in addition to the quantity of grain necessary for the next sowing.

¹ Or having more than ten laborers, without mechanical power.

² See above, Chap. XV, Sec. 3 and Chap. XVI, Sec. 1.

National production as a whole was thus exploited by the Government, which meanwhile was to supply manufactured articles to the population. Apparently the distribution of these articles was to be gratuitous. This applied equally to materials such as fuel and machinery, and to articles of personal use. The latter were distributed by means of ration cards, following a predetermined scale. This system of socialist economy made trade unnecessary, and it was abolished in 1918. Banks were unnecessary, and were likewise nationalized. A "People's Bank" was created in 1918. This was a bank only in name; in fact, it was a department of the Commissariat of Finance. By the decree of January 19, 1920, the People's Bank was merged with another organ of the Commissariat of Finance into a "Budget Accounting Department."

Money was not abolished, but in practice it soon became worthless because of the issues of paper currency. On March 1, 1917, there were 11,786,000,000 rubles of paper money in circulation. By November 1 this sum doubled. By January, 1918, it reached 27,312,000,000 rubles. Two years later, January 1, 1920, the total was 225,014,000,000 rubles, and a year later, January 1, 1921, 1,168,596,000,000 rubles. In the beginning of 1918 the dollar was worth about 9 rubles; in the beginning of 1919, about 80 rubles; and in the beginning of 1920, 1,200 rubles. The fall in the value of money led to the rise of prices. In 1917 the general index of prices was three times higher than in 1913. In the beginning of 1918 it was 23.5 times higher. In 1920 it rose to 2,420 and in the beginning of 1921 to 16,800 times the 1913 figure.

The new socialist economy, having destroyed the delicate and sensitive organization of trade and money exchange, was forced to substitute in its place clumsy bureaucratic organizations regulating the production and distribution of goods. At the head of these organizations was the Supreme Council of National Economy. The difficulty of the situation was that, not only had a new economic organization to be developed, but that new psychological incentives had to be found for the whole economic machine. The socialist system had destroyed natural incentives as well as individual enterprise. Demand lost touch with supply. The market for goods no longer depended upon the value of work done, but upon membership in one or another category of consumers. In view of the destruction of natural incentives to work, the Soviet Govern-

ment was forced to take recourse to the principle of forced labor. This was proclaimed in 1918, but was finally confirmed by the Decree on Universal Labor in January, 1920, to be applied, not only to factories, but also to agriculture.

This decree practically recreated the state economy that existed in Russia prior to the reforms of Alexander II. The whole population of Soviet Russia now was equalized at the level of the peasants and workmen assigned to state factories in the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries. A citizen of Soviet Russia was likewise assigned to a particular factory or a particular tract of land and could not shift without special permission. In addition, in Soviet Russia the principle of militarized labor was introduced in several industries, as for example, coal mining. In 1920 an attempt was made to organize military workers' communes, very similar to the military settlements of Alexander I. In demobilizing the Red Army it was proposed to convert the military units into working units for special labor, such as lumbering, the construction of public buildings, and the repair of agricultural machinery.

2.

THE characteristic trait of serf economy was the small productivity of labor, which found full expression in the socialist economy of 1918-20. In 1920 the annual output per man in the cotton industry was 22 per cent of the 1912 output, and in coal mining 25 per cent. It would be inaccurate, of course, to ascribe this small output exclusively to the socialist economy. Demoralization and postwar fatigue, as well as the general depreciation of plants, had their effects. But the basic reason was the socialist system, under which the workman was not interested in the productivity of his labor.

Industrial production fell with each year. In 1920 it was 13.2 per cent the 1913 volume.³ The value of transported goods also decreased. In 1916 daily car-loadings totaled 31,164; in 1920, 10,738. The decline of production in industry and in the disorganization of transport led to impoverishment of the country. Before the war, for example, the consumption of sugar and molasses per individual was to the value of 4.87 gold rubles. In 1920 it fell

³ According to prewar prices the value of the production of Russian industries in 1920 was 835,800,000 gold rubles as against 6,391,000,000 gold rubles in 1913.

to .24 gold rubles. The prewar consumption of textiles per individual was to the value of 6.77 gold rubles. In 1920 it fell to .91 gold rubles.

A more serious condition was indicated by the fall of agricultural production. The revolution gave to the peasant all the arable land. By appropriating the large estates the peasants increased their holdings of land by about 31 per cent. However, in the same time the system of socialist economy took away all incentive to the cultivation of the land. The peasant no longer had any desire to raise more crops than he needed for his own purposes. The result was a shrinkage of the cultivated area. In 1916, within the limits of the later Soviet state, this area was eighty-six million desiatins; in 1921 it fell to fifty-four million. In addition the destruction of the large estates where production was more efficient resulted in a further decrease of agricultural production. The collection of grain fell off even more than the area of cultivation. In 1916 the harvest totaled four and one-half billion puds of grain. In 1919 it was estimated at two billion, that is, for the population of 137,000,000 at the rate of fifteen puds of grain per capita, including grain for sowing. This was nearly a starvation scale. Cattle raising was likewise greatly upset by the economic policies of the Soviet Government. In 1916 there were thirty-one million horses in Russia. In 1920 there were only twenty-four million. The fifty million head of cattle in 1916 had fallen in 1920 to less than thirty-seven million.

It was because of the fact that Russia was in an impoverished condition that the drought of 1920 and 1921 led to the terrible famine. The collection of grain in 1920 barely reached 1,300,000,000 puds. In 1921 the harvest failed in the whole of south-eastern Russia. In the following year nearly thirty-five million people were starving, while fifteen million were in a state of semi-starvation. The loss of life from the famine of 1921-22 is variously estimated at from five to nine million; that is to say, it almost equaled the total number of victims of the World War. The loss of life would have been still greater, had it not been for assistance from outside, chiefly from the United States. The chief organization in famine relief was the American Relief Administration, headed by Mr. Herbert Hoover. The A.R.A. and other relief organizations also helped the Russian intellectuals, whose situation

otherwise would have been quite hopeless. The total sum administered by the A.R.A. was \$61,566,231.53, and the quantity of commodities furnished, 718,770 tons. The number of persons fed daily by the A.R.A. in Russia reached 4,173,339 children and 6,316,958 adults, a daily total of 10,490,297 during August, 1922. Besides food, the A.R.A. shipped and distributed medical supplies furnished by the American Red Cross and the American army to the total value of \$8,072,256.03.⁴

3.

THE socialist *régime* aroused considerable dissatisfaction among the Russian people. This expressed itself during 1920-21 in a series of peasant uprisings, the most important of which took place in the Tambov province under the leadership of Antonov. They were suppressed with great cruelty. Finally, in the end of February, 1921, an uprising occurred among the sailors of the Red Navy in Kronstadt. The chief demand of the rebels was the calling of a constituent assembly and the reintroduction of freedom of trade. This uprising among the sailors, who previously had been the chief support of the Bolshevik revolution, was taken as an ominous symptom by the Soviet authorities. The Kronstadt uprising was soon suppressed by armed force; but seeing the seriousness of the situation, Lenin determined to supplement the police measures by a change in policy calculated to put at rest the causes of discontent. Lenin again showed himself, as in 1906 in the question of the duma elections, ready to make a sharp turn in his policy. He was prepared to make any necessary compromise with reality so long as he retained command. "We are in a condition of such poverty, ruin, and exhaustion of the productive powers of the workers and peasants," said Lenin in March, 1921, "that everything must be set aside to increase production."⁵ Thus arose the New Economic Policy, known as the N.E.P.

The beginning of the N.E.P. was a radical reform with respect to the agricultural population, a substitution of taxation for the levy in kind. At first the tax was a tax in kind, principally grain; later it became a tax in money. This reform was undertaken with the purpose of recreating a will among the peasantry to cultivate

⁴ This figure is included in the previous total of relief sums expended.

⁵ Speech at the tenth Congress of the Communist party.

their land. The Soviet Government promised the peasants that it would take only a definite proportion of the produce of their labor in the form of a tax, and not the whole surplus in excess of their immediate needs. The peasants received the right to dispose of the surplus as they wished—that is, to sell it in the open market. For this reason the decree substituting a tax for the levy led inevitably to the introduction of freedom of trade. In July, 1921, before the collection of the harvest, freedom of trade was decreed.⁶

Simultaneously with the liberation of agriculture, there began a similar process in industry. The socialist form of production was replaced by a system of "state capitalism." The single management of industry was replaced by a system of "trusts." The state retained in its hands control over large-scale production, but small-scale production was partly turned over to private individuals. The concession system was introduced for foreign capital. The free supply of raw materials and tools to factories ceased; and every factory, whether government owned or privately owned, had to pay for everything it used. This logically led to the reintroduction of currency, in its proper economic function, as well as the reintroduction of banking and credit. At the end of 1921 a State Bank, run on a business basis, was opened.

The destruction of the socialist system in the realm of production of goods was necessarily accompanied by the abandonment of socialist principles in the distribution of goods. The right to receive goods free of charge was restricted to soldiers of the Red Army and sailors of the Red Navy, members of the police forces, and prisoners in the jails. The economic reconstruction led likewise to the abolition of forced labor.

4.

THE N.E.P. had a very beneficial influence upon Russian economy. The production both of agriculture and industry began to grow. The area under cultivation, which in 1921 fell to fifty-four million *desiatins* and in 1922 to forty-nine million, rose in 1923 to fifty-nine million and in 1927 almost reached the level of 1916 (eighty-three million *desiatins*). The grain collected in 1924 reached two and a quarter billion *puds*, and in 1926 exceeded four and a half

⁶ This was limited to internal trade. Foreign trade remained a monopoly of the Government.

billion. Gradually cattle grew in number, the number of horses in 1926 exceeded twenty-seven million and the number of cattle fifty-five million. The productivity of several branches of industry also rose. The production of coal, which had fallen in 1922-23 to eleven and a half million tons, rose in 1925-26 to twenty-four and a half million tons. Production of cotton fabrics rose from five hundred and sixty million meters in 1922-23 to two billion meters in 1925-26.

The economic reconstruction of Russia made possible a reorganization of currency and the establishment of a firm monetary unit. The State Bank, reestablished in 1921, was authorized in 1922 to issue chervonets bank notes. The chervonets is equal to ten gold rubles, or about \$5.00.⁷ The chervonets was to be backed by a quarter of its value in gold, platinum, or stable foreign currency. The rest of the value of the chervonets was to be guaranteed by readily negotiable short-term obligations. With the issue of the chervonets the old currency was not withdrawn. The state treasury continued to produce the old paper currency. Thus, for a time there were two kinds of paper money in circulation, one stable, the other constantly falling in value. The chervonets was quoted on the exchange like pounds sterling and dollars. One chervonets was worth 117 rubles of the 1923 paper currency, each of which was worth 1,000,000 rubles of any previous issue. In December, 1923, the chervonets rose to 13,700 "1923 rubles" and in April, 1924, to 500,000 "1923 rubles."

In the spring of 1924 the treasury was authorized to issue small currency notes of one, three, and five rubles. The State Bank announced that it would accept an unlimited amount of new currency notes in payment of all liabilities at the rate of ten rubles to the chervonets. The further printing of old paper currency was suspended, and silver and copper currency was issued. On March 17, 1924, the purchase of "1923 rubles" at the rate of fifty thousand to the gold ruble was announced. The latest date of circulation for the old currency was announced as May 10, 1924, and the latest date of redemption as May 31, 1924. Thus by June, 1924, there were only chervonets stable currency notes and metal coins in circulation.

⁷ The ruble contains 17.424 *dolyas* of pure gold. One *dolya* is equal to 0.68576 grain.

5.

THE introduction of the N.E.P. seemed at first to mark the beginning of a complete return to capitalist economy. However, the Soviet Government made extraordinary efforts to avoid this. In March, 1922, the eleventh Congress of the Communist party announced that the "retreat on the economic front" must end. Several further concessions to the N.E.P., however, were made in the reintroduction of the produce exchanges and the annual fair at Nizhni-Novgorod. Toward the end of 1922 "the retreat" actually came to an end,⁸ and from that time the economic system prevailing in Russia was neither fully socialistic nor fully capitalistic, but something between the two. The present Soviet system differs from the socialist system to the extent of all the reforms of the N.E.P. It differs from the capitalist system in the excessive government control in economic matters, in particular over foreign trade.

The development of government economy in Soviet Russia may be illustrated by the following figures. In 1923-24 the production of government industries amounted to 2,400,000,000 gold rubles, in prewar prices, while production by private industry, including foreign concessions, reached the value of only 842,000,000 rubles, that is, about one-third of the total production. With each year the relative importance of government industries grew. In 1925-26 the production of state industries reached 5,333,000,000 rubles, while private industry produced 1,252,000,000 rubles, that is, about one-fourth of the total production. The state retained the monopoly of foreign trade. The Soviet Government attempts to regulate the economic life of the country and for this purpose production is planned several years in advance. This is done by the *Gosplan*, or State Planning Commission.

The policy of the Soviet Government with respect to agriculture consists in raising productivity and in weakening, as far as possible, the development of the individual peasant household. The N.E.P. was not followed by the reintroduction of the right of ownership of small individual farms. According to the Land Code of 1922, all the land belongs to the state and the peasant merely

⁸ With the exception of the currency reform, ended in 1924. By 1925 some measures favorable to the peasants had been carried out, but by 1927 they had been canceled. See Chap. XX, Secs. 2 and 11.

has the free use of it. Section 27 of the Code categorically forbids the sale, purchase, mortgage, bequest, or gift of land. The land may be cultivated either by a community or by an individual. The Soviet Government is not committed to the support of the old commune; but it gives less encouragement to the peasant to leave the commune and become an individual tenant than did the Stolypin legislation. In case the peasant leaves the commune and works on an individual parcel of land, individual economy is not set up, but a family economy. The head of the family becomes the manager of the family possessions. If members of the family desire, the Local Executive Committee may replace the head by another member of the family.

The part formerly played by the commune in opposing peasant individualism is now taken by the coöperative movement. Soviet coöperatives came into existence only following the N.E.P. Prior to it, during the period of War Communism, the Soviet Government attempted to suppress all forms of coöperation as expressions of *bourgeois* prejudice. The agricultural coöperatives were reconstituted by the decree of May 7, 1921. By the decree of August 16, of the same year, the right of coöperatives to have property was recognized, and the coöperatives were recognized as essential to the state. On October 1, 1926, there were 33,500 agricultural coöperatives operating creameries, flour mills, etc., having 5,948,760 members.

Soviet coöperatives are similar in name only to coöperatives in capitalistic countries. They are controlled by the Government and are of a semiofficial character. The higher management of the coöperatives is in the hands of members of the Communist party, who conduct them according to the desire of the party.⁹ The coöperatives are a weapon in the hands of the Soviet Government to control and guide the economic activities of the peasantry. The Government hopes, by means of the coöperative movement, to achieve the unification of all individual peasant households. The opinion of the communist leaders is that the coöperatives must assist in the socialistic education of the peasantry. They must help to equalize differences between individual peasant households and, particularly, they must combat the development of richer house-

⁹ As to the part of the Communist party, see below, Chap. XVIII.

holds. For this reason the Soviet leaders speak of a policy of agricultural-coöperative-socialism.

The effect of the agricultural policy of the Soviet Government has been to lessen individual differences between peasant households and to bring peasant economy to an average. The percentage of peasant households without land under cultivation had fallen from 11.4 per cent in 1917 to 6.7 per cent in 1922. The percentage of peasant households having more than four desiatins of land under cultivation had fallen from 29.5 per cent in 1917 to 14.7 per cent in 1922. The number of peasants of moderate possessions, having less than four desiatins of land under cultivation, grew from 59.1 per cent in 1917 to 78.6 per cent in 1922. This latter category of peasant households can hardly supply itself with grain and sells a comparatively small amount in the open market. The productive households, which supply the markets, are the larger ones, the number of which has considerably decreased. The forced equalization of peasant households on the basis of a low average, seriously hinders an increase in agricultural productivity in Russia.

6.

WHILE "War Communism" or the socialist system of 1918-20 may be compared to the serf economy of Russia between the seventeenth century and the middle of the nineteenth century, modern Soviet economy in industry may be compared to an inferior form of the system advocated by Count Witte, and in peasant agriculture, to the *régime* of Imperial Russia prior to Stolypin's reforms.¹⁰ By great efforts Soviet economy has reached 1913 production in many branches, and in some has slightly exceeded it. Thus, the value of agricultural production within the present limits of the territory of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics totaled 12,790,000,000 rubles in 1913. In 1927 it reached 12,775,000,000 rubles. The value of industrial production in 1913 was 6,391,000,000 rubles, and it reached 6,608,000,000 rubles in 1927.¹¹ The production of coal in 1913 was twenty-nine million metric tons and thirty million metric tons in 1927. Oil production of nine million

¹⁰ Only a few points of the Stolypin reforms have been accepted by Soviet legislation.

¹¹ The figures given above are taken from official Soviet sources. It is not known how exact these figures are.

metric tons in 1913 reached ten million metric tons in 1927. Cotton cloth production of 2,238,000,000 meters in 1913 reached 2,342,000,000 meters in 1927.

The Government began the building of many new plants, among which are an \$80,000,000 water-power station on the Dnieper River,¹² as well as an oil pipe line from Grozny, Northern Caucasus, to the Black Sea port of Tuapse.

The construction of the Turkestan-Siberia railway, to be finished in 1930, must also be mentioned.

These facts seem to prove great improvement in Soviet economy following the catastrophe of 1918-20. The proper perspective on Soviet economy can be gained, however, only by comparing it not with Russian production prior to the war, but with what Russian production would have been had it continued to develop at the pre-war pace. The productivity of the main states of Europe and the United States in the years that followed the war exceeded in many branches prewar records.

Meanwhile, Russian production at best scarcely exceeds the pre-war level. It is also necessary to consider, not only the total productivity of Russian economy, but also the productivity per inhabitant. The population within the present territories of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in 1913 was 135,000,000. In January, 1928, the population of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was nearly 150,000,000. If the general production of the country remained approximately at the former level, considering the growth of the population, the production of the country per unit of population has fallen.

An outstanding characteristic of Soviet economy is that industry is being developed at the expense of agriculture. In the Soviet budget of 1926-27 the sum of 900,000,000 rubles was devoted to financing industry. Since that time the subsidies for industry have been increased. Thus Soviet industry is nourished at the expense of the state, that is to say, at the expense of the peasantry. In this connection it may be observed that the condition of the industrial laborer is better than that of the peasant. The material position of the laborer is probably equal to that before the war. According to Soviet official reports, the average monthly earning of the Rus-

¹² An American engineer, Hugh L. Cooper, has been engaged in the work of supervising and designing the project.

sian laborer in 1927 was 64.36 rubles, while the average monthly earning in 1913 was 25 rubles. The purchasing power of the ruble in 1913, however, was considerably greater than in 1927. Retail prices of some agricultural products as well as those of manufactured articles have risen 200 to 300 per cent. For this reason the real purchasing power of the workers' wages has hardly increased, on the other hand, the housing conditions of about 70 per cent of Russian workers in great towns are probably better now than before the revolution. Also the working day has been shortened. In 1927 the average working day was 7.4 hours instead of 10 hours in 1913.

The position of the laborer in the Soviet state is privileged as compared with that of the peasant. The standard of life of the Russian peasants is apparently lower than before the revolution. By 1925 they purchased, on an average, only 28 per cent as much tea and sugar as in 1913, 40 per cent as much cloth, 60 per cent as much salt, 80 per cent as much soap, and 90 per cent as much kerosene.

The rise of prices in Soviet industry was more rapid than that of prices for the chief agricultural products. At the end of 1927 the index of wholesale prices of textile products was about 200, as compared with 100 in 1913; at the same time the index price of rye was only 101 and that of wheat, 113. Thus, the peasant, in exchange for his grain, receives only half of the amount of goods he received in 1913. It is obvious that the working day of the peasant has not been decreased. He works during the summer, as before, from sunrise to sunset. The seven-hour working day could be introduced in Soviet factories at the expense of a twelve- to fourteen-hour working day for the Russian peasant.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF SOVIET RUSSIA

I.

THE Bolshevik revolution of November 7, 1917, had as its slogan the concentration of power in the Soviets. This purpose determined the general character of the new political structure of Russia. The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, meeting at the time of the Bolshevik revolution, sanctioned the new power and thus took over the function of the Constituent Assembly elected, as we have seen, two weeks later, but dismissed by the Bolsheviks following its first session. At the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the government of the Council of People's Commissars headed by Lenin, was confirmed.

The new Government, however, did not hasten to define the political structure of Russia. It was at first flooded with problems demanding immediate solution, the most important of which were the strengthening of its position and the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace with the Central Powers. It was only at the Fifth Congress of Soviets, on July 10, 1918, that the new Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) was adopted.

The Soviet territories at this time theoretically extended over all the territory retained by Russia by the Brest-Litovsk peace. Actually, however, as we have seen,¹ the area subjected to the Soviet Government in 1918-19 corresponded to the limits of the Moscow state of the sixteenth century. It was only following 1920 that it gradually reached its present limits.

According to the constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic of 1918, the political structure of Russia was built upon the Soviet or council system. The highest agency of

¹ Chap. XVI, Sec. 5.

power was the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. This was to meet when necessary, but never less than once a year. The Congress of Soviets was a large and cumbersome institution. It cannot be compared with the parliament of constitutional states, being intended as a substitute for an assembly of all the electors of the country. The decisions of the Congress may be compared to a universal referendum.² The Congress of Soviets elects a Central Executive Committee which is the supreme power in Russia between sessions of the Congress. The Committee consists of more than three hundred members and may be roughly compared to a parliament. It meets in sessions; its members have what corresponds to parliamentary immunity. They may not be arrested without the consent of the Praesidium or the chairman of the Committee. Its members are subject to trial only upon authorization of the Committee or its chairman.

Between the sessions of the Central Executive Committee, the supreme power in the Soviet state theoretically resides in its Praesidium, which is in the nature of a collective president of the Soviet state. Actually, however, the Council of People's Commissars has much greater significance than the Praesidium. The Council of People's Commissars is the Cabinet of the Soviet state. At first it was, in fact, the only agency of government of the Soviet Republics. At the end of 1917 and in the first half of 1918, a number of important laws were published in the name of the Council. These included the law respecting the organization of the Red Army, January 15, 1918, and the law concerning Land, January 27, 1918. Between 1917 and 1921, 1,615 decrees were issued in the name of the Council of People's Commissars and only 375 in the name of the Central Executive Committee.

In contrast to the constitutional states of Europe and America, there is no precise distinction between the supreme branches of the Soviet Government in their constitutional power. The principle of replacement has been carried through. The Central Executive Committee has the same legislative and administrative power as the Soviet Congress when the latter is not in session. Its Praesidium is the supreme legislative and administrative branch be-

² The similarity of the Soviet system to that of constitutional states is only external and arbitrary. The former, as will be seen below, is not a constitutional system.

tween sessions of the Committee. The Council of People's Commissars may also assume supreme power in case of necessity.

2.

THE Soviet Congress, supreme arm of the Soviet state, is elected according to a technique which has certain definite peculiarities. First of all, the franchise in the Soviet state is not universal. The following categories are deprived of passive as well as active franchise: (1) Persons using hired labor with the purpose of gaining profit; (2) persons living on an income such as interest on capital, income from business, income from various kinds of property; (3) private traders as well as commercial middlemen; (4) monks and clergymen of all religious sects; (5) members of the former police and members of the former ruling house. The denial of the franchise to the last category may be explained by the political struggle of the moment, and is apparently temporary, but the restrictions imposed upon the first four categories are peculiarly related to the communist system of government. The number of individuals falling within these categories is not great, particularly in view of the devastating effects of the revolution and civil war, but the important circumstance is that these categories exclude from political activity the national leaders in economic and moral life.

The peculiarity of the Soviet elective system is not limited, however, to these restrictions. The Soviet franchise is neither universal nor equal. The Soviet Congress consists of two groups, first, the representatives of the city Soviets—that is, the representatives of workmen, at the rate of one deputy to twenty-five thousand electors; and second, the representatives from provincial Soviet Congresses—that is, representatives both of the workers and peasants, at the rate of one deputy to one hundred and twenty-five thousand inhabitants. According to the constitution, the provincial Soviet Congresses consist in turn first, of representatives of town Soviets at the rate of one deputy to two thousand electors, and second, of *volost* or peasant congresses at the rate of one deputy to ten thousand inhabitants. Thus, the workers have more than double representation as compared with the peasants. In the first place, they vote in an isolated group and have 2.5 times greater representation as compared with the rest of the popula-

tion.³ The second time the workers vote together with the peasant mass, but here also they have a weighted representation 2.5 times greater than the peasants. In view of the fact that the workers vote twice, they are guaranteed larger representation than the peasants, although the peasant mass forms about 87 per cent of the population and the workers constitute less than 13 per cent.

Furthermore, the franchise is not direct. For example, the representatives of the city population pass through two stages before they reach the Soviet Congress. The representatives of the rural population pass through four stages.⁴

Finally, in Soviet Russia there is no secret balloting. All elections take place publicly by means of the showing of hands, and must take place in the presence of the elective commission and a representative of the local Soviet. Thus, the Soviet Government can easily control the elective machinery through its agents. The results of this control are surprising: while in the lower stages of the Soviet government system, we observe only a small percentage of Communists, the situation is entirely different in the higher branches of government. In 1922 there were only 6.1 per cent Communists in the village Soviets, the rest being qualified as "non-party" men. In the *volost* Soviet Congresses 11.7 per cent of the deputies were Communists. In the *uyezd* Congress 54.4 per cent of the deputies were Communists. In the provincial congresses 78.8 per cent of the deputies were Communists. In the All-Russian Soviet Congress 94.9 per cent of the deputies were Communists.⁵

3.

WHATEVER may be the advantages or disadvantages of the elective system of the Soviet Government, an understanding of the real character of the modern Soviet system in Russia is not to be found in these technical matters. Of much greater significance is the fact that it is merely decorative in character. The complicated

³ One "elector" corresponding roughly to two "inhabitants" in the Soviet system.

⁴ The indirect system of representation from the village to the *volost* from the *volost* to the province, is similar to the system of Speransky of 1809. See Chap. IX.

⁵ The total number of Communists it must be noted, does not exceed 1 per cent of the whole adult population.

system of Soviet institutions is only a screen, concealing the real rulers of Russia, the Communist party.

The position of the Communist party in the Soviet state cannot be compared with the position of political parties in constitutional states. The Communist party is not simply one of the parties in the country, but is the only party. Other parties are not permitted to exist. The political *régime* of the Soviet state is a dictatorship of the Communist party. In this sense it is nearer to an absolute government than to a constitutional government. This fact explains why the several agencies of supreme power in the Soviet state do not override each others' measures.⁶ All these agencies serve equally to express the will of one single authority, the Communist party. The Communist party, as the real governing class of Soviet Russia, is similar in this respect to the nobility during the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century. All the most important measures of the Soviet Government merely reflect decisions made by the Communist party. Thus, the constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic was first approved by the Central Committee of the Communist party, and was then accepted without modification by the Fifth Congress of Soviets. The substitution of taxation for requisitions in kind⁷ which was the beginning of the N.E.P. was first decided upon at the Tenth Congress of the party in March, 1921, and was then put into execution by the Central Executive Committee of the Eighth Soviet Congress.

The Communist party is a strictly centralized political organization, held together by iron discipline. Its Central Committee and Political Bureau are elected at its Congresses, but between Congresses absolute obedience to the higher authorities is required of all members.⁸ Actually the ruling group is able to prepare and direct the decisions of each party Congress. One of this group is usually empowered with dictatorial authority. Lenin held this unofficial position until his death in 1924 and at present Stalin occupies it.

In order to enter the Communist party it is necessary to pass

⁶ See above, Sec. 1.

⁷ See above, Chap. XVII, Sec. 3.

⁸ Regarding the Opposition within the Communist party, see below, Chap. XX.

through a trial period in the capacity of a candidate. The number of both members of the party and candidates at the present time is about 1,200,000. Members of the party live under the strict surveillance of the party machine. From time to time a "purification" of the party takes place, when undesirable members are expelled.

Members of the Communist party have many privileges in everyday life. But their lives do not belong to themselves. They cannot refuse to perform services demanded of them by the party, which at its will imposes tasks of administration, propaganda, or military duties. The majority of the members of the Communist party belong to the working class—in 1927, 58 per cent. The peasants constitute only 24 per cent of the total party and civil servants 17 per cent. On January 1, 1926, two hundred and fifty thousand Communists belonged to the rural party organizations, while seven hundred and fifty thousand, or about three-fourths of the total number, belonged to city organizations. The Communist party is not simply a group of individuals having political interests in common, but of individuals bound together by a common social philosophy—one might almost say, a common religion.

To the extent that the members of the Communist party are motivated by theories and not by considerations of personal advantage, Communism is to them a substitute for religion and dominates their whole life. The Communist party seeks to establish more than mere political ideals. It seeks to establish an entirely new society. As it is intolerant and fanatical, the Communist party conducts a constant struggle with other religions and the churches, particularly with the Christian faith.

4.

THE influence of the Communist party finds expression, not only in the organization of supreme power in the Soviet state, but also in local government. In theory, local government is in the hands of the Soviets. The inhabitants of each village and each town elect their Soviet. The local Soviets meet in Soviet Congresses, by *volost*, *uyezd*, and province. Each Soviet and Congress of Soviets elects an Executive Committee. These Executive Committees are the local governing bodies. The Central Government does not officially appoint representatives to control the work of the Executive Committees; thus in theory the Soviet system may seem to encour-

age popular self-government. In practice, this is not the case. First, the Soviet Congresses lost all power. They met less and less frequently as time went on. By the Constitution of 1918 local Soviet Congresses (Province) were to meet no less than four times a year, while *volost* Congresses were to meet every month. The constitutional requirements were not carried out; and in the end it was established by law that there should be only one meeting of local Soviet Congresses, which thus lost direct control over local affairs. By the declaration of the Seventh All-Russian Soviet Congress in December, 1919, they became "agencies of agitation and information." At first, the Executive Committees took over the powers of the local Soviet Congresses. They were not merely organs carrying out the will of the Congresses, but had independent powers to veto decisions of the Congresses and to pass their own legislation. With the weakening of the local Soviet Congresses, Soviets both in the towns and villages also lost power.

In large towns membership in the Soviets reached as much as one thousand, and even exceeded this figure in Leningrad and Moscow. Moreover, all the members of unions and of other workers' organizations may attend the meetings of the Soviets and have advisory powers. The town Soviets, under these conditions, have become so unwieldy that they have lost all capacity to accomplish the tasks originally set before them.

Under the Constitution, the town Soviets were to meet once a week, but this rule soon ceased to be observed and meetings became monthly. The town Soviets were regarded as subordinate to the corresponding *uyezd* and Provincial Congresses of Soviets. The town Soviets were deprived of their Executive Committees, and authority between sessions has been granted to the corresponding *uyezd* and provincial Executive Committees. Thus, local self-government in Soviet Russia actually slipped out of the hands of local Soviets and Soviet Congresses, and passed into the hands of the Executive Committees. But matters did not stop here. Just as the real power moved from the Congress of Soviets to their Executive Committees, so it passed from the Executive Committees to the Praesidia of these committees, composed of seven members in the Provincial Congresses and three members in the *uyezd*. The praesidia meanwhile were rapidly transformed into provincial

organs of the Central Government; that is, in the final analysis, the Praesidium of the Central Executive Committee and the Soviet of People's Commissars.

Every local Executive Committee and its Praesidium is bound to follow the decrees of the higher executive committees. Thus the provincial *uyezd* must obey the provincial committees. In its turn each higher executive committee can veto a decision of a lower executive committee. A provincial committee may veto a decision of the *uyezd* committee and the praesidiums of the higher government can impose disciplinary measures upon members of lower executive committees. Thus the whole system of local government became centralized. The local population, by means of its elections, merely supplies the Government with candidates for bureaucratic service. Self-government under the Soviets exists only in theory. In practice there is an intensely centralized government.

The apparent conflicts between these two powers are successfully resolved by a third power, the secret government of the Communist party. The Communist party has local committees corresponding to all governmental Soviets, in provinces, *uyezds*, *volosts*, towns, and villages. With the strict centralization and discipline of the party the local party committees may be counted upon to fulfil the will of the central organs of the party. Local party committees conduct all the work of the local organs and control the elections to the Soviets and the Congress of Soviets, by having communist candidates elected to the local executive committees and praesidiums.

5.

THE Soviet state from its very beginning declared itself to be a federated republic. It had, in fact, to face the centrifugal forces which appeared in Russia following the collapse of the empire. By the Soviet Constitution, several regions received considerable freedom of self-determination. Those are the so-called autonomous republics.⁹ Other regions received a lesser degree of independence. These were the so-called autonomous regions.¹⁰ In fact, these re-

⁹ As for example the Bashkir, the Kirghiz, the Tartar, the Crimean, and others, eleven in all.

¹⁰ In the beginning of 1928, there were twelve. The German Commune on the Volga was an important autonomous region until it was made an autonomous republic.

gions are scarcely different from the provinces into which the main mass of the Soviet territories are divided.¹¹ Only with the creation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (U.S.S.R.) in 1923, the importance of the autonomous regions was increased in view of the fact that they received representation in the second chamber of the Central Executive Committee.

The Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic came into being in the territories left to Russia by the Brest-Litovsk peace, i.e., without the Ukraine, but following the defeat of Germany in the World War, the question of the separate existence of the Ukraine was reopened. In the midst of the civil war the Ukraine passed from one side to the other until it was occupied by Soviet troops following the defeat of Denikin. The Soviet Government recognizes only formally the separate existence of the Ukrainian Republic. The Constitution of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic was passed by the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets on March 10, 1919. The final organization of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic was completed in December, 1919. At the same time a White-Russian Republic was created. The Constitution of this new republic was accepted by the White-Russian Soviet Congress on February 4, 1919. It was actually organized in August, 1920, in the midst of the Polish war. Undoubtedly its formation was caused by the need of attracting the sympathies of White Russia to the Soviet cause.

In the course of 1920-21 socialist republics were formed in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia.¹² At the same time the Soviet Government concluded a treaty with Khiva and Bokhara. This treaty recognized the Bokhara and Khorezm (Khiva) independent republics. These new organisms introduced confusion into the political structure of the Soviet state. For this reason the relations between the separate Soviet republics were reformed at the end of 1922, and on July 6, 1923, the new Constitution of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was passed.

At the end of 1928 the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was composed of the following component parts: (1) Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic; (2) Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Re-

¹¹ The division of the state into *gubernias* (provinces) was retained from the empire with small changes.

¹² See below, Chap. XIX, Sec. 3.

public; (3) White-Russian Socialist Soviet Republic; (4) Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic; (5) Uzbek Socialist Soviet Republic; (6) Turcoman Socialist Soviet Republic. The Russian and the Transcaucasian republics are federative. The others are units. The Transcaucasian Federative Republic was formed in the end of 1922 by the merging of the separate Transcaucasian republics. The Uzbek and Turcoman republics were formed in 1924, in place of the Trans-Caspian region and the Khorezm and Bokhara republics.

The organization of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics necessitated corresponding changes in the political structure of the Soviet state. Each of the six important republics of the union has a government organization similar to the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. In each of the six republics of the union there is a Congress of Soviets, a Central Executive Committee, and a Soviet of People's Commissars. But the supreme organ of power in the present union is the All-Union Congress of Soviets. The All-Union Central Executive Committee has approximately the same power as the former All-Russian Central Executive Committee. It is now composed of two chambers: The All-Union Soviet and the Soviet of Nationalities. The All-Union Soviet is composed of about four hundred members, representing the united republics and elected in proportion to the population of each republic. The Soviet of Nationalities is composed of representatives of allied and autonomous socialist republics at the rate of five for each, and representatives of the autonomous regions of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic at the rate of one for each.

The All-Union Soviet of People's Commissars consists only of the chiefs of the union commissariats. These included foreign affairs, war and marine, trade, communications, posts and telegraphs, labor, finance, the Supreme Council of National Economy, and Workers and Peasants' Inspection. The Soviet federal system differs as much from European or American federalism as does Soviet parliamentarianism from the corresponding democratic institutions in western Europe and America. Soviet federalism is of a special kind. At the basis of each allied republic there is the same class principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat which is in

reality the dictatorship of the Communist party. Following the formation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics the Russian Communist party was changed into the "All-Union Communist party." But even following this change in name, the Communist party continues to be centralized, and for this reason Soviet federalism is not as loose as it seems. The Communist party is the unifying force of the individual Soviet republics. It is interesting to note that in almost all the separate republics of the Union the Communist party contains a larger proportion of Russian members than of natives of the republic. Nevertheless, federalism in the Soviet Union is less artificial than is its parliamentarianism. The forces of local patriotism in the enormous territories of Russia proved to be too strong. Local patriotism provides a firm basis for Soviet federalism. Whatever may be the future political structure of Russia, it is likely that federalism in Russia will not disappear but, on the contrary, develop.

6.

IN contrast to the majority of modern constitutions, the Soviet Constitution did not support the principles of civil equality and personal freedom. The principle of equality in Soviet law is replaced by the principle of class distinction. Society is divided into the "workers" and the "non-workers."¹³ This principle was applied in its crudest form during "war communism" in the distribution of food to the various categories of the population. The division of society into classes was retained after the termination of "war communism." It has been noted above that the non-workers are deprived of political rights. The workers moreover, have other privileges, for example, the Soviet courts are inclined in practice to mitigate, and sometimes to suspend the punishment of workers of proletarian origin, even though they be accused of ordinary criminal offenses. Furthermore, the workers and their children have the privilege of priority in receiving higher education and special workers' faculties are organized for their benefit. Both the workers and the non-workers however have been deprived of the right of freedom from invasion of personal rights and of the home, and

¹³ The "non-workers," according to the communist doctrine, include a number of categories which would not be so regarded outside of Soviet Russia, as for example, industrialists and merchants.

only following the N.E.P. did they receive a limited right to the protection of their private property. The Soviet Government authorized its organs and particularly the Extraordinary Commission (Cheka) to make arrests and carry out executions of citizens without any prescribed procedure. Following the N.E.P., the Cheka was dissolved and replaced by the so-called G.P.U. in 1922, but this was only a change in name. The agents of the G.P.U. have full power to make arrests without special warrant, of all counter-revolutionists, bandits, and smugglers, if seized in the commission of the crime. In all other cases arrests may be made on the sole authority of the higher organs of the G.P.U. In theory, the arrested individual must be either released or tried within two months of his detention, but by special authorization of the Central Executive Committee the further "isolation" of the prisoner may be permitted.

The security of the home was for a long time denied by the Soviet Government. Government and party authorities had the right forcibly to eject people from their habitations and to replace them with other tenants.¹⁴ In 1922 a decree was issued announcing that the right to eject tenants from their domiciles was only to be exercised by order of a court, but the decree did not prevent the forcible intrusion of individuals into the dwellings of others, if deemed too spacious for their occupants. During the period of "war communism" private property, both real and personal, was subject to nationalization, requisition, and confiscation at the will of the government agencies, and without any accounting or responsibility. The decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars of October 17, 1921, recognized the principle of punitive requisition, and permitted the application of this type of punishment both to the courts and to the administrative organs.

There is no freedom of the press in the Soviet state. By the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, all the facilities for the publication of books and newspapers were handed over to the "working classes and to the poorer peasantry," that is, actually into the hands of the Communist party and the Soviet Government. All private publications were suppressed in

¹⁴ The members of the Workers' Unions had the right to occupy apartments in the best houses in the center of the city.

the autumn of 1918. With the N.E.P. the Soviet Government was forced to allow private publishing, but this was subjected to strict censorship. Works containing agitation against the Soviet Government, works stimulating public opinion by means of false statements or stimulating religious or nationalistic fanaticism, are forbidden. Every publication must have the approval of the censor marked upon it. Only the publications of the Communist International, the Central Committee, and local committees of the Communist party, the publications of the State Publishing House, the official newspaper, the "Izvestia," and the scientific treatises of the Academy of Science, are free from censorship.

The Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic recognizes the right of citizens to free assembly, and even undertakes to supply the workers and peasants with suitable meeting places. Actually, however, no public meeting can take place unless it is permitted by the Communist party or by the Government. Even the meetings of scientific societies can take place only with the express permission of the Government. Likewise, before the calling of any congresses, whether local or national, permission of the appropriate government agencies must be secured.

No political parties, with the exception of the Communist party, are sanctioned by the Soviet state. The existence of societies and unions was especially authorized by the decree of 1922, but on the condition that the Commissariat of Home Affairs should grant permission.

Freedom of conscience practically does not exist in the Soviet state. In the eyes of the Communist party, "religion is opium for the people," and for this reason the Soviet Government attempts to restrict the activity of the church and to give every possible advantage to anti-religious propaganda against the church. The doctrine of materialism is the state religion of communism. In theory, the church in the Soviet state is separated from the Government. As a matter of fact, the church is oppressed. It is deprived of its legal rights. It is not regarded as a juridical person, and cannot, for this reason, own property. The property of all churches, that is to say, principally of the Orthodox church, was seized by the Soviet Government in 1918. Local Soviets were given authority to turn over church buildings to "cults," but the rights

of these "cults" to the church property were revocable. The higher organization of the church, whether centralized or local, was not recognized by Soviet law, and was forbidden.¹⁵ The clergy fell into the non-worker category, and were further deprived of special rights; for example, priests were forbidden to have any position in schools or any posts connected with public education, the departments of justice, agriculture, food supply, or to take part in the coöperative movement.

Thus the Soviet Government left to its citizens very limited rights. However, even these rights are subject to invasion, in case a condition of siege or of war is announced. The decree regarding the "Extraordinary Measures of Defense of the Revolution," was issued on March 8, 1923.¹⁶ This decree contains the worst elements of imperial legislation during the period of the reaction of the eighties. According to the decree of 1923, extraordinary measures are introduced in case of counter-revolution or of opposition by the population to legal operations of the Government. A state of martial law is declared, in case a given territory becomes a scene of military activity, and also in case the "extraordinary situation" rules are insufficient to safeguard the revolution. The decree of 1923 does not in any way limit the powers of the government agencies to announce an extraordinary or military situation. Extraordinary measures are taken when they may be found necessary by the corresponding government agencies; that is, in fact, when they may be found necessary by the leaders of the Communist party.

¹⁵ Actually the organization of various churches continued to exist. The condition of the Orthodox church was the worst of all, but in 1927 it received semi-recognition.

¹⁶ During the first years of the existence of the Soviet Government, this decree regarding "extraordinary measures" was unnecessary, since the whole situation was regarded as "extraordinary."

CHAPTER XIX.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SOVIET RUSSIA TO 1924

I.

BOTH the foreign policy and the internal policy of Soviet Russia are controlled by the Communist party. The official representatives of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics are as a matter of fact not representatives of Russia but of the Communist party. While the Communist party within the territories of Soviet Russia is a single centralized political body, in international affairs, the Russian Communist party is only one of the component parts of the political organization of the Third International.

The Third International is the organized international Communist party, with its headquarters at Moscow. It was impossible to organize the Communist International until the termination of the World War. The Bolsheviks employed the last months of the war to spread communist propaganda among war prisoners in Russia. Immediately after the war was ended they hastened to organize the Third International. The announcement of the First Congress of the International was issued by Lenin and Trotsky on January 24, 1919.¹ The First Congress of the Third International met at Moscow in March, 1919. A long manifesto was issued to the working people of the world. Chiefs of its various departments were elected. The first period of activity of the International was marked by an attempt to incite communist revolutions in all countries outside of Russia. Revolutions indeed took place in Hungary and Bavaria, but were soon crushed.² Revolutions were also planned in England and the United States.

¹ It coincided with the Prinkipo invitation of President Wilson. See above, Chap. XVI, Sec. 6.

² The Communist Government of Bela Kun in Hungary lasted from March 21 till August 1, 1919. On April 7, 1919, a Bavarian Soviet Government was established for a still shorter time.

With the failure of the postwar revolutionary movement, the Bolsheviks launched a systematic program of propaganda in foreign countries. After the Second Congress of the Third International in July, 1920, a new plan was followed. The International, with its headquarters in Moscow, directed communist propaganda over the whole world, which, for convenience, was divided into special areas of propaganda. Europe was divided into six such areas. The sums expended upon the preparation of a "world revolution" were considerable, but are difficult to estimate with accuracy. By 1923 the budget of the Communist International was not less than \$100,000,000. It is intended to be a potential Soviet World Government, but at present it is merely a supplement to the Russian Soviet Government. In theory Moscow became the center of a communist world.

The Communist party expended great efforts in propaganda among Asiatic peoples. The leaders of the party and of the Soviet Government began a feverish activity in training revolutionary leaders for the peoples of Asia. The Asiatics showed themselves ready to listen to the call, in view of their growing irritation against Europeans, who possessed economic and political privileges in the East. The revolutionary appeals of Bolshevik agitators met at first with considerable success in Asia, but they were greatly handicapped by an excessive insistence upon communist doctrine and its violent opposition to all religion. Mohammedanism showed itself to be stronger than communism at the Congress of Eastern Peoples in Baku, in September, 1920. Zinoviev's speech against religion aroused the indignation of the Mohammedans.

Neither in the Middle nor in the Near East, in Persia, or in Turkey was the existing organization of society suited to the adoption of communism. As the Russian revolution showed, the communist doctrine was most attractive to the workers and some of the intellectuals. There were neither workers nor a great number of intellectuals in Persia or in Turkey.

Great Britain greatly feared communist propaganda in India, but the strong religious feeling of the peoples of India served as a decisive barrier against the growth of the communist idea. A different situation existed in China, where the influence of Russian communism has been greater than in Persia or Turkey. Con-

siderable numbers of Chinese intellectuals, as well as a portion of the laboring class, have accepted communism. The left wing of the Chinese Kuomintang has demonstrated its sympathy with communism. A Chinese Communist party has been formed and has entered into the organization of the Communist International.³

2.

BESIDES the international problems of world revolution, the Communist party has certain national problems, chiefly the protection of the territories of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. While the communist theory denies the existence of purely national problems, the requirements of practical politics have led the Russian Communists to support the unity of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, just as they were forced to recognize the rights of nationalities within the Union. The Communist leaders tried to mask their nationalism, by appealing for the defense of the so-called "socialist fatherland" of the working classes. The slogan of "socialist fatherland" was first declared by Trotsky during the Soviet-German negotiations in the beginning of 1918. It did not prevent the communist from concluding a disastrous peace with Germany, one of the conditions being the separation of the Ukraine from Russia.⁴ Following the collapse of Germany and the withdrawal of German troops from South Russia, the territories of the Ukraine became the object of conquest by both sides during the civil war; each regarded the Ukraine practically as part of Russia.⁵ With the victory of the Soviets, the Ukraine became part of the federated Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

However, the southwestern frontier of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics does not coincide with the former boundaries of the Russian Empire. Bessarabia was occupied by Rumanian troops in the spring of 1918, but the Soviet Government has not, to this day, abandoned its claims to Bessarabia. In 1924 a special Moldavian Soviet Republic was formed within the territories of the Ukraine, to serve as a political magnet to the peoples in Bessarabia.

Farther to the north, considerable portions of Russian territory, populated by Russians, have been ceded by the Soviet Government

³ See below, Chap. XX, Secs. 4 and 7.

⁴ See above, Chap. XV, Sec. 7.

⁵ Although the Soviet Government officially recognized the Ukraine as an independent state, see above, Chap. XVIII, Sec. 5.

to Poland, by the Peace of 1921.⁶ North of Poland the frontier of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics follows the lines laid down at the Brest-Litovsk peace. In 1920 the Soviet Government concluded treaties of peace with Esthonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Finland.

3.

IN the east the Soviet Government did not succeed in fixing its frontiers as soon as it did in the west, but it eventually reached nearly the former frontiers of the Russian state.

Let us first examine the Soviet policy in the Near and the Middle East.

The policy of the Soviet Government was least successful with respect to Turkey. According to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Russia ceded Batum, Kars, and Ardagan to Turkey. Batum, as well as Transcaucasia generally, was first occupied by British troops;⁷ later Batum was taken by Soviet troops; and finally was retained by Russia. Kars and Ardagan were actually ceded to Turkey.

The British occupation of Transcaucasia was officially temporary in character. It cannot be denied, however, that in 1919 British diplomacy had far-reaching ambitions in the Middle East. On August 9, 1919, an Anglo-Persian agreement was concluded at Teheran, which practically introduced a British protectorate over Persia. In November, 1919, Lord Curzon made a speech in which he referred to "the British lion standing forth as the proud and valiant champion of the rights and liberties of Persia." British troops were stationed at Enzeli and Meshed. A small force entered Russian Turkestan, occupying Merv and defeating the Soviet forces, composed in part of Hungarian war prisoners, at Dushakh. Some British officers were considering plans for establishing British rule over the whole of Turkestan; but the instability of the political situation in England, and in part, the propaganda of the Communist International in England, forced the British to abandon their Central Asiatic plans. In 1920 British troops were withdrawn from Turkestan, Transcaucasia, and northern Persia.⁸

The departure of the British meant the firm establishment of

⁶ See above, Chap. XVI.

⁷ See above, Chap. XVI.

⁸ The Anglo-Persian agreement of 1919 was not ratified by the Persian parliament and was never enforced.

Soviet rule in the Middle East. In Azerbaijan (Baku) and Armenia, Soviet republics were established as early as 1920. At the same time the Republic of Georgia concluded a treaty of peace with the Soviet Government. In the following year there occurred a communist revolution in Georgia, engineered by Moscow, which proclaimed a Soviet republic. In 1922-23 the Transcaucasian Soviet republics, as has been said above,⁹ formed the Transcaucasian Federative Soviet Republic, and entered into the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

In Turkestan the Soviet Government had to deal with an uprising of natives, the so-called "Basmachi." The movement was Pan-Turanian and Pan-Mohammedan. It was led by the famous Turkish general, Enver Pasha, who came to Turkestan in the guise of a friend of the Soviet but subsequently joined the Basmachi. The position of the Soviet Government was at one time so precarious that the best Soviet strategist, Kamenev, had to be put in charge of operations. Kamenev succeeded in suppressing the uprising in July, 1922. Enver Pasha was killed.

The Soviet Government, upon getting control of the situation, introduced administrative reforms in Turkestan which granted a certain degree of autonomy on the basis of workers' representation. In the spring of 1921 an autonomous Soviet Government was formed in Tashkent. In Khiva and Bokhara republics were formed with which the Soviet Government entered into treaty relations in 1920-21. Several years later Khiva and Bokhara were merged into the Uzbek Soviet Republic and entered into the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.¹⁰

While reestablishing the former Russian boundary in the Middle East, the Soviet Government pursued a new policy with respect to Persia. On February 26, 1921, it concluded a treaty with Persia, according to which the Soviet Government renounced the "imperialist policy of the former governments of Russia."¹¹ It rescinded all former conventions and treaties concluded between the two powers and between Russia and third powers respecting Persia. The Soviet Government handed over to Persia the railroad from Djulfa to Tavriz, which had been constructed and owned by Rus-

⁹ Chap. XVIII, Sec. 5.

¹⁰ See above, Chap. XVIII, Sec. 5.

¹¹ The same ideas were expressed by the Soviet Government in the treaty with Turkey of March 18, 1921.

sians. It also handed over the military roads from Enzeli to Teheran and from Kazvin to Hamadan, and the funds of the Loan Bank of Persia. The Soviet Government likewise withdrew all claims to Russian loans to Persia. The fishing industry of the southern coast of the Caspian Sea was to be discussed at a future conference which would fix the terms for its exploitation, but the Soviet Government retained the right to exploit these fisheries. The Caspian fisheries were the subject of prolonged negotiations and misunderstandings between Persia and Russia. Only in October, 1927, was an agreement finally concluded, by the terms of which the Caspian fisheries are to be exploited by a Russo-Persian company, under a Persian chairman, for the next twenty-five years, the produce being divided equally between the two countries.

4.

AFTER the defeat of Kolchak in western Siberia,¹² the Soviet Government was not in a position to undertake immediately the conquest of the whole of eastern Siberia. During the year 1920, it was occupied with the Polish War and the struggle with Wrangel in southern Russia. The Allied troops and the Czechoslovaks left Vladivostok toward the spring of 1920.¹³ Only the Japanese continued to occupy Vladivostok and the coast, while Ataman Semenov, who was their agent, maintained control of the Transbaikalian region. The remnants of Kolchak's army retreated to the Manchurian border. The Soviet Government decided to form a buffer state east of Lake Baikal. On May 14, 1920, the "Far Eastern Republic," with its capital at Chita, was recognized by the Soviet Government. Its first Prime Minister was Krasnoshchekov (Tobelson), formerly a Chicago lawyer. Immediately following its formation the new republic registered protest against the continued presence of Japanese troops in eastern Siberia, and against the support granted by the Japanese to the remnants of the White forces. Simultaneously, the "Far Eastern Republic" requested the Soviet Government to support it. Soviet troops entered Chita in the autumn of 1920. Meanwhile, Japanese policy was vacillating and undecided. In the spring of 1921, the Japanese Government

¹² See above, Chap. XVI, Sec. 10.

¹³ The last American troops withdrew on April 1, 1920.

gave its support to the formation of an anti-Bolshevik government in Vladivostok. The military forces of the Vladivostok government consisted of the remnants of the Whites who were, however, disarmed by the Japanese before being admitted to the coastal region. In September, 1921, Japan opened negotiations with the Far Eastern Republic at Dairen. Negotiations broke down and were followed by the conferences at Washington in February, 1922, and Changchun (September, 1922). Japan finally announced that she would voluntarily withdraw her troops from the mainland of Siberia by the end of October, 1922. The only question remaining unsettled was the Japanese claim to the northern portion of the island of Sakhalin.¹⁴

Without Japanese support the government at Vladivostok was incapable of resisting the Bolsheviks. The remnants of the White forces were evacuated to Shanghai, and Vladivostok was occupied by Soviet troops. The Far Eastern Republic was now of no more use to Moscow. On November 13, 1922, the "National Assembly" of the Republic, voted the transfer of all power to a revolutionary committee appointed by the Soviet Government. The Far Eastern Republic ceased to exist.

The Soviet Government concluded a treaty with Japan on January 20, 1925. According to this treaty both parties reaffirmed the terms of the Peace of Portsmouth. Japan abandoned North Sakhalin, but the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics agreed to grant a number of concessions to Japan in the northern half of the island.

5.

THE Soviet Government in its relations with China had to consider two complex problems left unsettled by Imperial Russia: the question of the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the question of Mongolia.

During the World War, in 1915, a tripartite agreement was concluded between China, Outer Mongolia, and Russia which established a joint protectorate of China and Russia over Mongolia. During the Russian upheaval in 1919, the Chinese Republic decided to revise the Mongolian situation by annexing Mongolia to

¹⁴ The northern half of Sakhalin was occupied by Japanese troops in the summer of 1920.

China, but the civil war in Siberia soon had its effect upon Mongolia. A part of the Russian White armies were driven by the Bolsheviks, in the beginning of 1920, into Mongolia. Neither the Mongolian nor the Chinese authorities were capable of preventing this. Soon after, the Soviet troops intervened in Mongolia in order to crush the last vestiges of the White Army. At the instigation of the Soviet Government a revolution was enacted in Mongolia and a revolutionary government set up. On November 5, 1921, a treaty of friendship between the new Mongolian Government and the Soviet Government was concluded. No mention of China was made in this treaty, a circumstance which provoked great indignation among Chinese ruling groups.

Another problem facing the Soviet Government in China, was the management of the Chinese Eastern Railroad. The declaration of 1919 announced the complete abandonment by the Soviet Government of its rights to the railroad. This declaration was made at the time when Siberia was under the control of the White armies, and the Chinese Eastern Railroad was being managed by an Allied Commission. The Soviet Government gave up something that it did not possess itself, but when the situation changed a year later, the attitude of the Soviet Government toward the Chinese Eastern Railroad changed also. When the Soviet troops occupied Vladivostok, the problem of the Chinese Eastern Railroad again assumed the importance that it formerly had—that of a short route between two portions of Russian territory. The Soviet representative, Joffe, in 1922, frankly informed the Chinese Government of the new point of view of the Soviet Government. At the same time the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Mongolia, and the recognition of Chinese sovereignty in Mongolia. The negotiations between Joffe and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs ended in nothing. Only in 1924 did Karakhan, the new Soviet representative, succeed in concluding an agreement by yielding to China on the Mongolian issue. According to the fifth article of the agreement, the Soviet Government "recognizes that Outer-Mongolia is an integral part of the republic of China and respects China's sovereignty therein." The Soviet Government also promised to withdraw from Mongolia. With respect to Manchuria and the Chinese Eastern

Railroad, the Soviet Government and China agreed to regard the railroad as a purely commercial enterprise and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics recognized China's jurisdiction and police control over the territories owned by the railroad. The Soviet Government also affirmed China's right to purchase the railroad. The management of the railroad is in the hands of a board of directors, half of whom are appointed by the Chinese Government and half by the Soviet Government. The chairman is to be appointed by the Chinese. The question was not completely solved by this treaty in view of the claims of the creditors of the railroad, including the United States and Japan, and the former Russo-Asiatic Bank. Furthermore, the demands of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the then dictator of Manchuria, had to be considered. On September 30, 1924, the Soviet Government concluded a treaty with Chang Tso-lin, regarding the Chinese Eastern Railroad, on approximately the same terms as the former agreement, but the question cannot be regarded as completely solved at the present time.

6.

IN attempting to protect its frontier the Soviet Government—like any *bourgeois* state—followed the practice of seeking to conclude commercial and political treaties both with its neighbors and other states. The first impetus in this direction was given by the "new economic policy," and was marked by a commercial treaty between Great Britain and Soviet Russia on March 16, 1921. The N.E.P. program envisaged the granting of concessions to foreigners.

The drift of European diplomacy at this time corresponded to the intention of the Soviets. In 1922 Europe had not yet recovered from the war. Neither political organization nor economic welfare had yet been stabilized. The majority of European statesmen did not believe the reconstruction of Europe possible without the restoration of normal relations with Russia. The leading exponent of this point of view was David Lloyd George. "There will be no peace in Europe before peace with Russia is concluded." Public opinion in the industrial countries of Europe was that Russia was indispensable, both as a source of raw materials and as a market for the products of European factories. No importance was attrib-

uted to the consideration whether a communist or a capitalist government was in control of Russia. Relations were to be reopened immediately. A competition arose among the several European countries; each was afraid of missing the right moment for renewal of relations with Russia. Also, the victorious Powers were afraid that Germany might obtain a monopoly in Russian trade. Soviet diplomacy played skilfully upon this fear among the western Powers.

The session of the Supreme Council of the *Entente* at Cannes on January 6, 1922, was the first step toward restoration of relations with Soviet Russia. Conditions were discussed which might make possible the economic reconstruction of the countries prostrated by the war, Russia being the chief subject of the deliberations. The two principal conditions were the following: (1) Recognition of all previous debts and obligations; (2) development of a normal financial and trade organization. Simultaneously the Supreme Council accepted the principle of non-interference in the economic life of each country.

The succeeding conference which opened in Genoa on April 10, 1922, was the first international diplomatic gathering to include representatives of the Soviet Government. The first declarations of the Soviet delegates were businesslike, and led the European statesmen to hope that an agreement of some kind might be possible. In tentative and preliminary terms, Chicherin declared himself ready to recognize both the prewar and the war debts of Russia, and either to return confiscated property to foreign owners or to give them compensation. In return he required immediate *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Government, and large credits. He also advanced some counterclaims for damages caused by Allied intervention in Russia during the civil war. Differences became apparent among the Allies with regard to Chicherin's proposals. Great Britain and Italy were willing to examine them, while France and Belgium refused even to discuss them. The question concerning former French and Belgian concessions in South Russia was at the bottom of this disagreement. Lloyd George was trying to secure economic privileges for Great Britain through a direct agreement with the Soviet Government. The entire production and export of Russian oil was to become a monopoly of the

Royal Dutch-Shell Company. When these negotiations became known to the public, the American "observer" warned the conference that the United States would insist on an "open door" policy with regard to Russian oil.

Conflicts of interest among the Allies caused the failure of the Genoa Conference, which was aggravated by the fact that on April 16, 1922, in Rapallo, the Soviet Government concluded a separate agreement with Germany. This treaty disposed of all mutual claims of the two countries regarding compensation for war damages. Germany abandoned the support of claims of German citizens for compensation for property confiscated by the Soviet Government "provided the Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic does not satisfy similar claims of other states." Full diplomatic and consular relations between Germany and Russia were to be resumed. Article V of the treaty provided: "The two Governments shall mutually assist each other in supplying the economic requirements of the two countries. . . . The German Government declares itself ready to facilitate as far as possible the conclusion and execution of economic contracts between private enterprises in the two countries."

Questions which had not been settled by the Genoa Conference were left to "commissions of experts" which were summoned to meet at The Hague in June and July, 1922. By this time, however, an irreconcilable attitude was assumed in Moscow because of the previous failure to reach an agreement with the "capitalistic" governments. The Soviet representatives came to The Hague in this uncompromising mood. For that reason The Hague Conference also was a failure, although the representatives of the *Entente* seemed to be more ready for an understanding with the Soviets.

7.

IN spite of the failure of two consecutive conferences, the Soviet Government received in the autumn of the same year an invitation to a new international gathering at Lausanne. Its primary aims were to discuss the problem of the Straits of the Dardanelles and to conclude a permanent treaty with Turkey. Soviet Russia and Turkey came to Lausanne with a common program. They both demanded that the Straits be closed to all military vessels except

those of Turkey. The British, on the contrary, wished the Straits to remain open to military as well as commercial vessels of all nations. The possibility of keeping the Caucasian ports and especially Batum, the outlet for the oil of Baku, under British control, was the underlying reason for this attitude. A compromise was finally reached, thanks to the mediation of France. Military vessels were allowed to pass through the Straits, provided their total tonnage should not exceed the tonnage of the navy of the principal naval power on the Black Sea, that is, Russia. The Turkish delegates accepted this proposal without previous agreement with the Soviet representatives. Chicherin then refused to sign the treaty and warned the Powers that the question could not be regarded as solved without the participation of Russia, the Ukraine, and Georgia.

It seemed that the Lausanne Conference would have no practical results. However, Soviet diplomacy was tempted by the opportunity to sign an international treaty, in common with other Powers, which could be considered a kind of *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Government by the other signatories of the treaty. Therefore, at the end of July, 1923, the Soviet representatives agreed to sign at Constantinople the treaty as worked out at Lausanne. They announced, however, that they reserved their right to make new proposals later concerning the Straits, since they regarded the prevailing *régime* as unsatisfactory.

CHAPTER XX.

SOVIET DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE DEATH OF LENIN

I.

LENIN was absolute dictator in Russia during the first years of the Bolshevik *régime*. On May 25, 1922, he had a stroke. By October of the same year, he had regained his health and resumed his work; but at the end of November his condition became worse. In March, 1923, he had a second stroke which deprived him of speech. He died on January 21, 1924.

For some time after his death, the spirit of Lenin continued to rule over Russia. His words became a Bible of communism, in which his followers sought political guidance. No speech by a party orator could omit a quotation from Lenin. His tomb in Moscow was made a communist shrine. Petrograd, "city of Peter the Great" was renamed Leningrad, "city of Lenin."

The death of Lenin, however, raised the question as to who should become leader of the Communist party of Russia, as well as head of the Soviet Government. At first a triumvirate, consisting of Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Stalin, replaced Lenin—all three Bolsheviks of long standing. Kamenev, whose real name was Rosenfeld, was the least revolutionary in temper and at the same time the most educated. Zinoviev, whose name was Apfelbaum, was an insolent man without either moral principles or great ability. He attained a leading position in the party chiefly because of his servile attitude toward Lenin. Stalin, a Georgian, whose real name was Djugashvili, was a man of firm will and undeniable organizing ability, which brought him to a prominent position in the Soviet Government.

The most prominent leader, next to Lenin, and the most brilliant orator of the Russian revolution, was undoubtedly Trotsky. He was, however, deposed from power by the "Triumvirate," against

whom he soon started an opposition movement. In his policy, personal motives were mixed with reasons of principle. He was never an orthodox Communist. During the Revolution of 1905 and the years following, he wavered between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, in many cases joining with the latter. It was only after the Revolution of March, 1917, that he finally fell in line with the Bolsheviks, and subsequently became one of the leaders of the Bolshevik uprising. But even after that, on many occasions Trotsky expressed views which were not approved either by Lenin or by the majority of the Communist party. It was therefore rather unexpected that, following Lenin's death, Trotsky should become an exponent of the ideas of pure communism. He charged Zinoviev and Kamenev with lack of true revolutionary spirit, pointing out that two weeks before the Bolshevik uprising Zinoviev and Kamenev voted against it in the central Committee of the Communist party. Trotsky's accusations evoked intense debates among the communist leaders. Various factions arose within the party, and Trotsky became a leader of the opposition to its Central Committee.

2.

ADHERENTS of Trotsky accused the party majority of *bourgeois* tendencies, and proclaimed themselves the guardians of pure communism. The new economic policy, or N.E.P., was the chief target of Trotsky's opposition. It has been mentioned that as early as 1922, when Lenin was still alive, the party Congress declared the "retreat on the economic front" to be completed. But a year after Lenin's death a new period of compromises began, mainly in regard to the peasants.

By the spring of 1925, relations between the Soviet Government and the peasants had become very strained. The chief theorist of the Communist party, Bukharin, editor of the *Pravda*, admitted that in spite of the N.E.P., the effects of "war communism" could still be observed in village economy. The peasants had no confidence that the restoration of their farms would be secure under the Soviet *régime*. Two years later, at the beginning of 1927, Stalin also was willing to confess that before 1925 the peasant problem had been pressing heavily on the Communist party: "Our agents in the villages were killed and their houses set on fire by

the peasants. . . . In some places, especially in the border regions, we had to fight the activities of organized bands; and we had to suppress a real peasant uprising in Georgia."

In view of these facts, the Soviet Government decided to carry out a policy more favorable to the peasants. The fourteenth party conference, in the spring of 1925, approved this new peasant policy. "The chief problem now is how to rally the middle groups of the peasants around labor; we have to conquer the sympathies of the middle groups of the peasants." Such were the views of Stalin when he defined the party aims at the conference. Simultaneously, Kalinin, Chairman of the Soviet Federation, and Rykov, the Prime Minister of the Soviet Government, spoke very strongly in favor of farm relief.

The new peasant policy of the Soviet Government, conceived as a further development of the N.E.P., evoked a fresh outburst of opposition within the Communist party. The situation became more dangerous for the unity of the party because two leading members of the Soviets, Zinoviev and Kamenev, also joined the opposition. The critics treated the new peasant policy as an example of abandonment by the Soviet leaders of pure communism. While the Central Committee of the party justified its policy as a means of union with the middle groups of the peasants, the opposition leaders accused the Committee of giving relief to the richer peasants. It is interesting to know what the Soviet leaders mean in classifying the peasant groups. According to the data presented to the Fifteenth Congress of the party, the "poorest peasants" group has an annual income per capita of \$39, while the middle group has \$46 and the group of "richer peasants" \$88 per capita. Besides this, the opposition charged the majority leaders with despotism in the party management. They asked that the Political Bureau be deprived of its autocratic power. The opposition leaders voiced sharp criticisms against the majority during the Fourteenth Congress of the party in December, 1925. The congress, however, approved the policy of the Central Committee. Stalin, victorious over the opposition, did not yet consider it necessary to take any punitive measures against its leaders. He confined himself to the following warning: "The Party desires unity, and it will achieve it with Kamenev and Zinoviev if they wish it, or without them if they do not wish it."

3.

SOVIET foreign policy after Lenin's death followed the same two lines marked out by Lenin. On the one hand, there was the line of the Communist International, toward world revolution; and on the other hand, the line of the N.E.P. in foreign relations—that is, toward *bourgeois* aims, trade agreements, and *de jure* recognition. The year 1924 was one of active Soviet policy in both these directions. The chief promoter of the N.E.P., Krassin, speaking at the Thirteenth Conference of the Communist party in January, 1924, argued that the aid of foreign capital was indispensable to prevent the bankruptcy of the Soviet *régime*. "To obtain foreign help, it is necessary, however," he added, "to assume a more peaceful attitude, and to lower the banner of the World Revolution."

The Communist International did not accept Krassin's point of view. On the contrary, Zinoviev, who was its President at that time, expressed a belief that a new wave of international revolution was rising. The Fifth Congress of the Communist International, which took place in Moscow during June and July, 1924, fully approved this point of view, and adopted an irreconcilable policy. In spite of this frame of mind among the communist leaders, precisely at the same time official European diplomacy showed willingness to accord *de jure* recognition to the Soviet Government. This was partly due to the fact that European public opinion was entirely unaware of the change in communist policy, and on the contrary, expected further concessions on the part of Soviet diplomacy.

The victory of the Labor and Radical parties in the British and French elections also created a tendency in the same direction. Great Britain was first to give *de jure* recognition to the Soviet Government. As early as the end of 1923, such recognition was included in the platform of the Labor party in England. After the victory of the party, the Labor Cabinet of MacDonald, at its first meeting on February 1, 1924, voted to fulfil the pledge. Italy, Norway, Austria, Greece, and Sweden followed the lead of Great Britain within two months. However, the recognition of Soviet Russia by Great Britain was not unconditional, and led to prolonged negotiations. First of all, the British note accorded recognition only within those parts of the former Russian Empire which

were willing to accept Soviet authority. Second, the British Government required the Soviets to recognize the pre-Soviet debts of Russia. Finally, it asked the Soviet Government to abstain from anti-British propaganda, especially in the Orient. In April, 1924, a Soviet delegation came to London for the purpose of negotiating with the British Government. For several months, however, the negotiations brought no results. While the British demanded Soviet recognition of Russian debts, the Soviet delegates asked for a loan which would enable their Government to begin to pay these debts. Not until August 8, 1924, was an agreement signed. It was a strange document, leaving unsettled almost all the important questions. The two parties decided only to try to reach a real agreement later.

MacDonald's attempts to enter into friendly relations with the Soviets, proving thus unsuccessful, only contributed to his unpopularity. On October 8, 1924, he was defeated in Parliament, and was obliged to dissolve the House, setting new elections for October 29. A few days before the elections, what purported to be a secret letter of Zinoviev was published in the English newspapers. This letter, comprising instructions for the preparation of a communist uprising in England, evoked great indignation among the voters, and contributed to the victory of the Conservatives over the Labor party.¹ The new Conservative Government canceled the agreement of August 8, 1924, but did not withdraw the recognition accorded on February 1. So this period of Soviet-British relations was crowned by a strange compromise. Formally, diplomatic recognition remained in force; but, as a matter of fact, it led only to complete estrangement between the two sides.

In spite of the British failure, France followed the example of England. In May, 1924, the Left Bloc, headed by Herriot, won the elections. On October 28, the French Government extended *de jure* recognition to the Soviet Government. The question of Russian indebtedness to France was not, however, solved, and subsequent negotiations proved futile. Meanwhile in France, as in England, secret communist instructions were published which left no doubt of revolutionary propaganda on the part of the Communist International. French soldiers in Morocco, where a war was

¹ The authenticity of the letter was denied by the Communists.

being waged against rebel tribesmen led by Abd-el-Krim, were also affected by it. Further proof of the existence of widespread propaganda in Europe was given by events in Bulgaria.²

4.

THE Orient as well as the Occident witnessed an expansion of communist activity after 1924. The conclusion of the Soviet-Chinese treaty in that year, and the efforts of Soviet diplomacy in Mongolia have already been discussed.³ The internal situation in China had by this time become very complicated. As a matter of fact, the division of China into several parts had been apparent since the first Chinese revolution of 1911-13, Yuan Shi-kai being then in control in the North, and Sun Yat-sen in the South. Following the death of Yuan Shi-kai in 1916, the military party achieved supremacy in northern China, and several generals began a struggle for dictatorship. The Soviet Government attempted to enter into relations with two of them—Chang Tso-lin, the war lord of Manchuria, and Feng Yu-hsiang, the so-called "Christian General" who organized the military forces of Inner-Mongolia. In 1924 the Soviet Government concluded an agreement with Chang Tso-lin concerning the Chinese Eastern Railroad.⁴ In the next year, however, a difference arose between them, Chang being inclined toward friendship with Great Britain and Japan, the Soviet Government trying to enter into close relations with the nationalist movement in southern China. This movement arose at the beginning of 1925. The southern revolutionary leader, Sun Yat-sen, died at this time; but the revolutionary party organized by him under the name of the Kuomintang continued his work. A labor and peasant movement was united in it with the nationalist movement, led by intellectuals and students who were offended by the imperialistic policies of certain European powers. The Kuomintang included a strong communist wing. While Sun Yat-sen was still alive, his party had entered into close relations with the Com-

² On April 15, 1925, an attempt was made to assassinate Tsar Boris of Bulgaria, and a Bulgarian general was murdered; at his funeral the church building, where the service took place, was blown up, and more than 150 men killed. The organizers of these attempts were immediately caught, and the plan of a communist uprising in Bulgaria frustrated.

³ See above, Chap. XIX, Sec. 5.

⁴ See above, Chap. XIX, Sec. 5.

munist International in Moscow. The Soviet Government was willing to support the southern Chinese movement. During 1925 about one thousand military and political instructors were sent from Soviet Russia to China, and money followed, about \$3,000,000 being transferred through the banks of Shanghai and Canton. A prominent communist, Borodin, was appointed adviser to the Canton Nationalist Government. During the years 1925 and 1926 this Government was able to expand its sphere of control along the sea shore toward Shanghai, as well as toward the middle section of the Yangtze River. A dictatorship following the Moscow model was introduced in the areas occupied by its armies.

5.

To the extent that European statesmen realized the dangers of international communist propaganda, they felt impelled to hasten the stabilization of Europe. The Locarno Conference of October 16, 1925, was an important step toward this goal. In it Germany coöperated with France and Great Britain. A system of agreements was built up, providing for arbitration as a means of settling disputes.

Soviet diplomacy regarded the conference as an international attempt at the "isolation" of Soviet Russia, and the "formation of a united anti-Soviet front." Soviet tacticians were anxious to pierce this front, and Germany was its most vulnerable point. Although invited to take part in the Locarno Conference, Germany had not yet attained equal membership in European diplomatic society, since she had not yet been admitted into the League of Nations. It was only natural for the Soviets to attempt to enter into closer relations with Germany, who was quite ready to threaten the western Powers with the possibility of an alliance with Soviet Russia in order to hasten her admission into the League of Nations.⁵ Just before the departure of the German delegation for Locarno, Chicherin succeeded, on October 12, 1925, in concluding a trade agreement with Germany, which simultaneously granted to Soviet Russia a loan amounting to 100,000,000 marks. On April 24, 1926, several months after the Locarno

⁵ This diplomatic situation resembled that of the Genoa-Rapallo period. See above, Chap. XIX, Sec. 6.

gathering, a Soviet-German treaty was concluded in Berlin; both sides were bound to maintain friendly contact, and to remain neutral in case one of them should face armed attack by a third power.⁶ The German note, accompanying the text of the treaty, pointed out that one of its aims was to oppose anti-Soviet tendencies within the League of Nations. This treaty proved to be a skilful move on the part of Germany; it led to her admission into the League of Nations on September 7, 1926.

6.

AFTER the Locarno Conference, Soviet diplomacy intensified its attack on Great Britain. "Chamberlain believes he encircled us at Locarno"—so wrote the *Pravda*, the official organ of the Russian Communist party in Moscow. "On the contrary, we will encircle him with the masses of labor at his very home."

The labor situation in England was indeed unstable. In September, 1925, the Congress of the English Trade Unions at Scarborough, by a majority of 2,456,000 against 1,218,000, passed a radical resolution opposed in principle to peaceful methods of settling differences between labor and capital. In December of that year, Zinoviev made the following statement at the Fourteenth Congress of the Russian Communist party: "A huge movement of miners is to be expected in England before May, 1926. A real revolutionary labor movement is beginning in England." In March, 1926, Zinoviev stated that England was on the eve of social catastrophe. "If the strike really begins, it will be our first task to help it, along the European and international front of industrial war." The rupture of negotiations between the English mine owners and miners led to a general strike, which, however, soon ended in complete failure. The miners remained on strike until the autumn of 1926. During this entire period the Soviet Government supported the English strike movement both with money and propaganda. By May of that year, as much as \$1,300,000 had been transmitted to the English miners from Soviet Russia. By July, aid from Moscow had reached the amount of \$2,225,000.

⁶ This was Germany's reply to the western Powers for the affront she had received at the March session of the League of Nations, when she was not accepted as a member, although her representatives had been summoned to Geneva.

An attempt was made to bring about an understanding between the Moscow leaders and the General Council of the English Trade Unions, the Anglo-Russian Committee of the Trade Unions acting as mediator. These negotiations did not, however, lead to an agreement, the English General Council not being ready to accept the irreconcilable point of view of Moscow. The London Conference of the Minority of English Trade Unions on August 30, 1926, accepted the Moscow standpoint, it is true; but the general congress of English Trade Unions of Bournemouth in the following September rejected it by a majority of 2,416,000 votes.

7.

ONE of the results of the failure of the English strike was a change in the personnel of the central body of the Communist International. The former chairman of the International, Zinoviev, was deprived of his position. Bukharin, instead of Zinoviev, played the leading part in the plenary session of the Executive Committee of the International in Moscow at the end of 1926. Similarly, the Fifteenth Conference of the Russian Communist party, which gathered at the beginning of November, condemned Zinoviev's policy as that of a revolutionary adventurer.⁷ As a matter of fact, however, the revolutionary policy of the Communist International was not changed. Bukharin expressed the same irreconcilable views that had been held by Zinoviev. "The Communist parties are parties of revolt; the Communist International is a world-wide organization of labor, leading to revolution."

The attention of the leaders of the International was now directed toward the Orient. A friendly agreement was concluded with Turkey as early as December 17, 1925. In November of the following year, Chicherin met the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs in Odessa, and hailed Turkey as the Soviet's faithful ally against European imperialism. Moreover, an agreement with Afghanistan was made in September, 1926. But China was the principal battleground of the Communist International against European imperialism. A new offensive of the Chinese nationalist army against the northern Chinese forces began in July, 1926. In September, Hankow was taken by the Nationalists. The end of that year marked the high point of Soviet influence in China.

⁷ See below, Sec. 11.

The leaders of the Communist International tried to extend their activities from China to the Dutch East Indies, where an abortive communist uprising took place in November. A general strike broke out at Hankow at the beginning of the following January, and a boycott of foreign goods was proclaimed. Simultaneously, violent anti-British demonstrations took place. On January 4 the mob invaded the area of the British concession at Hankow. On March 22, the nationalist forces occupied Shanghai, with the exception of foreign concessions, and on the next day Nanking was taken.

The further development of the military operations of the nationalist forces was temporarily stopped by internal dissension. Differences between conservative and moderate members of the Kuomintang and its communist wing began as early as the autumn of 1926. In the following spring, these differences grew stronger, and antagonism arose between the Chinese nationalist general, Chiang Kai-shek, and the Soviet adviser, Borodin. On April 6, the Peking police, with the written permission of the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, made a raid on the Soviet Embassy at Peking. Documents seized there revealed a close connection between Soviet diplomacy and the communist wing of the Kuomintang. The dominating rôle of Borodin in relation to the Kuomintang was plainly established. The publication of these documents led to a full break between Chiang Kai-shek and Borodin, who tried to organize a purely communist government at Hankow. Before he succeeded, he was forced to leave on July 27, 1927.

The following December, the Communists aided an uprising in Canton. They succeeded in seizing the city, but after three days of fighting, they were vanquished by the nationalist forces. The communist uprising in Canton was suppressed with severity; many revolutionary leaders were executed, among them some Russians. The Chinese Nationalist Government declared all relations with the Soviet Government suspended.

8.

THE part played by the Soviets in Chinese affairs exhausted the patience of the British Government. It became quite plain from the documents seized in the Soviet Embassy at Peking,⁸ that the

⁸ See above, Sec. 7.

Soviet Government had tried to foment anti-European disturbances in China. As the nationalist movement in China was directed first of all against the British, Soviet participation in it was a violation of promises made by the Soviet Government to Great Britain as early as 1921. The British Government decided to act. During the entire year of 1926 it had gradually been preparing public opinion for the impending rupture with Soviet Russia.

On May 12, 1927, representatives of Scotland Yard made a raid upon Soviet House in London, the headquarters of Arcos, Ltd., the trading company for the Soviet coöperative societies, and of the Soviet Trade Delegation itself, without regard for its claim to diplomatic immunity. The Secretary for Home Affairs explained that a document pertaining to military secrets, which had been stolen from the Government, had been traced to these premises. The document was not found, but other papers were seized which, in the opinion of the British Government, justified the action. The Soviet Government presented a note of protest, declaring that the British authorities had violated the immunity granted to the Soviet Trade Delegation by the agreement of 1921. The whole question was discussed in the House of Commons at the end of the month. Prime Minister Baldwin laid before the House some of the documents which had been seized, and declared that they proved "the existence, under the direct control of the Soviet authorities, of a regular system whereby documents of a subversive character from various organizations in Russia were conveyed secretly to various persons engaged in Communist activities in this country and elsewhere." In other words, he wished to say that the distinction between the Soviet Government and the Communist International was merely a pretense.

On the basis of all these considerations, a rupture of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia was recommended by the Ministry, and approved by Parliament. On May 27, 1927, the British Government communicated its decision to the Soviet *chargé d'affaires* at London. On the same day Baldwin made the following announcement: "I wish to state emphatically that our rupture of diplomatic relations does not in any way mean, or imply, war against Russia." Ordinary facilities for trade between the two

countries were not disturbed. Certain employees of Arcos, Ltd., were deported from England, but others were allowed to remain and continue their work.

9.

WHILE the policy of Great Britain toward the Soviet Government was variable, the policy of the United States rested firmly on one principle—that of non-recognition. The break between Great Britain and Soviet Russia seemed an argument in favor of this attitude. However, in some financial circles in the United States the question was approached from a different point of view, and reasons were advanced for the restoration of relations with Soviet Russia. The constant growth of commerce between the two countries was pointed out as an argument in favor of change. The turnover of United States trade with Russia reached, in 1927, the amount of \$100,000,000, which was twice the prewar total.⁹

A sharp conflict arose in the autumn of 1927 between English and American business interests in regard to Soviet oil; a division was also perceptible among the American interests themselves. In July, 1927, the Standard Oil Company of New York, and the Vacuum Oil Company, another member of the Standard group, concluded agreements with the Soviet Naphtha Syndicate for purchases of oil. The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey protested against these arrangements, insisting that prior to any deals with the Soviet Government, the former owners, who had been deprived of their property rights, should receive compensation. An even stronger protest was made on similar grounds by Sir Henry Deterding, head of the Royal Dutch-Shell interests. Representatives of the Soviet Government stated that both the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and the Royal Dutch-Shell Company had tried for some time to obtain a monopoly of oil export from Russia, and that the Soviet Government would not agree to grant exclusive privileges to these firms—hence their resentment. Answering this accusation, Sir Henry Deterding acknowledged that he had negotiated with the Soviets, but asserted at the same time that he had always demanded compensation for former owners. As late as December, 1928, the problem presented by this conflict still remained unsolved.

⁹ \$48,000,000 in 1913.

10.

THE victory of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist party over the opposition on the Fourteenth Congress¹⁰ of the party was not final. The opposition tried all sorts of measures in order to increase its influence within the party. In 1926 it had built up its own organization, with its own committee and a secret printing office. In September and the beginning of October, 1926, its leaders tried to win the labor group over to its side by attacking the Central Committee before the workers of various large factories in Leningrad and Moscow. The results of these efforts were unfavorable to the opposition, however, for the workmen remained loyal to the Central Committee. Realizing their defeat, the opposition leaders on October 16 drafted a petition to the Central Committee, promising to cease the internal struggle and to work together with the party majority. Stalin, however, was not ready to accept this statement as a *bona fide* recantation, and in his addresses before the Fifteenth Conference of the party, held in October and November of 1926, subjected the opposition to merciless criticism. He formulated the following principal "sins" of the opposition: (1) Its leaders tried to tempt the Communist International to follow the path of revolutionary adventures; (2) they proposed the greatest possible burden of taxation on the peasants, thus leading to an inevitable split between the peasants and labor; (3) they aimed at a relaxation of the party dictatorship over Russia; (4) they aspired to weaken the dictatorship of the Central Committee by requiring the establishment of a "democratic régime" within the party. Stalin's conclusion was that, while the opposition leaders were trying to mask their intentions with a pretense of pure communist principles, as a matter of fact their policy was permeated with opportunism and tended toward the restoration of a middle-class régime. This point of view was accepted by the party conference and approved by the Central Committee.

The peace within the Communist party, however, was not lasting. In the summer of 1927, relations between the party majority and the opposition again became very strained. Stalin decided to inflict penalties on the opposition leaders. Pointing out that they

¹⁰ See above, Sec. 2.

were causing a split in the party, he demanded that Trotsky and Zinoviev, as the two most active leaders, be formally excluded from its rolls. This was carried out in November, 1927, before a new congress of the party.

II.

THE Fifteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist party took place in December, 1927. This Congress had great importance, not only for the internal development of the party, but also for Soviet policy concerning the whole country. This session of the Congress was the culmination of the victory of the Central Committee over the opposition. The overwhelming majority of the deputies were followers of the Central Committee. The opposition was without a leader, Trotsky having been excluded from the party. Many addresses against the opposition were delivered before the Congress by representatives of the various workers' organizations.

The Central Committee proposed the expulsion from the party of all the leaders of the opposition. A special member of the Committee, appointed to study the problem, reported that all the counter-revolutionary elements in the country were beginning to center around the opposition leaders. To quote his own words: "The opposition leaders have become open enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat." On December 18, all opposition leaders were excluded from the party.¹¹ The political rôle of the opposition leaders thus came to an end.

However, Stalin and his followers, after having crushed the opposition, included in their own program many of the opposition proposals in order to avoid charges of abandoning the principles of pure communism.

In view of these developments, the Fifteenth Congress represented not at all a "swing to the right" as was thought at first by some expert observers, but rather a swing to the left. From the economic point of view the Congress devoted most of its attention to problems of industry. The necessity for the rapid "industrializa-

¹¹ At the end of January, 1928, Trotsky was exiled to the city of Alma-Ata (formerly Vierny) in Turkestan. Kamenev and Zinoviev sought pardon from the Central Committee, expressing their willingness to abandon their opposition. In this way they escaped formal exile, and were assigned instead to obscure positions in provincial towns of Central Russia. In the summer of 1928 they were both received back into the party.

tion" of Russia was included in the party program. As regards agriculture, the previous Congress in 1925, as we have seen,¹² carried out some measures favorable to peasant economy. The Fifteenth Congress recognized the value of these measures from the economic point of view, and stated that following their adoption the area of cultivated land had been greatly increased. However, at the same time, the Congress stated that this policy had for the Soviets resulted unfavorably in the field of politics. Reference was here made to the growth of the class of richer peasants. For that reason the Congress decided to repudiate the policy of its predecessor toward the peasants. The resolution of the Fifteenth Congress asserted the necessity for a new offensive against the class of rich peasants and urged that the peasant economy be transformed more and more in accord with socialistic patterns.

The exemption of 35 per cent of the peasants from the land tax was confirmed by the Congress. This exemption was directed in favor of the class known as "the poorest peasants." Other measures approved by the Congress favored the agricultural coöperative movement, the development of the collective farming of tracts of land (*kolkhoz*), and the expansion of large state-owned farm estates (*sovkhos*).

Thus, the resolutions of the Fifteenth Congress were designed to turn agriculture from the N.E.P. back to socialist economy.

12.

TURNING to foreign policy, the Fifteenth Congress confirmed the previous lines of diplomacy by which Moscow entered into peaceful relations with *bourgeois* countries, but at the same time prepared itself for a desperate struggle with the capitalist world.

In this particular the resolution of the Fifteenth Congress was as follows:

"The Central Committee of the party must build up its foreign policy on the following fundamental lines. First, by carrying out a policy of international peace, which is nothing other than a struggle against the dangers of imperialistic wars. This policy of international peace is at the same time a fundamental condition for the development of socialism within the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics; second, by the strengthening in every way of the

¹² See above, Sec. 2.

brotherly ties between the workers of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and those of the western European countries, as well as the laboring masses of other oppressed countries; third, by the further systematic development of economic relations with the capitalist countries, provided that the economic independence of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics shall be secured; fourth, by the constant strengthening of the means of national defense and especially the power and fighting capacity of both the Workers and Peasants' Army and Navy; fifth, by the accumulation of necessary economic reserves, such as grain, goods, currency, and special reserves of defense."

The first point in this resolution brings to the foreground the Soviet proposal for disarmament set before the League of Nations in the autumn of 1927.

Before 1927 for a period of years, Soviet diplomacy pretended to ignore the League of Nations, in which the Communists saw merely an international capitalist agency. Consequently, when the Soviet Government was invited in February, 1926, to participate in the Geneva conference on disarmament, it refused, on the pretext that it had had no relations with the Swiss Government since the assassination of the Soviet envoy, Vorovsky, in Swiss territory on May 10, 1923. Later, however, the Soviet Government changed its views, and on November 1, 1927, issued a statement that it would participate in the disarmament conference. According to Rykov, the Soviet Prime Minister, "the Soviet Union was ready to propose, support and carry out the most complete program of disarmament for the whole world simultaneously." The Soviet draft as presented to the conference provided for immediate demobilization of half of all existing armed forces, corresponding destruction of arms and munitions, and cessation of all military and naval construction. Demobilization and destruction were to continue progressively for four years, leaving at the end only such forces as were needed for police and frontier guards. National navies were to be supplanted by an international maritime police. Control over the enforcement of the disarmament agreement was to be intrusted to a permanent international commission, formed on the basis of equality, with participation of the working classes.

On March 19, 1928, the Soviet delegate Litvinov delivered a long speech explaining the Soviet proposal. While the German and the Turkish delegates rather approved his ideas, the British representative, Lord Cushendun, voiced strong opposition to them. His address contained the following remarks: "There are two kinds of war, and where there are two kinds of war, there are two kinds of peace. There are international and civil wars, and of these the civil is more horrible. It is a fair question to ask whether the Soviet Government sets its face against civil war as resolutely as against international war. . . . For years past the whole basis for the Soviet world policy has been to produce armed insurrection amounting to civil war in every country where they can exercise influence. If that is so, before we proceed much further some assurance should be given to us by the Soviet that in that respect there is to be a complete change in policy. We ought to be told whether the Soviets now have decided no longer to interfere in the affairs of other nations." In his turn, Hugh S. Gibson, chairman of the delegation from the United States, also disapproved the Soviet proposal, explaining at the same time that the Government of the United States supported the idea of a multilateral compact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy.

13.

AFTER the rejection of the Soviet proposals at the Geneva conference, the views expressed by the United States delegation became the starting point for the next steps of international diplomacy. On August 27, 1928, the general Pact for the Renunciation of War was signed at Paris by the representatives of fifteen states, including the British Dominions. Soviet Russia was not invited to participate as an original signatory Power. Nor was Soviet Russia in the list of those states which later on received the note of the United States on the subject of adherence to the general Pact. The Government of the United States could not address such a note to the Government of the Soviet Union, as there were no diplomatic relations between the two states. Acting as an intermediary, France formally approached the Soviet Government on the question of adherence.

On August 31, 1928, the Soviet Government signified its ac-

ceptance of the Pact. Its adherence to the Pact, however, was not open-hearted, and the Soviet leaders were eager to assail the Pact on every occasion as a capitalist trap, designed only to deceive the laboring masses.

The real opinion of the Soviet leaders on the problem of disarmament was plainly attested at the Sixth Congress of the Communist International, held at Moscow from July 17 to August 28, 1928. This Congress assumed without question that a new world war was in preparation by the capitalist and imperialist countries. The Congress debated what tactics should be employed by the laboring masses to avert the supposedly imminent war.

According to the resolution of the Congress, labor all over the world has a threefold task in this regard. First, the proletariat of each capitalist country must struggle against its own government. Second, the proletariat of the whole world must defend the Soviet Union against the imperialism of its enemies. Third, the proletariat must promote the revolutionary movement in the colonies subject to the Great Powers.

In order to carry out the first of these tasks, the proletariat of each country must establish immediately a secret organization of workers' "cells," especially in those industries which manufacture army munitions. At the outbreak of the war this organization should adopt a "defeatist" program by vigorous propaganda and try to turn an imperialistic war between states into a class war of the proletariat against the middle class within each state. A special resolution was carried out by the Congress in regard to the "revolutionary movement in colonial and semicolonial countries."

The immediate task of the Communist International, according to the resolution, is to build up and develop Communist parties in those colonial and semicolonial countries.

Special attention was paid to the relations between the United States and Latin America. The Congress voiced the opinion that these relations were becoming strained owing to fear of North American imperialism in the Latin countries to the south. A special section of the resolution called for the consolidation of all the Communist parties of Latin America into one united organization and urged active coöperation with the proletariat of the United States.

Besides the problem of colonial countries the resolution emphasized the importance of communist propaganda among negroes, and especially among negroes in the United States. Another section of the resolution recommended that Communists should explain to negro workmen and farmers that the Communist party is the only party which can solve the negro problem and secure the emancipation of the negroes from the "barbaric yoke" of the capitalism of the white man.

CONCLUSION

THE eleventh anniversary of the Soviet state was celebrated on November 7, 1928. Eight years had elapsed since the end of the civil war in Russia. However, the position of the Soviet state can hardly be considered normal. On the contrary, it is quite obviously facing a new crisis.

The Soviet Government admittedly has been unable to solve its complicated economic problems. The most serious of these arises from the fact that production, both industrial and agricultural, is not able to keep pace with the demands of the constantly growing population. To quote *Economic Life*, the leading Soviet economic daily newspaper, "there is a disproportion between production and consumption."

Although, as we have seen,¹ the volume of production of Russian industry has reached the prewar level, its further development is now seriously handicapped by the fact that the production of cast iron lags behind the general growth of industry. According to the data presented to the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist party, the production of cast iron at the end of 1927 was only 71 per cent of the prewar figure. The situation lately has been but slightly improved. That is why a "cast-iron famine" is now one of the most serious problems of Russian industry. Further, the costs of industrial production in general are still very high, resulting in greatly advanced prices. The average index of the wholesale prices of industrial products for October 1, 1928, was 187 as compared with 100 in 1913.

The Soviet Government has not been disposed to acknowledge that its own principles have been responsible for many of the current deficiencies of the industrial system. On the contrary, the Soviet leaders have looked to other causes for the explanation, notably to some individual malefactors among the real or supposed enemies of the *régime*.

Thus, the Soviet Government put on trial some of the engineers

¹ See above, Chap. XVII, Sec. 6.

of the coal mines of the Donets Basin in South Russia in the spring of 1928. These engineers were charged with sabotage intended to obstruct the mining of coal.

During the trial it developed that some of the accused had been guilty of mismanagement and inefficiency, but this guilt did not involve any organized movement to overthrow the Soviet economic order. Nevertheless, on July 5, 1928, eleven of the accused were sentenced to death by the court; five were executed, and the death penalty was commuted to ten years' imprisonment for the remaining six sentenced men.

The results of the trial were contrary to the expectations of the Soviet Government. Instead of an increase, an actual decrease in production followed, and this has been the case, not only in the coal mines, but in many factories generally. This decrease in industrial production was the result of the fact that the labor discipline declined after the Donets Basin trial. Many workers became increasingly critical of the factory management on the pretext that the engineers were sabotaging against the Government. On the other hand, many engineers were terrorized by the trial and chose to abstain from giving orders which might be useful to the factory but disagreeable to workmen.

If the condition of Russian industry is still abnormal, the position of agriculture is worse. Because of the low price of grain fixed by the Government, the peasants turned to other crops and to animal husbandry and dairying. The peasants are reluctant to sell grain to the Government, even when they are well supplied, and prefer to turn the grain illicitly into spirits.

The shortage of grain appears in the reports of Russian foreign trade. During the first eleven months of the fiscal year 1926-27, 2,507,000 tons of grain, worth about \$112,000,000, were exported from Russia across the European frontiers. For the same period in 1927-28 only 544,000 tons, worth about \$25,000,000, were exported.²

During the spring of 1928, the Soviet Government applied

² The Soviet Government seeks to replace grain by other agricultural products for exports, such as butter, eggs, and meat. The amount of the exported agricultural products other than grain was about \$115,000,000 for the first eleven months of the fiscal year 1926-27 and about \$153,500,000 for the corresponding period in 1927-28.

compulsory methods to the collection of grain from the "rich peasants." These methods provoked great irritation among the peasants toward the authorities.

The Government is planning now to build up new large state-owned farms run by the most modern machinery, in order to become economically independent of the peasants. About fifteen million acres of land are designated to be turned over to those state-owned farms or governmental "grain factories," chiefly in the Volga basin, the Northern Caucasus, Siberia, and Kazakistan. Whether these far-reaching plans can be realized in the future is still a problem. At all events, they will not afford the Soviet Government any immediate relief.

It seems that the only way in which the Soviet Government at the present time might manage to settle its difficulties would be to carry out certain *bourgeois* reforms in the Russian economic system.

This way, however, was barred by the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist party in November, 1928. The Committee repudiated the proposals of reform, the authors of these proposals being referred to as the "Right Opposition" and threatened with the same fate as the "Left Opposition" suffered the year before.

Instead of getting money by internal economic reforms, the Soviet Government hopes now to secure funds from abroad in the form of loans or payments for various concessions. A policy of speedy development and multiplication of these concessions was proclaimed in Moscow in the autumn of 1928.

However, it is doubtful whether the Soviet Government can raise the necessary amount of money from abroad. Its financial needs are by no means inconsiderable. Its expenditures have been increasing in recent years, reaching \$2,500,000,000 in the state budget for the fiscal year 1925-26 and exceeding \$3,500,000,000 in 1927-28.

The subsidies to industry which form the main item in the budget have been increasing also. As much as \$371,000,000 was expended on the new building and equipment programs in the large industrial plants during the year 1925-26. The amount increased to \$650,000,000 in 1927-28. The economic plan of the Soviet Gov-

ernment requires not less than \$10,000,000,000 for financing its industries during the next five years. The domestic loans provided for in the Soviet economic system can supply but a small part of this necessary total.

Meanwhile, failure to obtain this money will be a serious drawback to Russian industry. Industrial production cannot fall behind the demands of the population without serious complications for the Government, notably in its dealings with the peasants. The Government must exchange manufactured articles for agricultural products. An insufficient supply of manufactured wares means smaller returns of grain, decreased revenues, and still more meager resources for the operation of the state-controlled industries. Thus, the seriousness of the present situation in Russia cannot be denied. The Soviet Government can postpone the ultimate solution for some time, but it might then come too late, in the event of some such catastrophe as the famine of 1921-22.

APPENDIX I.

I.

The Condition of Learning and Education in Soviet Russia.

THE communist revolution deeply affected learning and education in Russia. During the civil war and "war communism" (1917-21), the general breakdown of life could not fail to react disastrously upon education in a negative way. One of the most serious factors was the dying off of teachers and men of learning, who had to live for several years in a condition of semistarvation. During these years in Soviet Russia several of the most famous Russian men of learning died of sheer hunger. Many others were supported by the A.R.A. and other foreign charitable organizations. Following the N.E.P., the condition of the intellectuals in general, and of teachers and men of learning in particular, was considerably improved.

The organization both of scientific institutions and of public education was greatly changed by the Soviet Government. The whole process of education was given a political tint. The schools, according to the views of Soviet leaders, must serve, or at any rate must not contradict the ideals of communism and materialism. The whole of education, and particularly the teaching of social and historical sciences, is taken under governmental control. Many men of learning who cannot agree with the theory of historic materialism, are deprived of the right to teach, or have been exiled abroad.

In Moscow several purely Marxian centers of learning have been formed, among them the "Institute of Marx and Engels" in 1920, and "The Communist Academy" in 1918. Of the old institutions of learning, the Academy of Science in Leningrad has been most successful in carrying on and even expanding its activity. Its name was changed in 1925 to the "All-Union Academy of Science." In Kiev a Ukrainian Academy of Science was formed in 1918 during the rule of Hetman Skoropadsky.

The universities have greatly changed in character. Their au-

tonomy was revoked by the Soviet Government and they have been handed over to the management of communist officials. The faculties of law, history, and philology have been reorganized and their programs considerably narrowed. New faculties for the benefit of workers have been introduced (*Rabfak*). Moreover, the students of "proletarian origin" have been given special privileges in entering the universities. Individuals of *bourgeois* origin and the children of the clergy, are subjected to restrictions or completely refused admission to the universities. The number of students in the institutions of higher education is 168,000. The secondary and primary schools are two branches of a single system. The number of pupils is only slightly more than before the war. In 1925-26, the number of students in the primary schools was eight million instead of seven million in 1913.

In December, 1927, Lunacharsky, the Soviet Commissar for Education, stated during the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist party that only the prewar level had been reached by the Soviets in the matter of primary education. Lunacharsky stated also that about 25 per cent of the children eager to learn are refused admission owing to the lack of schools in Russia. According to Lunacharsky, the percentage of new schools opened annually since 1925-26 has shown a steady decline and he expressed the fear that the opening of new schools might cease altogether by 1928.

A considerable development under the Soviet *régime* has been noted in adult education for the suppression of illiteracy. In 1925-26 there were about 50,000 schools for adult illiterates with 1,600,000 pupils.¹ Nevertheless, adult illiteracy has not yet been suppressed in Russia. It was the plan of the Soviet leaders to celebrate their tenth anniversary by the complete conquest of illiteracy, but the plan proved to be a failure. The figures for December, 1927, showed 43 per cent of illiteracy among the men and 65 per cent among the women of Russia.

The teaching of any religion is prohibited in all schools of Soviet Russia.

2.

The Church in Soviet Russia.

By the decree of January 23, 1918, the Soviet Government sepa-

¹ Such schools existed prior to the war, but almost exclusively in the cities.

rated the church and the state. The decree permitted each citizen to belong to any church or to none at all. The activity of church organizations, however, was greatly hampered by the fact that they were not recognized as juridical persons or permitted to own property. All church buildings are regarded as the property of the local Soviets which can, but need not, grant them to the use of religious groups. There is, moreover, a considerable difference between the letter of the law and the actual practice. The Communist party is opposed to religion and to the church on grounds of principle. The opposition to religion was directed chiefly against the Orthodox church because the revolutionary government saw in this church an institution of the former government. As a matter of fact, the Orthodox church, as we have seen, had been suffering under the Imperial Government from lack of freedom and independence although, on the other hand, it was in a privileged position compared with other churches.

Following the Revolution of 1917, a *Sobor* of the Russian Orthodox church was called. This *Sobor* recognized the necessity of re-establishing the patriarchate which had been abolished by Peter the Great, and thus regaining the former independence of the church with respect to the state. Several days after the Bolshevik Revolution in November, 1917, the *Sobor* elected Archbishop Tikhon patriarch. The new patriarch had to work under the most trying conditions. While the Government did not formally forbid religious life, persecution was commenced by many local Soviets against representatives of the clergy. In the course of the years 1917-20, more than a thousand bishops, priests, and monks were either shot or put to death by imprisonment and hunger. Patriarch Tikhon was not touched by the Soviet Government at this time, although he published, on January 19, 1918, a severe denunciation of its measures.

In the spring of 1922, the Soviet Government issued a decree authorizing the requisition of church treasures, with the excuse that they were to be used for famine relief work. The seizure of church treasures was connected with a new wave of persecution. Several hundred priests were arrested and many were shot, among them the Bishop of Petrograd, Veniamin. Patriarch Tikhon was incarcerated in one of the Moscow monasteries.

Simultaneously, the Soviet Government attempted to introduce internal disorganization into the Orthodox church, by supporting a group of priests who urged radical reforms in the organization of the church. In the spring of 1923, this group called a meeting of the representatives of part of the Orthodox clergy and laity, which declared itself to be a legal *Sobor* of the Orthodox church.² This *Sobor* accused Patriarch Tikhon of counter-revolutionary ideas and deprived him of his position. He was, however, soon released by the Soviet Government. The majority of the church members continued to regard him as patriarch until his death, April 7, 1925.

Following the death of Patriarch Tikhon, his *locum tenens*, Metropolitan Peter, became the head of the church. The latter was also imprisoned by the Soviet Government, and the keeper of the Patriarchal Throne became Metropolitan Serge, who, in the summer of 1927, concluded an agreement with the Soviet Government and announced his loyalty to the Soviet state.

What the further relations between the Orthodox church and the Soviet Government will be is impossible to predict. At the present time it is only possible to say the Orthodox church has shown itself more vital than the imperial *régime* in Russia.

² The "second *Sobor*," the first being the one that took place in 1917-18.

APPENDIX II.

Russian Refugees Abroad.

THE communist revolution and civil war in Russia were accompanied by the emigration of an enormous number of Russian citizens. Almost all the surviving officials of the anti-Bolshevik governments, as well as the officers and soldiers of the anti-Bolshevik armies, emigrated with their families. The total number of emigrants in various countries reached one million. They are distributed in fifty different nations. The greatest number, over four hundred thousand, live in France. Next comes Germany with one hundred and fifty thousand; Poland, ninety thousand;¹ China, eighty thousand; Yugoslavia, thirty-five thousand; Czechoslovakia, thirty thousand; Bulgaria, twenty-five thousand.

A considerable proportion of the Russian refugees belong to the intellectuals and the higher classes of society. There are also several tens of thousands of Cossacks. Almost all of them lost all their property in Russia and find themselves abroad without any means. As a considerable percentage of the Russian refugees are not capable of work, being war invalids, aged, or sick, the situation of the majority of them is very precarious. Most of the Russian refugees, including the intellectuals, earn their living by manual labor in factories or mines, or on farms. The average wage of the Russian laborer varies in different countries according to local conditions. In France, where the majority of Russians find their work, the average earnings are about \$30 per month. Very few have succeeded in securing occupations in line with their previous training.

The governments of several European countries, particularly the Slavonic states, have assisted the Russian refugees in educational matters. Thanks to this aid, about twenty-two thousand have com-

¹ This figure includes only Russian refugees and not all Russians in Poland. There are about four million Russians in Poland, in view of the annexation by Poland of part of Russian territory.

pleted their higher education abroad. The Government of Czechoslovakia also gave scholarships to a number of Russian men of learning who found refuge in that country.²

Russian professors abroad have organized several universities for Russian students—schools of law in Prague and Harbin, an Agricultural-Coöperative Institute in Prague. The remnants of the Russian Zemstvo and Town Committees, utilizing the means left in the Russian Embassies abroad and charitable contributions from the United States, have organized a series of schools and gymnasia (high schools) for the children of Russian emigrants. In 1926-27 the Zemstvo and Town Committees were maintaining eighty schools in European states, with 4,023 pupils.

Russian refugees are in a position of complete legal helplessness. They do not possess ordinary passports and are therefore deprived of freedom of movement. Many countries refuse them entrance. In 1921 the League of Nations undertook the care of the Russian refugees and appointed Dr. Nansen as Special Commissioner. The International Labor Office at Geneva has also taken an interest in the refugees. The problems of the material relief and settlement of the Russian refugees, as well as of their legal status, have not yet been solved.

² The governments of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria invited many Russian refugee professors to take positions in Yugoslav and Bulgarian universities.

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(Up to 1914)

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THE PRE-MONGOLIAN PERIOD

972-1238

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Measures of length

1 *verst* = 0.6629 mile

Square measures

1 *desiatin* = 2.7 acres

Weights

1 *dolya* = 0.68576 grain

1 *pud* = 36.1127 avoirdupois pounds

Capacity measure

1 quarter (<i>chetvert</i>) =	5.77	imperial bushels
	5.95	American bushels
1 <i>vedro</i> =	2.7	imperial gallons
	3.249	American gallons

The metric system has been introduced by the Soviet Government.

Russian currency values

1 *ruble* = 100 *kopeks* = \$0.515

1 *chervonets* = 10 rubles

1 American dollar = 1.94 rubles

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